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This pamphlet implements AFD 31-1, *Physical Security*, AFI 31-101, *The Installation Security Program* and AMC Pamphlet 31-3, *The Installation Security Constable Handbook*. It establishes procedures for developing and organizing Phase I training standards. It establishes and describes the restricted areas located within the boundaries of Travis AFB and further describes procedures for granting authorized entry into such areas. It applies to all personnel requiring access to Travis AFB restricted areas. This pamphlet is directive in nature.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

It adds Paragraph 5 photography and video taping of the restricted areas and flight line. It adds the word exit to the proper way to utilize an entry control point for a restricted area in paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2. and 6.2. It updates terminology from Security Response Team to Security Forces and priority resource to Protection Level (PL) 1, 2, and 3 resources in paragraph 3.3. It changes the name Mobile Area Reconnaissance Center to the Mobile Air Reporting Center in paragraph 4.2.5. It updates terminology and adds an alternative way of displaying the Restricted Area Badge (RAB) during engine run or engine start-up procedures in paragraph 4.3. It adds examples of mutilated RAB's in paragraph 4.3.4. It adds the relinquishing of escort authority of escorted individuals to another authorized individual in paragraph 4.3.5. It adds paragraph 5, Photography and Video Taping of Restricted Areas/Fightline. It adds verbally escorting violators out of restricted areas in paragraph 6.4.2. It updates terminology on not using physical means to detain violators inside PL 3 restricted areas and how to detain violators inside the Navy TACAMO (PL 1) in paragraph 6.4.3. It updates terminology from Terrorist Threat Conditions to Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) in paragraph 7. It revises the wording on when FPCON are implemented by higher headquarters in paragraph 7.2. It adds the implementation of FPCON by installation commanders in paragraph 7.2.1. It adds increased security measures in paragraph 7.2.2. It adds paragraph 8, Duress Words. It adds paragraph 11, important numbers to know. Realigns the pamphlet layout for easier comprehension of key terminology. A “|” indicates revised material since the last edition.

1. Requirements.

1.1. Personnel requiring unescorted entry into a restricted area will be provided Phase I Security Education by their assigned security manager. Phase I training must include a review of the 60 AMW Installation Security Plan 31-99, methods for contacting the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC); restricted area entry control procedures, including verification of the right and need to be in a restricted area; responsibilities and duties of a visitor escort; and tricks and ruses that may be used to gain unauthorized entry to restricted areas.

2. Security Protection Levels.

2.1. **Protection Level 1 (PL 1)** : Highest priority. Applies to weapons systems on alert status for direct enemy engagement, all nuclear weapons in the US Air Force arsenal, and components of tactical command/control/warning facilities (examples: Alert Status Navy TACAMO Aircraft, Air Force One).

2.2. **Protection Level 2 (PL 2)** : Second highest priority. Applies to the major components of weapons systems that are not on alert status but are on bases and sites from which they could be launched for direct strikes against or engagement with the enemy. Certain aircraft support facilities area also PL2. (Examples: E-3A AWACS, Alternate Tanker Airlift Control Center, when activated).

2.3. **Protection Level 3 (PL 3)** : Third highest priority. Applies to combat aircraft and missiles that cannot be considered in place forces by virtue of their present location. It also applies to logistic, air commando, reconnaissance, and aircraft designated for direct support of engaged combat forces or required to sustain operations in general limited war (examples: C-5, KC-10, C-17, Non Alert Status Navy TACAMO aircraft, Travis Command Post, Alternate Travis Command Post, when activated).

2.4. **Protection Level 4 (PL 4)** : Lowest priority. Areas not meeting the above PL criteria but require additional security measures. All Controlled Areas on Travis AFB. (For example: SFCC).

3. Security Terms and Definitions.

3.1. **Restricted Area** : A legally established military zone under United States Air Force jurisdiction into which persons may not enter without specific authorization. This authorization comes from the Installation Commander. Restricted areas contain operational resources such as the Command Post, Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 aircraft, or missile systems. The use of deadly force in these areas is authorized for Security Forces personnel.

3.1.1. Restricted area boundaries are identified by raised barriers or a 4-6 inch red stripe painted on the concrete and restricted area signs posted every 100 feet. If a building or room is a restricted area, all doors will be marked with restricted area signs.

3.1.2. You may only enter/exit restricted areas via established entry control points which are marked by a 4-6 inch white stripe painted onto the concrete and signs denoting that area as a valid entry control point.

3.2. **HELPING HAND** . Term used to report an unusual incident, **possibly hostile**, affecting a Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resource. Examples include an incident in which an individual enters/exits a restricted area at a point other than an established entry control point, or discovering an individual inside the restricted area without a restricted area badge and not under proper escort.

3.3. **COVERED WAGON** . Initially, this is an unclassified telephonic report sent up the chain of command. It shows that a condition exists, or an event has occurred at a base in connection with Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources as the result of **actual** or **probable hostile actions**. A Covered Wagon report could result from an upgrading of a HELPING HAND based on an investigation by Security Forces. It can also result when an event is serious enough to immediately suspect enemy action. Examples include an unauthorized individual tampering with an aircraft or an individual on the flightline with the intent of causing some type of harm to a Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resource.

4. Restricted Area Badge (RAB).

4.1. The AF Form 1199, **USAF Restricted Area Badge (RAB)** serves as an official document issued to a person who has been granted unescorted entry authority into a restricted area. Travis AFB currently uses the AF Form 1199 CG, **Computer Generated**.

4.2. There are currently three number designations that may be open on a Travis AFB RAB for permanent restricted areas, one number designation for temporary restricted areas when it is activated, and one number designation for an off site restricted area when it is activated.

4.2.1. **Area #1** - 60 AMW Command Post (Travis Command Post).

4.2.2. **Area #4** - 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 900 Ramps and H-13/14 when aircraft are present. Number 4 open on the RAB is an Air Mobility Command wide designator. This means if you are TDY to another AMC base, or someone is here TDY from an AMC base, unescorted entry authority is granted into AMC ramp for official use in conjunction with official military orders if supported by a copy of crew orders or individual TDY orders.

4.2.3. **Area #11** - Navy TACAMO Alert Area.

4.2.4. **Area #12** - Alternate Tanker Airlift Control Center (when activated).

4.2.5. **Area #20** - Mobile Air Reporting Center (off site when activated).

4.3. **Wear of the RAB** : The RAB will be worn above the waist of your outermost garment and be in plain view when inside a restricted area. If directly involved **with engine start-up or engine run procedures**, the RAB may be stowed in such a manner as to not create a safety hazard, but must be properly displayed immediately upon termination of the event. If possible your RAB should be placed in a protective clear armband and display on the arm (in plain view) when involved in engine start up or engine run procedures.

4.3.1. Ensure the RAB is properly stowed in a buttoned or zippered pocket upon departing the restricted area.

4.3.2. If the bearer is asked to surrender their RAB for inspection by a flightline worker with a valid RAB or a Security Force member they will do so without fail.

4.3.3. It is the bearer's responsibility to ensure that not only themselves, but also others around them are properly displaying their RABs.

4.3.4. If a RAB is lost, stolen, mutilated (examples: lamination coming off, access to picture, information hard to read, in general bad repair, etc), or does not match the information on the bearer's DD Form 2, **Geneva Conventions Identification Card**, the bearer must contact their unit security manager immediately to accomplish the proper actions to get a new RAB.

4.3.4.1. The bearer must account for their RAB at all times.

4.3.4.2. The bearer may not rely on another individual to escort them into or around the restricted area if they are not in possession of their RAB. Escorting procedures are set up for personnel who may have a limited access to the areas, not personnel who fail to secure their RAB.

4.3.5. **Visitor escort.** All individuals issued unescorted entry authority to Area 4 (PL 3 area) are authorized to escort individuals into the restricted area. The person providing the escort must have the escorted individual within sight at all times. The individual escorting is accountable for the escorted individual's actions while in the restricted area. The individual escorting may relinquish escort authority of the escorted individual to another individual who is issued unescorted entry authority. That individual will then be accountable for the escorted individual's actions, and must have the individual in sight at all times.

4.3.5.1. For unofficial tours (friends, family, relatives) you must contact the SFCC for current procedures, and permission.

5. Photography and Video Taping of Restricted Areas/Flight Line.

5.1. Official photography is permitted with prior notification to the Travis Command Post (TCP) who will notify the SFCC. (Exceptions: Policies may change during heightened security or Force Protection Conditions.)

5.1.1. Unofficial photography is permitted via a coordination letter through 60 AMW/PA, TCP, 60 OSS and 60 SFS/SFOS. (Exceptions: policies may change during heightened security or Force Protection Conditions.) **A copy of this letter must be with the individual taking photos.** Security Forces will also maintain a copy of this letter.

5.1.2. The letter will be in standard Air Force memorandum format and will include dates/times the photography is requested and what will be photographed.

5.1.3. If an individual is seen taking photographs or video taping the restricted areas or flight line area, make contact with the individual and notify a Security Forces patrol or the SFCC for verification that the individual is authorized.

6. Helping Hand/Covered Wagon Reporting Procedures.

6.1. RAB's must be displayed in accordance with paragraph 4.3.

6.1.1. If the individual has a RAB, but is not recognized as a co-worker, they should be checked further by asking questions about the RAB, why they are in the area, where they work, and may even be asked for other credentials to verify the information on their RAB.

6.2. **Detection:** All personnel inside the restricted area must look for abnormal conditions on or around equipment they work with, such as: cut wires, fuel leakage, missing batteries, and boxes or containers left unattended near equipment. Individuals entering/exiting through unauthorized entry points to a restricted area could be attempting to cause serious damage to valuable resources.

6.3. **Sound the Alarm:**

6.3.1. **Manual HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON Reporting Signals:**

6.3.1.1. **Daylight Hours** – personnel will wave their headgear or hand over their head in a circular motion and shout, “HELPING HAND or COVERED WAGON,” as applicable.

6.3.1.2. **Hours of darkness** – personnel will wave a flashlight in a circular motion and shout, “HELPING HAND” or “COVERED WAGON,” as applicable.

6.3.2. Individuals hearing a HELPING HAND alarm should temporarily drop what they are doing, safety permitting, to assist.

6.3.3. One individual should then run to the nearest telephone or radio equipped vehicle, and report the incident and location to the SFCC. **Important numbers to know to contact the Security Forces are located in Chapter 11 of this pamphlet.**

6.3.4. If Security Forces is in the area and readily available, they should be notified immediately.

6.4. **Detain and keep the violator at a disadvantage:** Use voice commands to halt the violator and keep them in place.

6.4.1. Keep their hands above their head, feet spread, to ensure the safety of you and others. If on the flight line turn the violator away from the resources.

6.4.2. Verbally escort the violator out of the restricted area, if possible.

6.4.3. **Under no circumstances will physical means be used to detain violators inside the PL3 aircraft parking areas or TCP** (Exception: Individuals **not in possession of a RAB** within the **TACAMO (PL1) aircraft parking area** must be physically detained, and removed from the area.) If the violator fails to heed a challenge or departs the vicinity, keep them under observation until they can no longer be seen.

6.4.4. Relay all pertinent information to Security Forces.

7. Force Protection Conditions.

7.1. Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) are implemented when a threat based on current intelligence or circumstances indicate that a period of increased threat exists toward base resources, facilities, or personnel.

7.2. When **advised** by higher headquarters (example: HQ USAF, or HQ AMC), the installation commander **may** implement a FPCON tailored to the local threat. If higher headquarters **directs** a specific FPCON that FPCON **must** be implemented.

7.2.1. The installation commander may also implement a FPCON without being advised or directed by higher headquarters when a local threat is known or a hostile situation has occurred. The FPCON change **must** be reported to higher headquarters.

7.2.2. A FPCON will remain in effect until the increased threat ends. Increased security measures implemented by a FPCON could hinder the mission of the base while in effect. If a FPCON remains in effect for a sustained period of time some security measures may be altered.

7.3. Force Protection Conditions are separated into the following categories:

7.3.1. **FPCON Normal** : Normal Security Operations.

7.3.2. **FPCON Alpha** : Declared as a general warning of possible terrorist activity of which the nature and extent are unpredictable.

7.3.3. **FPCON Bravo** : Declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

7.3.4. **FPCON Charlie** : Declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

7.3.5. **FPCON Delta** : Declared in the immediate area where a terrorist act has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely.

| 8. Duress Words.

8.1. Duress words are established and used in maintaining the integrity of restricted areas. A duress word is a word or words used during normal conversation to indicate duress. (Example: An individual with a weapon gets into a vehicle with you, and tells you to drive into a restricted area or they will harm you. If you are approached by another co-worker, flightline worker, or Security Forces you can use the duress word in a conversation to let them know you are under duress.)

8.2. Personnel with unescorted entry authority into PL 1, 2, and 3 restricted areas must know the current duress words.

8.3. Your Unit Security Manager will let you know what the current duress words are. Protect the duress words by revealing it only to those who need to know it.

8.3.1. Duress words are changed every 6 months or when compromise is suspected.

8.4. All AMC installations will have a primary (to be used in a real duress situation), alternate (to be used if the primary has been compromised), and exercise duress word (to be used in exercises).

9. Tricks and Ruses that Might be used to Gain Unauthorized Entry into a Restricted Area.

9.1. One method to gain unauthorized entry is simply walking into the restricted area, hoping no one will question a need to be in the area.

9.2. Another method is the use of a bogus RAB. Examples are homemade RAB's, and altered lost or stolen RAB's.

9.3. After being stopped without a RAB, unauthorized personnel may state they have lost their RAB or simply forgot it. If this happens, try to detain the individual and have a Security Forces member respond to confirm if they are authorized.

10. Summary.

10.1. One factor will enable our base to oppose an unfolding wide spread enemy clandestine operation with maximum possible preparedness. That one factor is SPEED, speed in which required reports are initiated at base level, and in which such reports are flashed to and analyzed by higher headquarters. Remember, any circumstances delaying the receipt of HELPING HAND and COVERED WAGON reports will lessen the possibility of timely reaction to the opening phase of a widespread coordinated enemy attack.

10.2. Your physical and mental capabilities will be tasked to the utmost if no other personnel are available to assist you. The obligation of detaining an unauthorized person and promptly reporting the incident may well be beyond your capability. It may require the accomplishment of one attack at the expense of the other. In such instances, you must evaluate comparative physical superiority of the sus-

pect, weapons in the suspect's possession and the extent of damage that could be inflicted on our sensitive resources. These considerations must be compared against the time it will take you to report the incident to the SFCC and receive assistance from the Security Forces. If at all possible, accomplish these tasks simultaneously. If they are obviously beyond your capability, report the incident to the SFCC as rapidly as possible. In reporting the incident by telephone or radio speak in a clear voice and remain calm. Don't omit the what and where of the report. These two factors are required for Security Forces dispatching the help you need.

10.3. Return to the area where the suspect was last seen. Attempt to relocate the suspect and keep them under observation. Watch for and attract the attention of the Security Forces so they will arrive at the earliest possible moment. Immediately report the incident and any other pertinent information you have to the Security Force person that remains with the vehicle. The information you provide is the basis for the necessary counter actions.

10.4. Our combat capability can be placed in unnecessary jeopardy if we fail to carry out our individual security responsibilities. Examples of these responsibilities include detecting and reporting hostile or possible hostile events and detaining unauthorized persons. If these actions are not within your capability, keep the intruders under surveillance and notify Security Forces.

10.5. Security is placed squarely on our shoulders. An alert command of dedicated personnel is the most dangerous situation the enemy can enter. You are contributing to our national survival by guaranteeing the ground protection of our general war resources.

10.6. Security of our priority resources is not only the responsibility of the Security Forces; it is everyone's responsibility. You are the eyes and ears of Travis AFB.

11. Important Numbers to know.

EMERGINCIAS	911
SECURITY FORCES CONTROL CENTER (SFCC)	424-3293/3297
424-2800/2227	
TERRORIST/CRIMESTOP HOTLINE	424-2000
HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON HOTLINE	424-3200
INSTALLATION SECURITY CONSTABLE	424-7657
NCOIC, PHYSICAL SECURITY	424-1199

12. Forms Adopted. AF Form 1199, AF Form 1199 CG, and DD Form 2.

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Director of Wing Staff

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

1. AFPD 31-1, *Physical Security*
2. AFI 31-101, *The Installation Security Program*
3. AMCP 31-101, *Installation Security Constable Handbook*
4. 31-99, *Travis AFB Installation Security Plan*
5. Travis AFB Instruction 31-101, *Travis AFB Installation Security Program*