



**THE AIR FORCE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE  
PROTECTION (AT/FP) PROGRAM  
STANDARDS**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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**AFI 31-210, 1 August 1999, and AMC Sup 1, 1 June 2000, are supplemented as follows.** This publication establishes requirements for program management at installation and unit/agency levels. It applies to all host/tenant units and agencies on Travis Air Force Base, California. Send recommended changes to this publication to 60 SFS/SFOSA, 510 Airlift Drive, Room 112, Travis AFB CA 94535-2446.

**1. The Travis AFB Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.** The Travis AFB AT/FP program enhances Department of Defense (DoD), United States Air Force (USAF), and Air Mobility Command (AMC) programs, designed to deter or blunt terrorist attacks against personnel and resources. The program gives guidance on collecting and disseminating threat information, training all personnel, developing comprehensive plans, allocating funds, and implementing defensive measures.

1.7. The Travis AFB Installation Security Council (ISC) is the AT/FP decision-making body to fully integrate and coordinate AT/FP actions. The installation vice commander (60 AMW/CV) chairs the council. The ISC will review installation-wide AT/FP programs and provide recommendations to the 60 AMW/CV for approval/disapproval. The ISC meets semi-annually, or as directed by the chair. Minutes from ISC meetings are forwarded to the installation commander (60 AMW/CC) for review.

3.1.1. 60 AMW/CC is responsible for implementation of DoD, USAF, and AMC AT/FP policies on Travis AFB.

3.1.1.1. The Installation Chief, Security Forces (ICSF) is the primary advisor to the installation commander on AT/FP matters, and serves as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) and executive agent for AT/FP matters and policy on Travis AFB. The 60 AMW Force Protection Working Group (FPWG) is the principal advisory body to the ISC for AT/FP matters. This group will focus on AT/FP policy, countermeasures, and resource management in response to the assessed terrorist threat. The ICSF chairs the FPWG. The FPWG will meet on a quarterly basis, or as directed by the chair. Membership will be composed of representatives from Security Forces (Operations, Installation Security, Antiterrorism/Force Protection), Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Intelligence, Judge Advocate, Operations (Airfield

Operations), Civil Engineering (Structures, Infrastructure/Utilities, Readiness, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fire Protection), Communications, Comptroller, and Medical (Medical Response, Medical Readiness). Other functional experts may attend FPWG meetings and provide advice as needed. Commanders will appoint, in writing, primary and alternate members to the FPWG. Functional representatives to the FPWG should be responsible, possess a broad knowledge base, and be experienced in their functional areas to provide advice to the members of the ISC and recommend actions for installation-level AT/FP policies and programs. Once the primary and alternate FPWG members have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter, containing the names, SSANs, security clearances, duty phone numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Installation AT/FP NCO, 60 SFS/SFOA.

3.1.1.2. (Added) The 60 AMW Threat Working Group (TWG) convenes when threat information is received that could affect Travis AFB personnel and/or assets, and provides recommendations based on the local threat situation as to what THREATCON or AT/FP posture the installation should assume. Core members of the TWG include the ICSF, 60 OSS/IN, and AFOSI Det 303/CC. Other functional experts may attend FPWG meetings and provide advice as needed. Core members will immediately convene the TWG to review and make recommendations when threat information is received that may affect Travis AFB personnel and resources, or when directed by the 60 AMW/CC.

3.1.2. The ICSF will:

3.1.2.1. Draft and coordinate AT/FP matters and policy with the FPWG and appropriate functional experts for ISC review.

3.1.2.2. Develop guidance on AT/FP and physical security enhancements.

3.1.2.3. Coordinate reviews of AT/FP plans.

3.1.2.4. Provide core members to the ISC, the FPWG, and the TWG as required.

3.1.2.5. Provide a fully qualified physical security specialist to support Travis AFB vulnerability assessments.

3.1.2.6. Coordinate funding submissions for AT/FP initiatives with the FPWG and functional experts for ISC review.

3.1.2.7. Evaluate antiterrorism equipment and supplies in conjunction with other force protection functional areas.

3.1.3. 60 MDG/CC will:

3.1.3.1. Set medical support requirements for antiterrorism planning and for personal force health protection.

3.1.3.2. Provide guidance for mass casualty situations.

3.1.3.3. Assist 60 AMW/XP with the development of plans for safe handling of chemical, biological, radiological incidents.

3.1.3.4. Provide core members to the ISC and the FPWG, as required.

3.1.3.5. Provide a fully qualified medical readiness specialist to support Travis AFB vulnerability assessments.

3.1.7. 60 AMW/JA will provide core members to the ISC and the FPWG as required.

3.1.8. AFOSI Det 303 provides antiterrorism training, counterintelligence and terrorism investigations; threat information collection, analysis, and assessment; specialized protective services; and local threat assessments and briefings. AFOSI Det 303 also provides counterintelligence expertise and threat analysis to the ISC and the FPWG, and special investigative assistance to support Travis AFB vulnerability assessments.

3.1.9. 60 LG/CC will provide core members to the ISC and FPWG to provide logistical expertise as required.

3.1.10. 60 SPTG/CE will:

3.1.10.1. Provide core members to the ISC and the FPWG to provide civil engineering, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and disaster response planning expertise as required.

3.1.10.2. Provide structural and infrastructure engineers to support Travis AFB vulnerability assessments.

3.1.10.3. Serve as the OPR for nuclear, biological, and chemical defense matters and policy.

3.1.10.4. Provide AT/FP guidance for all new and existing construction standards and incorporate AT/FP measures ensuring the safety of personnel and resources.

3.1.10.5. Route all new facility and project approval documentation through the ICSF for coordination and AT/FP requirements.

3.1.10.6. Coordinate with the ICSF for utilization of vehicles and equipment needed for deployment of barriers in accordance with appropriate plans.

3.1.10.7. Through the CE Readiness Flight, assist base agencies with developing their procedures for responding to incidents involving terrorist use of WMD.

3.1.10.8. Provide Travis AFB personnel with current information on personal protection and tasked agency response to WMD incidents.

3.1.12. (Added) 60 AMW/XP will:

3.1.12.1. (Added) Assist the ISC and the FPWG with planning expertise as required.

3.1.12.2. (Added) Plan for and conduct installation-wide antiterrorism exercises (both operational and command post), as required.

3.1.12.3. (Added) Track installation AT/FP exercise observations/recommendations and lessons learned with the Installation AT/FP Officer and NCO for follow-up by the FPWG.

3.1.13. (Added) 60 AMW/FM will:

3.1.13.1. (Added) Provide financial expertise to the ISC and the FPWG as required.

3.1.13.2. (Added) Provide policy and guidance on legal limitations and obligation criteria for AT/FP budget request issues and expenditures.

3.1.13.3. (Added) Track AT/FP budget program execution.

3.1.14. (Added) 60 AMW/SE will provide safety expertise to the ISC and the FPWG as required.

3.1.15. (Added) 60 OG/CC will provide a core member to the ISC and the FPWG with airfield operations, passenger terminal, and cargo operations expertise as required.

3.2. All units on Travis AFB will use standards contained in AFI 31-210, AMC Sup 1, and this supplement, to fully implement the Travis AT/FP program.

3.2.1.1. The ISC, through the FPWG, will develop AT/FP plans, Threat Assessment Plans, and Incident Response plans for implementation of DoD, USAF, and AMC AT/FP program standards and initiatives on Travis AFB.

3.2.1.2. The ICSF identifies Travis AFB physical security requirements for the ISC to program for resources necessary to meet those requirements.

3.2.1.3. 60 SPTG/CE is responsible to ensure all new construction projects and programs employ AT/FP features and meet minimum DoD, AF, and AMC AT/FP Construction Standards. The Installation AT/FP Officer or NCO will coordinate with civil engineering planners to address AT/FP requirements for new construction and major remodeling projects. All new construction and major remodeling design plans will be routed through the ICSF for approval/disapproval based on compliance with AT/FP requirements.

3.2.1.4. (Added) The ISC will review all AT/FP budget submissions and approve them before submission to HQ AMC/SFX. All AT/FP budget requests should have a direct AT/FP application and wide-ranging impact.

3.2.2. The ICSF is the OPR for this supplement, which implements the AT/FP program on Travis AFB.

3.2.3. Responsible units will develop plans to implement DoD and USAF AT/FP initiatives, threat assessment procedures, and response measures to terrorist incidents. Principal among these plans are the Installation Security Plan (OPR: SF), Air Operations Security Plan (OPR: XPO), Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan (OPR: CE), Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan (OPR: CE), and Medical Contingency Response Plan (OPR: MDG). Installation AT/FP plans/annexes will include, as a minimum, security and law enforcement assets, fortifications, sensors, obstacles, contract/hired forces, unit guards and on-call support from reaction forces, AT/FP training and education, vulnerabilities and associated countermeasures (classified annex), installation priorities, and coordination with local civilian authorities. All installation AT/FP plans will be reviewed at least annually. All host/tenant units and agencies will develop unit-specific checklists to implement AT/FP plans within 90 days of publication/revision of any plan. Unit AT/FP Managers will maintain copies of all unit-specific checklists.

3.3.2. The ISC and the FPWG are the focal points for all Travis AFB AT/FP matters. 60 AMW/CV holds the position as permanent chairperson for the ISC. The ICSF is the Executive Agent and the OPR for the Travis AFB AT/FP program.

3.3.4.1. 60 AMW/XP will plan for and conduct installation-wide antiterrorism exercises (both operational and command post) at least semiannually or at the installation commander's request. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with AT/FP plans, to include THREATCON measures, evacuation/notification plans and procedures, command and control, terrorist use of WMD, and other key areas outlined in the ISP. As a minimum, one exercise will be conducted to assess execution of THREATCON procedures, and one exercise will be conducted to assess response to a terrorist incident. Exercises will test a broad range of required THREATCON actions specified within the installation's plans. These exercises may be combined with other base exercises. 60 AMW/XP will coordinate with appropriate units/agencies to develop exercise scenarios and Training and Exercise Evaluation Outlines to test and evaluate the installation's ability to respond to the local terrorist threat. 60 AMW/XP will track installation AT/FP exercise observations/recommendations and lessons learned with the Installation AT/FP Officer and NCO for follow-up by the FPWG. The FPWG will monitor after-action reports and observations/lessons learned to ensure compliance with applicable directives and continuously enhance the installation AT/FP program.

3.3.4.2. 60 AMW/PA will establish an active public affairs program to combat terrorism. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will provide periodic AT/FP awareness information on terrorist threats and personnel protection principles and techniques to the base populace. As a minimum, publish articles concerning AT/FP awareness during THREATCON NORMAL in the base newspaper on a regular basis. Increase this frequency to meet mission needs during increased THREATCONs. In addition, this information will be displayed on the Travis AFB Commander's Channel. The PAO will assist with informing the base populace and the local civilian populace at the first indication of a terrorist incident. Incidents of terrorism and crime will generate external media interest. In response to queries concerning a possible or real terrorist threat, the commander may acknowledge that increased security measures have been or will be taken without going into specific details regarding the measures being taken. The PAO will provide assistance to dispel rumors and misinformation by providing appropriate information to the news media and to the base populace. Operations Security (OPSEC) must be considered before releasing information.

3.4.5. Agreements for local AT/FP support will be reviewed annually as part of the AT/FP planning process and in conjunction with reviews of AT/FP plans. Units/agencies who require local AT/FP support will ensure agreements are in writing and signed by the appropriate military and civilian officials.

3.5.3. (Added) The Installation Security Plan (ISP) serves as the overarching AT/FP plan for Travis AFB. The ISP will clearly describe force protection measures in all THREATCONs and will include procedures to collect and analyze terrorist threat information, threat capabilities, and vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. It will also identify potential terrorism threats to the installation, personnel and assets. The ISP will reference other associated existing plans as necessary for contingencies. All AT/FP-related plans will integrate procedures for security, fire, medical, command and control, and other emergency services to respond to terrorism incidents.

3.8.2.1. AFOSI Det 303 has primary responsibility for collection, analysis and dissemination of terrorist threat information gathered from local authorities and counterintelligence sources. The Commander, AFOSI Det 303, is a core member of the 60 AMW Threat Working Group (TWG).

3.8.2.2. 60 OSS/IN is responsible for ensuring the timely collection, processing, analysis, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence, current intelligence, and national-level intelligence information concerning terrorist activities, terrorist organizations and force protection issues. The Wing Intelligence Officer is a core member of the TWG.

3.8.2.3. (Added) All personnel on Travis AFB are tasked to immediately report information on individuals, events, or situations that could pose a threat to the security of Travis AFB personnel or assets to Security Forces or to AFOSI Det 303.

3.8.3. AFOSI Det 303 continuously analyzes, studies, and assesses terrorist threats to Travis AFB personnel and resources for the 60 AMW/CC. This includes all available threat information regarding the potential terrorist use of WMD.

3.9.3. AFOSI Det 303 maintains guidance for collection, storage and dissemination of terrorist threat information. This guidance should be sufficient to fulfill requirements outlined in AFI 31-210 regarding a "terrorist threat assessment plan." AFOSI Det 303 prepares a detailed written threat assessment for the 60 AMW/CC at least annually and as required by changes to the threat. This threat assessment will be incorporated in the risk assessment process and included in appropriate plans.

3.10. The TWG will advise the wing commander and staff of all information pertaining to terrorist threats, or acts of terrorism involving Travis AFB personnel or assets.

3.10.2. The ICSF is the primary liaison with law enforcement response agencies pertaining to terrorist incidents, and for coordinating AT/FP prevention and deterrent measures on and in the immediate vicinity of the installation. 60 MDG/CC and 60 SPTG/CE share responsibilities for liaison with response agencies pertaining to WMD incidents. 60 SPTG/CE will coordinate with the Federal Emergency Response Agency for assistance, training and planning measures. AFOSI is chartered to maintain liaison and is the Air Force single point of contact with federal, state, local and foreign national law enforcement, counter-intelligence and security agencies for matters falling within the AFOSI mission. AFOSI Det 303 is the primary focal point for the collection and reporting of terrorist threat information gathered as the result of counterintelligence and law enforcement activities to include liaison with domestic and host nation security, law enforcement, and counterintelligence agencies. AFOSI Det 303 will maintain close contact with the ICSF, TWG, and security forces for all matters concerning antiterrorism and force protection.

3.10.5. All commanders will develop procedures to ensure immediate dissemination of threat changes to all personnel under their command. The ICSF will establish procedures to notify supporting law enforcement agencies of threat changes and coordinate necessary support.

3.11. When notified of a change in THREATCON by higher headquarters, or any time threat information is received that could affect the safety and security of Travis AFB personnel or resources, the TWG will be immediately convened to assess the threat and recommend actions to the installation commander. The installation commander will determine if the situation warrants activation of the Crisis Action Team (CAT), Group Control Centers (GCCs) and/or Unit Control Centers (UCCs). All host/tenant units and agencies will develop appropriate checklists to disseminate information to individual units through these control centers, and report actions to higher headquarters. Checklists will include measures to disseminate orders and information in situations when the CAT/GCCs/UCCs are not activated. All tenant units will be immediately notified of changes in the THREATCON as described in the ISP and appropriate QRCs. Quality Assurance Evaluators are responsible to immediately notify all service contractors of changes in the THREATCON.

3.12.1. All units on Travis AFB, regardless of MAJCOM or service component, will be notified of changes in the THREATCON. The Travis Command Post (TCP) is responsible for coordinating and reporting changes in the THREATCON with HQ AMC/TACC Emergency Action Cell. This does not preclude any tenant unit/agency from reporting THREATCON changes through their chain of command per AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*.

3.12.2. All tenant units will conform to the installation's THREATCON. Tenants on Travis AFB will coordinate owning MAJCOM/Service directed THREATCON changes with the 60 AMW/CC through the TWG and seek concurrence prior to implementation. 60 AMW/CC will consider the request, determine local threats, and make a base-wide determination. In those instances where local threats are absent, the TWG will seek clarification from HQ AMC prior to implementing a change in the THREATCON. There should only be one THREATCON on Travis AFB with final determination by the 60 AMW/CC.

3.13. The ISP will list measures or actions for each THREATCON utilizing at least the minimum number of measures/actions enumerated for each THREATCON as listed in DoD O-2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*. These measures will change as the threat situation increases from THREATCON NORMAL to THREATCON DELTA, and will be based on the mission, assessed threat and vulnerabilities at Travis AFB. These actions will also be reflected in Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) attachments to the Basic Unit Supplement.

3.13.1.2. All host/tenant units and agencies will develop and maintain checklists to implement THREATCON and QRC measures and actions. These checklists should be tailored to each facility, and describe specific actions and procedures to execute THREATCON and QRC measures. Unit checklists will be developed and copies forwarded to the Installation AT/FP NCO within 90 days of the date of this supplement and/or any change to THREATCON measures. Unit AT/FP managers will maintain copies of all applicable QRCs and unit AT/FP checklists.

3.13.1.4. The 60 AMW/CV will implement Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) according to DoD O-2000.12-H that will include implementation of a minimum of at least one RAM from a higher THREATCON (See **Attachment 7 (Added)**). RAMs will be changed weekly and briefed to commanders at an appropriate forum to avoid predictability. All host/tenant units and agencies on Travis AFB will comply with execution of the RAM program. RAMs will be employed during all THREATCONS (including NORMAL) to enhance force protection. The Installation AT/FP Officer and NCO will develop and monitor execution of the RAM program.

3.13.1.5. All host/tenant units and agencies sponsoring major functions (e.g., changes of command, open houses, and organized off-base activities) must incorporate appropriate AT/FP measures into plans for those functions. Unit AT/FP managers can provide advice and assistance with planning. Forward plans for these type functions to the Installation AT/FP NCO. The Installation AT/FP NCO will review plans and provide guidance as necessary.

3.14. The 60 AMW/CV will appoint a Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) to prepare a terrorism vulnerability assessment for Travis AFB facilities and operating areas. This assessment will be conducted at least once every three years or when significant changes occur. The ideal period for this assessment is 18 months from the last higher-headquarters assessment, as outlined in paragraph 3.6. of the parent instruction.

3.14.2. As a minimum, the VAT shall include qualified representatives with expertise in the following areas: physical security, electrical or structural engineering, operational readiness, infrastructure, and intelligence/counterintelligence. Additional areas of expertise for the VAT team can include WMD effects, AT/FP technology, explosive ordinance disposal, special warfare, communications, disaster preparedness, and information assurance. The 60 CS Information Systems Flight will conduct the communications portion of the physical security vulnerability assessment. Results of Information Protection Assessment Program reviews will supplement the physical security vulnerability assessment.

3.14.3. Vulnerability assessments should address the full spectrum of threats to mission essential critical assets, utilities, facilities, medical, and information systems. They will include functional experts appropriate to the location assessed and be conducted IAW DoD O-2000.12-H.

3.15.5. Copies of all plans dealing with AT/FP will be forwarded to the Installation AT/FP NCO.

3.19.3. The FPWG will evaluate the need to conduct assessments of off-installation housing areas, based on the assessed threat. Upon recommendation by the FPWG, the ISC will ensure residential security assessments for off-installation housing are conducted. Results of these evaluations will be documented and maintained on file by the Installation AT/FP NCO for review by higher headquarters assessment officials pursuant to DoD Standard 6.

3.20. All new construction projects and programs on Travis AFB will employ AT/FP features and meet minimum DoD AT/FP construction standards. The Installation AT/FP Officer or NCO will attend planning meetings related to construction projects on Travis AFB to address AT/FP concerns. Base Civil Engineer will coordinate security requirements with the Installation AT/FP NCO and the ICSF on all facility

construction and rehabilitation projects. The Installation AT/FP NCO and the ICSF will review and provide comment for consideration by the installation commander on all facility construction and rehabilitation projects to ensure compliance with AT/FP criteria. The Installation AT/FP Officer may convene the FPWG for additional expertise in the review and coordination of new construction projects and existing building rehabilitation plans. 60 CONS/CC will ensure applicable AT/FP construction requirements are included in construction contracts.

3.23. The ICSF serves as the Installation AT/FP Officer as primary advisor to the installation commander on AT/FP matters, and is the OPR and executive agent for 60 AMW AT/FP matters and policy. The ICSF will recommend a knowledgeable NCO to be appointed by the 60 AMW/CC as the Installation AT/FP NCO. The Installation AT/FP NCO will coordinate all AT/FP programs and ensure compliance with all DoD, USAF and AMC AT/FP requirements. The Installation AT/FP NCO will provide oversight and guidance for unit AT/FP program managers.

3.23.3.3. (Added) The Installation AT/FP NCO will develop a local training program for unit AT/FP managers who cannot attend AT Level II training, and will train newly appointed AT/FP managers. The training program will include review of antiterrorism principles, applicable directives and installation AT/FP plans. The ICSF will review and approve this training program annually. Personnel who complete this training program may be qualified to manage their unit's AT/FP program, but cannot perform AT Level I training or act as a Level II-certified individual.

3.23.4.1. The Installation AT/FP NCO will:

3.23.4.1.1. (Added) Provide guidance and oversight for all unit AT/FP program managers.

3.23.4.1.2. (Added) Develop local self-inspection checklists and conduct program assistance visits with all host/tenant units regularly.

3.23.4.1.3. (Added) Coordinate meetings of the FPWG. The Installation AT/FP NCO will attend FPWG meetings and record minutes.

3.23.4.1.4. (Added) Assist with coordinating meetings of the TWG. The Installation AT/FP NCO will attend TWG meetings and record significant information when directed by the ICSF.

3.23.4.1.5. (Added) Monitor and report installation compliance with DoD AT/FP standards semiannually. Reports will be coordinated through command channels and forwarded to HQ AMC/SFOP no later than 10 April and 10 October each year.

3.23.4.1.6. (Added) Track and report all AT Level I training to HQ AMC/SFOP. AT Level I training statistics will be forwarded to HQ AMC/SFOP no later than 10 April and 10 October each year.

3.23.4.1.7. (Added) Review and prioritize all AT Level II training requests for 60 AMW personnel. Forecast and submit training requests through HQ AMC/SFX.

3.23.4.1.8. (Added) Forward after action reports, containing comprehensive discussion of lessons learned to HQ AMC/SFOP within 30 days of a reported terrorist threat or terrorist incident.

3.23.4.1.9. (Added) Develop and maintain a resource forum (publications, messages, computer homepages, etc.) to provide information on prescribed general AT/FP awareness training and specific AOR training.

3.23.4.1.10. (Added) Develop an installation AT/FP recognition program to acknowledge and reward individuals for exceptional AT/FP efforts. Collect and forward AT/FP recognition program award packages to HQ AMC/SFOP no later than 20 February of each year.

3.23.4.2. All host/tenant unit commanders will appoint, in writing, a primary and an alternate officer or NCO as the Unit AT/FP Program Manager. Personnel appointed should be in a position to advise the unit commander on AT/FP matters. Unit AT/FP managers serve as AT/FP subject matter experts and advisors, implement installation AT/FP actions and initiatives at the unit level, recommend actions to the Installation AT/FP NCO, and ensure AT/FP training requirements are met in accordance with applicable standards. Once the primary and alternate unit AT/FP managers have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter, containing the names, SSANs, security clearances, duty phone numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Installation AT/FP NCO. Unit AT/FP Program Managers will:

3.23.4.2.1. (Added) Attend quarterly AT/FP Manager meetings.

3.23.4.2.2. (Added) Maintain an AT/FP continuity folder containing appointment letters, self-inspection checklists, training reports, RAM compliance, copies of the most recent program assistance visit report conducted by the Installation AT/FP NCO, AFI 31-210 (as supplemented), the ISP, standardized installation THREATCON signs, and AT/FP training material.

3.23.4.2.3. (Added) Track and report all unit AT Level I training to the Installation AT/FP NCO.

3.23.4.2.4. (Added) Monitor and ensure compliance with all installation AT/FP policies and guidance.

3.23.4.2.5. (Added) Develop unit-specific THREATCON defensive measures for each threat condition. At a minimum, the THREATCON measures listed in AFI 31-210 will be tailored to effectively change the security posture of each facility within the unit.

3.23.4.2.6. (Added) Include AT/FP awareness training in the unit ancillary training program. Consider inviting guest speakers from AFOSI, 60 OSS/IN, or security forces.

3.23.4.2.7. (Added) Maintain copies of all applicable AT/FP training certificates (i.e., AT Level II/III/IV, Dynamics of International Terrorism, etc.).

3.23.4.2.8. (Added) Ensure the Travis AFB standardized THREATCON signs (TAFB VA 31-101 and 31-102) are posted on all entrances to facilities within the unit during increased THREATCONs.

3.24.7. The Personnel Readiness Unit (PRU) and Unit Deployment Managers (UDMs) will ensure AT Level I training is documented on all TDY outprocessing checklists. All TDY orders to overseas locations (including Puerto Rico) will include a statement in the remarks section, indicating the personnel identified on the orders received AT Level I training as required by USAF, MAJCOM and AOR-specific guidelines. Unit ancillary training managers will document AT Level I training in ancillary training records annotating the date of completion. PRU and UDMs will coordinate with ancillary training managers to ensure AT Level I training requirements are met before orders are issued. Issuance of orders for overseas travel (deployed, PCS, TDY or leave) for those personnel who have not received AT/FP training, with special emphasis on AOR-specific threat and medical threats, is prohibited.

3.24.8.1. Unit commanders will develop written procedures to verify Level I training is conducted prior to overseas TDY, PCS, or leave. Personnel, to include family members, who have not completed Level I AT/FP training with special emphasis on AOR-specific threat, to include medical threats, will not be issued orders for overseas travel (deployed, PCS, TDY or leave). Units will program funds for local

reproduction of Joint Staff Guide 5260 in sufficient numbers to cover requirements for all assigned personnel.

3.24.8.2. All host/tenant unit commanders will ensure unit personnel traveling to DoD-designated high-threat areas (as defined in the Foreign Clearance Guide) are briefed on Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD (SO/LIC)) or USAF/ILT DoD Travel Security Advisories, and any Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) travel advisories.

3.24.9. All AT/FP managers should receive AT Level II training. If course slots cannot be obtained, local training should be conducted as described in paragraph 2.23.3.3. Course slots for 60 AMW personnel must be requested through the Installation AT/FP NCO. Course slots for USAF reserve members will be requested through AFRC training channels, coordinated through the 349 AMW AT/FP Manager. The 349 AMW AT/FP Manager will review and prioritize training requests for all 349 AMW personnel. Requests must include full name, rank/grade, SSN, security clearance, and duty phone to facilitate orders preparation.

3.28. The ISP will include annexes to address terrorism incident response. These annexes shall include procedures for determining the nature and scope of post-incident response measures, and plans to reconstitute the installation's ability to perform AT/FP measures. Terrorism incident response annexes will be cross-referenced with existing plans for emergency response and disaster planning/consequence management for installation/base engineering, logistics, medical, mass casualty response, transportation, personnel administration, and local support.

3.32.1. Installation vulnerability assessments will contain the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in accordance with Standard 14 of AFI 31-210, and will be developed with supporting agencies, e.g., civil engineering, readiness, medical, etc.

3.33.2. All AT/FP plans will cross-reference or include WMD disaster response force procedures contained in Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Plan 25-1. Plans must address response/mitigation assessments to terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. AT/FP plans and terrorist incident response and recovery plans/annexes will specifically address command, control, communications between local, state, and federal emergency assistance agencies, procedures to protect, respond to, and reduce the vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. AT/FP plans should clearly identify command and control, first responders, and other follow-on support teams. WMD response plans will cross-reference or include casualty, triage, decontamination, evacuation, and tracking; site security, evidence preservation, and contamination control measures; detailed interagency support and coordination measures. Tasked units will ensure first responders and treatment personnel are designated, trained, and equipped to respond to nuclear, biological, chemical/HAZMAT incidents IAW AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations*.

**Attachment 7 (Added)****RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES**

**A7.1. Responsibilities.** Host/tenant unit/agency commanders and AT/FP managers have primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with this instruction. Unit commanders and AT/FP managers will ensure unit personnel understand the Random Antiterrorism Measure (RAM) program and requirements for implementation.

**A7.2. Description.** RAMs are additional security measures conducted to provide the installation with multiple security measures that will consistently change the look of an installation's force protection posture. RAMs are measures taken from higher threat conditions (THREATCONs) and employed to supplement lower THREATCONs at random locations and times.

**A7.2.1.** Investigations of past terrorist operations show extensive surveillance of the target was conducted prior to the attack. Terrorist organizations have been known to obtain actual security post instructions, base maps, and photographs of security positions when formulating plans for future attacks. Additionally, these organizations have been known to conduct extensive surveillance of base entry procedures, documenting required forms of identification needed for entry and noting daily routines. RAMs introduce uncertainty to an installation's overall security to defeat surveillance attempts and make it difficult for a terrorist to accurately predict our actions.

**A7.2.2.** RAMs have three objectives under the goal of detecting and deterring terrorist activity—create an outwardly unpredictable security atmosphere, increase security awareness through training and job enrichment, and test which security measures provide the most security while minimizing costs.

**A7.3. Procedures.**

**A7.3.1.** The Installation AT/FP NCO will develop a list of RAMs based on THREATCON measures developed during AT/FP planning. RAMs will be selected at random to implement throughout the installation. The Installation Chief, Security Forces (ICSF) will announce the selected RAM to all commanders. OPSEC/COMSEC should be considered when announcing RAM selections.

**A7.3.2.** Commanders and unit/agency AT/FP managers will ensure the RAM is conducted during the time and date specified. 60 AMW/XPI will facilitate compliance checks of the RAM program. Unit EET representatives will check at least ten percent of the facilities assigned to their organization and report compliance statistics through the unit commander to the Installation AT/FP NCO after each RAM is conducted. Reports should include the specific RAM conducted; the date, time, and location of the RAM; whether the RAM was performed correctly; and any remarks necessary. The Installation AT/FP NCO will track and document all completed RAMs. If for any reason the RAM cannot be conducted, the unit AT/FP manager will explain in the report.

**A7.3.3.** Any individual(s) designated by the unit commander or AT/FP manager can conduct RAMs. AT/FP managers must ensure tasked individuals understand the RAM procedures completely, and instruct individuals not to alter these procedures. At no time will the persons conducting the RAM search an individual's personal items (i.e., purses, bags, and packages). If any problems, suspicious activity or persons are encountered, the unit will contact the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC) immediately with details to obtain timely and appropriate assistance.

**A7.3.4.** In addition to the installation-wide RAMs, Security Forces personnel will conduct at least three RAMs per day. The Installation AT/FP NCO will develop a separate list of RAMs each month for on-duty

security forces, and will track implementation. RAMs conducted by Security Forces personnel will be recorded on AF Form 53, **Security Police Desk Blotter**.

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