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**Security**

**BASE SECURITY INSTRUCTION**

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This instruction establishes requirements/procedures for conducting normal security operations on McConnell Air Force Base (MAFB), Kansas, as required by AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 SUP 1/AMC 1, The Air Force Physical Security Program. This instruction establishes policies and procedures for effective day-to-day security, entry into restricted areas, security reporting and alerting, authorization to bear firearms, photography within restricted areas, composition of the Installation Security Council (ISC), individual unit support tasking and generation procedures. The provisions and requirements of this instruction apply to all personnel assigned, attached, or visiting the 22d Air Refueling Wing (ARW). In addition, this instruction applies to all personnel assigned, attached, or visiting the Kansas Air National Guard (KSANG), 184th Bomb Wing (BW) and the 931st Air Refueling Group (Associate). United States military personnel who violate this instruction are subject to disciplinary action under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In addition, violations of this instruction by Air Force civilian employees may result in disciplinary action without regard to criminal liability.

This instruction is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Applicable forms required by this instruction must have a Privacy Act statement. This statement may be in the document itself or in a separate statement attached to the form. Organizations responsible for preparing these forms must comply with AFI 37-132 as supplemented. The appropriate table and rule in AFMAN 37-139, Disposition of Air Force Records - Disposition Schedule, control documents.

**SUMMARY OF REVISIONS**

Add Generation procedures. Definition of "cocked on". The change of Bldgs 1106, 1107, and 1166 as temporary restricted areas when aircraft are present. Add Bldg 10 as restricted area, when aircraft are present. Current post priority chart. Add Alert Facility (Bldg 978) as a controlled area, during Generations. Add Alert Facility purge and entry procedures. Current restricted area badge issue procedures. Change processing procedures for AMC Form 41, Flight Authorization. Change of Red-Ball response Procedures. Add Maintenance Aircraft Coordination Center to Command Post escorted/unescorted entry

procedures. Change procedures for Entry/Exit at other than Entry Control Point. Change procedures for Unserviceable Restricted Area Badges. A “|” indicates revised material since the last edition.

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## Chapter 1

### NORMAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

**1.1. GENERAL.** Normal security operations are day-to-day security activities used during non-emergency conditions to support Priority resources. A combination of in-place security forces, support force personnel, and personnel of other units provide support for normal security operations.

**1.1.1. Overall Objective .** The overall objective of the Air Force physical security program is to establish and maintain a viable and visible deterrent/reaction to any hostile threat. This deterrence and reaction is accomplished through effective security operations and procedures at MAFB.

**1.1.2. How Requirements Are Determined .** DoD and Air Force security instructions establish the requirements for in-place security force posts; patrols, equipment, aids, and facilities needed to support Priority resources.

**1.1.3. Day-to-Day Effectiveness .** Effective systems security requires an awareness of security threats on the part of all personnel assigned or attached to McConnell AFB. This also includes a willingness of every organization to share in security tasks.

**1.1.4. Security Education and Motivation Program.** A formal security education and motivation program is established to ensure all assigned personnel are aware of their responsibilities. Unit security managers are responsible for the administration of the program. Refer to **Chapter 3** of this instruction and AFI 31-101 for further guidance.

**1.1.5. Application .** Normal security operations are reinforced by specific security contingencies and THREAT CONDITIONS, which may require additional tasking to include the possibility of being engaged in armed conflict. Refer to 22 ARW Installation Security Plan (ISP) for detailed guidance.

**1.1.6. Doctrine for Normal Security Operations .** Normal security operations supported at McConnell follow standard criteria. Normal security operations posture is formed by using allocated and available security forces to include personnel working in or near base resources.

1.1.6.1. Detecting Unusual Occurrences. The primary source of detection is through in-place security force members and support force personnel associated with the Priority resources working within or around restricted areas.

1.1.6.2. Initiating Immediate Alarms. Alarms are initiated through the use of security communications system, alarm systems, and reports by support force personnel. Alarms are initiated as a result of unauthorized acts, procedures, or hostile activities. The security reporting and alerting system is an extension of this capability.

1.1.6.3. Providing Immediate Armed Response. Armed security force members provide immediate response to the scene of an incident. It is the responsibility of all base personnel to cooperate with responding security forces; i.e., leave the immediate area, relay messages, assist in area evacuation, etc.

1.1.6.4. On-Scene Discrimination. To discriminate between real and probable hostile actions or other occurrences is the sole responsibility of the on-scene security force elements. Support force and other non-security forces personnel are responsible for sounding the alarm and on-scene cooperation.

1.1.6.5. Use of Deadly Force Policy. Resources designated as vital or substantial to national security are subject to the use of deadly force policy as outlined in AFI 31-207. These resources include, but are not limited to Priority "A", "B", and "C" resources. Deadly force may be used when it reasonably appears necessary to prevent the actual theft of, damage to, or espionage aimed at resources specifically designated as being vital or substantial to the national security.

1.1.6.6. Initiating the Proper Security Contingency IAW 22 ARW ISP.

1.1.6.7. Authority. This instruction localizes and defines the authority for security forces to establish procedures in support of these operations. It also gives the Chief of Security Forces (CSF) the authority to establish post Priority lists, and when required, to curtail lower Priority posts to man higher Priority posts.

**1.2. REFERENCES.** DoD 5210.41M, AFI 31-101, AFI 31-101 SUP 1/AMC 1, AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Instruction, and 22 ARW ISP.

### **1.3. TERMS EXPLAINED.**

**1.3.1. Air Force Physical Security Program .** The formal security activity established by Air Force AFI 31 series publications, that secures the vital components of weapons systems and essential direct support systems from hostile operations.

**1.3.2. Alert Aircraft .** Aircraft, which are fully serviced with combat crews, assigned to launch within a specified period of time after receipt of a launch order.

**1.3.3. Circulation Control .** The control of entry, exit and internal movement of personnel, material, and vehicles in restricted areas.

**1.3.4. Clear Zone .** A belt of terrain extending at least 30 feet on both sides of a boundary barrier (i.e. fenceline). For dual barriers, the 30-foot zone extends out from the outer barrier and inward from the inner barrier. Within the zone, all objects and terrain that could conceal an intruder or obstruct vision must be removed. NOTE: See AFI 31-101, paragraph 7.6. for specifications.

**1.3.5. Close-In Exclusion/Security Area .** A small area established to contain one or more nuclear weapons or weapons systems and located within a larger restricted area. It is the innermost zone of security control for nuclear weapons. The close-in security area is always a "no-lone zone."

**1.3.6. Cocked on.** Aircraft within generation area has a crew assigned, mission tasking, preflight complete, and classified material aboard the aircraft.

**1.3.7. COVERED WAGON.** Initially, a COVERED WAGON report is an unclassified up-channel telephone report (designator immediate or flash) sent up the same channel and in the same format as a HELPING HAND report. COVERED WAGON reports inform higher level headquarters of an unusual incident (probably or actually hostile) affecting priority resources occurred at an installation or dispersed site. The terminating authority for COVERED WAGON on MAFB is the **22 ARW/CC**.

**1.3.8. Chemical Warfare Code.** A locally devised code. Utilized during exercise chemical operations.

**1.3.9. Chemical Weapons Convention .** An inspection comprised of foreign officials and their escorts who inspect for compliance with chemical weapons treaties.

**1.3.10. Degeneration .** Removal of an alert status aircraft to normal status.

**1.3.11. Demarcation Line** . Marks the borders of an area. Demarcation of a restricted area may be accomplished by fences, ropes on stanchions, painted lines, walls or jersey barriers.

**1.3.12. Duress Code** . A predetermined word or procedure which, if used, indicates the user is under duress. All personnel who have unescorted entry into any priority restricted area use the duress code.

1.3.12.1. The CSF will publish duress codes every six months unless compromised. Duress codes are classified "For Official Use Only", and are distributed to all McConnell personnel who have unescorted entry in restricted areas.

**1.3.13. Entry Control Point (ECP)** . A location for the admission of personnel, vehicles, and equipment into established restricted areas.

**1.3.14. Escort** . To exercise surveillance and control over a visitor who does not possess a valid restricted area badge with the proper area open and has been authorized entry into a restricted area by an escort official on a one-time basis to perform an official task.

**1.3.15. Escort Official** . An individual designated by an "E" typed/stamped on the restricted area badge next to the applicable area. The escort official is responsible for vouching and escorting personnel who do not possess unescorted entry authorization, but have a valid need to enter a restricted area. This requirement applies in priority "A" and "B" restricted areas. On MAFB this requirement applies to the generation areas, alert tankers and the Air Refueling Wing Command Post (ARW/CP). Personnel with a valid AF Form 1199, Air Force Entry Control Card, can escort anywhere on the mass aircraft parking area (MAPA) and temporary priority "C" restricted areas.

**1.3.16. Friendly Forces** . Military, government, and civilian agencies identified as being available for assistance.

**1.3.17. Free Zone** . An area temporarily established inside/outside a restricted area that facilitates the movement of equipment and personnel by limiting or eliminating the need for entry prerequisite for personnel entry as stated in AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-501, USAF Personnel Security Program.

1.3.17.1. Entry requirements are determined by the ISC. This is accomplished or validated by the chairman.

**1.3.18. Generation** . Upgrading of aircraft to alert status.

**1.3.19. Force Generation Area** . An area where aircraft are upgraded to alert status. Specific restricted areas are identified with ropes, stanchions, cones, or painted lines with restricted area and ECP signs. Normally located within the MAPA.

**1.3.20. HELPING HAND** . A HELPING HAND is an unclassified message relayed by the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC) to the installation command post of an unusual incident, possibly hostile, affecting priority resources. Incidents are reported to the SFCC by any means available by anyone who witnesses or discovers the problem. The installation command post shouldn't immediately relay the information to higher headquarters. The security forces immediately investigate the situation.

**1.3.21. Security Forces Post Priority**. The security forces commander will take personnel from a lower priority post, to fill in for a higher priority post if required during manning shortages.

**1.3.22. Installation Commander** . An officer who commands a host support unit, host wing, or higher level host unit, and has been identified by administrative order or command directive as the "Installation Commander." They discharge the duties directed by United States statutes or Air Force

directives to be performed by the "Installation Commander." At MAFB, the installation commander is the 22 ARW/CC.

**1.3.23. Installation Security Council.** The commander or designee of each installation that supports priority resources appoints the Installation Security Council (ISC) and may combine it with the Resource Protection Committee.

1.3.23.1. The council selects and designates restricted areas. Ensures the installation provides adequate personnel, equipment, and facilities for priority resources. Monitors on-going security enhancement projects. Develops entry control procedures for free zones. Conducts annual reviews of all deviations or waivers in effect.

**1.3.24. No-Lone-Zone .** An area where the "two-person concept" must be enforced because it contains nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or certified critical components in which access is denied to a lone individual.

Terms "close-in security area" (CISA) in AFI 31-101, and "exclusion area" in DoD 5210.41M are the same as the term "no-lone zone" when nuclear weapons are present.

**1.3.25. Priority Resources .** Air Force operational resources that are secured under the Air Force Physical Security Program. Priority resources are divided into three categories: Priority "A," "B," or "C." On MAFB, priorities are assigned to weapons systems, aircraft, aircraft parking areas, hangars, and the 22 ARW/CP.

**1.3.26. Response Force (RF) .** A security force consisting of 15 personnel capable of responding within five minutes to an incident involving priority "A" resources.

**1.3.27. Restricted Area .** An area under military jurisdiction in which special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. This term "restricted area" refers to those areas that contain Air Force resources designated a security priority, and equates to the term "limited area" as specified in DoD 5210.41M for areas containing nuclear weapons.

**1.3.28. Security Contingencies .** A security response in support of a specific situation which may or may not require the posting of additional security forces, and may or may not exist over an extended period of time.

**1.3.29. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Team (START) .** An inspection team comprised of foreign officials and their in-country escorts that inspect McConnell Air Force Base resources and areas under the provisions of the START.

**1.3.30. Support Force Personnel .** Owner/user unit personnel working in or around a restricted area. They support the security forces by applying internal controls within the area, and in some cases, by providing armed support of security forces. Those personnel working in the vicinity of a restricted area support the security force by remaining alert to and reporting suspicious activities.

**1.3.31. Temporary Restricted Area .** An area under military jurisdiction in which special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. This area is only a restricted area when priority resources are present. This term "restricted area" refers to those areas that contain Air Force resources designated a security priority, and equates to the term "limited area" as specified in DoD 5210.41M for areas containing nuclear weapons.

**1.3.32. Threat Condition Alerting Message (TCAM) .** A down-channel alerting order from either a major command (MAJCOM) Command Post or the HQ USAF operations center, advising of a situ-

ation which could pose a threat to priority resources, and may direct the implementation of THREAT-CONS.

**1.4. SECURITY THREAT.** Security operations are designed to detect and react to possible hostile events aimed toward priority resources. The complete threat analysis for McConnell AFB is contained in Annex "B" (classified FOUO) to 22 ARW ISP. THREATCONS have been developed and tailored to McConnell AFB to support increased threat levels.

## Chapter 2

### RESTRICTED AREAS

**2.1. ESTABLISHING RESTRICTED AREAS.** This instruction designates restricted areas of McConnell AFB in compliance with the lawful authority of the installation commander and pursuant to DoD 5200.8 and Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 797). This directive serves as the authority for the physical and legal enforcement of restricted area boundaries and as the basis for federal prosecution. This is applicable to assigned, attached, or visiting personnel at this installation. Specific written permission by the installation commander or his designee required for unescorted entry into restricted areas. Entry is limited to individuals performing essential official duties. All restricted areas are marked by restricted area warning signs and other physical aids. All restricted areas on MAFB have a 30-foot clear zone on all sides of their boundaries. The MAPA will have a permanent clear zone. The following areas will have a 30-foot clear zone when aircraft are present: Delta/Echo/KSANG ramps; buildings 10, 1106, 1107, 1166, and 1176. Additionally, this instruction permits security forces to establish temporary restricted areas on an as needed basis, without ISC approval, to support priority resources. The following have been designated restricted areas by the installation commander and approved by the ISC.

### 2.2. LISTING OF PRIORITY RESTRICTED AREAS.

#### 2.2.1. Priority “A.”

2.2.1.1. Hot cargo pad (temporary). When logistics aircraft containing priority “A” weapon systems or critical components are located in this area, a priority “A” restricted area is established. The hot cargo pad is located at the east end of taxiway Charlie. The designated alternate parking location is at the east end of taxiway Delta. Both are defined by raised ropes and restricted area signs. The support forces for the area is the 22 SFS.

#### 2.2.2. Priority “B.”

2.2.2.1. Force generation area (temporary). This area is activated to generate aircraft to alert status. The generation area is located within the established priority “C” MAPA. This area may contain individual priority “B”, and “C” resources. This area is activated during emergency war orders, and higher headquarters and local exercises. **NOTE:** If only a portion of the MAPA is used as the generation area, it will be marked off with a red rope (raised with metal stanchions or on the ground with rubber donuts attached). Restricted area signs are posted on the boundary of the MAPA. The support force for this area is the 22 SFS with augmentation as required from the 22d Operations Group (OG) and 22d Logistics Group (LG) IAW 22 ARW/ISP.

#### 2.2.3. Priority “C” (B-1B and KC-135 not in DEPO Status or Generated).

2.2.3.1. The MAPA, individual hangars and Bldg 10 (refer to [Attachment 6](#))

2.2.3.1.1. The MAPA is a restricted area located between the runways and the main base. The boundaries begin at the north end of the airfield east of runway 19L/19R identified by chain-link fence topped with barbed wire outriggers starting at parking spots A, B, and C-1. It continues south paralleling Taxiway Alpha on the west to a point perpendicular to bldg. 1112, Base Operations, on the south; a west/east painted boundary south of spots B-24 and A-21 and adjacent to Bldg 1112 border the south end of the MAPA; a painted red line just behind the engine exhaust blast fences east of the “alpha row” is the east boundary. The area is posted

with “Restricted Area” signs. The MAPA area is designated as Priority “C” except during aircraft generation. During this time, the area is designated as a “Generation Area”, with possible “B” and/or “C” resources inside. Designating this a generation area will not affect entry into the facilities within the Facility Maintenance Complex (FMC); it will only affect entry into the aircraft generation area. Movement in the MAPA is restricted to authorized personnel and vehicles cleared to operate within and around the flight line environment.

2.2.3.1.2. Hangar 1106. The hangar contains non-alert B-1Bs and KC-135Rs while in maintenance. The walls of the hangar supported by painted red lines, as needed define the boundary of the restricted area. Hangar will be a restricted area, when aircraft are present.

2.2.3.1.3. Hangar 1107. The hangar contains non-alert B-1Bs and KC-135Rs while in maintenance. The walls of the hangar supported by painted red lines, as needed define the boundary of the restricted area. Hangar will be a restricted area, when aircraft are present.

2.2.3.1.4. Hangar 1166. The hangar contains non-alert B-1Bs and KC-135Rs while in maintenance. The walls of the hangar supported by painted red lines, as needed define the boundary of the restricted area. Hangar will be a restricted area, when aircraft are present.

2.2.3.1.5. Hangar 1176. The hangar contains non-alert B-1Bs and KC-135Rs while in maintenance. The boundary of the restricted area is defined by the walls of the hangar supported by painted red lines, as needed. Hangar will be a restricted area, when aircraft are present.

2.2.3.1.6. Hangar 10. The hangar contains non-alert B-1B’s while in maintenance. The walls of the hangar supported by red lines, as needed define the boundary of the restricted area. Hangar will be a restricted area, when aircraft are present. **NOTE:** The MAPA and hangars 10, 1106, 1107, 1166 and 1176 are utilized by all organizations under the 22 LG, 931 ARG and the 184 BW.

2.2.3.2. 22 ARW/CP. This facility is located in building 384, room 160. This area is priority “C” but will be temporarily upgraded to a higher priority based on the highest generated priority resource on the base. It is delineated by the walls of the facility. The support force is 22 ARW/CP.

2.2.3.3. Temporary restricted areas located south of Bldg 1218 (Spots D1-D4) and the South Hammerhead (Spots E1-E5) (refer to [Attachment 4](#) & [Attachment 5](#)) are considered restricted areas when aircraft are present and will hold the priority of the highest resource present. These areas will be clearly marked with red lines, entry control point signs and restricted area signs (painted on the ground or raised where flight line operations will permit). Restricted area signs will read “Restricted Area When Aircraft Present”. Movement in these areas is restricted to authorized personnel and vehicles cleared to operate within and around the flight line environment.

2.2.4. In addition to those areas listed above, other priority resources may be required to be parked outside established restricted areas. When these aircraft cannot be parked in an established restricted area, temporary restricted areas are established with defined boundaries and appropriate restricted area warning signs. All temporary restricted areas are established and posted IAW AFI 31-101 and this instruction.

**2.3. AUTHORITY FOR ENTRY INTO RESTRICTED AREAS.** The installation commander's specific written permission is required for unescorted entry into restricted areas. This authority can only be delegated to other commanders, permanently assigned to this installation, by letter. A DD Form 577/Signature Card must also be on file with Pass and ID to verify individual authority to sign for specific areas.

The DD Form 577 permits commanders to only allow access to authorized individuals. Unescorted entry is granted to an individual who has a continuing/regular need for entry. This instruction grants the installation commander or designated representative the authority to extend unescorted entry to TDY personnel deployed to MAFB if all other qualifications for unescorted entry are met. For example, a need to enter, clearance, possession of an AF Form 1199, USAF Restricted Area Badge, etc. Restricted area badges (RAB) issued by other installations may be honored when accompanied by a valid entry authority list (EAL) and authenticated by the installation commander or designated representative, and a security forces E-6 or above.

### **2.3.1. Back-Up Verification.**

2.3.1.1. A copy of the master restricted area badge listing (MRABL) is located at the SFCC and is used in those situations where a discrepancy exists with MAFB RABs.

2.3.1.2. Personal recognition (normally reserved for key staff personnel; i.e., 22 ARW/CC, 22 ARW/CV, 22 SPTG/CC, 22 OG/CC, 22 LG/CC.)

2.3.1.3. Signature/credential check.

2.3.1.4. Chemical warfare code (utilized during chemical warfare operations and chemical warfare exercises)

### **2.3.2. Inspector/TDY Personnel Entry.**

2.3.2.1. Inspector General (IG)/MAJCOM/Numbered Air Force (NAF) personnel conducting inspections and personnel assigned to MAJCOM or NAF may be granted unescorted entry, escort authority, and circulation to the degree specified on their EAL or visit notification letter. The EAL is authenticated by the 22 ARW/CC, 22 ARW/CP, and a security forces supervisor (E-6 or above).

2.3.2.2. TDY personnel may be granted unescorted entry based upon possession of their home-base RAB, backup verification with a form of identification which has a picture on it (DD Form 2 series card for military), and being listed on an EAL or crew orders authenticated by the wing commander or designated representative and security forces supervisor, E-5 or above.

2.3.2.3. Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA)/Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) teams performing inspections are authorized unescorted entry into restricted areas. This is based on their possessing a valid FCDNA Form 239, DNA Form 442 (both will have bearer's name and photograph on the front, badge number and signature on the back), combined with a valid military identification (DD Form 2 series card), and their identification information appearing on the authenticated (security supervisor E-7 or above and 22 ARW/CC) inspection team notification list (an electronically transmitted message).

**NOTE:** All EALs posted at security posts must have original (wet) signatures of the security forces supervisor who authenticates them. Inspectors who do not have an AF Form 1199 must be escorted.

2.3.2.4. 184 BW (KSANG) personnel will use their RABs for entry into the MAPA and hangars 10, 1106, 1107, 1166 and 1176 when warranted.

**2.4. UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO RESTRICTED AREAS.** Any unauthorized attempted entry into a restricted area results in the individual being detained until the security forces arrive. Unless previously determined, security forces flight chief will determine if the attempted entry is a Helping Hand,

Covered Wagon, etc. Security force operating instructions determine precise actions for security force response and control actions.

**2.5. UNESCORTED ENTRY REQUIREMENTS INTO WING COMMAND POST/MAINTENANCE AIRCRAFT CONTROL CENTER (MACC).** Personnel authorized unescorted entry into the Command Post/MACC during normal security operations must be in possession of an MAFB-issued RAB with area "1" open (see note). All personnel must be in compliance with **Chapter 3** of this instruction. Prior to allowing unescorted entry, one of the following supporting techniques is employed:

- 2.5.1. Personal recognition.
- 2.5.2. Signature/credential check.
- 2.5.3. Checked against MRABL.

**NOTE:** Any time the Crisis Action Team (CAT) is formed or upon the direction of the on-duty senior controller, area "9" is required to gain access to the CAT area of the command post.

## **2.6. ESCORTED ENTRY INTO WING COMMAND POST/MAINTENANCE AIRCRAFT CONTROL.**

Requests for escorted entry are accomplished prior to arrival at the command post. This is accomplished by a phone call to the command post from the visitor's duty section providing, at a minimum, name, rank, SSN, time, and reason for visit. The command post reverifies by recalling the duty section. The command post controller maintains full determination for the validity of the visit. Upon arrival at the Wing CP, the command post controller is contacted by direct line (mounted to the wall adjacent to the outside door). Two forms of identification, one of which should contain a picture, are required for entry (personal recognition may be used as one form of identification). The controller verifies the individual's identity and need to enter the command post. If all is correct, entry is granted. Escort officials must have a valid MAFB-issued RAB with an area "1" open and an "E" typed/stamped to the right of the number. Escort officials, during periods when CAT is in effect, must have area "9" open with an "E" typed/stamped adjacent to the number. Escort officials must brief personnel requiring escorted entry on escort procedures. An inspection of hand carried items is conducted prior to entry. The escort official must authorize visitors to bring hand carried items into the Wing CP in performance of official duties. The escort official must be present during instructions. The escort official may turn the escorted person over to another MAFB person possessing unescorted entry authority for the area. This delegation of escort may only be delegated once unless the individual is an authorized escort official with the "E" designator on the RAB. **NOTE:** Personnel who request escorted entry without pre-announcement, will be denied entry and investigated by on-duty security forces.

**2.7. UNESCORTED ENTRY REQUIREMENT INTO THE MAPA AND HANGARS.** Personnel authorized unescorted entry into the priority "C" restricted areas through established entry control points (ECP) must be in possession of a valid MAFB/KSANG-issued RAB with area "4" open. Anytime two or more persons approach the entry point together, the entry controller (if applicable) may, after positively identifying one individual via the RAB and a supporting technique, allow that person to vouch for the identity of other individuals. The other individuals must possess valid entry authority credentials if not, they must be escorted.

- 2.7.1. Emergency Vehicle Entry .** Defined as the need for the immediate presence of response elements (security, fire, hospital, etc.) to preclude or limit damage or injury, or to deal with any situation

which might endanger the mission. Security forces must be aware of the emergency and responding elements. Emergency vehicles need not be inspected when entering/exiting, but must be maintained under constant surveillance. Emergency response personnel are considered “under duress” when emergency rotating flashers are not in operation.

**2.7.2. Entry/Exit at Points Other Than Entry Control Points .** Personnel/vehicles may cross the boundary at a location other than the ECP, provided a valid need exists and notification is made to SFCC. This procedure is normally limited to vehicles towing equipment, RED BALL-dispatched vehicles and vehicles in support of taxiing aircraft.

## **2.8. ESCORTED ENTRY INTO THE MAPA AND MAINTENANCE HANGARS.**

**2.8.1. Personnel Entry .** Personnel requiring escorted entry must be escorted into the MAPA or maintenance hangars by an individual in possession of a MAFB-issued RAB with area “4” open. There is no requirement to have an “E” designator typed/stamped adjacent to the number. The escort official must explain the rules of movement for the area to the visitor and ensure the inspection of all hand carried items/vehicles is conducted prior to entry into the area. 22 TRNS/CC or PAX will be responsible for escorting passengers and crews who do not have unescorted entry to and from aircraft upon arrival and departure.

**NOTE 1:** The ratio of escorts to visitors must be based on the trustworthiness of the visitors and the ability to maintain effective control over all visitors.

**NOTE 2:** The AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log, is not required in the MAPA or maintenance hangars, or generation area.

**2.8.2. START/CWC Inspection Team Entry .** Procedures for START/CWC inspection teams entry into the MAPA are contained in MAFB START/CWC Compliance Plans.

## **2.9. POV ENTRY INTO THE MAPA AND MAINTENANCE HANGARS.** Only the following POVs are authorized:

2.9.1. Rental vehicles used by IG, staff assistance visit (SAV), maintenance standardization and evaluation team (MSET), and other inspection teams identified as such are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the team member is listed on a valid EAL, a placard identification is in the front windshield and all other requirements for entry.

2.9.2. Vehicles used by contractors (Rockwell International, Boeing Military Airplanes, and EATON/AIL Corp), identified with company logos, are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the MAFB company manager for the company has submitted a letter to 22 SFS/SFO identifying the mission-essential POVs and the individual driving the vehicle has a MAFB-issued RAB granting unescorted entry for the area being entered and satisfies all other requirements for entry.

2.9.3. Selected personnel from the air refueling squadrons will have parking permits issued from 22 LG/CMS and must be displayed in the windshield of the vehicle.

2.9.4. POVs authorized on the flight line must have a MAFB Form 41, Flight line Authorization displayed. The form is issued by 22 OSS/OSAA.

**2.10. UNESCORTED ENTRY INTO A FORCE GENERATION AREA.** Personnel authorized unescorted entry into the force generation area must be in possession of a valid MAFB-issued RAB with area "6" open. All personnel entering the area must have their RAB and a second form of identification with a picture inspected by the Entry Controller. Military members will present a DD form 2 series ID card as the second form of identification. **Vehicle operators must ensure their vehicles have been inspected for contraband items prior to attempting entry.**

**2.10.1. Emergency Vehicle Entry .** Defined as the need for the immediate presence of response elements (security, fire, hospital, etc.) to preclude or limit damage or injury, or to deal with any situation, which might endanger the mission. Emergency vehicles and personnel in response to an actual emergency will be allowed entry based upon pre-announcement from SFCC or knowledge of the need for such entry. Agencies dispatching forces to a restricted area containing priority "B" resources must inform the SFCC dispatcher of the vehicle type and number of personnel in each vehicle. The SFCC will verify the data by a call back or by using a direct line. Security and support forces will maintain surveillance of the emergency response forces and ensure all vehicles; personnel and support equipment are removed from the area upon resolution of the emergency. Security forces surveillance must not degrade the normal security posture.

**2.10.2. Entry/Exit at Points Other Than Entry Control Points .** Personnel/vehicles may cross the boundary at a location other than the ECP, provided a valid need exists and notification is made to SFCC. This procedure is normally limited to vehicles towing equipment, RED BALL-dispatched vehicles and vehicles in support of taxiing aircraft. **NOTE:** Notification from MACC will consist of the type of vehicle(s) responding i.e. Cobra vehicle responding to spot Bravo-4.

**2.10.3. ENTRY TO ALERT AIRCRAFT.** Is authorized with a valid AMC Form 41. See [Chapter 7](#) this regulation for more detailed information.

**2.11. ESCORTED ENTRY INTO A GENERATION AREA.** Personnel requiring escorted entry must be escorted into the force generation area by an individual in possession of an MAFB-issued RAB with area "6" open and an "E" designator typed/stamped adjacent the number. The escort official must explain the rules of movement for the area to the visitor and ensure the inspection of all hand carried items/vehicles is conducted prior to entry into the area. The "E" designator is required due to the presence of priority "B" resources within the area.

**NOTE 1:** The ratio of escorts to visitors must be based on the trustworthiness of the visitors and the ability to maintain control over all visitors.

**NOTE 2:** The AF Form 1109 is not required in the force generation area unless the current threat requires it.

**NOTE 3:** START/CWC inspection teams entry procedures into the Force Generation Area are contained in MAFB START/CWC Compliance Plans.

**2.12. POV ENTRY INTO A GENERATION AREA.**

2.12.1. No privately owned vehicles (POVs) are allowed in the generation area except command post controller vehicles when delivering messages during communication outage situations. Rental vehicles used by inspection teams and contractor vehicles (i.e. Rockwell, Boeing and Eaton/AIL Corp) are considered government vehicles while performing official duties.

2.12.1.1. Command post controllers delivering Emergency Action (EA)/Emergency War Order (EWO) messages in support of SIOP Operations during communication outages, are granted entry in their POV based upon:

2.12.1.2. A communication outage has gone into effect.

2.12.1.3. POVs of controllers have a base decal (DD Form 2220, DoD Registered Vehicle) and "CMD POST EMERGENCY" signs in the windshield and rear window and their names appear on a valid pre-positioned EAL in SFCC. **SPECIAL NOTE:** All controllers **must** conduct a quick search of their vehicle, looking for obvious items that do not belong on or in the vehicle, prior to departing for the generation area.

2.12.1.4. Wing CP pre-announcement to SFCC with the following information, "Rank, name, last four of ssn, driving his (make/model) POV will be delivering EA/EWO messages to the aircrews." SFCC will call back the Wing CP, verify the information, and then notify all generation posts and patrols. Persons delivering EA/EWOs are allowed entry based upon successful use of the Distant Recognition Code, with an accurate pre-announcement or knowledge of the need for such entry. When the Wing CP dispatched individuals to a priority "B" restricted area, they must inform the SFCC of the vehicle type and number of personnel in each vehicle. Security and support forces will maintain surveillance of the emergency response forces and ensure all vehicles, personnel, and support equipment are removed from the area upon delivery of the message. Security Forces surveillance must not degrade the normal security posture. These personnel must depart immediately after delivering the message(s).

2.12.2. Rental vehicles used by IG, a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) team, a Maintenance Standardization Evaluation Team (MSET), and other inspection teams identified as such are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the team member is listed on a valid EAL, and satisfy all other requirements for entry.

2.12.3. Vehicles used by contractors (Rockwell International, Boeing Military Airplanes, and EATON/AIL Corp), identified with company logos, are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the MAFB company manager has submitted a letter to 22 SFS/SFOS identifying the mission-essential POVs and the individual driving the vehicle has a MAFB-issued RAB granting unescorted entry for the area being entered and satisfies all other requirements for entry. **Note:** Contractor vehicles should only be allowed when conducting mission essential task on aircraft

**2.12.4. NO OTHER** POVs are authorized in or around priority "B" resources.

2.12.5. The escort official will search vehicles for those personnel being escorted

**2.13. CHEMICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS EXERCISE ENTRY INTO THE GENERATION AREA.** Entry is authorized with the appropriate USAF Form 1199 with the appropriate area open and the proper use of the chemical warfare code. If the entry controller has any doubt about the identity or the security status of the individual or if the code is passed incorrectly. The entry controller will have personnel demask on the spot under exercise conditions.

**2.14. ENTRY REQUIREMENTS/KSANG MUNITIONS AREA.**

2.14.1. Essential MAFB personnel possessing a valid MAFB issued RAB with area "15" open and a valid need to enter are allowed unescorted entry into the area.

2.14.2. Essential KSANG personnel possessing a valid KSANG issued RAB with area "15" open and a valid need to enter are allowed unescorted entry into the area.

2.14.3. Personnel needing access to the KSANG munitions area not having area "15" open on a line badge can be escorted by those with area "15" open on a valid MAFB or KSANG issued RAB.

**2.15. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) FLIGHT LINE TOUR.** All tours are required to enter the flight line area via the flight line gate located adjacent to the fire department. PA will supply security forces with a letter containing the date/time of the tour, names of people on the tour/group name, and termination time of tour. PA representative will serve as the escort for the tour.

## Chapter 3

### OBTAINING RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY AUTHORIZATION

**3.1. RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY AUTHORIZATION.** Specific written permission from the installation commander is required for entry into any restricted area. An appropriately coded AF Form 1199, 1199A, 1199B, or 1199C, (USAF Restricted Area Badges), serves as written permission. For Command Post and priority “B” or “C” restricted areas, a properly coded restricted area badge supported by a Master Restricted Area Badge Listing (MRABL) serves as written permission and authorizes entry appropriately. The local anti-counterfeiting techniques are developed by the 22 SFS/SFACR and distributed on a “need to know” basis.

**3.1.1. RAB Prerequisites .** Unescorted entry is granted to personnel whose day-to-day duties require entry into a restricted area. Other personnel may be escorted into a restricted area on an “as required” basis. Unescorted entry will not be granted solely to avoid the inconvenience of having to escort personnel.

**3.1.2. Obtaining Unescorted Entry Authorization .** Unescorted entry requests are made on AF Form 2586 (Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate). Personnel requiring unescorted entry must have a favorable adjudicated personnel security investigation (PSI) recorded in the Automated Security Clearance Approval System (ASCAS) IAW AFI 31-501, USAF Personnel Security Program. When derogatory information is known, the unit security manager coordinates with the Chief, Security Forces to determine if the derogatory information affects unescorted entry eligibility. If eligibility is affected, a Security Information File (SIF) IAW AFI 31-501 must be considered.

**3.1.3. Coordinating Instructions .** Before a RAB is issued, the requesting unit/staff agency must initiate and complete the applicable sections of the AF Form 2586. Sections I, II, III and columns 1, 2, and 3 of section IV must be completed by either the squadron commander or designated representative. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) must coordinate the restricted area by completing columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 in section IV of the AF Form 2586. All coordinating officials must serve in the position with direct responsibility for the restricted area. Designees may not delegate this authority further.

**NOTE:** Personnel attempting to sign any section of the AF Form 2586 must have a current DD Form 577 (Signature Card) or appointment letter on file with the 22 SFS/SFACR (Pass and Registration) section. AF Forms 2586 with signatures other than those on file in Pass and Registration will not be accepted. Contact 22 SFS/SFAR for proper completion of this form.

**3.1.4. Granting and Coordinating Officials for Unescorted Entry (Columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Section IV of AF Form 2586).**

AREA	OPR	LOCATION	COORDINATING/APPROVING OFFICIAL
1	22 ARW/CP	CP	22 ARW/CP
4	22 OG		MAPA and 22 OG/CC, 22 OG/CD, 22 LG/CC 1106, 110722 LG/CD, 22 AGS/CC, 22 MXS/CC, 22 MDG/CC, 1166, 1176 344 ARS/CC, 349 ARS/CC, 350 ARS/CC,

22 LG

6	22 OG	Generation	22 OG/CC, 22 OG/CD, 22 LG/CC, 22 LG/CD, Area22 AGS/CC, 22 MXS/CC, 22 MDG/CC,
	22 LG		
9	22 ARW/CP	CAT	22 ARW/CP
15	184 BW	NMSA	184 BW/CC, 184 LG/CC, 184 MXS/CC

**NOTE 1:** The Chief of Security Forces is designated as coordinating official and entry granting official for all areas when granting unescorted entry authority to security force personnel (except self).

**NOTE 2:** The installation commander may designate other individuals as coordinating officials for restricted areas by signing a properly completed DD Form 577 or letter. The DD Form 577 or letter must specify which restricted areas the individual will be authorized to sign coordinating officials who sign Section IV also serve as the approving officials for granting escort authority.

**NOTE 3:** The 184 th Bomb Wing offices will only coordinate areas “4” and “6” for personnel assigned to the 184<sup>th</sup> Bomb Wing and will coordinate area “15” for all installation personnel.

**NOTE 4:** Designated escort officials must be certified/re-certified annually or when there are substantial changes in the restricted areas. McConnell Form 87, Escort Official Certification, is used in the planning and tracking of the re-certification requirements. Escort officials should be kept to the minimum necessary to accomplish daily requirements.

3.1.5. The AF Form 2586 is delivered to Pass and Registration for badge issuance no later than 90 days after initiation. AF Forms 2586 not meeting this criteria are not processed and will be returned for re-accomplishment. **All dates must be consecutive; i.e., section IV cannot be dated before the requesting official's date in section II. Absolutely no white out or correction tape is authorized on any section of the AF Form 2586; Pen and ink changes are not acceptable on the signature or date blocks.**

**NOTE 1:** Security managers must ensure the information on an individual’s identification card and the AF Form 2586 match exactly. This will ensure that when completed the AF Form 1199 matches the individual’s identification card. Once an AF Form 1199 is issued to an individual if any information changes on that individual’s identification card, the AF Form 1199 will be required to be re-accomplished.

**NOTE 2:** For individuals who are designated as escort officials, a properly completed McConnell Form 87 must accompany the AF Form 2586. McConnell Forms 87 do not have a 90 day expiration date. For personnel going PCA the form will accompany the original AF Form 2586 to the gaining unit as long as all requirements of paragraph 3.1.9.1. are met.

3.1.6. Security managers are responsible for ensuring their assigned personnel receive Phase I, Orientation Training/Phase II, Continuation Training. Additionally, personnel granted unescorted entry must receive training on AFI 31-101 and this instruction with respect to RABs and restricted areas. Document phase I training on the AF Form 2586 in section III for all personnel requesting a restricted

area badge. Prior to the issuance of a RAB a test must be administered by the respective unit security manager. Personnel must achieve a score of at least 80 percent.

**NOTE** The following entries are required to be entered in the duty block of Section III: Duty Title, Security Clearance (Investigation date and date awarded), Security Training date, and the statement, "I have been briefed on the proper display and security of restricted area badges IAW MAFBI 31-101."

3.1.7. RABs are issued on normal duty days by Pass and Registration in building 1115 between 0800 and 1230 by appointment only. Mission-essential issue of RABs may be accomplished after 1230 with prior coordination through Pass and Registration personnel.

**3.1.8. Each individual is Responsible for Properly Displaying, Securing and Repairing Their RAB.**

3.1.8.1. RABs must be prominently displayed on the front of the outer most garment (so it can easily be seen), above the waist and below the neck with the picture facing out.

3.1.8.2. RABs must be secured immediately upon departing a restricted area, regardless of the securing device.

3.1.8.3. Defaced or damaged RABs must be promptly replaced.

3.1.8.4. It is the responsibility of all personnel for the enforcement of the above requirements.

**3.1.9. Badge Reissue.** When a badge contains an administrative error, personnel information changes, is mutilated etc., the individual will report to their responsible security manager. The security manager will accomplish a letter supporting the discrepancy and request re-issuance. The individual will establish an appointment with Pass and ID and bring both the letter and AF Form 2586 to Pass and ID for re-issue.

3.1.9.1. Personnel who PCA to another squadron will obtain the AF Form 2586 and associated documentation from the losing unit security manager and deliver the form to the gaining unit security manager during in-processing. The gaining unit security manager will review the form and documentation, determine if authorized areas will remain the same. If the required authorized areas do not change, then the gaining unit security manager will accept the AF Form 2586 (plus associated documentation) and notify 22 SFS/SFAR by letter, email or fax of person's name, ssn, badge number, card number and losing unit. 22 SFS/SFAR will adjust the person's information on the MRABL and notify the losing unit of the change. If the member will require additional areas or no longer requires the current authorized areas, the gaining unit security manager will accomplish the required documentation and instruct the member to make an appointment with Pass and ID within 90 days of the PCA. The member will bring the current RAB and all AF Forms 2586 (plus associated paperwork) for re-issuance to Pass and ID. Pass and ID will clear the old information and provide the original AF Form 2586 to the appropriate agency. **Exception:** Personnel moving to or from the local Field Training Detachment will be treated as a PCS and will turn-in restricted area badges during out-processing of the current unit. A new badge will be issued during in processing at the new unit.

3.1.9.2. Personnel requiring an addition or deletion of an area will notify their unit security manager. The security manager will make the necessary entries and coordination in Section IV of the original AF Form 2586. In addition the security manager will enter a comment in the remarks section of the original AF Form 2586 indicating the request for adding or deleting the area. This entry

will be signed by the unit commander. The member will proceed with normal processing procedures after obtaining the appropriate coordination and signature.

**3.1.10. Lost or Stolen Badge .** In the event of a lost or stolen badge, personnel must immediately notify their unit security manager and supervisor. The security manager notifies Pass and ID immediately (if after duty hours, first thing next duty day) of the missing RAB and obtains a written statement from the individual as to the circumstances surrounding the loss/theft. The security manager investigates the loss/theft and submits a report to Pass and ID through the Security Forces Administration and Reports Superintendent (22 SFS/SFAR). The original AF Form 2586 is submitted with the loss/theft report.

**3.1.11. Mass Reissue.** Conduct a mass reissue when the restricted area badge loss percentage rate totals 7%, (not including destroyed badges), or when the installation commander loses confidence in the system. Follow guidelines for individual issue and local procedures when conducting a mass reissue.

**3.1.12. Badge Turn-in .** When a person no longer requires entry into restricted areas; i.e., PCS or separation, the badge, along with the AF Form 2586, is taken to Pass and ID. The badge will be destroyed, and the AF Form 2586 is annotated to show badge turn-in. The form is returned to the unit security manager to be kept in a transitory file, the length of which will be determined by the security manager. For all practical purposes, the form may be shredded when notified credentials have been destroyed by the issuing authority.

3.1.13. When a Security Information File (SIF) is established on an individual, they lose unescorted entry privileges. The unit security manager retrieves the badge and takes it along with the AF Form 2586 to Pass and ID who, in turn, destroys the badge and annotates the AF Form 2586 to show destruction. The unit security manager then forwards the respective AF Form 2586 to 22 SFS/SFAIP, Personnel Security, for inclusion in the SIF.

**3.2. PROCEDURES FOR UNSERVICEABLE RABs.** When an entry controller or security forces member discovers a badge needs replacement the holder is instructed to notify their unit security manager and a blotter entry will be accomplished. In cases of mutilation and the security forces member believes the form could be altered in any way, the badge will be confiscated and the member will be given the receipt portion of the AF Form 52, Evidence Tag. The member will be instructed to notify his/her security manager and accomplish the required paperwork for re-issue. The badge and AF Form 52 will be delivered to 22 SFS/SFOX for proper disposition.

**NOTE:** Entry is denied when the RAB is in such a condition that it cannot be positively matched to the individual or second form of identification.

## Chapter 4

### FREE ZONES AND PHOTOGRAPHY PROCEDURES

**4.1. ESTABLISHING FREE ZONES.** Some construction projects and similar activities of a one-time nature within restricted areas may make it inappropriate or impracticable to use the escort procedures described in **Chapter 2** of this instruction and AFI 31-101, as supplemented. The installation commander must approve free zones in non-nuclear restricted areas. Requests to establish free zones must be coordinated with those agencies involved in the project, including the unit commander or agency chief having immediate responsibility for the operational resources of the area, and the responsible security Forces commander. Also, IAW AFR 205-32 entry procedures should be limited or eliminated for construction workers. In such cases, a free zone is established to allow entry to the project work area with a free zone corridor.

4.1.1. When a free zone is used, other security measures are needed to include support force personnel, entry controls, and physical security barriers to maintain the capability to detect unauthorized entry to the restricted area and to free zones. Security afforded the free zone boundary is equal to that given the restricted area boundary. Surveillance over the boundary of the free zone is maintained by the USAF organization or agency most directly associated with the project, as determined by the installation commander and the CSP.

4.1.2. Primary responsibility for free zone surveillance rests with support force personnel, unless otherwise determined by the ISC.

4.1.3. Entry into the free zone is controlled by support force personnel using procedures established by the ISC. It is the responsibility of the USAF agency/organization concerned to prepare an EAL for all personnel requiring entry. The list includes the full name of the individuals and other identifying data; i.e., SSN, working position/rank, etc.

4.1.4. All priority resources are removed from within the free zone boundaries.

**4.2. PHOTOGRAPHING AND SKETCHING WITHIN RESTRICTED AREAS.** Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 795, and Executive Order 4400400, or their successor, DoD Directive 5200.8, and AFI 31-101, photography, sketching, and graphic representations of classified or restricted areas of the airfield are prohibited unless authorized by the installation commander. For the purpose of simplicity, photography is categorized as official or unofficial.

**4.2.1. Official photography .** Photographs taken for government purposes are considered official photos. These photos are **normally** taken by audiovisual service, public affairs personnel, or personnel escorted or sanctioned by either of those two agencies. Government contractors may be authorized to take photos in connection with a government contract. However, these photos require prior approval. Official photography does not require written permission; however, advance notification to the monitoring agency, SFCC, normally prevents delays or interruptions to photographers to verify authorization.

**4.2.2. Unofficial Photography.** Unofficial photography is authorized on the flight line and areas that are designated by area "4" on the restricted area badge. There are some qualifiers that must be observed. You and any guests of McConnell are prohibited from photographing classified material, information or components. **If you're in doubt about an item's classification, don't photograph it!**

Aircraft carrying a Priority higher than "C" and transient aircraft should not be photographed without first clearing it with the visiting aircraft commander. Unofficial photography within the command post must be verbally coordinated with the chief of Wing Command Post. Photography within a controlled area may be authorized by the respective controlled area monitor.

4.2.3. Photography of other areas of MAFB is permitted without approval; however, photographers taking pictures of restricted areas from inside or outside the restricted area boundary may be stopped and questioned/identified by security/support forces.

4.2.4. News media personnel must be escorted by public affairs personnel at all times while on the installation.

4.2.5. All personnel are responsible for detecting and reporting any violation of these photography procedures. Personnel detecting unauthorized photography should notify SFCC. Security forces may confiscate film and have it developed at the photographer's expense to determine film content.

## Chapter 5

### SECURITY REPORTING AND ALERTING

**5.1. GENERAL.** The security reporting and alerting system is a rapid security communications procedure that connects all Air Force bases and commands. This system provides a defense against widespread coordination sabotage by using any error in timing or coordination that could occur in such operations. The success of the security reporting and alerting system depends on the speed with which the report is received at SFCC, command post, and appropriate higher headquarters agencies.

**5.2. REPORTS.** There are two types of up-channel reports that affect MAFB: HELPING HAND and COVERED WAGON. These reports are only used for priority resources/areas located at MAFB.

**5.2.1. HELPING HAND.** An unclassified message relayed by the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC) to the installation command post of an unusual incident, possibly hostile, affecting priority resources. Incidents are reported to the SFCC by any means available by anyone who witnesses or discovers the problem. The installation command post shouldn't immediately relay the information to higher headquarters. The security forces immediately investigate the situation. **Exception:** If you believe a hostile event occurred involving a priority resource, immediately up-channel a COVERED WAGON report. HELPING HANDS involving the Wing Command Post (CP) will be reported to the CSF pending validation of hostile/non-hostile intent.

5.2.1.1. Terminating HELPING HAND Reports. The installation commander has delegated termination authority down to the on-duty security forces flight chief. The installation commander will be informed of all

HELPING HAND actions through the CP. All HELPING HAND reports will be numbered sequentially and reported in Zulu time.

**5.2.2. COVERED WAGON.** Initially, a COVERED WAGON report is an unclassified up-channel telephone report (designator immediate or flash) sent up the same channel and in the same format as a HELPING HAND report. COVERED WAGON reports inform higher level headquarters of an unusual incident (probably or actually hostile) affecting priority resources occurred at an installation or dispersed site. The terminating authority for COVERED WAGONS on MAFB is the **22 ARW/CC**.

5.2.2.1. SFCC will relay all information pertaining to a COVERED WAGON incident to CP immediately.

5.2.2.2. Wing Command Post will relay COVERED WAGON information to HQ AMC Command Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center) as specified in AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*.

5.2.2.3. Each successive command post relays the report, at the same precedence or higher, until it reaches the Air Force Operations Center (AFOC)

5.2.2.4. Report COVERED WAGON incidents as an OPREP-3B BEELINE according to AF reporting instructions in AFMAN 10-206, Operational Reports (RCS: HAF-XOO [AR] 7118, OPREP 3-Operational Event and Incident Report). Include all MAJCOMS/SFS, HQ AFSPA/CC and HQ USAF/SF as an addressee in the "TO" section.

**5.3. PROCEDURES.** Individuals working in and around restricted areas must be alert to detect possible threats to priority resources. Anyone observing a suspicious person or unusual event in a restricted area must initiate a **HELPING HAND** or **COVERED WAGON** report to SFCC. This report must be relayed by the quickest means; i.e., radio, direct line, or commercial telephone to 652-6777. The person making the report must remain in the affected area to assist responding security forces.

## Chapter 6

### SUPPORTING TASKS

**6.1. GENERAL.** Certain units are tasked with various functions and responsibilities necessary to support normal security operations. Each agency or unit tasked must ensure that all sections under their command fulfill their requirements.

**6.2. INSTALLATION SECURITY COUNCIL (ISC).** The installation commander appoints the ISC. The council is composed of the following:

**6.2.1. 22 ARW.**

6.2.1.1. 22 ARW/CV (*chairperson*)

6.2.1.2. 22 ARW/SE

6.2.1.3. 22 ARW/JA

6.2.1.4. 22 ARW/CP

**6.2.2. 22 LG.**

6.2.2.1. 22 LG/CC

6.2.2.2. 22 LG/CD

6.2.2.3. 22 LSS/CC

6.2.2.4. 22 TRNS/CC

6.2.2.5. 22 MXS/CC

6.2.2.6. 22 AGS/CC

**6.2.3. 22 MDG/CC.**

**6.2.4. 22 OG.**

6.2.4.1. 22 OG/CC

6.2.4.2. 22 OG/CD

6.2.4.3. 344 ARS/CC

6.2.4.4. 349 ARS/CC

6.2.4.5. 350 ARS/CC

6.2.4.6. 384 ARS/CC

6.2.4.7. 22 OSS/CC

**6.2.5. 22 SPTG :**

6.2.5.1. 22 SPTG/CC (*Vice Chairperson*)

6.2.5.2. 22 CES/CC

6.2.5.3. 22 SFS/CC (*Recorder*)

6.2.5.4. 22 CS/CC

**6.2.6. Associate Units.**

6.2.6.1. 184 BW

6.2.6.2. AFOSI Et 321 (when requested)

6.2.6.3. 931 ARG/CC

**6.3. SPECIFIC TASKS.** In order to ensure a proper degree of security is maintained, the following designated agencies are assigned the following tasks:

**6.3.1. 22 ARW/CC.**

6.3.1.1. Ensures a high degree of security education and motivation are maintained within the subordinate units and staff agencies.

6.3.1.2. Coordinates with the Chief, Security Forces, on any special requirement not provided for in this instruction.

**6.3.2. 22 ARW/CV.**

6.3.2.1. Acts as chairman of the ISC.

6.3.2.2. Advises the wing commander on ISC problems.

**6.3.3. 22 SUPS.**

6.3.3.1. Ensures suitable cold weather clothing and equipment are issued to the security forces supply section on a priority basis. Clothing and equipment must be completely serviceable.

6.3.3.2. Ensures procedures and priorities for acquisition of items required by security plans and directives for protection of priority resources are established.

**6.3.4. 22 ARW/CP.**

6.3.4.1. Ensures all COVERED WAGON reports received from SFCC are relayed to higher headquarters.

6.3.4.2. Ensures all down-channel alerting messages affecting security received from higher headquarters; i.e., TCAMs, DEFCON changes, and JCS exercise messages, are relayed to SFCC. Ensures SFCC is advised of any changes concerning alert messages or THREATCON changes.

6.3.4.3. Ensures SFCC is provided with advance information on the arrival of special assignment airlift missions or other transient aircraft that require special security operations.

6.3.4.4. Enforces internal security and entry controls for the command post during normal operations.

6.3.4.5. Ensures SFCC is notified of any changes to alert aircraft status.

6.3.4.6. Ensures SFCC is immediately notified of any unauthorized movement of aircraft.

6.3.4.7. Ensures the command post is purged upon implementation of the crisis action team (area 9).

6.3.5. 22 OSS/OSO provides 22 SFS/SFO with a weekly flying schedule.

**6.3.6. Maintenance Aircraft Control Center (Active/Guard).**

6.3.6.1. Ensures coordination with SFCC for movements of aircraft through restricted areas or that cross a restricted area boundary. Ensures all movements or engine start-ups of aircraft are reported. Ensures SFCC is provided with current maintenance schedules and generation flow plans.

6.3.6.2. Ensures immediate notification, once known, to SFCC of generation/degeneration of bomber and tanker aircraft, and the number and locations of loading sites within the mass generation area are furnished.

6.3.6.3. Ensures all HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON messages received over the maintenance expediter system are relayed to SFCC.

6.3.6.4. Ensures SFCC is immediately notified of any unauthorized movement of aircraft reported by flight line personnel.

6.3.6.5. Ensures SFCC is notified prior to all tows into or out of all restricted areas.

6.3.6.6. Ensures all priority aircraft are parked within established restricted areas and ensures SFCC is notified if operational aircraft must be left unattended outside the restricted area so security can be established.

6.3.6.7. Ensures SFCC is notified of any upload or download of aircraft prior to action being initiated.

6.3.6.8. Ensures SFCC is notified when security responsibility is transferred/accepted in the MAPA or hangars.

6.3.6.9. Ensures SFCC is notified when aircraft are left in unusual configuration (i.e. Doors left open, etc.).

6.3.6.10. Ensure SFCC receives a flying schedule, by 0200, each day.

**6.3.7. 22 TRANS/CC.**

6.3.7.1. Will be responsible for escorting passengers and crews to and from aircraft for personnel who do not have unescorted entry upon their arrival and departure. The exception to this is during force generation within the MAPA. 22 Trans personnel do not have escort privileges in area 6.

**6.3.8. 22 CES/CC.**

6.3.8.1. Ensures restricted area escorts are provided for contractor personnel upon initial survey of project. Once work has started, escorts are provided by the organization most directly associated with the contract.

6.3.8.2. Ensures priority installation and repair of all security fencing, lighting, and restricted area signs used in support of priority "B" and "C" resources. Maintenance priorities should be established commensurate to the priority of the area being secured.

6.3.8.3. Ensures the capability to respond to the MAPA immediately to activate the emergency generator should the self-start capability fail to achieve automatic start.

6.3.8.4. Ensures priority maintenance through contracting for cutting vegetation. Maximum height cannot exceed eight inches within the area and outer 30-foot clear zone. Ensure all debris, ridges, depressions, or objects are removed within 30 feet of the outer restricted area boundary.

(which could afford concealment for an enemy or obstruct the view for proper assessment by security forces).

6.3.8.5. Ensures immediate maintenance response for generators supporting priority "A" restricted areas.

6.3.8.6. Ensures procedures are established with EOD to respond, identify and neutralize suspicious devices reported by the security/support forces.

6.3.8.7. Ensures that snow and vegetation in excess of eight inches within the outer 30-foot clear zone is removed.

### **6.3.9. 22 CS/CC.**

6.3.9.1. Ensures normal and emergency maintenance of security force communications on a priority basis. Priorities are outlined in 22 CS Operating Instruction 33-4, "Maintenance Response Priorities and Restoral Precedence."

### **6.3.10. 22 SVS.**

6.3.10.1. Ensures the capability to provide hot meals to on-duty security forces at established hours on a day- to-day basis at an established dining facility.

6.3.10.2. Ensures meals are provided for on-duty security force personnel who cannot eat at an established dining facility through established procedures; i.e., use of AF Form 2039, Ground Support Meal Request/AF Form 812, Meal Order Record.

6.3.10.3. Ensures changes in dining facility and flight kitchen operating hours are provided to all organizational control centers.

### **6.3.11. 22 SFS/CC.**

6.3.11.1. Ensures manning for security of resources IAW appropriate AFI 31 series directives and MAFB ISP.

6.3.11.2. Ensures the implementation and enforcement of stringent entry and internal controls for all restricted areas.

6.3.11.3. Ensures security control centers and associated equipment required by current directives are maintained.

6.3.11.4. Ensures 22 ARW duress codes are published and distributed every six months by 22 SFS/SFOXP or when compromised.

6.3.11.5. Ensures 22 ARW sign/countersigns are published and distributed if needed for generation by 22 SFS/SFOXP.

6.3.11.6. Ensures close liaison with friendly forces regarding security matters.

6.3.11.7. Ensures training is provided for READY personnel when programs are implemented.

6.3.11.8. Ensures operating instructions, special security instructions, and post priority listings are prepared.

6.3.11.9. Ensures a temporary restricted area for transient aircraft located outside an existing restricted area is established and a security response team capable of responding within five minutes to support these aircraft.

6.3.11.10. Coordinates on all security deviations (AF Forms 116, Request for Deviation from Security Criteria) prior to being submitted to higher headquarters.

6.3.11.11. Ensures preparation of the minutes of the ISC (see para 6-2).

6.3.11.12. Ensures the receiving unit of 22 ARW assigned aircraft can support specific security requirements and informs the 22 OG/CC of the status of support.

**6.3.12. AFOSI Det 321.**

6.3.12.1. Ensures a threat analysis for McConnell IAW MAFB OPlan 31-209, AFI 31-101 and higher headquarters contingency directives is provided annually.

6.3.12.2. Ensures investigative services in support of security of Air Force resources are provided.

**6.3.13. 184 MXS.**

6.3.13.1. Ensures coordination with SFCC for movements of aircraft through restricted areas or that cross a restricted area boundary. Ensures all movements or engine start-ups of aircraft are reported. Ensures SFCC is provided with current maintenance schedules.

6.3.13.2. Ensures all HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON messages received over the maintenance expediter system are relayed to SFCC.

6.3.13.3. Ensures SFCC is notified of any unauthorized movement of aircraft reported by flight line personnel.

6.3.13.4. Ensures SFCC is notified on all tows into or out of all restricted areas.

6.3.13.5. Ensures all priority aircraft are parked within established restricted areas and ensures SFCC is notified if operational aircraft must be left unattended outside the restricted area so security can be established.

6.3.13.6. Ensures SFCC is notified whenever security is relinquished or accepted by support force personnel.

## Chapter 7

### TANKER GENERATION PROCEDURES

#### 7.1. The Generation Area.

7.1.1. The Generation Area will be the Mass Aircraft Parking Area (MAPA) or a portion of the Mass Parking Area depending on the number of aircraft to be up-graded. AFI 31-101, Volume 1/ AMC 1, 13.8.1., "security forces will coordinate with maintenance to ensure aircraft are collocated (not dispersed) to avoid additional close boundary sentry posting requirements and to enhance security."

7.1.2. Security Forces Control Center (SFCC) and the Maintenance Coordination Center (MACC) are responsible for close coordination on determining the size of the generation area and which entry control point(s) will remain open.

7.1.3. Once the size of the generation area has been determined, the 22d Security Forces Squadron commander will ensure the proper number of personnel/posts are provided for security of the area.

7.1.4. After posting of the generation area is complete, SFCC will coordinate with MACC, the 184th Bomb Wing Maintenance Aircraft Control Center (a.k.a. 'Guard' MACC) and Wing CP to inform them that the purge of the area is initiated. Entry controllers will stop all traffic into the generation area.

7.1.4.1. MACC and the Guard MACC will inform all non-essential personnel to exit the area to expedite the purge.

7.1.4.2. The purge will start at the north end of the generation area and terminate at the south end of the generation area. The Alert Facility Purge and flight line purge will begin at the same time, utilizing two Military

Working Dog Teams, if available. This will allow time for MACC to remove any non-essential personnel and provides SFS with a logical termination point.

7.1.4.3. Only those personnel with area "6" open on their McConnell issued Restricted Area Badge (RAB), under proper escort or TDY being listed on a properly authenticated EAL will be allowed to remain in the area. Personnel left in the area will be those personnel that are deemed mission essential.

7.1.4.4. Once the area purge is complete, all entry control points will be opened and SFCC will notify MACC, the Guard MACC, the Alert Facility Manager, and CP.

#### 7.2. Entry procedures (Not to a particular aircraft).

7.2.1. Unescorted entry to the area is granted to those personnel with area "6" open on their McConnell issued RAB or being listed on properly authenticated EAL. (Note: Only a SF representative E-6 or above and the Wing Commander or designated representative can authenticate an EAL)

7.2.2. All personnel will have a second form of identification with a picture on it. All military personnel will have their military ID card as their second form of identification.

7.2.3. Inspector General (IG)/MAJCOM/Numbered Air Force (NAF) personnel conducting inspections and personnel assigned to MAJCOM or NAF may be granted unescorted entry, escort authority,

and circulation to the degree specified on their EAL or visit notification letter. The EAL is authenticated by the 22 ARW/CC, 22 ARW/CP, and a security forces supervisor (E-6 or above).

7.2.4. TDY personnel will be listed on a properly authenticated EAL. TDY personnel will have their home base issued USAF RAB and military identification card.

7.2.5. Chemical warfare operations entry into the generation area is authorized with the appropriate AF Form 1199 RAB with the appropriate area open and the proper use of the chemical warfare code. If the entry controller has any doubt about the identity or the security status of the individual or if the code is passed incorrectly, the individual will be detained. In an exercise situation, personnel will de-mask on the spot.

### **7.3. Escorted entry procedures (Not to a particular aircraft).**

7.3.1. Designated escort officials will have a McConnell issued USAF RAB with area "6" open and a typed or stamped letter "E" next to area "6."

7.3.2. All personnel needing escorted entry into the generation area will contact the agency responsible for the visit and arrange for an escort. The escort official must verify all information concerning the individual to be escorted is factual. The escort official will meet the escortee at the Entry Control Point (ECP).

7.3.3. The escortee will not show up at the ECP or attempt to enter the generation area until the escort official is present. The escort official will approach the ECP without escortee and identify himself/herself.

7.3.4. The escort official is responsible for checking the escortee's equipment and hand carried items. Those items the escort official determines are not required for the job will not be allowed to enter and will not be left at the ECP.

### **7.4. Vehicle entry/search requirements for the generation area.**

7.4.1. Personnel authorized unescorted entry into the generation area are required to search their own vehicles.

7.4.1.1. When the vehicle arrives at the entry control point, the entry controller will ask the driver of the vehicle if it has been searched.

7.4.1.2. If the answer is "yes," no further actions are required.

7.4.1.3. If the answer is "no," the entry controller will have the driver do a complete (inside/outside) search of the vehicle prior to allowing entry.

7.4.2. No privately owned vehicles (POVs) are allowed in the generation area except command post controller vehicles when delivering messages during communication outage situations or rental vehicles used by inspection teams and contractor vehicles (i.e. Rockwell, Boeing and Eaton/AIL Corp) which are considered government vehicles while performing official duties.

7.4.2.1. Command post controllers delivering Emergency Action (EA)/Emergency War Order (EWO) messages in support of SIOP Operations during communication outages, are granted entry in their POV based upon:

7.4.2.1.1. A communication outage plan has gone into effect.

7.4.2.1.2. POVs of controllers have a base decal (DD Form 2220, DoD Registered Vehicle) and “CMD POST EMERGENCY” signs in the windshield and rear window and their names appear on a valid propositioned EAL in SFCC. **SPECIAL NOTE:** All controllers **must** conduct a quick search of their vehicle, looking for obvious items that do not belong on or in the vehicle, prior to departing for the generation area.

7.4.2.1.3. These personnel will be pre-announced to SFCC through Wing CP with the following information, i.e. Lt. Jones, last four 2234, driving his POV will be delivering EA/EWO messages to the aircrews. SFCC will call back the Wing CP and verify the information and then notify all generation posts and patrols. Persons delivering EA/EWO’s will be allowed entry based upon successful use of the Distant Recognition Code, accurate pre- announcement or knowledge of the need for such entry. When the Wing CP dispatches individual to a restricted area containing priority “B” resources must inform the SFCC of the vehicle type and number of personnel in each vehicle. The SFCC will verify the data by a call back or by using a direct line. Security and support forces will maintain surveillance of the emergency response forces and ensure all vehicles, personnel and support equipment are removed from the area upon delivery of the message. Security forces surveillance must not degrade the normal security posture. These personnel must depart immediately after delivering the message(s).

7.4.2.2. Rental vehicles used by IG, a staff assistance visit (SAV) team, a maintenance standardization evaluation team (MSET), and other inspection teams identified as such are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the team member is listed on a valid EAL, an identification placard in the windshield and all other requirements for entry are met.

7.4.2.3. Vehicles used by contractors (Rockwell International, Boeing Military Airplanes, and EATON/AIL Corp), identified with company logos, are treated the same as government vehicles and allowed to enter any restricted area, provided the MAFB company manager has submitted a letter to 22 SFS/SFO identifying the mission-essential POVs and the individual driving the vehicle has an MAFB-issued RAB granting unescorted entry for the area being entered and satisfies all other requirements for entry. **Note:** Contractor vehicles should only be allowed when conducting mission essential task on aircraft.

**7.4.2.4. NO OTHER** POVs are authorized in or around priority “B” resources.

7.4.3. The escort official will search vehicles for those personnel being escorted.

## **7.5. Alert/Cocked-On Tanker Entry.**

7.5.1. Aircraft commanders will notify Wing CP when their aircraft are “Cocked-On” or “Uncocked” and Wing CP will in-turn notify SFCC.

7.5.2. All crews, to include crew chiefs, authorized to Alert/ “Cocked-On” aircraft will be listed on an AMC Form 41 (Flight Authorization).

7.5.2.1. The AMC Form 41 is prepared by the 22d Operations Group, staffed by flying squadron personnel or the Operations Group Control Center.

7.5.2.2. The AMC Form 41 can be done on Perform Pro, Form Flow or computer generated, but must be filled out as shown on ([Attachment 3](#)). The authorizing official’s signature validates the form and the aircraft commander’s signature verifies vouching authority of those crew members

with an “asterisk” by their name. **NOTE:** Last minute additions may be hand written however, once the AMC Form 41 is posted in SFCC, any other changes will require a new AMC Form 41 to be generated. **All** information must be legible or the form will be invalid.

7.5.2.3. Authorizing official(s) must be appointed in writing (refer to **Attachment 2**). An SF supervisor in the grade of E-6 or above will authenticate and validate the letter.

7.5.2.4. The Alert Facility Manager will contact SFCC when the AMC Form 41 is ready for pick-up. The on-duty controller will contact either Golf-1 or Security –1 to pick the completed form up. The responding patrol will verify the authenticity of the form by verifying the authorization officials signature against the letter in **7.5.2.3.** above.

7.5.2.5. After authentication of the AMC Form 41, copies will be delivered to Generation/AARP ECPs and area ARTs. The original will be maintained at SFCC.

7.5.3. All visits to cocked alert aircraft must be pre-announced through SFCC. This applies to all air-crew and ground crew members who are listed on the AMC Form 41. Personnel not requesting aircraft entry to a cocked alert aircraft, e.g. AGE personnel performing maintenance on equipment, must be pre-announced to the generation area, but will not be listed on AMC Form 41. **NOTE:** If an aircraft is not “Cocked-On,” pre-announcements are not required.

7.5.3.1. Personnel requesting entry into alert tankers must be pre-announced through the Alert Force Facility Controller or MACC to SFCC, to the specific aircraft they are assigned, who will in turn notify all security post and patrols within the area. The Controllers will have a direct line from the facility to SFCC and Wing CP. These lines will be checked daily during alert operations.

7.5.3.2. SFCC will check these pre-announcements against the AMC Form 41 on the file to ensure personnel pre-announced to aircraft are authorized for that aircraft.

7.5.3.3. Once an individual is pre-announced to an aircraft, the area Alarm Response Team (ART) will check the individual(s) at the aircraft to ensure they were pre-announced to that aircraft.

7.5.4. Personnel needing access to alert aircraft will coordinate through the Alert Force Controller or MACC.

7.5.4.1. If the individual has area “6” open on their RAB they may enter the generation area and wait at the aircraft until the vouching official arrives. The vouching official will physically check the individual.

7.5.4.1.1. Once the whole area is “cocked on” all personnel entering the area will be pre-announced.

7.5.4.2. Individuals requiring escort to the generation area must follow the procedures outlined in **7.3.**

## **7.6. Alert Tanker Klaxon/Emergency Fast Response Procedures.**

7.6.1. Wing CP will notify SFCC of the Klaxon/Emergency Fast Response via direct line, and SFCC in turn will notify all posts and patrols.

7.6.2. All security posts/patrols within their post limits will remove and secure any temporary ropes/stanchions that could obstruct responding crews, taxiing aircraft or become a FOD hazard.

7.6.3. All posts/patrols will ensure any responding vehicle is allowed to enter the area, expedited by using sign/countersign. As a reminder the security person will give a portion of the code and the responding person will give the correct portion to finish the proper code (i.e. the code is "5" the entry controller gives the responding person "3", the responding person will pass "2" back to the entry controller). At no time will the driver of a vehicle have to use two (2) hands to give a reply. This procedure can be used only at an ECP.

7.6.4. Once all responding personnel are in the area, all security forces personnel will take a position of cover (not to get injured and clear of jet blast) where they can still provide security over the generation area. Security forces patrol will assume stand down at points designated in local special security instructions to provide security for aircraft.

#### 7.6.5. Crew Fast Response

7.6.5.1. If the responding crew fails to properly respond to the sign/countersign, the entry controller will:

7.6.5.2. Attempt to stop the responding crew and pass the sign verbally. If correct, the crew will proceed.

7.6.5.3. If incorrect, detain, challenge, and conduct a verification check against the AMC Form 41 with the senior ranking crew member. If positive identification is obtained, allow the crew to proceed.

7.6.5.4. If crew fails to stop, security forces will respond to the aircraft and verbally authenticate with the senior ranking crew member. If the crew is already on board the SFCC dispatcher will contact the CP and authenticate with the senior ranking crew member. If the authentication is correct, allow the crew to proceed.

7.6.5.5. If authentication still cannot be verified, security forces must be prepared to implement HELPING HAND procedures.

### 7.7. Alert Facility Establishment and Entry Control Procedures.

7.7.1. The Alert Facility, Building 978, is a designated controlled area located within the priority "B" restricted area when it is used for billeting the Alert Force. The designated controlled area monitor, as required by MAFB Installation Security Plan Tab T-1-A-1-2 para 2.3.1, is the AFM and his alternate. These individuals will be trained by Security Forces Squadron personnel to accomplish controlled area monitor duties.

7.7.1.1. All personnel who will use building 978, when it has been designated as the alert facility during SIOP generation, will comply with these procedures.

7.7.1.2. The AFM, the alert controllers on duty, and building custodians will have primary responsibility for offices vacated by 22 ARW AGS, 931 AGS, and contractor personnel. This includes those offices opened for access to latrine and shower facilities.

#### 7.7.2. Purge Procedures:

7.7.2.1. Upon notification of generation operations, the AFM and Alert Controller will conduct a joint facility check. The purpose of this check is to identify rooms to be accessed, evacuate all personnel, and secure all exterior doors.

7.7.2.2. The AFM will meet the Flight line Area Security Supervisor (Golf-1) to assist with the facility purge. The Alert Facility purge will be conducted as early as possible in the generation sequence to minimize delays.

7.7.2.3. The purge will be conducted jointly using Explosive Detector Dog (EDD) teams (when available), Golf-1, and two Alert Controllers, one for each EDD team.

7.7.2.4. The AFM will designate an entry controller to stop all entry during the purge.

7.7.2.5. Once the entry controller is posted, Golf-1 will initiate the purge starting on the top floor, and will be conducted South to North, down the stairways and continue on the ground floor North to South.

7.7.2.6. Upon completion of the purge, entry procedures will be initiated.

7.7.2.7. The AFM must ensure Controlled Area signs (AFVA 31-203) are posted on all exterior doors. When not in use, these signs should be stored by the AFM with all checklists and materials used to reactivate the alert facility.

### **7.7.3. Unescorted Entry:**

#### **7.7.3.1. Alert Aircrew Personnel:**

7.7.3.1.1. All personnel on alert must possess a valid RAB, issued for MAFB with area "6" open and listed on AMC Form 41. The AMC Form 41 must be authenticated by the 22 OG/CC or designated representative, verified by the alert aircraft commander, and authenticated by a SF Supervisor (E-6 or above).

7.7.3.1.2. The Alert Controller will verify and compare the information on the AF Form 1199a against the individual and the individual's information on the AMC Form 41.

7.7.3.1.3. The Alert Controller will ask if the individual has searched all hand carried items. If **NO**, or if there is any reason to doubt the status of the items, have the individual search it in the presence of the alert controller. **NOTE:** Classified containers will not be searched in the presence of personnel who are not authorized access to the classified.

#### **7.7.3.2. Non Alert Personnel:**

7.7.3.2.1. All non-alert personnel must be in possession of a valid AF Form 1199a RAB issued for McConnell AFB with area "6" open and be listed on the EAL. The EAL will be authenticated by the 22 OG/CC or designated representative and authenticated by a Security Force Supervisor (E-6 or above).

7.7.3.2.2. The Alert Controller will verify and compare the information on the AF Form 1199a against the individual and the individual's information on the EAL.

7.7.3.2.3. The Alert Controller will ask if the individual has searched all hand carried items. If **NO**, or if there is any reason to doubt the status of the items, have the individual search it in the presence of the alert controller. **NOTE:** Classified containers will not be searched in the presence of personnel who are not authorized access to classified.

### **7.7.4. Escorted Entry to the Alert Facility:**

7.7.4.1. All personnel not authorized unescorted entry will be escorted. Before allowing an individual to enter the controlled area, determine their need for entry. There are two situations requir-

ing escorted entry: escorted entry to the generation area and the alert facility (does not possess AF Form 1199a with area "6" open); escorted to the alert facility only (has area "6" open but is not on EAL or AMC Form 41).

7.7.4.1.1. Escorted entry to the generation area and the Alert Facility. Verify the identity of the escortee through the use of two forms of identification (ID), one of which must be picture ID. The individual(s) must be met at the ECP and escorted into the area by an individual with escort authority.

7.7.4.1.2. Only individuals with the letter "E" next to the open area "6" on the AF Form 1199a are authorized escort authority.

7.7.4.1.3. Ensure the escort official conducts a search of all hand carried items/vehicles in the presence of the escortee and alert aircraft parking area entry controller prior to entry into the generation area.

7.7.4.1.4. Escorted entry to the alert facility only. Escortee must have a valid ID.

7.7.4.2. The Alert Controller will complete the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log for all personnel being escorted.

#### **7.7.5. Emergency Entry:**

7.7.5.1. Emergency Entry is defined as the need for the immediate presence of response elements (security, fire, hospital, etc.) to preclude, limit damage or injury, or to deal with any situation which might endanger the mission. Security Forces must be notified of the emergency to allow responding emergency vehicles immediate entry.

7.7.5.2. Pre-announcement will include the number of vehicles and total number of personnel in each vehicle.

7.7.5.3. The alert controller will allow unimpeded entry based on the above procedure/information.

7.7.5.4. To the greatest extent possible, the alert controller will verify the number of personnel entering the area and monitor all emergency responses until termination.

7.7.5.5. Upon termination of the emergency, all emergency response personnel must depart the area through the ECP. The alert force controller and security force EC will verify that the same number of personnel depart the area as entered. After all emergency personnel have departed, a purge will be conducted by the alert controller and security forces for unauthorized personnel and/or devices.

#### **7.7.6. Cipher Lock Procedures:**

7.7.6.1. The Cipher lock on the main (west) entrance of building 978 will be utilized at all times during exercise and/or real world SIOP operations.

7.7.6.2. The combination will be changed immediately upon initiation of SIOP operations.

7.7.6.3. Ensure this combination is given to the security force area supervisor (Golf-1) for emergency entry only.

7.7.6.4. The combination will only be given to personnel authorized unescorted entry to the alert facility listed on the EAL or AMC Form 41.

7.7.6.5. The combination will be changed weekly during extended alert operations or whenever there is suspicion of compromise.

#### **7.8. Alert Facility Located Outside of Restricted Area:**

7.8.1. If additional crew billets are not located within the alert area, they must be designated as a minimum a controlled area. Security requirements as a minimum are:

7.8.2. All doors and windows must be locked or alarmed.

7.8.3. The owner/user controls entry using a signal badge system and a supporting credential. Cipher locks on exterior doors may be used to control access. If a cipher lock is used, alert force management is responsible for changing and issuing the combinations, and ensuring a copy of the current cipher lock combination is provided to SFCC.

7.8.4. During the hours of darkness, illuminate the outside area around the facility.

7.8.5. Post controlled area signs on doors leading into the facility or on the surrounding boundary. Building walls may be used as the area boundary.

7.8.6. Security will provide periodic patrol coverage.

7.8.7. The owner or user is primarily responsible for security; however, security forces provide emergency response and assistance as needed.

7.8.8. When the installation reaches ThreatCon Charlie or higher, one security force representative will be dispatched to provide additional security.

## Chapter 8

### IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

- 8.1.** An in-flight emergency is when an aircraft in flight has declared a mechanical problem which could hinder continuous flight or result in a serious accident upon landing.
- 8.2.** Notification/initiation of the emergency will be relayed to all responding agencies on the Commanders Information Network (CIN) by Base Operations personnel.
- 8.2.1. All emergency responders will be notified of the type of aircraft, estimated time of arrival, runway the aircraft will be utilizing, nature of the emergency, number of personnel on board, wind speed and direction, amount of fuel on-board, and if there are any hazmats or ordinance on-board.
- 8.3.** Emergency responders will proceed to the areas of the flight line designated by internal operations procedures.
- 8.4.** An in-flight emergency response can only be terminated by the on-duty fire chief.

FREDERICK F. ROGGERO, Col, USAF  
Commander

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****Abbreviations And Acronyms***

**ASCAS**—Automated Security Clearance Approval System

**CAT**—Crisis Action Team

**CIS**—Close-in Sentry

**CISA**—Close-in Security Area

**CPP**—Central Processing Point

**SFCC**—Central Security Control

**CPM**—Maintenance Operations Center

**CWC**—Chemical Weapons Convention

**DNA**—Defense Nuclear Agency

**EAL**—Entry Authority List

**EC**—Entry Controller

**ECP**—Entry Control Point

**EOD**—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

**ESO**—Emergency Security Operations

**EWO**—Emergency War Order

**FCDNA**—Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency

**FMC**—Flight line Maintenance Complex

**IG**—Inspector General

**ISC**—Installation Security Council

**KSANG**—Kansas Air National Guard

**MAFB**—McConnell Air Force Base

**MACC**—Maintenance Aircraft Control Center

**MAJCOM**—Major Command

**MAPA**—Mass Aircraft Parking Area

**MRABL**—Master Restricted Area Badge Listing

**MSET**—Maintenance Standardization Evaluation Team

**NAF**—Numbered Air Force

**Oplan**—Operations Plan

**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility

**POV**—Privately Owned Vehicle

**PRP**—Personnel Reliability Program

**PSI**—Personnel Security Investigation

**RAB**—Restricted Area Badge

**RF**—Response Force

**SAV**—Staff Assistance Visit

**SSF**—Special Security File

**SST**—Safe Secure Transport

**START**—Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

**TCAM**—Threat Condition Alerting Message

**UBS**—Unit Battle Staff

**Attachment 2**

**AMC FORM 41 SIGNATURE LETTER**

XX Nov 98

MEMORANDUM FOR 22 SFS/SECURITY FORCES CONTROL CENTER

FROM: Unit Concerned

SUBJECT: Authorized to Sign AMC Form 41 used for Alert Aircraft Entry

1. The following individuals are authorized to sign the AMC Form 41 used for Alert Aircraft Entry.

John D. Smith, Lt Col,

\_\_\_\_\_

Kathryn S. Thomas, Capt

\_\_\_\_\_

2. If you have any questions, please contact me at x \_\_\_\_.

JOHN D. SMITH, Lt Col, USAF

Commander, XXX Air Refueling Squadron

**Attachment 3**

**AMC FORM 41/FLIGHT AUTHORIZATION**

**Attachment 4**

**DELTA ROW MAP/RESTRICTED AREA**

**Attachment 5**

**ECHO ROW MAP/RESTRICTED AREA**

**Attachment 6**

**MAPA MAP/RESTRICTED AREA**

**Attachment 7**

**HANGARS 1106, 1107, 1166, 1176/RESTRICTED AREA**

## Attachment 8

## POST/PATROL PRIORITY LISTING

<u>POST</u>	<u>POST DESCRIPTION/LOCATION</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
01	Security Forces Control Center (SFCC)	McConnell		01
02	MAPA/Restricted Area ART Leader	Mike 3	01	02
03	MAPA/Restricted Area ART Member	Mike 3a		14
+04	KSANG ART Leader	Jayhawk 3	02	03
++05	KSANG ART Member	Jayhawk 3a		15
+06	ECHO Area ART Leader	Echo 3	03	04
++07	ECHO Area ART Member	Echo 3a		16
+08	DELTA Area ART Leader	Delta 3	04	05
++09	DELTA Area ART Member	Delta 3a		17
10	Base SRT Leader	Mike 6	05	06
11	Base SRT Member	Mike 6a		18
12	East Gate Entry Controller	East Gate		07
13	Base Patrol #1	Police 1	06	08
14	Flight Chief	Security 1	07	09
15	Base Patrol #2	Police 2	08	10
16	West Gate Entry Controller	West Gate		11
17	Asst SFCC	McConnell		13
18	Base Patrol #3	Police 3	10	22
18	Housing Gate Entry Controller	Housing Gate		12
*19	MAPA Mobile Patrol	Mike 4	11	19
**20	MAPA Mobile Patrol	Mike 5	12	20
**22	Base SRT Leader	Mike 7	09	21
**23	Base SRT Member	Mike 7a		22

**NOTE 1:** Lower priority posts and patrols may be pulled to support higher priority posts and patrols at the discretion of the chief of security forces.

**NOTE 2:** Posts/patrols with (+) indicate they will be posted when assigned aircraft are present in the restricted area. Posts/patrols with (++) indicate they are waived through THREATCON Alpha and will be posted in THREATCON Bravo or higher.

**NOTE 3:** Post/Patrols with (\*) indicate they are posted when number of assigned Priority "C" aircraft on the ground is between 33-47 Priority "C" aircraft. Post/Patrols with (\*\*) indicate they are posted when number of assigned Priority "C" aircraft on the ground is 48 or more.

**POSTING CHART FOR THE GENERATION AREA AND ALERT AIRCRAFT REPOSITIONING (AARP) GENERATION AREA**

<u>Post</u>	<u>Post Description</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Radio</u>
01	Alert Reponse Team Leader	<i>Golf-3</i>	M-16	01
02	Alert Response Team Member	Golf-3A	M-16	17
03	Flightline Supervisor	Golf-1	M-16	04
04	Entry Controller	Golf-2	M-16	02
05	Entry Controller	Golf-2a	M-16	05
06	Entry Controller	Golf-2b	M-16	03
07	Close Boundary	Golf-10	M-16	06
08	Close Boundary	Golf-11	M-16	07
09	Close Boundary	Golf-12	M-16	08
10	Close Boundary	Golf-13	<i>M-16</i>	09
11	Close Boundary	Golf-14	M-16	10
12	Close Boundary	Golf-15	M-16	11
13	Close Boundary	Golf-16	M-16	12
14	Close Boundary	Golf-17	M-16	13
15	Close Boundary	Golf-18	M-16	14
16	Close Boundary	Golf-19	M-16	15
17	Close Boundary	Golf-20	M-16	16

**NOTE:** The number of Entry Controllers and Close Boundary Sentries is dictated by the size of the Generation Area.

## AARP

<u>Post</u>	<u>Post Description</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Radio</u>
01	Entry Controller/CBS	Alpha 2	M-16	01
02	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 10	M-16	02
03	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 11	M-16	03
04	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 12	M-16	04
05	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 13	M-16	05
06	Area Supervisor/Alert Response Team Leader	Alpha 3	M-16	06
07	Alert Response Team Member	Alpha 3a	M-16	15
08	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 14	M-16	07
09	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 15	M-16	08
10	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 16	M-16	09
11	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 17	M-16	10
12	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 18	M-16	11
13	Area Supervisor/Alert Response Team Leader	Alpha 4	M-16	12
14	Alert Response Team Member	Alpha 4a	M-16	16
15	Entry Controller/CBS	Alpha 2b	M-16	13
16	Close Boundary Sentry	Alpha 19	M-16	14

**NOTE:** The size and number of AARP areas will dictate the number of Posts/Patrols utilized.

## SECURITY FORCES POSTING CHART

(THREATCON BRAVO)

<u>POST</u>	<u>POST DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
01	East Gate Controller (Alpha Member)	East Gate A	<i>M-16</i>	01
02	Base Entry Controller (Alpha Member)	West Gate A	M-16	02
03	Housing Gate (Alpha Member)	Housing Gate A	M-16	03

## (THREATCONS CHARLIE &amp; DELTA)

<u>POST</u>	<u>POST DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
01	WCP Entry Controller	Whiskey 2	9mm	01
02	WCP Generator Guard	Whiskey 10	M-16	02
03	MAPA Entry Controller	Mike 2	M-16	03
04	MAPA Entry Controller	Mike 2a	M-16	04
05	ALT SFCC Dispatcher	Alpha Control	M-16	05
06	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 10	M-16	06
07	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 11	M-16	07
08	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 12	M-16	08
09	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 13	M-16	09
10	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 14	M-16	10
11	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 15	M-16	11
12	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 16	M-16	12
13	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 17	M-16	13
14	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 18	M-16	14
15	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 19	M-16	15
16	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 20	M-16	16
17	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 21	M-16	17
18	MAPA Close Boundary Sentry	Mike 22	M-16	18
19	LP/OP (Control Tower, Bldg 70)	Oscar 10	M-16	19
20	LP/OP (Old BISS Tower, Bldg 979)	Oscar 11	M-16	20
21	Flightline Gate (Alpha-2 ECP)	Fox 2	M-16	21
22	Flightline Gate (Bravo-2 ECP)	Fox 2a	M-16	22
23	Flightline Gate (Bravo-4 ECP)	Fox 2b	M-16	23
24	Flightline Gate (Fire Department)	Fox 2c	M-16	24
25	Flightline Gate (Munitions Area)	Fox 2d	M-16	25
26/27	Alert Crew Billets Sentry	Charlie 10/11	M-16	26/27

**SECURITY FORCES POSTING CHART  
(THREATCONS CHARLIE & DELTA CONTINUED)**

<u>POST</u>	<u>POST DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
28	Zone 1 SRT Leader	Bravo 6	M-16	30
29	Zone 1 SRT Member	Bravo 6a	M-16	31
30	Zone 2 SRT Leader	Bravo 7	M-16	28
31	Zone 2 SRT Member	Bravo 7a	M-16	32
32	Additional K-9 unit	Police 5	GAU	29
33	Alpha Member Base Patrol #1	Police 1a	M-16	33
34	Alpha Member Base Patrol #2	Police 2a	M-16	34
35	Alpha Member Base Patrol #3	Police 3a	M-16	35
36	Alpha Member Base Patrol #4	Police 4a	M-16	36
37*	Flightline Gate (KSANG Ramp)	Jayhawk 2	M-16	30

**NOTE 1: These posts are manned in addition to normal posting**

**NOTE 2:** Charlie 10-11 will only be posted if the Alert Crew Billets are activated.

**NOTE 3:** \* Indicates post(s) only manned at the discretion of 22 SFS/CC.

**NOTE 4: Flightline** gates on the KSANG side of the base will be posted by 184 BW/SFS or secured.

**NOTE 5: The** SRTs for Zones 1 and 2 will require a vehicle.

**NOTE 6: The** following personnel are required, in addition to the posting chart, and are based on 12-hour shifts, 24 hours a day:

Battle Staff Director	Admin/Manpower
Battle Staff Member	CATM
Building/Equipment Custodian	Bus Driver
SRC Representative	EST X 6
Crisis Action Team	