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*Security*

**INSTALLATION SECURITY INSTRUCTION/  
PHYSICAL SECURITY**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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In accordance with Air Force Instruction 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*, each installation possessing or routinely supporting protection level resources must have an installation security instruction (ISI). The installation commander must issue, approve, and assure implementation of this instruction as an installation directive. This security instruction forms the foundation and directs procedures for normal day-to-day security operations and the establishment of restricted areas in support of aircraft operations. The Privacy Act of 1974 affects this instruction, and is applicable to all military and civilian personnel assigned, attached, or detailed to duty at MacDill Air Force Base (MacDill AFB) who require access to the restricted areas assigned to MacDill AFB. This program requires the continuous attention of commanders, supervisors, and all other base personnel. This instruction also serves as the basis for security planners to develop checklists and operating instructions. Use this instruction in conjunction with AFI 31-101. Increased security operations and/or contingency actions are covered in MacDill AFB OPLAN 31-101, *Installation Security Plan* (ISP). The MacDill AFB installation commander issues this directive in accordance with the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C 797).

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**This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.**

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## Chapter 1

### INSTALLATION SECURITY COUNCIL (ISC)

**1.1. General.** Per this instruction the Commander, 6th Air Mobility Wing (6 AMW/CC), has identified the Installation Security Council (ISC) as the single governing body responsible for installation security. The 6 AMW/CC will chair the ISC and review and approve meeting minutes. In the absence of the 6 AMW/CC the Vice Commander (6 AMW/CV) will serve as the chairman. In the absence of both 6 AMW/CC and 6 AMW/CV, the ISC will be chaired by the Commander, 6th Support Group (6 SPTG/CC). If the ISC is chaired by 6 SPTG/CC, the meeting minutes will be reviewed and approved by 6 AMW/CC. The Chief, Security Forces (CSF), is designated as the recorder and will maintain all records and files pertaining to the ISC. The CSF will also prepare the ISC agenda and schedule all meetings. Membership will include a senior representative from each unit on base whose participation the commander deems necessary. The ISC will meet semiannually at a minimum or more frequently as required to address open items or other areas pertaining to the security of Protection Level resources.

1.1.1. The following agencies are designated primary members of the ISC. Primary members (or their designated alternates) will attend each ISC meeting.

Commander, 6th Medical Group (6 MDG/CC)

Commander, 6th Logistics Group (6 LG/CC)

Commander, 6th Support Group (6 SPTG/CC)

Commander, 6th Operations Group (6 OG/CC)

Commander, 6th Supply Squadron (6 SUPS/CC)

Commander, 6th Civil Engineer Squadron (6 CES/CC)

Commander, 6th Services Squadron (6 SVS/CC)

Commander, 6th Security Forces Squadron (6 SFS/CC)

Commander, 6th Communications Squadron (6 CS/CC)

Commander, 6th Operations Support Squadron (6 OSS/CC)

Commander, 6th Transportation Squadron (6 TRNS/CC)

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Detachment 323

Safety (6 AMW/SE)

US Special Operations Command, Provost Marshall (USSOCOM/SMO)

US Central Command, Provost Marshall (USCENTCOM/CCPM)

**1.2. Special Voting Members.** These personnel will consist of commander/director level when issues directly affecting operations are addressed.

1.2.1. Units/organizations that are affected will be notified prior to or decided upon through the permanent-voting members. Approval authority for these issues must not extend below the deputy or vice level.

1.2.2. Issues affecting special voting members will most often only pertain to resource protection and security operations.

**1.3.** The ISC is vital to the security planning process. The council will:

1.3.1. Select and designate restricted areas, restricted area entry control points, and controlled areas.

1.3.2. Ensure the installation provides adequate personnel, equipment, and facilities for protection level resources.

1.3.3. Monitor on-going security enhancement projects.

1.3.4. Review and approve entry control procedures for free zones.

1.3.5. Review both the installation security plan (ISP) and the ISI Volume 1 and 2 annually.

1.3.6. Conduct annual reviews of all deviations in effect.

1.3.7. Authorize the installation CSF to task other base agencies through the 6th Air Mobility Wing Plans (6 AMW/XP) to prepare applicable annexes pertaining to contingency operations for the Installation Security Plan (ISP).

## Chapter 2

### LOCAL THREAT ASSESSMENT/VULNERABILITIES

**2.1. Local Threat Assessment/Vulnerabilities.** This chapter discusses the local threat assessment and vulnerabilities associated with MacDill AFB. Due to classification of these documents, specific information is intentionally omitted. Copies can be obtained from AFOSI, Detachment 323.

**2.2. Local Threat Assessment.** The local AFOSI, Detachment 323, will prepare and update a local threat assessment and present it to the MacDill AFB Threat Working Group (TWG) for consensus annually. The threat assessment will be briefed at every ISC meeting. After annual review, the intelligence will be disseminated to the CSF and other agencies as determined by the ISC.

**2.3. Vulnerabilities.** The 6 SFS Antiterrorism/Force Protection Section will prepare and update the vulnerabilities associated with MacDill AFB based upon the results of Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA) and other assessments, to include local semiannual assessments. The MacDill AFB vulnerabilities assessment will be updated as required, incorporated into the local threat assessment, and briefed at the ISC.

## Chapter 3

### PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

**3.1. Physical Security Requirements.** This chapter outlines the physical security requirements for establishing and maintaining restricted areas on MacDill AFB. Technical support for these requirements is available by referencing AFI 31-101, AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, or by contacting the 6 SFS/SFOS at DSN 968-2373, or commercial (813) 828-2373. All changes, variations, or deviations from established physical security requirements as outlined in this or higher headquarters (HQ) instructions to permanent or temporary restricted areas established on MacDill AFB must be coordinated through 6 SFS/SFOS.

**3.2. Technologies.** With the availability of new technologies, units will take full advantage of these technologies when establishing, upgrading, or correcting physical security requirements. Procurement of these technologies can be accomplished through various funding avenues.

3.2.1. Prior to the purchase or utilization of any technologies, units must coordinate with 6 SFS/SFOS and receive approval from the ISC. An approval package will be submitted via AF Form 1768, *Staff Summary Sheet*, and must include all support data and technology justification documents, camera, and/or sensor plans indicating placement and ownership. Packages will include the 6 SFS/SFOS in the coordination section.

3.2.2. Examples of technologies currently being utilized on MacDill AFB include the ADVANTOR alarm system for PL4 resources, and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) for flightline operations.

**3.3. Funding.** Funding for physical security matters will be addressed through the ISC. Approved funding will be utilized solely for the purpose of upgrading, maintaining, or correcting physical security matters in relation to PL resources assigned to or hosted by MacDill AFB. The request and approval of funding does not have to be addressed during the semiannual ISC meeting, but must be approved by the voting members of the ISC.

3.3.1. Intrusion Detection Equipment (IDE). IDE funding is the responsibility of the unit that owns or is the primary user of the facility requiring the IDE. Use of commercially leased or purchased IDE is permitted, however, the IDE must meet or exceed all Department of Defense (DoD) standards. Prior to any installation of IDE equipment, a site security survey must be conducted by the 6 SFS/SFOS to ensure the IDE being purchased meets or exceeds these standards. All requests for acquisition or modification of alarm systems must be coordinated through, and approved by, the ISC before contract tendering. **NOTE:** Coordinate all purchases of commercial IDE with the installation civil engineer squadron and communications squadron to ensure compatibility with previously installed IDE equipment. All IDE systems being sought for MacDill AFB will include a maintenance contract with the IDE installer. The pricing and terms of the maintenance contract will be explained in the contract.

**3.4. Facilities.** Units housing PL3 resources within facilities (i.e., hangars) must ensure that these facilities meet the minimum requirements as outlined in AFI 31-101, AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, or this instruction. Currently on MacDill AFB, all facilities housing PL3 resources meet these requirements. It is the responsibility of the 6 SFS/SFOS to ensure these and any new facilities meet requirements.

**3.5. General Physical Security Requirements.** The below information outlines the minimum physical security requirements for PL2 or 3 restricted areas: **NOTE:** PL1 restricted area requirements are not

addressed since MacDill AFB does not normally support PL1 resources. If PL1 resources arrive at MacDill AFB, they will be provided the physical security requirements as outlined in AFI 31-101.

3.5.1. Make restricted areas as small as possible to eliminate the need for securing and maintaining unnecessary terrain. Consider the quantity of Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources to be protected, nature of the operational mission, and general terrain characteristics when deciding area size and configuration. Based upon the type and quantity of resources assigned to MacDill AFB, current restricted areas are configured in such a manner to safely operate.

3.5.2. When possible, locate the boundary barrier for restricted areas at least 250 feet from the base perimeter or property line.

3.5.3. Do not routinely establish more than one entry control point for each restricted area. Base its location on operational requirements and logical routes of travel. The Installation Security Council (ISC) will decide whether additional entry points are needed and where to place them. **NOTE:** Do not establish additional entry points for the purpose of providing more or easier routes of travel (convenience) for personnel working in restricted areas. Additionally, the ISC will establish procedures to ensure additional entry control points can be closed during maintenance non-duty hours and during increased force protection levels. Limit the number of restricted area entry control points to the absolute minimum based on mission needs. Due to location of support facilities and size of the permanent restricted areas, MacDill AFB has more than one ECP per restricted area. These ECPs are not based upon convenience, but upon operational necessities. Procedures for closing the additional (non-priority) ECPs during increased force protection conditions will be determined by owner/user personnel based upon operational needs.

3.5.4. Marking of restricted area boundaries. Clearly mark the boundary of each restricted area. Mark the boundary of mass parking and temporary restricted areas with an elevated boundary marker, if possible. Elevated barriers are the standard within Air Mobility Command (AMC). The ISC must determine areas, in conjunction with airfield management, that cannot have elevated barriers due to airfield restrictions. Those areas must have markings that are visible during periods of darkness and reduced visibility. For units with Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) missions and other alert aircraft missions, elevated barriers must be applied to mark temporary restricted areas during Alert Aircraft Relocation Plans (AARP). For purposes of standardization, the following are considered elevated barriers:

    Type A fencing

    Stanchions with red rope and restricted area signs

    Jersey barriers

    Planting blocks

    Other concrete formations used to block entry

3.5.4.1. If elevated markers cannot be used, mark the boundary with a painted line four to six inches wide (red orange, fluorescent, or reflective paints are acceptable), tape, rope, chain, or like devices. These devices should be of the same color and placed on the ground or parking surface. The permanent restricted areas assigned to MacDill AFB are marked with red/orange painted lines. Temporary restricted areas are established for transient aircraft by using ropes and stanchions.

3.5.5. Lighting. Adequate restricted area lighting is necessary during periods of reduced visibility and darkness to enable Security Forces to monitor likely avenues of approach to restricted areas and Protection Level resources.

3.5.5.1. Security Forces will know the location and operation of all flightline and maintenance hangar lighting. Security Forces will check once daily all restricted area/flightline lighting. Discrepancies will be annotated in the Security Forces Control Center blotter and reported to the civil engineer work order desk (urgent work order). Security Forces planners will monitor the progress of these work orders. When necessary, the Maintenance Activity Control Center (MACC) will be contacted to supply light-alls for areas with deficient lighting.

3.5.5.2. The mass parking area is illuminated with ballpark type lighting.

3.5.5.3. Distinguished visitor aircraft parking lighting is sufficient with present supplemental lighting.

3.5.5.4. Aerospace Ground Equipment will provide portable light to all units to illuminate all aircraft parked in temporary restricted areas in support of direct flying operations or as directed by the installation commander.

3.5.5.5. No additional lighting is needed for random entry control point checks. Lighting for entry control points for alert aircraft is required at all times during hours of darkness and reduced visibility. Depending on the location of alert aircraft, additional light-all support may be required to supplement present lighting.

3.5.5.6. When in-place lighting is insufficient to provide adequate lighting for direct flying operations, the Security Forces Control Center will contact the MACC and request light-all support. Restricted areas and protection level resources in direct support of flying operations will receive priority attention for light-all support.

3.5.6. Clear Zones for Restricted Areas. Create a clear zone for permanent restricted areas that contain Protection Level 1 and 2 resources and for new areas (built after 3 October 1988) that contain Protection Level 3 resources that are upgraded to Protection Level 1 or 2 during contingencies. Major commands (MAJCOM) specify clear zone requirements for restricted areas with Protection Level 3 resources that are not upgraded during contingencies. In accordance with AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, clear zones for PL 3 areas must be established. Make the clear zone 30 feet where possible. If roads, buildings, and other obstructions are within the clear zone, security deviations are not required.

3.5.6.1. Clear Zone Specifications. Use the following procedures to create a clear zone.

3.5.6.1.1. Level a belt of land at least 30 feet on both sides of a single boundary barrier.

3.5.6.1.2. Level at least 30 feet inside the inner fence, the entire area between fences, and 30 feet outside the outer fence for dual fences. **NOTE:** Areas with animal control fences are not considered to have a dual fence.

3.5.6.1.3. Remove all possible dips, ridges, ditches, and objects that could conceal an intruder or obstruct vision.

3.5.6.1.4. Position poles (lighting, power, camera, etc.), overhead wires, and other features so they cannot be used to circumvent the sensor system or fence.

3.5.6.2. Vegetation Control. MAJCOMs determine the height of vegetation. It must be kept at a height to not allow concealment of an intruder. **NOTE:** Trim or prune vegetation to avoid removing plants preventing ground erosion and cutting down protected plants. AMC installations will keep vegetation trimmed to no greater than eight inches inside PL 1 and PL 2 restricted areas and within clear zones. Vegetation control for PL 3 restricted areas and clear zones will be determined by the ISC, but will not allow concealment of an intruder. The maintaining of clear zones will be coordinated through Chugach ground maintenance personnel by owner/user personnel or Security Forces as deemed necessary.

3.5.7. Free Zones. A free zone is established in restricted areas when normal circulation control procedures would be inappropriate. Free zones are established by the ISC. If a contractor is doing the work, the installation contracting officer will give the contractor a letter signed by the installation commander or the group commander responsible for the security of the area, outlining the responsibilities of the contractor. The request will be coordinated with those agencies involved in the project, including the unit commander/agency chief having immediate responsibility for the operational resources involved, and through the installation CSF. The 6 SFS/Flightline Constable at extension 8-2045 will be the point of contact for coordination through the CSF.

3.5.7.1. Normally, free zones are only established for construction projects and other similar activities that must take place inside the restricted area. **NOTE: It is the responsibility of the commander responsible for the area to ensure that no PL resources are maintained within the free zone.**

3.5.7.2. The organization or agency most directly associated with the work to be accomplished in the free zone is responsible for:

3.5.7.2.1. Monitoring the free zone boundary.

3.5.7.2.2. Providing sufficient personnel as escorts. **NOTE:** Security Forces will not be used as escorts.

3.5.7.2.3. Preventing unauthorized entry into the restricted area.

3.5.7.2.4. Ensuring the free zone boundary is marked with an elevated boundary and identified as a free zone.

3.5.7.2.5. Ensuring the integrity of the free zone boundary is maintained.

3.5.7.2.6. Ensuring contractors responsible for work in free zones are aware of contractor security responsibilities.

3.5.7.2.7. Ensuring SFCC is notified when opening/closing free zones.

3.5.7.3. This boundary is considered an extension of the restricted area boundary. Violations of the free zone boundary will be enforced in the same manner as a penetration of the restricted area boundary.

3.5.7.4. Free zones must be closed and secured at the end of the workday. Responsible units will contact the SFCC when opening and closing free zone operations. Security Forces will conduct a check of the area to ensure all personnel have departed, and to ensure that the boundary is in-place when free zones are closed.

## Chapter 4

### RESTRICTED AREA DESIGNATIONS

**4.1. Restricted Area Designations.** The ISC identifies and establishes restricted (either permanent or temporary) areas. The installation CSF must be involved in the planning phase for any new restricted areas, and changes in the size, location, or construction to existing restricted areas, or in the immediate vicinity surrounding a restricted area.

**4.2. General Requirements:** Restricted areas built after October 1988 containing protection level resources that can be upgraded to Protection Level 2 during contingency are required to have a clear zone. Security Forces planners will work closely with civil engineers and the ISC to ensure the following to the greatest extent possible:

- 4.2.1. Level a 30-foot belt of land on both sides of the single boundary to the restricted area.
- 4.2.2. Remove all possible dips, ridges, ditches, and other objects, which could conceal an intruder or obstruct the view of the clear zone.
- 4.2.3. Ensure vegetation in and around restricted areas and clear zones is maintained at a level that will not conceal an intruder.

**4.3.** The following designated restricted areas are located on MacDill AFB. It is unlawful to enter these areas without the specific written permission of the installation commander. Security standards for restricted areas are contained in AFI 31-101. Restricted areas are established pursuant to DoD Directive 5200.8, Security of DoD Installations and Resources, and Section 21 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50 U.S.C. 797), and are identified by restricted area warning signs. The installation commander has the authority to establish temporary restricted areas within the 6 AMW area of responsibility. These areas are listed in the following order of importance:

- 4.3.1. Protection Level 1 (PL1) Areas: There are no permanently designated Protection Level 1 restricted areas on MacDill AFB. Transient Protection Level 1 aircraft may arrive at MacDill AFB. Security for these aircraft will be provided in accordance with AFI 31-101, AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, and other pertinent directives (e.g., DoD 5210.41-M).
- 4.3.2. Protection Level 2 (PL2) Areas: Aircraft placed on alert status are considered PL2 and will be positioned in the Alert Aircraft Parking Area (Mole Hole Area). The Alert Aircraft Parking Area is located on the southwest portion of the base on taxiway "I" (India) near Building 1105. A painted 4-6 inch red/orange reflective line (minimum) is used to identify the boundary for this restricted area. Elevated barriers will be installed on areas when they will not impede aircraft movements on the taxiways or parking ramp. Restricted area warning signs will also be painted onto the cement and pavement. These signs will be on the outside of the restricted area boundary at 100-foot intervals and where boundaries make abrupt changes in direction. Otherwise, there are no permanently designated Protection Level 2 restricted areas on MacDill AFB. A Protection Level 2 restricted area may be established if the need arises (e.g., arrival of in-transit aircraft). Security for PL2 aircraft will be provided in accordance with AFI 31-101 and AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101.
- 4.3.3. Protection Level 3 (PL3) Areas: All military aircraft, regardless of branch of service, will be provided, as a minimum, security equivalent to Protection Level 3 aircraft. Joint Regulation AR 190-16/AFR 207-4/MCO 5500.13A/DLAR 5710.4 will be used to implement additional security

requirements as needed or requested by the aircraft commander will be used. Aircraft that must be parked outside permanently identified restricted areas will have a restricted area established around them using stanchions, ropes, and restricted area signs. Additionally, Security Forces will be posted as required in accordance with AFI 31-101.

4.3.3.1. The 6 AMW mass aircraft parking area is designated a Protection Level 3 restricted area (when aircraft are present) and will encompass the north ramp, to include the wash racks, extending along the northwest boundary of the ramp. The restricted area is considered basically the ramp area of the flightline from aircraft parking spot A-1 to A-15 on the north ramp. This area normally contains KC-135 tankers and EC-135 aircraft assigned to MacDill AFB. Different types of PL3 resources may be secured in this area upon the approval of the CSF or higher authority. This area is designated area #4 on the AF Form 1199, USAF Restricted Area Badge (RAB). For aircraft and airfield safety, type fencing cannot be used as a barrier to mark the aircraft mass-parking ramp. A painted 4-6 inch red/orange reflective line (minimum) is used to identify the boundary for this restricted area. Elevated barriers will be installed on areas when they will not impede aircraft movements on the taxiways or parking ramp. Restricted area warning signs will also be painted onto the cement and pavement. These signs will be on the outside of the restricted area boundary at 100-foot intervals and where boundaries make abrupt changes in direction. The physical security provided to this area will consist of one Internal Security Response Team (ISRT) (Alpha – 1), and one External Security Response Team (ESRT) (Sierra – 1) during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.2. Hangar 4 has been designated a restricted area when aircraft are present. This hangar normally houses C-37 aircraft used for Commander in Chief (CINC) support. This area is designated area #4 on the AF Form 1199 RAB. A painted 4-6 inch red/orange reflective line (minimum) is used to identify the boundary for this restricted area. Elevated barriers will be installed on areas when they will not impede aircraft movements on the taxiways or parking ramp. Restricted area warning signs will also be painted onto the cement and pavement. These signs will be on the outside of the restricted area boundary at 100-foot intervals and where boundaries make abrupt changes in direction. The physical security provided to this area will consist of owner/user personnel providing internal circulation and control with one External Security Response Team (ESRT)(Sierra – 1) during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.3. Transient Protection Level 3 aircraft will arrive periodically at MacDill AFB and will be parked inside a permanently established restricted area (i.e., mass aircraft parking area) when operationally feasible. If not feasible (and coordinated with 6 SFS/SFO), the transient alert ramp will become a temporary restricted area and aircraft will be positioned within this area. The transient ramp is located from the ramp area adjacent to fuel pit 16 to fuel pit 25 on the south ramp of the flightline. Aircraft maintained within the temporary restricted area will be roped and stanchioned with restricted area signs and established entry control point. Security to these aircraft will be provided in accordance with AFI 31-101 and AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101. The physical security provided to this area will consist of one ISRT (Tango – 1), and one ESRT (Sierra – 1) during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.4. The 6th Communications Squadron Satellite Earth Terminal Facility located in Building 1750 (a fenced-in complex adjacent to the South Ramp) is designated area #9 on the AF Form 1199 and is also designated a Protection Level 3 restricted area. The cipher locks and on-duty

Controller control entry into the Satellite Earth Terminal facility. During increased Force Protection conditions (Force Protection Condition CHARLIE or higher), 6 CS/CC will post an Entry Controller. The on-duty Controller has escort authority for this area and can vouch for any person(s) needing entry into the Satellite Earth Terminal Facility. Restricted area warning signs are also required on the perimeter of this area, along with other AFI 31-101 physical security mandates. The physical security provided to this area will be in accordance with AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, Para 13.5.1. Additionally, one ESRT (Sierra – 1) will provide 5-minute response during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.5. The Command Post, located in Building 54, maintains the same priority as the highest permanently assigned protection level resource on the installation and, in most cases at MacDill AFB, it is designated a PL3 asset. This restricted area also includes the Command Post generator and antenna array on the north side of Building P-9. This area is designated as area #1 on the AF Form 1199. The Command Post Battle Staff located within Building P-9 is designated as area #2 on the AF Form 1199. Entry into the Command Post, generator, and antenna array are controlled by the on-duty Command Post Controller. During increased Force Protection conditions (Force Protection Condition CHARLIE or higher), or as directed by the installation commander, Security Forces may control entry into the Command Post and Command Post generator via an authenticated entry authority list (EAL). The on-duty Command Post Controller has escort authority for this area and can vouch for any person(s) needing entry into the Command Post. Restricted area warning signs are also required on the perimeter of this area, along with other AFI 31-101 physical security mandates. The physical security provided to this area will be in accordance with AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, Para 13.5.1. Additionally, one ESRT (Sierra – 1) will provide 5-minute response during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.6. Aircraft Maintenance Hangars: A temporary restricted area will be created inside maintenance hangars with rope and stanchions or painted red lines when Protection Level resources are present. The Protection Level of the hangar will be in accordance with the type of resource as directed by AFI 31-101. Restricted area warning signs will be placed around the resource, to include on office doors leading into the restricted area. This area is designated area #4 on the AF Form 1199. If painted red lines and ground painted warning signs are used, these signs will include the statement, “when aircraft are present”. Security Forces will provide response to hangars containing Protection Level resources. Maintenance personnel will secure all entrances to the hangar at the end of the duty day. Interior doors (such as office doors) leading into the restricted area must also be posted with restricted area warning signs.

4.3.3.7. The 347th Wing, Detachment 1, Air Combat Command (ACC) Transient Aircraft Parking Area: Located between Buildings #70 and #71. Protection Level aircraft will be parked in a restricted area designated by red lines and restricted area signs painted on the ground. This area is designated a temporary restricted area when aircraft are present. This area is designated area #4 on the AF Form 1199. If painted red lines and restricted area signs are not available, the restricted area will be established using stanchions, ropes, and restricted area signs. Temporary duty (TDY) personnel will provide internal and external security and controls. **NOTE: Depending upon current manning and operational requirements, a 6 SFS radio will be provide to the internal security personnel for sounding the alarm. Additionally, in the event that a response is required, the 6 SFS will provide an ESRT (Sierra – 1). These items will require prior coordination and approval through 6 SFS/SFO.**

4.3.3.8. The South Ramp Transient Aircraft Parking Area: Located between Buildings #826 and #829. Protection Level aircraft will be parked in a restricted area designated by red lines and restricted area signs painted on the ground. This area is designated a temporary restricted area when aircraft are present. This area is designated area #4 on the AF Form 1199. If painted red lines and restricted area signs are not available, the restricted area will be established using stanchions, ropes, and restricted area signs. The physical security provided to this area will consist of one Internal Security Response Team (ISRT) (Alpha – 1), and one External Security Response Team (ESRT) (Sierra – 1) during Force Protection Condition Normal. For increased force protection conditions, refer to the ISP.

4.3.3.9. Security arrangements for MacDill AFB assigned aircraft flying missions to other locations must be coordinated prior to departure. AFI 31-101, Chapter 14, addresses specific procedures to ensure adequate security for deployed or aircraft otherwise away from home station. Assistance can be obtained by contacting the 6 SFS/SFO staff.

## Chapter 5

### RESTRICTED AREA CIRCULATION CONTROL

**5.1.** Personnel wishing to enter the restricted areas designated in **Chapter 4** of this instruction must obtain permission from the Installation Commander prior to attempting to enter any restricted area assigned to MacDill AFB. The procedures for obtaining permission are outlined in **Chapter 6** of this instruction and below.

**5.2.** Restricted area entry control points (ECP) are selected and designated by the ISC. ECPs will be kept to the absolute minimum and will not be established based on convenience. The KC-135 mass aircraft parking area (North ramp) has five vehicle/pedestrian entry control points. The South ramp has two vehicle/pedestrian entry control points. The DUC ramp has three vehicle/pedestrian entry control points. The Transit ramp has two vehicle/pedestrian entry control points. The Mole Hole ramp has one-vehicle/pedestrian entry control point. The Satellite Earth Terminal Facility has one vehicle and one pedestrian entry control points. The Wing Command Post has one pedestrian entry control point.

5.2.1. Restricted area boundaries will be identified as outlined in AFI 31-101, Chap 11.3.

5.2.2. Entry control points will be identified by a 41 foot by 10 foot wide, white lined box area with large red "ECP" letters.

**5.3.** Restricted Area Badge (RAB). The AF Form 1199, RAB, has several series: AF Form 1199 (Blue); AF Form 1199A (Green); AF Fm 1199B (Pink); AF Form 1199C (Yellow); AF Form 1199D (blue); and AF Form 1199CD RAB (White). The AF Form 1199B is used on MacDill AFB. A computer generated AF Entry Control Card will replace the AF Form 1199B through attrition.

5.3.1. Areas used on AF Form 1199B/AF Entry Control Card.

Area 1 - Command Post

Area 2 – Crisis Action Team/Battle Staff

Area 4 - Mass Parking Areas/Aircraft Maintenance Hangars

Area 9 - Earth Satellite Terminal

5.3.2. Wear of the Restricted Area Badge. In accordance with AFI 31-101, the RAB will be displayed at all times while inside a restricted area. The RAB will be secured to the wearer by means of an alligator clip, armband, parachute cord, or similar device. All personnel entering an entry control point will display a RAB worn above the waist on the outermost garment. The badge will not be obstructed from view and will be easily visible to all personnel working inside the area. Once an individual(s) departs the restricted area, the badge will be removed and secured from view. Display of the RAB outside of a restricted area is prohibited. If the RAB is displayed in the plastic armband, the armband will be removed outside of the restricted area. The RAB may be removed when performing intake or exhaust inspections or maintenance in the immediate vicinity of operating aircraft engines. Upon completion of the inspection or maintenance, the badge will again be displayed.

5.3.3. For restricted areas containing Protection Level 3 resources, any person possessing a valid AF Form 1199B or AF Entry Control Card for that area may perform duties as an escort official for that

area. No designation of this authority is required on the AF Form 2586, Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate, or AF Form 1199. However, areas that are upgraded to a higher Protection Level during contingencies, or aircraft in Protection Level 2 alert status, will have selected personnel designated as escort officials via an EAL. For Protection Level 1 and 2 areas, individuals will be identified by an "E" on the EAL next to the areas in which they are authorized to act as escort officials.

5.3.4. Temporary duty (TDY)/deployed personnel will use their home base RAB for entry into restricted areas. The squadron for which the TDY/deployed personnel are assigned will furnish an EAL for all personnel to 6 SFS/SFO for proper authentication and distribution. For transient aircrews, crew orders can serve as an EAL if the following information is provided on the orders: name, rank, last six numbers of social security number (SSN), organization, badge number, clearance status, dates of visit, and expiration date. The aircrew orders will be authenticated by the aircraft commander and a Security Forces member (E-6 or above). Copies of all EALs/aircrew orders will be maintained by the Entry Controller (if posted), along with the ISRT and the ESRT responsible for the area, and the SFCC, and will serve as a supporting technique for personnel entering the area.

#### 5.4. General Entry Control Procedures.

5.4.1. Unescorted Entry. Personnel who possess a valid restricted area badge have unescorted entry authority for the area(s) that are not blacked out on the badge. Personnel will enter and exit only through designated ECPs unless coordinated in advance with the SFCC. Unannounced violation of a restricted area boundary is a **HELPING HAND** and violators will be detained/apprehended.

5.4.1.1. Before allowing entry, entry controllers (EC), when posted, will physically inspect each person's restricted area badge and visually compare the individual against the badge. RABs will be worn at all times within the restricted area unless otherwise dictated by safety considerations (e.g., engines running). When using the single credential entry procedures, one of the following supporting techniques will also be used:

5.4.1.1.1. Personal Recognition. Used only after the entry controller has established the individual's authority to enter the area. Personal recognition is defined as knowing the person's rank, last name, and organization without first referring to any identification.

5.4.1.1.2. Signature or Credential Check. Picture and/or signature on the DD Form 2, Armed Forces Identification Card, or similar personal identification credential may be compared with the data on the RAB.

5.4.1.1.3. Authenticated EAL. This list may be a computer product, card file, AF Form 2586 file, message, or letter. Entry controllers will compare information on the EAL with the data on the restricted area badge.

5.4.1.2. ECs will confiscate mutilated restricted area badges and deny entry to personnel having damaged entry credentials until the RAB is repaired or replaced. Examples of damaged entry credentials include disfigurement to the point of not being able to read the information on the badge, being able to gain access to the photograph through the lamination, etc. All confiscated restricted area badges will be seized via AF Form, 52, Evidence Tag, and forwarded to Security Forces Investigations for disposition.

5.4.1.3. Hand-carried items for temporary Protection Level 1 areas will be searched by the EC. The individual requesting entry will search hand-carried items for Protection Level 2 and 3 areas. When the individual approaches the ECP, the EC will ask the individual whether all hand-carried

items have been searched. If the hand-carried items have been searched, the individual is allowed to proceed. If not, the EC will direct the individual to inspect each hand-carried item.

5.4.1.4. If multiple personnel approach an ECP for entry into a Protection Level 1 or 2 restricted area, all individuals will be checked. For Protection Level 3, when an EC is posted and not conducting random ECP checks, only one individual's restricted area badge needs to be verified, although additional support techniques may be used for access control as listed above. The person checked can vouch for everyone else, however, each individual must have their restricted area badge to enter the area unless under escort.

5.4.1.4.1. The requirement for unescorted entry into restricted areas must be validated to the installation commander or designated representative by the commander or person in charge of a TDY element. A message, TDY orders, or a letter may serve this purpose.

5.4.1.4.2. Information Required on EALs. Information includes the requester's organization, that unescorted entry is requested, the area(s) to which the individual(s) needs entry, beginning and ending dates access is required, the signature of the unit commander or designated representative, and information on each person to include:

Last name, first name, and middle initial

Grade or rank

Last six of the SSN

Organization

Badge number

Security clearance

Escort authority, if required

5.4.1.4.2.1. EALs are approved by signature of the 6 AMW/CC or designated representative. Those designated representatives are the Vice Commander (6 AMW/CV), Commander, 6th Logistics Support (6 LG/CC), 6 SPTG/CC, and Commander, 6th Operations Group (6 OG/CC). All EALs must have an approval authority signature before Security Forces authentication. The 374 Wing, Det I/CC is the approval authority for ACC deployments only.

5.4.1.4.2.2. EALs not in accordance with the above stated requirements will not be accepted for authentication by Security Forces personnel.

5.4.1.4.2.3. All EALs will be authenticated by a Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-6 or above.

5.4.1.4.2.4. Copies of EALs can be made after they are authenticated.

5.4.1.4.2.5. Security Forces Operations will distribute the authenticated EAL to the SFCC, who will ensure it is distributed to all posted sentries.

5.4.1.4.2.6. The Security Forces supervisor's signature on the EAL signifies that they received the EAL from an authorized official and indicates to Security Forces members

that the document was distributed to their post through the Security Forces chain of command and is an authentic document.

5.4.1.4.2.7. Pen and ink additions or deletions on the EAL are not authorized. **EXCEPTION:** In accordance with AMC Sup 1 to AFI 31-101, pen and ink deletions are authorized for MAJCOM Inspection Teams for administrative errors.

5.4.1.4.2.8. All changes must be made on a separate memorandum, authenticated, and attached to the original EAL.

5.4.1.4.2.9. Restricted area escort authority will be recognized when annotated on the EAL.

5.4.1.4.3. Telephone/Radio Verification. This requires the control center of the person requesting entry to preannounce the individual's need to enter the restricted area to the SFCC. The SFCC will call the initiating control center to verify the information and, in turn, notify the respective entry controller.

5.4.1.4.4. Sign and Countersign. Though not routinely used at MacDill AFB, a sign/countersign may be used to facilitate emergency entry into restricted areas during contingencies. SFOS will develop and distribute the sign/countersign listing as required.

5.4.1.5. Vehicle Entry. Personnel introducing a government owned vehicle (GOV) to a restricted area must ensure the vehicle poses no threat to the protection level resources in the area. Vehicle operators must conduct a check of their vehicle for unauthorized material/explosive devices. This check should be conducted prior to initial operation and after extensive periods when the operator cannot observe the vehicle. Privately owned vehicles (POV) are prohibited from entering into restricted areas. Commercial vehicles, contractor vehicles, government leased, and specialized vehicles operated by an authorized or properly escorted person may be operated within restricted areas when their entry is necessary for the performance of official duties. These vehicles must have a magnetic POV cone issued by Base Operations (Hangar 3). The escort will verify to the entry controller, when posted, that the vehicle does not contain any unauthorized persons or materials. In restricted areas, the escort will ride in the cab area of the vehicle or in an accompanying vehicle, keeping all escorted persons under surveillance and control at all times.

5.4.1.5.1. Entry controllers, when posted, will ask vehicle operators to vouch for the security of their vehicle. If vehicle operators cannot vouch for the security of the vehicle, the operator will be directed to conduct a search prior to being allowed entry to the area. For vehicles entering a temporary Protection Level 1 area, the operator and the entry controller will conduct a joint search of the vehicle.

5.4.1.5.2. POVs and rental vehicles utilized for TDY personnel are authorized on the flightline by Base Operations and will be treated as GOVs.

5.4.1.5.3. All vehicles operated in restricted areas are subject to search by Security Forces personnel.

5.4.1.5.4. Any vehicle operated by an individual under escort must be inspected by the escort official. The escort official must verify that an inspection was conducted in accordance with para. 5.3.1.5.1. above.

5.4.1.5.5. Vehicles will enter and exit restricted areas only through designated ECPs unless coordinated in advance with Security Forces. Unannounced violation of a boundary is a **HELPING HAND** and violators will be detained or apprehended. Vehicles authorized to enter/exit restricted areas through other than established entry control points with preannouncement to the SFCC are:

5.4.1.5.5.1. Vehicles dispatched from the area or arriving at the area in direct support of the imminent launch or recovery of aircraft assigned to the area. Example: Follow-Me vehicles, tow vehicles.

5.4.1.5.5.2. Emergency vehicles if an emergency situation exists (after verified by an on duty Security Forces member).

5.4.1.5.5.3. Vehicles transporting munitions. Munitions control will contact SFCC to coordinate movements bound for the area. Personnel transporting munitions from the area coordinate their departure with Security Forces in the area.

5.4.2. Escorted Entry. Personnel who do not possess a valid restricted area badge, but require entry to a restricted area must be escorted into the area by authorized escort officials. All personnel requesting escorted entry into a restricted area must have an official need to be in the area. The escort official will verify this need.

5.4.2.1. Preannouncing visitors is not required for Protection Level 3 restricted areas. However, escort officials must accompany the visitors to and from the ECP.

5.4.2.2. The unit/agency for/with which the individual works will ensure that a proper escort official is assigned. Contractors will be escorted by the agency requesting the work. Should an individual requiring escorted entry arrive at the area prior to the escort official, he/she will stand/park away from the entry control point so as not to hinder traffic or the entry controller (as applicable).

5.4.2.3. Upon arrival at the entry control point, the escort official will present their RAB to the entry controller, if posted, and verify they are escorting the individual. Once the entry controller has verified the credentials of the escort official, normal entry will be granted.

5.4.3. Escort Officials. Unit security managers conduct Phase I and Phase II Physical Security Awareness Training using locally developed lesson plans to formally certify escort officials. Unit lesson plans will be revised and approved by the Security Forces administration flight. An escort official acts on behalf of the installation commander for the purpose of granting entry to a restricted area. For restricted areas containing only Protection Level 3 resources, all individuals possessing a valid restricted area badge for the area may act as escort officials. Escort officials for Protection Level 1 and 2 areas will be identified on the EAL by a large capital letter "E" to the right of the area(s) in which they are authorized to perform escort duties. Transient aircrew members may be identified as escort officials by the aircraft commander on properly authenticated aircrew orders.

5.4.3.1. Escort officials are responsible for the safety and security of all personnel they escort while in the restricted area and must keep all escorted personnel under constant surveillance and control. Escort officials are responsible for briefing escorted personnel in the presence of the entry controller.

5.4.3.2. Escort officials are responsible for briefing all visitors on restricted area procedures and security responsibilities prior to entering the restricted area.

5.4.3.3. Escort officials search any hand-carried items and vehicles belonging to the escorted person prior to entry.

5.4.3.4. Internal Controls. Escort officials must only escort the number of personnel they can effectively control. The ratio of escorts to escorted personnel will not exceed one escort for every five escorted personnel, unless waived by the restricted area coordinating official for that specific area (e.g., aircraft mass parking area ramp, 6 LG/CC). Personnel under escort must be under the observation of the escort official at all times while in the restricted area. At no time will a person under escort be left unattended.

5.4.4. Change of Escort Official. Once a person has been escorted into a restricted area, the escort official may turn that individual over to anyone possessing a valid RAB for the area. This change must occur in person with the escort official, the escorted individual, and the person assuming escort responsibilities. All personnel must understand their responsibilities.

5.4.5. Security Forces personnel posted in support of Protection Level resources will not perform duties as escort officials. Military personnel performing duties as escort officials will be in uniform.

**5.5. Specific Unescorted Entry Control Requirements and Procedures.** The following are specific procedures used to grant unescorted entry to the restricted areas on MacDill AFB:

5.5.1. Mass parking area (North Ramp).

5.5.1.1. Owner/user personnel and Security Forces patrols will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD with area 4 open displayed.

5.5.1.2. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry authority are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series RAB with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.1.3. Transient aircrew members will have their home station RAB verified against authenticated crew orders. Transient aircrew members will be required to give a copy of their crew order to Base Operations.

5.5.1.4. When entry controllers are posted for random checks or security contingencies, individuals requesting entry will surrender their restricted area badge to the entry controller. The entry controller will compare the photograph with the person presenting it and use one of the supporting techniques outlined in para 5.3.1.1. to verify the individual's identity.

5.5.2. Aircraft maintenance Hangars 1 through 4. Part of the hangar will be a restricted area only when aircraft are present. The restricted area will be established in accordance with para 3.2.3.5.

5.5.2.1. Owner/user personnel and Security Forces patrols will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD with area 4 open displayed.

5.5.2.2. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series restricted area badge with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.2.3. Transient aircrew members will have their home station RAB verified against authenticated crew order.

5.5.2.4. When entry controllers are posted for random checks or security contingencies, individuals requesting entry will surrender their RAB to the entry controller. The entry controller will com-

pare the photograph with the person presenting it and use one of the supporting techniques to verify the person's identity.

5.5.3. 6 AMW Alert Tanker Aircraft. Personnel requesting entry must be preannounced (when required) by the MACC through the SFCC, who will notify the entry controller prior to the individual approaching the aircraft. These individuals will possess an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD RAB, area 4 open, and be listed on a properly authenticated Alert Aircraft Entry Authority List, Alert Aircraft Crew Orders, or AMC Form 41, Flight Authorization.

5.5.3.1. Owner/user personnel and Security Forces patrols will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199 CD with area 4 open displayed.

5.5.3.2. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry authority are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series RAB with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated Alert Aircraft Entry Authority List or Alert Aircrew Orders.

5.5.3.3. Individuals requesting entry will surrender their RAB to the entry controller. The entry controller will compare the photograph with the person presenting it and verify the information against a properly authenticated Alert Aircraft Entry Authority List or Alert Aircrew Orders.

5.5.4. Transient Aircraft Parking Ramp (South Ramp). Parts of the south ramp become restricted areas only when aircraft are present. Restricted areas will be established in accordance with para 3.2.3.1.2.

5.5.4.1. Owner/user personnel and Security Forces patrols will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD with area 4 open displayed.

5.5.4.2. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry authority are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series RAB with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.4.3. Transient aircrew members will have their home station RAB verified against authenticated crew order.

5.5.4.4. When entry controllers are posted for random checks or security contingencies, individuals requesting entry will surrender their RAB to the entry controller. The entry controller will compare the photograph with the person presenting it and use one of the supporting techniques to verify the individual's identity.

5.5.5. 6 AMW Command Post. When entry controllers are posted, individuals requesting entry will surrender their RAB to the entry controller. The entry controller will compare the photograph with the person presenting it and verify the information against a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.5.1. Owner/user personnel will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD with area 1 open displayed.

5.5.5.2. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry authority are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series RAB with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.6. 6 AMW Crisis Action Team/Battle Staff. Manned only during contingency operations.

5.5.6.1. When manned, individuals requesting entry will surrender their RAB to the entry controller. The entry controller will compare the photograph with the person presenting it and verify the information against a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.6.2. Owner/user personnel will ensure that personnel working in the area have an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD with area 2 open displayed.

5.5.6.3. TDY personnel granted unescorted entry authority are required to have their home station AF Form 1199 series RAB with any area open and be listed on a properly authenticated EAL.

5.5.7. 347th Wing, Det 1, ACC Transient Aircraft Parking Area: Restricted area only when aircraft are present. When ACC aircraft are parked in the restricted area, entry will be authorized based on an authenticated EAL and a home station RAB for TDY/deployed personnel or MacDill AFB 1199B or 1199CD or with open area 4 for permanent party personnel.

**5.6. Specific Escorted Entry Control Requirements and Procedures.** The following are specific procedures used to grant escorted entry to the restricted areas on MacDill AFB:

5.6.1. Mass Parking Area (North Ramp).

5.6.1.1. Escorted entry will be in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.1.2. Escort officials will perform duties in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.2. Aircraft Maintenance Hangars 1 through 4.

5.6.2.1. Escorted entry will be in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.2.2. Escort officials will perform duties in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.3. 6AMW Alert Tanker Aircraft (Protection Level 2).

5.6.3.1. Personnel requesting escorted entry must be preannounced (when required) through the Command Post/MACC to SFCC who will notify the entry controller prior to the individual approaching the aircraft or arriving at the area.

5.6.3.2. Personnel requiring escorted entry will be escorted by the aircraft commander or designated representative as identified on the alert aircraft entry authority list or alert aircrew orders.

5.6.3.3. The escort official will conduct a visual inspection of all items hand-carried by the individual under escort.

5.6.3.4. Internal Controls. Personnel under escort must be under the observation of the escort official or escort at all times while in the restricted area. At no time will a person under escort be left unattended.

5.6.4. Transient aircraft parking ramp (South Ramp). Parts are restricted only when aircraft are present.

5.6.4.1. Escorted entry will be in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.4.2. Escort officials will perform duties in accordance with paragraph 5.3.2.

5.6.5. The 6 AMW Command Post.

5.6.5.1. Individuals requiring escorted entry to the 6 AMW Command Post will be logged in and out on an AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log, by the escort official.

5.6.5.2. The escort official will conduct a visual inspection of all items hand-carried by the individual under escort.

5.6.6. The 6 AMW Crisis Action Team/Battle Staff. Manned only during contingency operations.

5.6.6.1. Individuals requiring escorted entry into Battle Staff will be logged in and out on an AF Form 1109, Visitor Register, by the escort official.

5.6.6.2. The escort official will conduct a visual inspection of all items hand-carried by the individual under escort.

5.6.7. 347th Wing, Det 1, ACC Transient Aircraft Parking Area: Restricted only when aircraft are present.

## 5.7. Special Entry Procedures.

5.7.1. US Customs, Department of Agriculture, and Immigration and Naturalization officials may require escorted entry to aircraft for the purpose of conducting official inspections. Base Operations will maintain a list of local US Customs, Department of Agriculture, and Immigration and Naturalization personnel and provide escorts after determining a valid need for entry into the flightline area.

5.7.2. Transient Aircrews

5.7.2.1. Unescorted entry is granted based on a properly authenticated EAL or properly authenticated aircrew orders and home station AF Form 1199 series RAB.

5.7.2.2. Authentication for transient aircrew orders is accomplished by the on-duty Security Forces flight chief (E-6 or above).

5.7.3. TDY Personnel. Unescorted entry is granted based on a properly authenticated entry authority list (EAL) and home station AF Form 1199 series RAB.

5.7.4. Emergency Entry. Emergency response vehicles may enter a restricted area through the most expeditious route. Their route will be preannounced to Security Forces. As soon as conditions permit, emergency response forces will be positively identified and cleared for access to the area by Security Forces. Exit will be made through the ECP, unless a secondary emergency response arises. Should a situation occur inside a restricted area that requires emergency response, Security Forces will implement the following procedures:

5.7.4.1. SFCC will be notified of any emergency inside a restricted area by Security Forces or support agencies. If the notification is received from the support agency, the SFCC will confirm the emergency through posted Security Forces. Entry is not granted solely on the basis of emergency lights and sirens. SFCC will notify all posts and patrols of the following information:

5.7.4.1.1. Nature of the emergency.

5.7.4.1.2. Location of the emergency.

5.7.4.1.3. Which emergency agency will be responding.

5.7.4.1.4. Which entry points will be used (if posted).

5.7.4.2. The Flight Chief or posted ISRT/ESRT will confirm the information and authenticate with the control center operator using applicable Security Forces authentication procedures.

5.7.4.3. Emergency vehicles and personnel are continuously monitored by security or supporting forces (owner/user when present) while inside the restricted area. SFCC dispatches patrols to monitor the emergency unit from their point of entry until their departure. The senior Security

Forces person on-scene coordinates security actions with the emergency team chief, usually the Fire Chief.

5.7.4.4. Emergency personnel responding to temporary restricted areas containing Protection Level 1 resources will be kept under continuous surveillance by Security Forces while in the area. Upon termination of the emergency, all personnel will be logged in on the AF Form 1109, and all vehicles will be searched prior to departing the area.

5.7.4.5. The following agencies are authorized to enter restricted areas under emergency conditions and do not require an AF Form 1199B or 1199CD RAB.

6 MDG (Hospital)

6 CES/CEF (Fire Department)

6 SFS

6 CES/CEX (Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD))

5.7.5. Controlling entry.

5.7.5.1. Preparing for entry. ECs (when posted), Internal Security Response Teams (ISRT), External Security Response Teams (ESRT), and motorized patrols will be dispatched by SFCC to ECPs or gates to control entry.

5.7.5.2. Once a vehicle approaches the EC (when posted), pass the vehicle driver part of the distant recognition code.

5.7.5.3. If the vehicle driver responds properly to the distant recognition code, allow entry.

5.7.5.4. Repeat the same procedures for each vehicle entering.

5.7.6. Duress procedures. Improper response to the distant recognition code indicates the vehicle occupants may be under duress and a HELPING HAND will be implemented. Personnel are kept under observation until investigation by Security Forces confirms or denies the duress situation. Once the situation is declared a false indication or the actual duress is terminated, the vehicle(s) may proceed.

5.7.7. Termination.

5.7.7.1. Upon termination of the emergency, the senior Security Forces person on-scene organizes Security Forces to conduct a sweep of the affected area(s) to ensure no unauthorized vehicles, personnel, or equipment remain in the area.

5.7.7.2. Security Forces will monitor the emergency vehicle(s) and personnel to the ECP where normal exit processing is accomplished. Direct the vehicle(s) to depart through an authorized ECP.

5.7.7.3. Discrepancies between the number granted entry and the number departing will result in a HELPING HAND.

5.7.7.4. Personnel authorized unescorted entry or personnel under proper escort do not have to leave the area.

5.7.8. Emergency exit.

5.7.8.1. When possible, SFCC will be notified of the total number of personnel departing in the emergency vehicle(s) to include the names of casualties, if known. The names of the individuals will not be transmitted over the radio.

5.7.8.2. The senior Security Forces person on-scene will ensure all RABs and weapons (if applicable) are retrieved from injured personnel and properly secured.

5.7.8.3. The EC, when posted, allows expedited exit, maintaining a count of personnel and vehicles allowed emergency exit (distinctive between emergency personnel and casualties escorted and unescorted).

5.7.9. Normal exit. Normal exit procedures will be used during exercises, testing, or evaluation of emergency response actions. When casualties are ready for transport, exercise evaluators will declare an administrative "Time Out" to allow them to properly process out of the area.

**5.8. Passenger Escort:** Terminal personnel will escort all aircraft passengers and baggage to/from the terminal and designated aircraft. These escorts will have an AF Form 1199 with the appropriate area open. At no time will passengers be allowed on the flightline without an escort.

**5.9. Visitors.** Visitors need specific approval before they may be escorted into a restricted area. Individuals assigned to the installation or who need to enter a restricted area to perform official duties are not considered visitors. The installation commander or coordinating official may approve visits to nonnuclear restricted areas by US citizens and local or regional news media. Visit requests by national level news media must be approved by Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Public Affairs (HQ AMC/PA). Individuals requesting visits must formally request approval beforehand. Address the request to the installation commander with copies to HQ AMC.

5.9.1. Visit request letters must include:

Name, SSN, Rank, Duty Title

Security Clearance

Military, Government, or Civilian agency affiliation.

Date of proposed visit

The installation sponsoring the visit

Reason for the visit

5.9.2. Visit requests to restricted areas by foreign nationals or foreign news media must be approved in accordance with AFI 31-101, AMC Sup I, paragraph 9.12.2.2.

**5.10. Inspector Entry Procedures.** Security of priority resources cannot be degraded for the inspection process. This section outlines the specific entry procedures used by Security Forces and owner/user personnel during an inspection.

5.10.1. Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Inspector General (USAF IG), HQ AMC IG, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

5.10.1.1. Members of Air Force inspection teams sanctioned by the Air Force Inspector General qualify for unescorted entry to all restricted areas, except exclusion areas, where they qualify for

escorted entry. **NOTE: Even though inspector personnel are authorized unescorted entry, inspectors should be accompanied by host personnel.**

5.10.1.2. Members of the DTRA, when conducting surveillance, autonomous, or over-the-shoulder inspections, receive the same authorization, provided the requirements of AFI 31-101, Vol 1, are met. DTRA members require a DNA Form 442, Defense Nuclear Agency Identification Badge, or FCDNA 239, Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency Identification Badge, valid military ID card, and a valid, authenticated EAL.

5.10.2. Permanent members of the AMC IG Team use home station RABs. These badges have all areas open and the words "AMC IG TEAM" typed above the photograph. These badges are valid only when accompanied by an authenticated EAL.

5.10.3. Augmenters to the AMC IG inspection team use their home station badge supported by a separate authenticated IG Team Augmenter EAL.

5.10.4. When the team arrives, they will bring a permanent and augmenter EAL. The EALs will be received by a member of the 6 SFS/SFO staff. The staff member will verify the EAL against each inspectors home station restricted area badge for authenticity and administrative errors. Upon completion of the verification, the EAL will be approved by the Wing Commander or designated representative and authenticated by a Security Forces member in the grade of E-6 or above. Once the EALs are authenticated they will be distributed to all restricted and controlled areas under the purview of the inspection.

5.10.4.1. Unescorted entry is granted by checking the inspector's badge against the EAL. Badges must be verified each and every time entry is requested.

5.10.4.2. At the beginning of an inspection, inspectors may request entry prior to delivery of an EAL. Entry will be allowed only after verification with SFCC.

5.10.4.3. IG team members are not permitted to act as escort officials.

5.10.5. Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) Teams. SAV personnel must be listed on an EAL specifying the areas to which access is granted. Grant SAV team members unescorted entry into controlled and restricted areas and escorted entry into exclusion areas based on their home base AF Forms 1199 and the SAV EAL. Entry is granted after verifying the badge against an authenticated EAL.

5.10.6. 6AMW Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) Inspectors. The same procedures stated in para 7.2.5. above will be utilized for entry of 6 AMW EET inspectors in restricted areas.

**5.11. Entry Control Procedures During Chemical Environments.** Chemical codes as outlined in para **9.5.1.1.** of this instruction allow the entry controller to identify personnel and allow entry to restricted areas and individual resources using Restricted Area Badges and codes. Additionally, these procedures may be used during restricted area exit.

5.11.1. Chemical codes utilized at MacDill AFB are a pre-designated portion of an individual's social security number. Chemical Codes are necessary when personnel are wearing gas masks and other protective gear that prevent visual identification of the wearer.

5.11.2. In a chemical environment, a chemical code will be designated such as the last two numbers of an individual's social security number. EXAMPLE: If the chemical code is the last two numbers, the subject seeking entry will approach the entry control point with his/her restricted area badge on the

exterior of the protective gear. The entry controller will visually verify that the badge is authentic and the subject is authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area. The entry controller will also verify the individual's information on the Entry Authority List if one is being utilized. The entry controller will then ask the individual in a clear voice for the "CHEM CODE". The individual should reply with the last two numbers of his/her social security number. If the individual replies with the improper chemical code the entry controller will initiate challenge procedures. If more than one person approaches the entry control point, all personnel will be asked for the chemical code separately.

5.11.2.1. Chemical codes will be issued only when the situation demands its use.

5.11.2.2. Chemical codes will only be issued to personnel authorized entry into restricted areas.

5.11.2.3. Distance Response codes are still utilized in Klaxon situations that occur in a chemical environment.

## Chapter 6

### SECURITY CREDENTIALS (AF FORM 1199)

- 6.1.** This chapter describes the control and issuance of the security credential used at MacDill AFB.
- 6.2.** Security Forces will issue the AF Entry Control Card, which will be used for unescorted entry into restricted areas on MacDill AFB. Restricted area badges (RAB) will be issued only to those personnel receiving a favorable personnel security investigation in accordance with DoD 5200.2-R/AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, and who possess a valid need to be in the area. Security managers will be trained by 6 SFS/SFA on applicable procedures.
- 6.3.** Unit Security Managers are responsible for completion, in duplicate, and coordination of AF Form 2586, Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate, prior to the badge being issued by 6 SFS/SFA. The completion of the AF Form 2586 will be done in accordance with AF 31-101, para 9.2. The security manager will ensure all investigative requirements are satisfied and individuals are properly trained and tested in restricted area entry and internal security control procedures prior to requesting a RAB.
- 6.4.** Each unit security manager will conduct a physical audit each year of all AF Forms 1199 issued to his/her unit not later than 1 October. The inventory will be accomplished by compiling a roster of assigned or attached personnel. Personnel not present (leave, sick, TDY, etc.) will be reported upon return to duty. The completed roster will be forwarded to 6 SFS/SFA not later than 15 October. The 6 SFS/SFA will verify rosters against AF Forms 2586 on file. Discrepancies will be resolved between 6 SFS/SFA and the unit security manager.
- 6.5.** Individuals designated as restricted area coordinating officials (see listing below) must serve in positions with direct responsibility for the applicable restricted area and be identified by a letter, with original signatures, listing all individuals authorized to sign sections II and V of the AF Form 2586. The responsible unit commander/agency chief will ensure the letter is on file at 6 SFS/SFA and updated as required. The letter will specify area(s) to which the person may authorize access. Write-in changes to this information are not acceptable. Individuals may not authorize themselves.
- 6.6.** RABs will not be issued to individuals who do not routinely work in restricted areas at least twice a week. RABs will not be issued for the convenience of not having to identify escort officials.

**6.7. Coordinating Officials:** The installation commander has designated group, deputy group, or squadron commanders with ownership responsibility of the resources within the restricted area to sign as approving official in section IV of the AF Form 2586. Operations officers may be designated as approving officials when the squadron commander is not available due to TDY, leave, or hospitalization. The installation commander has designated the installation CSF as the coordinating official for all areas for Security Forces. See para **9.4.** for documentation requirements. The following individuals are designated base coordinating officials for the restricted areas indicated and will designate coordinating officials for their respective restricted areas:

**UNIT/POSITION**

6 LG/CC

6 AMW/CP

6 CS/CC

**AREA/RESTRICTED AREA BADGE NUMBER**

Aircraft Mass Parking Ramp (Area #4)

Command Post (Area # 1) and the Battle Staff (Area #2)

Satellite Earth Terminal Facility (Area #9)

## Chapter 7

### RESTRICTED AREA BADGE REISSUE/ACCOUNTABILITY

- 7.1.** This chapter describes the reissue and accountability of the restricted area badges used on MacDill AFB.
- 7.2.** Mass reissue of restricted area badges will occur when there is a compromise, possibility of a compromise, or a badge loss of 10 percent of total badges issued. This percentage is based on the total number of like badges in issue at the time and the protection level of the area(s).
- 7.3.** A mass badge issue is not required when unit designations change. Use the new designator during issue of new badges and eliminate old badges through attrition. Ensure Security Forces is aware of the change. When an individual changes squadrons but remains in the host wing, a new AF Form 2586 and restricted area badge need not be accomplished. As a minimum, the gaining squadron commander will determine the need for the individual to retain the restricted area badge if no areas are to be added or deleted. Notify the badge issuing official, in writing, and annotate the duty block on the original AF Form 2586.
- 7.4.** All individuals departing the installation permanent change of station will outprocess Reports and Analysis (6 SFS/SFAR). The badge issuing official will receive all personnel departure notices from the Military Personnel Flight and establish a suspense system for retrieving badges and copies of AF Form 2586 for departing personnel at least one working day prior to departing.
- 7.5.** Unit security managers will be notified and the restricted area badge immediately returned to 6 SFS/SFA when no longer required by the individual(s) to whom it was assigned due to transfer, separation, no longer requiring entry, etc. Unit commanders will develop procedures to return the AF Form 1199 along with the unit copy of AF Form 2586 for personnel who are discharged, injured, or physically incapable of performing assigned duties. Unit commanders will develop procedures to ensure that personnel out-process via 6 SFS/SFA and turn in their AF Form 1199 prior to final departure.
- 7.6.** Reports and Analysis is responsible for destruction of all badges that are turned in, confiscated, or found in accordance with applicable directives.
- 7.7.** A Master Restricted Area Badge Listing (MRABL) will be prepared monthly and used as an aid in accounting for issued restricted area badges. The listing will be maintained at the SFCC and at 6 SFS/SFA. The list should be updated daily reflecting the restricted area badges currently in issue, to whom issued and the organization, and last 6 digits of each individual SSN. The listing will be authenticated by the supervisor of the badge issuing office or alternate and secured when not in a continuously manned control center. The listing is considered a single document, provided the pages are not separated and the required authentication with original ink is on the first page, indicating the total number of pages and signature of the authentication official on the first page. The MRABL will not be used as an EAL.
- 7.8.** Lost or Stolen Restricted Area Badge Procedures.

7.8.1. Each individual issued a restricted area badge (RAB) is responsible to safeguard it against loss, theft, or unauthorized use. Although not classified, a restricted area badge will be afforded maximum protection to prevent its use to gain unlawful entry into a restricted area.

7.8.2. If a blank badge is missing, the CSF will conduct a thorough investigation to determine the reason for the loss. The investigating official will determine if an AF Form 3545 and AF Form 1168 need to be accomplished. If the bearer loses the badge, an AF Form 1168 will be accomplished and the responsible commander or designee will investigate the loss before a badge can be reissued.

7.8.3. File a copy of the report of investigation with the original AF Form 2586. The purpose of the investigation is to determine if the lost badge may compromise the installation security program and detect abuse of the system. If a badge is found after the series has been replaced and all logs are already destroyed, complete an AF Form 310, Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate, and maintain it in a transitory file for at least three months.

7.8.4. Once the investigation is completed, the security manager responsible for the individual who reported the badge lost or stolen will review the report to determine if negligence was involved. If negligence was involved, it will be the decision of the individual's commander whether to re-issue the badge. The unit security manager will complete a memorandum to 6 SFS/SFA requesting that the badge be re-issued which will be maintained by SFA. This letter along with the completed investigation report and AF Form 2586 will be hand-carried by the security manager to 6 SFS/SFA for badge re-issue.

## Chapter 8

### AIRFIELD PHOTOGRAPHY

**8.1.** This chapter describes the requirements for taking photo and video images of the MacDill AFB airfield and surrounding areas.

**8.2.** Owner/user and Security Forces will stay alert to identify any unofficial photography, filming, or audio recordings. In the event an individual is detained, Security Forces will confiscate the film and get all pertinent information on the individual to include home address. The film will be recorded on AF Form 52, and forwarded to Security Forces Investigations (6 SFS/SFOI). 6 SFS/SFOI will develop the film, via the base photo lab, and mail all prints not depicting restricted areas or protection level resources to the owner. A blotter entry and AF Form 3545, Incident/Complaint Report, will be completed.

**8.3.** All photography in or around restricted areas or Protection Level resources within the legal confines of MacDill AFB is prohibited unless coordinated as outlined below.

#### 8.3.1. Official Public Affairs Tours:

8.3.1.1. Public Affairs (6 AMW/PA) will coordinate the dates and locations of all official base tours with the following listed agencies to ensure no classified actions are in progress:

Agency to be photographed

Security Forces Operations (6 SFS/SFO)

Airfield Management (6th Operations Support Squadron (6 OSS/OSAA))

Command Post (6 AMW/CP)

8.3.1.2. News media personnel photographing on MacDill AFB must be escorted by Public Affairs personnel at all times.

8.3.1.3. No specific passes are required by personnel when accompanied by Public Affairs personnel.

8.3.1.4. Public Affairs personnel are responsible for the control of all personnel on the tour.

#### 8.3.2. Non-Public Affairs Tours:

8.3.2.1. Personnel wanting to take photographs when not on an official Public Affairs tour must coordinate all requests through Base Operations.

8.3.2.2. Base Operations will maintain a log of all photographic requests approved by listing the individual's name, date, and sponsor (if any).

8.3.2.3. Base Operations will coordinate the dates and locations of all photographic activities with the following listed agencies to ensure no classified actions are in progress:

Agency to be photographed

Security Forces Operations (6 SFS/SFO)

Airfield Management (6 OSS/OSAA)

Command Post (6 AMW/CP)

8.3.2.4. Once clearance has been coordinated, Base Operations will issue the requester a locally produced "photo pass" and brief the individual on authorized areas to photograph and flightline security procedures.

## Chapter 9

### SECURITY OPERATIONS

**9.1.** The SFCC is a combined law enforcement desk/central security control and, as such, a controlled area. The mission of base Security Forces is to provide a secure environment that allows the 6 AMW to conduct ground and air operations.

**9.2.** Posting Priority. Posting of Security Forces will always be accomplished based on the Protection Level of the resource and current FPCON in accordance with the established post priority charts. Security Forces personnel will not be used for base details when posts supporting priority resources would go unmanned or when the Security Forces workweek would exceed that of the general installation military population. The installation CSF has the authority to determine which post will go unmanned during personnel shortages. The post priority chart has limited distribution and is maintained by the 6 SFS/SFO.

9.2.1. Posting of Protection Level 1 posts will, if applicable, always take precedence over posting of Protection Level 2 and Protection Level 3 posts.

9.2.2. Posting of Protection Level 2 posts will, if applicable, always take precedence over posting of Protection Level 3 posts.

**9.3.** Security Forces associated with Protection Level 2 and Protection Level 3 are entry controllers, close boundary sentries, security response teams, and mobile patrols. Security Forces will, as a minimum, have gas mask, body armor, helmet, ear protection, handcuffs, and foul weather gear immediately available when posted in support of protection level 1, 2, or 3 resources. Additional required equipment will be as required by the CSF.

**9.4.** Minimum arming/ammunition requirements for Security Forces personnel will be as follows:

9.4.1. Personnel performing law enforcement functions and all flight chiefs and flight commanders will be armed with the M-9 pistol with 30 rounds of ammunition.

9.4.2. Personnel performing duties in direct support of Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources will be armed with the M-16 rifle with 120 rounds of ammunition. Additionally, the ISRT and ESRT will be armed with a M203 Grenade Launcher and M-249 automatic rifle in accordance with AFI 31-101, if available.

9.4.3. Entry controllers in nonnuclear areas whose place of duty is inside a facility or building housing resources will be armed with an M-9 pistol with 30 rounds of ammunition.

9.4.4. Additional arming/ammunition requirements is left to the discretion of the CSF based on the local threat, geographical location of resources, and safety considerations.

9.4.5. The arming of qualified support personnel will be at the request of the CSF and approved by the ISC based on the threat and current manpower.

9.4.6. Each entry control point to Protection Level 2 or higher restricted areas that have aircraft parked in it will have an EC posted unless the ECP is physically closed (i.e., barriers, cones, etc.).

**9.5.** Security Reporting and Alerting System (SRAS): The SRAS, as outlined in AFI 31-101, will be utilized on MacDill AFB.

### 9.5.1. Upchannel Reporting Procedures.

9.5.1.1. Any person who witnesses or becomes aware of an event they feel meets the definition of an upchannel reporting situation should declare it as such when reporting it. Report the situation immediately. Do not delay reporting a situation pending investigation. For example, if an individual observes an unknown person attempting to climb a restricted area fence, they should call the SFCC or their control center and report "This is Amn Smith with a HELPING HAND at the mass parking area. An unknown person is climbing the fence adjacent to the wash rack."

9.5.1.2. Initial event reporting must be short but descriptive to prevent delays in getting the report to the appropriate command level. Do not delay initial upchannel notifications over minute details or overly specific information that can be reported during follow-up reports.

9.5.1.3. SFCC will upchannel declared incidents to the Command Post. Because termination authority for HELPING HANDS has been delegated to the on-duty flight chief, the Command Post must ensure the installation commander is informed of all HELPING HAND actions. The Command Post will not report the HELPING HAND to HQ AMC Command Post unless directed by the installation commander. The Command Post will immediately report all COVERED WAGONS to the HQ AMC Command Post (Tanker Airlift Control Center). The Command Post will notify the MAJCOM command centers of all COVERED WAGONS affecting tenant unit resources.

9.5.1.4. All upchannel reports are logged and tracked on a locally developed log by the Security Forces Control Center Operator using successive numbering, starting with number one at the beginning of each calendar year, e.g., 96-01, 96-02, etc.

9.5.1.5. SFCC uses the direct line to the Command Post and states, "This is (Name/Rank) from the Security Forces control center with (HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON) number \_\_, initiated at hours ZULU." Provide a brief description of situation.

9.5.1.6. If the Command Post is under duress, the Security Forces Control Center Operator, under direction of the 6 AMW/CC or designated representative, will make the upchannel report directly to the AMC Command Post using one of the following procedures:

9.5.1.6.1. Using a Class "A" telephone line, dial HQ AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell) 94-779-1706 or 779-1823. State "This is (Name/Rank) from the MacDill AFB Security Forces Control Center with HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON) number \_\_\_\_, initiated at hours ZULU." Provide a brief description of the situation.

9.5.1.6.2. Using any administrative telephone line, dial "O" to get the operator and state, "This is (Name/Rank) from the Security Forces Control Center, with Security Forces control number \_\_, requesting "Immediate" to AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell) at DSN ext 779-1706, or DSN 779-1823 (STU III). If "Immediate" is busy, use "Flash". When the AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell) controller comes on line, state "This is (Name/Rank) from the MacDill Security Forces Control Center with (HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON) number \_\_\_\_\_ initiated at \_\_\_\_\_ hours ZULU." Provide a brief description of the situation.

### 9.5.2. Report Updates.

9.5.2.1. HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON reports will be followed up as the situation dictates.

9.5.2.2. Periodic written reports for COVERED WAGONS will be submitted by message until the situation is terminated.

#### 9.5.3. Termination/Cancellation.

9.5.3.1. The on-duty Security Forces Flight Chief or higher authority has termination authority for HELPING HANDS. The CSF or higher authority will terminate COVERED WAGONS.

9.5.3.2. When a decision is made to terminate, the SFCC notifies the Command Post and briefs them on the response and reason for termination.

9.5.3.3. SFCC uses the direct line to the Command Post and states, "This is the SFCC terminating (HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON) number \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ hours ZULU." Provide a brief description of the situation.

9.5.3.4. A full written report is submitted to HQ AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell) not later than 1 hour after termination of a COVERED WAGON by the initiating Command Post.

9.5.3.5. When the upchannel report is reported directly to AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell), termination/cancellation of the report must be accomplished directly with AMC Command Post (Emergency Action Cell) by the initiating control center. If possible, keep the line open throughout the duration of the event.

### 9.6. Security Forces Procedures.

9.6.1. Codes. Code information is classified "**For Official Use Only**". All codes are published semi-annually by the 6 SFS/SFO and distributed to Security Managers for dissemination.

9.6.1.1. Chemical Code - A pre-designated portion of an individual's social security number used in chemical warfare environments to assist in identifying individuals while wearing protective masks. This code will be changed daily during exercise or real world situations or when compromised.

9.6.1.2. Duress Words - Used by all 6 AMW personnel and tenants to covertly notify others of a duress or emergency situation. The duress word is a word that can be used in a normal conversation to alert a knowledgeable individual of a duress situation.

9.6.1.2.1. Duress words will remain current for a period of six months or until compromised or superseded. The alternate duress word will only be used in the event the primary duress word is compromised.

9.6.1.2.2. During exercises, use only the exercise duress word. The primary and alternate duress words will never be used in exercise situations.

9.6.1.2.3. Passive Duress - Duress situation declared when a posted Security Forces member or other individual working in a restricted area deviates from established standard operating procedures.

9.6.1.2.4. Active Duress - Duress situation declared when a posted Security Forces member or other individual working in a restricted area passes the duress word.

9.6.2. Distant Recognition Code (DRC) - Number used by all emergency response forces and alert aircraft crews to aid in expediting emergency entry into restricted areas when entry controllers are

posted. The DRC is published by the 6 SFS and changed semiannually or when compromise is suspected.

**9.7.** During increased Force Protection Conditions or certain contingencies, operational runways and taxiways will be closely monitored by airfield management and tower personnel. Nonessential restricted area entry control points will be closed. All unusual activity will be reported to the SFCC for immediate response and investigation.

**9.8.** Checks and Inspections. A Security Forces member conducts checks and inspections as specified below. If posted, the area supervisor conducts the check. Otherwise, a combination of motorized patrols, Internal Security Response Team (ISRT), External Security Response Team (ESRT), or the flight chief conducts the inspection. Record in the blotter all checks, discrepancies, work orders, and any compensatory measures taken.

9.8.1. Flightline/Restricted Area Check. Conduct a check of the flightline and each flightline restricted area each shift of the below listed items and record this check in the blotter. If discrepancies are found, Security Forces will notify SFCC who will in turn notify the appropriate agency responsible for the discrepancy.

9.8.1.1. Barriers (fence-lines or painted lines), gates, locks, and restricted area signs, etc.

9.8.1.2. Cleanliness and serviceability of SF facilities/vehicles.

9.8.1.3. Vegetation control in and around all restricted area 30 foot clear zones.

9.8.1.4. SF communication systems (radios and landlines).

9.8.2. Flightline/Restricted Area Lighting Checks. Conducted at least once each night shift. Check to ensure that all flightline/restricted area lighting is operational on the north and south ramps. All discrepancies and compensatory measures will be annotated in the blotter. Check the following:

9.8.3. Flightline Aircraft Security Checks. Conduct a physical check of all aircraft on the flightline for signs of tampering or unauthorized access at intervals not to exceed four hours when the owner/user has security of the ramp. Conduct a physical check of all aircraft on the flightline for signs of tampering or unauthorized access at intervals not to exceed two hours when Security Forces have responsibility, and during increased Force Protection Conditions and reduced visibility.

9.8.4. Hangar Aircraft Security Checks. For aircraft in maintenance hangars, conduct checks at intervals not to exceed four hours when maintenance personnel are present in the facility (duty hours) and every two hours during non-duty hours.

9.8.5. Four random 15 minute ECP checks will be conducted each 8 hour shift or six random ECP checks will be conducted each 12 hour shift for 15 minutes on ramps that have Protection Level resources present. These checks will be annotated in the blotter. Security Forces will notify SFCC when they initiate and terminate these checks.

9.8.6. Post Checks. The flight chief and senior Security Forces member posted in each area conducts post checks of personnel during the shift to ensure all are properly posted, are knowledgeable of their duties, and post instructions and other required equipment are readily available on each post.

9.8.7. Flightline Security Status. The MACC located in Wing Command Post contacts SFCC when maintenance activity has ended and primary security responsibility for the flightline reverts to the

Security Forces. The Security Forces Control Center Operator verifies the caller's name against the letter on file in SFCC, notifies patrols assigned to the area, and records the time in the desk blotter. Additionally, determine from MACC if any aircraft in maintenance status are parked in a hangar and left unattended. Follow the same procedure to return control back to owner/user. Personnel entering the ramps or restricted areas during periods when Security Forces have primary responsibility must be pre-announced to Security Forces.

9.8.8. Hangar Security Status. The MACC contacts SFCC when maintenance activity has ended and primary security responsibility for the hangar reverts to the Security Forces. The Security Forces Control Center Operator verifies the caller's name against the letter on file in SFCC, notifies patrols assigned to the area, and records the time in the desk blotter. Personnel entering the hangar during periods when Security Forces have primary responsibility must be pre-announced to Security Forces. Follow the same procedure to return control back to owner/user.

9.8.9. Flightline Gates. Flightline gates will remain locked at all times unless they are manned by own/user personnel who have completed Phase I Security Education & Motivation Training as outlined in [Chapter 11](#) of this instruction. Personnel requesting entry onto the flightline will contact SFCC or Base Operations prior to opening any gates. After they completed using the gates, owner/user personnel will ensure the gates are properly locked. If there are any problems, they will contact SFCC and man the gate until the problem is corrected.

9.8.10. Aircraft Plots. The SFCC must keep a current plot of all assigned and transient aircraft. This includes the taxiing, towing, moving, recovering, and parking locations of all permanently assigned and transient aircraft. Posted Security Forces must keep SFCC continually updated on aircraft locations.

9.8.11. Aircraft Movement. The MACC will pre-announce all permanently assigned aircraft movements to the SFCC. Base Operations will pre-announce all transient aircraft movements to the SFCC.

9.8.12. Transient Aircraft Arrival/Departures. Base Operations will notify SFCC of all transient aircraft arrivals, departures, and aircrew activity on transient aircraft. Transient Alert will notify the SFCC of all maintenance crews responding to transient aircraft. A security patrol will meet all arriving transient aircraft and provide the aircraft commander a briefing on the current security status of MacDill AFB and the surrounding area. This briefing should include the local force protection condition, responsibility for securing their aircraft, security of classified material, security of weapons, and any other information pertinent to personnel and aircraft security. Once the briefing has been completed, obtain a copy of aircrew orders from the aircraft commander. These aircrew orders will be signed by the aircraft commander and authenticated by a Security Forces member in the grade of E-6 or higher. The original authenticated aircrew orders will be maintained in SFCC. Copies of the aircrew orders will be maintained by the ESRT and ISRT. When the aircraft departs MacDill AFB, the SFCC Controller will be notified by the ESRT and ensure all copies of the aircrew orders are collected and destroyed. All transient aircraft will have a minimum of a Protection Level 3 restricted area established using ropes, stanchions, and restricted area signs if not parked in an established restricted area. Acquire sufficient light-all to illuminate avenues of approach to the aircraft during periods of darkness and reduced visibility.

9.8.13. Restricted Area Sweeps. Twice per shift, conduct a sweep of your assigned area. Ensure all individuals have their RAB openly displayed in all restricted areas.

9.8.14. Perform additional duties as directed by the flight chief or higher authority.

**9.9. Managing Work Orders/Job Orders.** Work/job orders are initiated to correct deficiencies on security facilities and equipment that require Civil Engineer (CE) work. The SFCC will contact the civil engineer work order desk to report and initiate work orders. Security Forces planners will monitor the progress of all work orders. The initiation and completion of work orders will be annotated in the Security Forces desk blotter. The priority of response for work orders affecting the security of Protection Level resources are:

9.9.1. Emergency - response is needed within one hour. A deficiency affects the immediate war fighting capabilities of the base, seriously degrades security protection of Protection Level resources, or is categorized for this priority in higher headquarters regulations. Notify the Security Superintendent when an emergency work/job order is opened.

9.9.2. Urgent - response is needed within 72 hours. A deficiency requires immediate attention, but is not of such urgency to possibly impede the mission or seriously degrade protection of priority resources.

9.9.3. Routine - response is needed within one week. A deficiency that does not degrade protection of Protection Level resources but requires maintenance to meet mission requirements.

## Chapter 10

### DEVIATIONS

**10.1.** All units that cannot secure Protection Level resources according to established DoD and Air Force requirements must develop a deviation program. The installation CSF will establish and monitor the deviation program. Security Forces planners will identify security deficiencies, request approval of deviations, and establish compensatory measures using AF Form 116, Request for Deviation From Security Criteria, through the ISC and installation commander. All MacDill AFB deviations and compensatory measures are approved by the installation commander.

**10.2.** When deficiencies are identified, compensatory measures will be implemented immediately. Do not wait for formal approval before implementing compensatory measures.

**10.3.** Units must compensate for the specific security threat created by a deficiency. Security Forces supervisors must ensure that posted sentries are knowledgeable of the deficiencies and compensatory measures for their assigned posts.

**10.4.** Copies of all approved deviations are sent to HQ AMC/SFO.

**10.5.** Copies of all closed deficiencies, to include justification for closure, will be sent to HQ AMC/SFO.

**10.6.** Ensure all deviations and compensatory measures are reviewed annually by the ISC.

**10.7.** All deviations pertaining to resources tenant to MacDill AFB must also be submitted to HQ AMC/SFO.

## Chapter 11

### INSTALLATION SECURITY CONSTABLE PROGRAM

**11.1.** The CSF will develop and maintain a security education program using guidance in AMCPAM 31-5, Security Manager's Security Education and Motivation Guide, and AMCPAM 31-3, Installation Security Constable Handbook. The Security Education/Motivation Program will be evaluated through detection exercises in restricted areas and written testing of personnel possessing the USAF restricted area badge. Exercises will be designed primarily to evaluate the ability of non-Security Forces personnel to detect and report security violations. The airfield manager is a key component in this area. The constable and airfield manager must have a consistent flow of information to enhance this program. As part of the Installation Security Constable Program, a summary of exercise results will be presented at each ISC meeting.

**11.2.** The role of the constable is to educate, motivate, be a public relations representative and, above all else, a professional who can be counted on for guidance and assistance. He is a key player in an effective security education and training program (SET) that has direct impact on the security of USAF protection level resources. Specific duties are determined by the installation CSF to meet the following minimum requirements:

11.2.1. Phase I, Orientation Training: Conduct this training during indoctrination to the installation. Documentation of this training can be accomplished by maintaining sign-in sheets for the indoctrination program in accordance with AFI 31-101, para 7.2.2.). As a minimum include:

11.2.1.1. Local force protection conditions and how the threat applies to the individual.

11.2.1.2. Information on the Installation Security Instruction concerning restricted area entry, controlled area entry, and other pertinent installation specific security information. Include locations and designations of restricted areas assigned to MacDill AFB.

11.2.1.3. Escort procedures for restricted areas.

11.2.1.4. Duress word procedures.

11.2.1.5. Security Reporting and Alerting System information. Include telephone numbers for reporting.

11.2.1.6. The local threat and how it applies to their area of responsibility.

11.2.2. Phase II, Continuation Training encompasses recurring detection exercises in restricted and controlled areas by working with security managers and unit training managers to ensure they have updated information in their phase II security education and training programs in accordance with AFI 31-101, para 7.2.3. This phase of training will be conducted in two distinct parts:

11.2.3. During the first part of the training phase, the constable should physically go to the work centers to visit with personnel before and after training to continue awareness training and validate the effectiveness of the unit level training to include:

11.2.3.1. Information on threats to USAF protection level resources.

11.2.3.2. Security procedures for restricted and controlled areas (i.e., circulation and entry control).

11.2.3.3. Duress words and authentication.

11.2.3.4. Written knowledge tests.

11.2.4. During the second part of the training phase, the constable will conduct continuation training to include:

11.2.4.1. Visits to each restricted area work center twice per year.

11.2.4.2. Detection exercises to determine the effectiveness of the training program.

**11.3.** The Installation Security Constable will conduct continuation training separate from units by planning, conducting, and evaluating detection exercises in restricted areas and controlled areas that support protection level resources.

**11.4.** Evaluations Using Bogus Badges: Bogus restricted area badge (RAB) credentials can be used during Security Forces quality control evaluations, wing exercise evaluation team exercises, and Security Forces flightline constable exercises. Control and accountability procedures outlined in AFI 31-101, Vol 1, as supplemented, must be adhered to.

**11.5.** SET exercises should be designed to test the security awareness of non-security personnel assigned to controlled and restricted areas.

**11.6.** Develop an exercise grading scale using the MTEL grading scale for use during SET exercises. A grading scale (i.e., Green, Light Green, and Red) may be adopted by the ISC.

**11.7.** The Installation Security Constable must be the security education and training expert for the entire installation.

## Chapter 12

### NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA (NDA)

**12.1.** NDAs are established in the Continental United States (CONUS) and U.S. territories when necessary to secure Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources located off installation lands not under the jurisdiction or administration of, or in the custody of, DoD or a military department of the DoD.

**12.2.** Who May Establish NDAs. Only those commanders delegated the authority to establish restricted areas have the authority to establish a NDA. This is generally the senior operational commander. The senior U.S. Air Force military or Department of the Air Force civilian representative at the scene must mark the boundary of the NDA. This official acts under the authority of the commander responsible for the resource involved. Authority for establishing an NDA must be shown on a temporary sign.

**12.3.** When NDAs are Established. It may be necessary to establish NDAs in the following circumstances.

12.3.1. Aircraft are sent to civilian airports. SFOS will ensure proper coordination with civilian airports is conducted ensuring all security requirements are met.

12.3.2. An aircraft crashes. Procedures for aircraft crashes are explained in MacDill AFB Plan 31-101.

12.3.3. Other unplanned emergencies occur.

**12.4.** Requirements for NDAs. Installation commanders, through their on-scene commanders, establish NDAs. Minimum requirements are as follows.

12.4.1. Use a temporary barrier to mark the boundary of the area. Security Forces will utilize all available ropes and stanchions to mark the boundaries of the area.

12.4.2. Post Air Force Visual Aid (AFVA) 31-102, Restricted Area Sign-National Defense.

12.4.3. Explain the situation to landowners, including why you need to set up the area and the kinds of controls in effect.

12.4.4. Obtain the consent and cooperation of the landowner if at all possible, but establish the area with or without consent.

12.4.5. To the greatest degree possible, let civilian authorities handle civilian arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, military personnel may detain violators or trespassers. Work with the judge advocate personnel to release violators and trespassers to proper authorities as soon as reasonably practical.

## Chapter 13

### COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAMS/POLICY COMPLIANCE

**13.1.** This chapter outlines programs that complement the Physical Security program of MacDill AFB.

**13.2.** Resource Protection Program (RPP). This Protection Level 4 (PL4) program is designed to develop habits and attitudes in personnel that, when combined with protective measures and equipment, will enhance the security of the installation. A goal is to safeguard property by reducing the opportunity for theft or terrorist attack by making a potential target inaccessible or unattractive. See MACDI 31-103, Volume 2, for full details of this program.

**13.3.** Inspections and Program Exercises. The installation must periodically exercise, review, and evaluate the installation security program. 6 AMW/XPI will be the point of contact for developing and implementing realistic exercise scenarios.

**13.4.** Compliance With Policy. Compliance with Air Force physical security policies is assessed by evaluating incidents involving damage to and loss of protection level resources, inspection results (including security constable reports), and deviations from security standards.

WILLIAM W. HODGES, Brig Gen, USAF  
Commander

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

50 U.S.C. 797, *Internal Security Act of 1950*

DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-501, *Personnel Security Program Management*

DoD 5200.8, *Security of DoD Installations and Resources*

DoD 5210.41-M, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*

Joint Regulation AR 190-16/AFR 207-4/MCO 5500.13A/DLAR 5710.4

AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*

AMC Sup 1, AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*

AMCPAM 31-3, *Installation Security Constable Handbook*

AMCPAM 31-5, *Security Manager's Security Education and Motivation Guide*

MACDI 31-103, Vol 2, *Installation Security Instruction/Resource Protection*

MacDill OPLAN 31-101, *Installation Security Plan (ISP)*

**Attachment 2**

**PREPARING ENTRY AUTHORITY LIST (EAL) – SAMPLE FORMAT**

MEMORANDUM FOR XX AMW/CC

Date

FROM: HQ AMC/SFOS  
 502 Scott Drive Room 326  
 Scott AFB IL 62225-5318

SUBJECT: XX AFB Visit/Inspection Entry Authority List (EAL) Format

The following personnel assigned to HQ AMC will conduct a (Staff Assistance Visit or type of inspection) visit to MacDill AFB during the period of XX XXX XX to XX XXX XX. They require access as indicated.

<b>NAME</b>	<b>GRADE</b>	<b>SSN</b>	<b>RESTRICTED AREA BADGE NUMBER</b>	<b>CLEARANCE</b>	<b>AREAS AUTHORIZED ENTRY</b>
John Smith	MSgt	XXXXXXXXXX	c-xxxxxx	SECRET	1,2,4,9

Team Chief's Signature Block

Personal information contained in this document is to be protected by the Privacy Act of 1974.

**Attachment 3****PREPARING VISITOR REQUEST – SAMPLE FORMAT**

MEMORANDUM FOR XX AMW/CC

Date

FROM:

SUBJECT: XX AFB Visit Request

Request approval for visit of XX AFB during the period of XX XXX XX to XX XXX XX for the following personnel. State purpose of the visit and host agency sponsoring the visit.

<b>NAME</b>	<b>GRADE</b>	<b>SSN</b>	<b>CLEARANCE</b>	<b>AGENCY AFFILIATION</b>
John Smith	MSgt	XXXXXXXXXX	SECRET	

Team Chief's Signature Block

cc: (Info copies to MAJCOM and Intermediate HQ)

Personal information contained in this document is to be protected by the Privacy Act of 1974.