

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER,
436TH AIRLIFT WING**

**DOVER AIR FORCE BASE
INSTRUCTION 91-101**

4 DECEMBER 2002



Safety

**THE DOVER AIR FORCE BASE NUCLEAR
SURETY PROGRAM**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. This instruction is the nuclear surety portion of the wing mishap prevention plan. It provides guidance and establishes a program for reporting deficiencies of nuclear-certified equipment as DULL SWORD Material Deficiency Reports (MDRs) IAW T.O. 00-35D-54, AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*. It applies to all base organizations that use, operate or perform maintenance on airlift mission support equipment that has received nuclear safety certification. Tasked organizations will develop operating instructions (OI) in support of this instruction and provide a copy to the Wing Safety office (436 AW/SE).

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

Non-specific grammatical changes. Updated to meet compliance with new publication format. Deleted para 2.4. and accompanying note. Rewrote para 2.4. to reference Chapter 12, AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*. Added 'aircraft' to para 3.11.1. **A bar (|) indicates a change since the last edition.**

1. General: Nuclear Surety is not limited to the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF). It involves most AMC units. Nuclear Surety also includes nuclear-certified equipment deficiency reporting, nuclear airlift mission support, and SAFE HAVEN procedures.

1.1. Dover Air Force Base (DAFB) is not a prime nuclear airlift support base, and therefore does not routinely support nuclear-laden aircraft or maintain facilities for storage and handling of nuclear weapons or components. However, as an emergency nuclear airlift support (ENAS) base, DAFB is required to maintain an awareness of support requirements for emergency diversions of nuclear airlift missions. See AW OPLAN 005-XX, *Nuclear Airlift Mission Support*, for information and specific guidance.

1.2. Organizations use general purpose, special purpose, and material handling equipment that is certified for use with nuclear weapons/components during day-to-day cargo handling operations. Timely

reporting of deficiencies that may impact the combat readiness capability of this equipment and the owning organization is the primary concern of this regulation.

2. Investigating and Reporting:

2.1. Material deficiencies in nuclear-certified equipment will be investigated and reported as DULL SWORD NMR IAW T.O. 00-35D-54 and AFI 91-204. This includes material handling equipment such as K-loaders, forklifts, flatbed trailers, tie down equipment listed in T.O. 00-110N-16, and the vehicle listing maintained by 436 TRNS/LGTM.

2.2. Report DULL SWORD On:

- 2.2.1. Deficiencies that occur while equipment is in use during all operations.
- 2.2.2. Deficiencies for which corrective action procedures are not provided in technical orders.
- 2.2.3. Weld cracks, regardless of the existence of corrective action procedures or when discovered.
- 2.2.4. Brake system deficiencies that affect a tow vehicle's capability to stop safely or hold in park a tow vehicle-trailer combination.
- 2.2.5. Deficiencies, including weld cracks, in the structural members through which the towing/braking force is transferred to the trailer.
- 2.2.6. Deficiencies that affect steering or stability.
- 2.2.7. Weld cracks in pintle hook mounting plates and support brackets.
- 2.2.8. Deficiencies in pintle hooks or fifth wheels.
- 2.2.9. Brake system deficiencies that affect the transport vehicle's ability to stop or to hold itself in park.
- 2.2.10. Deficiencies in tie down points and tie down patterns.
- 2.2.11. Deficiencies in forklift hydraulics, or mechanical or structural components of the lifting system that result in non-responsive operation or uncontrolled lowering of cargo.
- 2.2.12. Deficiencies that affect forklift brake system, steering and stability, and restraint of cargo on lift tines.

2.3. Do Not Report DULL SWORD On:

- 2.3.1. Discrepancies noted during routine maintenance inspections where corrective action procedures are provided in existing technical orders.
- 2.3.2. Traffic accidents not involving nuclear weapons and not caused by a vehicle deficiency.
- 2.3.3. Dents, rust, and corrosion that do not affect the vehicle's ability to steer, stop, tow, or hold in park a tow vehicle-trailer combination, or to lift, transport, or restrain cargo on the vehicle's cargo deck.
- 2.3.4. Deficiencies in electrical accessories including lights, windshield wipers, and washers.

2.4. Report Preparation: DULL SWORD Material Deficiency Reports will be prepared IAW Chapter 12, AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*.

3. Responsibilities:

3.1. Airlift Wing Commander (436 AW/CC) will:

3.1.1. Organize a nuclear surety council that will, at a minimum:

- 3.1.1.1. Be chaired by the 436 AW/CC, or may be delegated to 436 AW/CV or a Group Commander.
- 3.1.1.2. Include all members who are PRP certifying officials and the Base PRP Monitor.
- 3.1.1.3. Include, as advisors, functional experts who support the nuclear surety program.
- 3.1.1.4. Develop and implement a unit nuclear surety program.
- 3.1.1.5. As requested, the 436 AW or tenant units will provide attendees at unit nuclear surety councils.

3.2. Unit commanders are ultimately responsible for compliance with the nuclear surety program and will make sure their units meet all safety responsibilities. They must make sure all personnel who work with nuclear-certified equipment are aware of the need to report deficiencies.

3.3. Safety (436 AW/SE). The 436 AW Chief of Safety is responsible for overall management of the wing nuclear surety program. 436 AW/SE will:

- 3.3.1. Appoint, in writing, a member of the Safety staff to handle nuclear surety matters and send a copy of the appointment letter with name and telephone number to HQ AMC/IGFN, Scott AFB, IL 62225-5101. The 436 AW/CC will sign this letter.
- 3.3.2. Act as validation and certifying official on all MDRs where damage or injury resulting from a material deficiency is reported as a Combined Mishap or DULL SWORD MDR.
- 3.3.3. Ensure nuclear surety plans and procedures are reviewed by affected agencies before implementation.

3.4. Weapons Safety (436 AW/SEW) will:

- 3.4.1. Serve as the central point of contact for all matters concerning nuclear surety and publicize nuclear surety whenever possible.
- 3.4.2. Annually review base security programs and procedures to make sure all nuclear surety requirements are met.
- 3.4.3. Make sure the base SAFE HAVEN support plan complies with requirements of AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations*.
- 3.4.4. Serve as the single point for requirements and distribution of the AMC Nuclear News.
- 3.4.5. Comply with applicable portions of AFI 91-101.
- 3.4.6. Review all DULL SWORD MDR reports for compliance with T.O. 00-35D-54 and maintain a file copy of the report in the safety office.
- 3.4.7. Make sure the Chief of Safety is included as a certifying official in all DULL SWORD MDR reports.
- 3.4.8. Track unit DULL SWORD reports on AMC Form 151, Control for Follow-up/Closeout Action, until closeout and update AMC Form 151 as necessary, but at least every 60 days.

3.5. Base Transportation Officer (436 TRNS/CC) will:

- 3.5.1. Appoint a member of his/her staff to manage DULL SWORD reporting for nuclear-certified vehicles and material handling equipment processed through the vehicle maintenance facility. Send a copy of the appointment letter to 436 AW/SE.
- 3.5.2. Ensure MDRs are coordinated with 436 AW/SE.
- 3.5.3. Establish procedures for holding MDR status reports until closeout actions are complete.
- 3.5.4. Make sure subordinate units investigate and report deficiencies in nuclear-certified vehicles and materials handling equipment.
- 3.5.5. Review and validate all vehicle-related MDRs.
- 3.5.6. Make sure all vehicle-related DULL SWORD MDRs are routed through 436 AW/SE for validation and certification by the Chief of Safety.

3.6. Aerial Port (436 APS/CC) will:

- 3.6.1. Ensure 436 APS/TRXV, vehicle control section, maintains a pool of certified operators for program equipment. These operators will be trained on all applicable deficiency reporting requirements.

3.7. Equipment Maintenance (436 EMS/CC) will:

- 3.7.1. Validate non-vehicle/material handling equipment-related DULL SWORD MDRs before submission to make sure they are correct and properly routed.
- 3.7.2. Ensure maintenance quality assurance personnel are trained on DULL SWORD MDR procedures.
- 3.7.3. Provide a secured area inside the Munitions Storage Area for the protection of nuclear weapons during emergency and SAFE HAVEN conditions.

3.8. Base Civil Engineer (436 CES/CC) will:

- 3.8.1. Ensure base fire protection personnel are trained to fight fires involving nuclear weapons.
- 3.8.2. Develop fire fighting plans for all areas and locations where nuclear weapons could be stored under emergency situations.
- 3.8.3. Ensure 436 CES/CEX develops major accident response procedures in support of emergency situations involving nuclear weapons.
- 3.8.4. Ensure 436 CES/CEX acts as coordination official on plans and procedures developed in support of emergency nuclear airlift mission diversions and Department of Energy (DoE) SAFE HAVEN requests.

3.9. Command Post (436 AW/CP) will:

- 3.9.1. Ensure 436 AW/CP personnel are aware of nuclear airlift support plans requirements.
- 3.9.2. Monitor plans developed to maintain effective security operations in support of transient nuclear airlift missions.

3.10. Security Forces (436 SFS/CC) will:

3.10.1. Develop plans and procedures for the protection of nuclear airlift missions and DoE SAFE HAVEN convoys diverted to Dover AFB.

3.10.2. Make sure security police personnel selected to support applicable security response options outlined in Base Security Plan OPLAN 31 are trained on the two-man concept requirements of AFI 91-101.

3.11. Base Operations (436 OSS/OSA) will:

3.11.1. Determine aircraft taxi route and remote aircraft parking location to appropriate support agencies.

3.11.2. Relay aircraft type, cargo, and parking location to appropriate support agencies.

3.12. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Certification: There are no duty positions on Dover Air Force Base that require PRP certification.

SCOTT E. WUESTHOFF, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERNECES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFPD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*

AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations*

AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*

AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*

AW OPLAN 005-XX, *Nuclear Airlift Mission Support*

TO 00-110N-16, USAF Nuclear Certified Equipment and Software

TO 00-35D-54, *Dull Sword Material Deficiency Report (MDRs)*

Terms

Nuclear Surety—A term used to encompass all activities that ensure Air Force compliance with the four DOD Nuclear Safety Standards defined in AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*.

Nuclear-Certified Equipment—Support equipment, combat and non-combat delivery vehicles that have received a nuclear safety certification and are authorized for use with nuclear weapons. A computer listing of certified commercial vehicles is maintained by 436 TRNS/LGTM. All other equipment is listed in T.O. 00-110N-16.

SAFE HAVEN—Code name for an agreement between the DoE and the Department of Defense (DoD) authorizing the temporary storage of DoE classified shipments at DoD facilities in the event of natural disasters, civil disorders, or other emergencies. Also includes parking for commercial vehicles containing Class A or Class B explosives (JCS Pub-1).

DULL SWORD—Flag word used to identify material deficiencies in nuclear-certified equipment.

Material Deficiency—A product deficiency which occurs after Program Management Responsibility Transfer or the Service Report cutoff date. This deficiency, if uncorrected, would cause death, severe injury, occupational illness, or loss or damage to equipment of a major weapons system.