



1 June 2000

Security

**THE AIR FORCE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE
PROTECTION (AT/FP) PROGRAM
STANDARDS**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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AFI 31-210, 1 August 1999, is supplemented as follows. This publication consolidates the procedures and criteria that support AMC's AT/FP Program. It applies to all AMC installations and those AMC units tenant on other command or service installations. It applies to AMC-gained Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units. Send recommended changes to this publication via **AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication**, to HQ AMC/SFOP, 102 East Martin Street, Room 110, Scott AFB, IL 62225-5318.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

1. AMC AT/FP Program. The AMC AT/FP program enhances the Department of Defense and Air Force programs of deterrence designed to blunt terrorist acts against personnel and resources by providing timely guidance on collecting and disseminating threat information. This will be accomplished by providing training to all command members, developing comprehensive plans, allocating funds, and implementing defensive measures.

1.6. The program is an integrated effort where all units and installation commanders must have the mind-set combating terrorism is not solely the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF). Security Forces are merely one component of a comprehensive, successful team effort.

1.7. Each AMC installation, wing, group, or unit will establish an AT/FP decision making body to fully integrate and coordinate AT/FP actions. Key functional membership for this working group, at a minimum, will include: Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Communications (SC), Civil Engineering (CE), Intelligence (IN), Judge Advocate (JA), Operations, Security Forces (SF), Financial Management (FM), and Surgeon General (SG).

1.8. (Added) Operations Security (OPSEC). The goal of OPSEC is to control information and observable actions about friendly force capabilities, limitations, and intentions to prevent or control their exploitation by an adversary. OPSEC must be incorporated throughout the entire AT/FP program. Air Force OPSEC policy is located in AFI 10-1101.

3.1.1.1. AMC/CC will establish an AT/FP corporate structure. AMC/SF is the OPR and the executive agent for AMC AT/FP matters and policy. AMC/CV is the chair for the Force Protection Council (FPC). AMC/SF is the OPR and chair for the Force Protection Board (FPB), and AMC/SFO is the OPR and chair for the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG).

3.1.2.3. AMC/SF monitors Responsibility Center/Cost Center (RCCC) 1001B4 (Force Protection Board Fund), and coordinates funding submissions for AT/FP initiatives with AMC functional experts for FPB/FPC approval.

3.1.7. AMC/JA provides core members to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG, as required.

3.1.8. AFOSI (3 FIR) provides a fully qualified terrorist options specialist to support the AMC VA team. 3 FIR provides core members to the AMC FPC, FPB and FPWG to provide counterintelligence expertise, as required.

3.1.9. AMC/LG provides core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG to provide logistical expertise, as required.

3.1.10. AMC/CE provides structural and infrastructure engineers to support the AMC VA team. AMC/CE provides core members to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG to provide civil engineering and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) expertise, as required.

3.1.12. (Added) AMC/XP provides a core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB and FPWG with plans expertise, as required.

3.1.13. (Added) AMC/DP provides a core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG with personnel expertise, as required.

3.1.14. (Added) AMC/FM provides a core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG with financial expertise, as required.

3.1.15. (Added) AMC/SE provides a core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG with safety expertise, as required.

3.1.16. (Added) AMC/DO provides a core member to the Headquarters FPC, FPB, and FPWG with passenger terminal and cargo operations expertise, as required.

3.2.1.3. Plan for physical security of new facilities through the base CE office and the Installation Security Council (ISC). **NOTE:** The following sections (3.2.1.3.1. through 3.2.1.3.7.) apply to AMC active duty units only. They are not applicable to AFRC units.

3.2.1.3.1. (Added) Submit budget requirements to HQ AMC/SFX twice a year (15 Jan and 15 Jun) using the suggested format (**Attachment 6**). The installation FP decision making body, e.g., ISC, should review all budget submissions and approve them before submission to HQ AMC/SFX. Action officers preparing the budget submittal must research funding amounts, and ensure the requested amounts are firm and executable. Ensure budget requests have a direct AT/FP application with wide-ranging impact.

3.2.1.3.2. (Added) Include a Project by Contract Management System project number and Facility Investment Metric rating for Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Real Property Maintenance by Contract

(RPMC). Include a Program Design Construction project number for Military Construction (MILCON) facility projects. Obtain this information from the host CE squadron.

3.2.1.3.3. (Added) Include a Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Requirements Document number for communications/computer requests.

3.2.1.3.4. (Added) Include appropriate document numbers if requesting funding for "Memo Due-Out" items.

3.2.1.3.5. (Added) Indicate purchases to be made through International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card and include where the project is located on the wing commander's priority list.

3.2.1.3.6. (Added) The following priorities apply to the distribution of AT funds to effectively compete for diminishing resources:

3.2.1.3.6.1. (Added) Budget requirements that arise in response to specific and credible threats will receive highest priority for AT (Appropriation 3400) funding.

3.2.1.3.6.2. (Added) O&M RPMC facility projects that are designed to correct security deficiencies and are identified on **AF Form 116, Request for Deviation from Security Criteria**. These security standards are identified in AFI 31-101, Vol 1, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*.

3.2.1.3.6.3. (Added) In accordance with AFI 32-1021, *Planning and Programming of Facility Construction Projects*, security deficiency-related projects which meet MILCON funding criteria must be identified and compete within the normal MILCON process.

3.2.1.3.6.4. (Added) Equipment items that directly support AT/FP (e.g., barriers, alarms, Closed Circuit Television, Mylar film, ballistic shields for windows, and communications items).

3.2.1.3.7. (Added) All facility project work shall be programmed in accordance with AFI 32-1032, *Planning and Programming Real Property Maintenance Projects Using Appropriated Funds*, for O&M RPMC requirements and AFI 32-1021 for MILCON requirements. Prioritize requirements in accordance with the precedence of the security deficiencies they will correct. Consider phasing large O&M repair projects (where feasible and in accordance with programming guidance) into separate, smaller work to be funded as independent, stand-alone projects. It is illegal to fragment or split projects or equipment system requirements to circumvent MILCON or Investment Equipment cost thresholds. Contact the supporting budget office for clarification of funding rules.

3.2.2. AMC/SF is the OPR for this supplement, which implements the Air Force AT/FP program within AMC.

3.2.3. Installation/Site Commanders will provide HQ AMC/SF a copy of their supplement within 120 days from the date of this supplement, and as changes occur thereafter.

3.2.4. Installation/Site Commanders must budget for force protection requirements during the Unfunded Requirements (UR) process.

3.2.4.1. Installation/site commanders will submit copies of CbTRIF funding requests to AMC/SFOP for review by the AMC FPWG, FPB, and/or FPC.

3.3.1. Installation/site commanders have operational responsibility for AT/FP for all units and individuals whether permanently or temporarily assigned. In accordance with Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, Chapter II, paragraph 3b, tenant AMC units of another MAJCOM or service installations will comply with the requirements of the host AT/FP program. Tenant commanders maintain overall

responsibility for their command's physical security and AT/FP planning not provided by the host installation.

3.3.2. The HQ AMC FPWG, FPB, and FPC are the focal points for all AMC AT/FP matters. The Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC/CV) holds the position as permanent chairperson for this forum. The AMC Director of Security Forces (HQ AMC/SF) is the Executive Agent and the Office of Primary Responsibility for the AMC AT/FP Program. AMC installation commanders will ensure a current listing of their primary and alternate installation AT/FP Responsible Officer/NCO is on file with HQ AMC/SFOP.

3.3.4.1. Installation-wide antiterrorism exercises (both operational and command post) will be conducted at the installation commander's discretion, but no less than annually. The exercises will be used to test and evaluate the installation's ability to respond to the local terrorist threat. Exercises will test a broad range of required THREATCON actions specified within the installation's local plans and may be combined with other base exercises such as a MARE, BROKEN ARROW, etc.

3.3.4.2. Through the public affairs program, installations are tasked with providing periodic AT/FP awareness training on terrorist threats and personnel protection principles and techniques to the base populace. This may be satisfied using base newspaper articles or flyers distributed at accessible points throughout the installation. Incidents of terrorism and crime will generate external media interest. In response to queries concerning a possible or real terrorist threat at a particular activity, installation, or community, the commander may acknowledge that increased security measures have been or will be taken without going into specific details regarding the measures being taken. In other words, it may be appropriate and operationally sound to acknowledge the obvious. For example, increased security measures such as additional guards at the gate and/or more stringent identification checks are usually obvious to the public, and acknowledgement may serve to send a positive message of increased readiness. Commanders must exercise care and prudent judgement in any discussion of these or other security measures to preclude revealing tactics and techniques that an adversary could exploit. Practice good operations security (OPSEC).

3.3.4.4. (Added) Report Air Force Strategic Plan, Vol. 2, Performance Plan FP Performance Measures 2.A.9., *Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program*, and 2.A.11., *Implementation and Tracking of Level I Antiterrorism Training*, semi-annually, no later than 10 Apr and 10 Oct of each year to AMC/SFOP.

3.3.4.4.1. (Added) The reporting periods for both FP Performance Measures are 1 Oct through 31 Mar, and 1 Apr through 30 Sept.

3.3.4.4.2. (Added) Use the AMC AT/FP self-inspection checklist to report FP Performance Measure 2.A.9.

3.3.4.4.3. (Added) Calculate the percentage for reporting FP Performance Measure 2.A.11. by ascertaining the number of installation personnel who deployed, and of those, the number who received Level I Antiterrorism training.

3.4.5. Ensure local and host nation support planning efforts consider Threat Levels 1 and 2 (AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*), as well as the known criminal threat in the immediate area of the installation. Installation/Site Commanders will ensure all agreements for local emergency support; e.g., fire, police, medical, etc., are formally coordinated for their installations/sites. Review of agreements is a part of the AT/FP vulnerability assessment process.

3.5.2. AT/FP plans will be assessed during higher headquarters program reviews as identified in Standard 6 to DoDI 2000.16 and paragraph 3.6 to AFI 31-210. Plans shall address areas outlined in DoD Standard 2 as supplemented, and include these additional areas to meet security requirements (**NOTE:** this list is not all inclusive): media control during terrorist incidents, THREATCON procedures, to include the means to rapidly advise all units of THREATCON changes, and all DoD elements and personnel for whom the installation/activity has force protection responsibility. Commanders are encouraged to use the J-34 installation-planning template in developing/revising their installation plans.

3.6.3. HQ AMC/SF schedules JSIVA, AF and AMC vulnerability assessments of AMC installations and sites through HQ AF/XOFP. The schedule will be coordinated with the HQ AMC/IG Gatekeeper and the respective installation /site commander.

3.6.3.1. (Added) Installation/Site Commanders must address, and attempt to correct AT/FP vulnerabilities identified during DoD Standards 6 and 14 vulnerability assessments; especially those that are procedural or relatively inexpensive and would improve the AT/FP posture. Conversely, high cost improvements must be considered in context with threat and risk assessment, and if necessary, planned for, and programmed.

3.6.5. HQ AMC will conduct independent Vulnerability Assessments (VA) of AMC installation/sites in addition to those conducted by the AF team and the JSIVA. VAs will ensure installation/site commanders have included all tenant organizations (on the installation/site or remote but administratively attached), into force protection plans, and that they are afforded the same level of AT/FP support as AMC units. AMC vulnerability assessments are not required to physically assess every single activity on the installation, but instead must assess an adequate number of activities, which will indicate an effective level of FP is in place for the entire installation/site.

3.6.5.1. (Added) AMC VA team composition may vary based on the type of installation being assessed. The assessment team shall consist of a team chief (an O-6 appointed by the AMC Force Protection Board (FPB), assessment engineer, counterintelligence specialist, physical security specialist, medical readiness specialist, and a medical response specialist. Other functional experts may augment the team as needed. Augmentation will depend on type of assessment required, the nature of the installation's/site's mission, the terrorist threat level, and the THREATCON. Assessments may require expertise in preventive medicine, linguistics, chemical/biological/radiological weapons effects, emerging AT/FP technology, explosive ordnance disposal, Information Operations (IO), special warfare, or other specialties as determined by the commander or directed by HQ AMC FPB or FPC. Regardless of team composition, the team must have expertise in these areas: (1) Physical Security, (2) Structural Engineering (Weapons Effect Specialist), (3) Operational Readiness, (4) Law Enforcement and Security Force Operations, (5) Infrastructure Engineering, and (6) Counterintelligence/Intelligence.

3.6.7. (Added) The HQ AMC FPB will determine the composition of the HQ AMC VA team in accordance with the standards of DoDI 2000.16.

3.7. The AMC Threat Working Group (TWG) will ensure commanders are provided the most current terrorism threat in overseas areas of operation. This will be done by request, through official correspondence, or on-line via the classified HQ AMC Intelligence homepage.

3.7.4. Installation/site commanders should use intelligence information (to include terrorist, criminal and other potential threats, as well as the security environment of the local area) in developing/updating plans and programs to protect assets for which they are responsible.

3.8.2.2. Installation/Site Commanders shall task the appropriate intelligence/counterintelligence organizations under their command to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information, as appropriate. Commanders at all levels shall ensure personnel under their command report information on events or situations that could pose a threat to the security of DoD personnel and resources.

3.9. Each installation will forward one copy of their Terrorism Threat Assessment Plan to AMC/SFOP no later than 120 days after receipt of this publication, and when changes occur thereafter.

3.9.3. Installation/Site Commanders shall ensure terrorist threat assessments for their area of responsibility are incorporated in the risk assessment development process and included in appropriate plans.

3.10.3. The Installation/Site commander will establish a formal force protection decision making body, and outline its purpose, roles and responsibilities with respect to the installation. This may be accomplished by enhancing the Installation Security Council (ISC).

3.11.1. (Added) The THREATCON development process will incorporate the procedures outlined in paragraph 3.12.2 as supplemented.

3.12.2. Installation/Site Commanders may implement higher THREATCONs based on local conditions. Downward directed THREATCON changes for AMC units will come from or through AMC/CC. Tenants on AMC bases should coordinate owning MAJCOM/Service directed THREATCON changes with the host, and seek concurrence prior to implementation. Installation Commanders will consider the request, determine local threats, and make a base-wide determination. In those instances where local threats are absent, commanders will seek clarification from AMC prior to increasing THREATCONs. There should only be one THREATCON on AMC bases with final determination by the installation/site commander.

3.12.3. After action reports, containing comprehensive discussion of lessons learned will be forwarded to HQ AMC/SFOP within 30 days of a reported terrorist threat or terrorist incident.

3.13. Develop local checklists from DoD O-2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*. As a minimum, follow THREATCON measures outlined in the parent document (AFI 31-210, Attachment 3).

3.13.1.3. Commanders at all levels shall establish local measures to transition between THREATCONs. These procedures will be included in installation AT/FP plans.

3.13.1.4. Installations will develop and implement local Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) encompassing a variety of career fields from across the installation, to include daily implementation of at least one (1) RAM. RAMs will be employed during all THREATCONS (including NORMAL) to enhance force protection. As a minimum, utilize the required RAMs contained in DoD O-2000.12-H. Locally developed measures may be used, as directed by the installation/site commander.

3.14.2. Include off-site activities (outside-the-fence) as part of the assessment. Conduct assessments a minimum of once every three (3) years or when significant changes occur. Units with nuclear missions will update their physical security vulnerability assessment every twelve months. Initial Standard 14 assessments will be completed by December 2000 with the respective two and one year cycle starting thereafter. As a minimum, assessment team composition shall include Security Forces, AFOSI, Civil Engineering, Intelligence, Medical and Communications. A qualified representative from the Wing Information Protection Office will conduct the communications portion of the physical security vulnerability assessment. Results of the Information Protection Assessment Program review conducted IAW AFI 33-230 will supplement the physical security vulnerability assessment. Use the JSIVA checklist con-

tained in Appendix C to DoD 0-2000.12-H, Apr 99 and AFOSI Pamphlet 71-123, to accomplish the assessments. Classify assessment vulnerability reports pursuant to the JSIVA Security Classification Guide, 1 Sept 97. Forward a courtesy copy of the completed DoD Standard 14 assessment to HQ AMC/SFOP within 90 days after the assessment. **NOTE:** Higher Headquarters Standard #6 Vulnerability Assessments compliment but do not replace Installation Physical Security Vulnerability Assessments.

3.14.2.1. (Added) The ISC or other AT/FP decision making body should consider identified vulnerabilities when the wing commander's priority requirements list is developed for AT/FP funding submissions.

3.15.2. The installation force protection corporate structure, e.g., ISC, FPWG, will review all AT/FP plans annually.

3.15.3. AT/FP plans must include tenant activities and/or DoD elements and personnel for whom the commander has force protection responsibility. Where there are multiple command authorities on the installation, the installation/site commander is responsible for coordinating the physical security plans for all units on the installation. Review these program plans on a semi-annual basis or when the local threat level changes.

3.15.5. All units on AMC installations will forward unit specific AT/FP plans to the installation AT/FP responsible officer/NCO.

3.16.1. Local command authorities will exercise all portions of their AT/FP plans semi-annually. Exercises shall involve local off-base agencies to the greatest extent possible, and encompass duty and non-duty hours. Exercises shall include all tenant activities and/or DoD elements and personnel for whom the commander has force protection responsibility. Properly documented "Real World" scenarios may satisfy portions of this requirement.

3.17.2. Commanders shall routinely (or when the Terrorist Threat Level changes) review the effectiveness of day-to-day physical security measures under the existing THREATCON posture. As a minimum, consider access control, patterns of population concentrations for both work and social purposes, and sensitive areas that may be lucrative targets for terrorists and criminals.

3.17.2.1. (Added) The installation force protection corporate structure, e.g., ISC, FPWG, will review all THREATCON measures a minimum of semiannually.

3.18.2. Installation/site commanders will develop procedures for coordinating with local/federal authorities for the protection of personnel residing in off-installation housing, and ensure all DoD personnel receive the following guidance for selecting private residences to mitigate risk of terrorist attack. A Housing Office, if available, should be the installation/site commander's executive agent to ensure guidance is provided.

3.18.2.1. (Added) Give preference to residences that maximize safety and security while minimizing the need for security upgrades.

3.18.2.2. (Added) For single family residences, preferences should be given to those with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence that deters access to the property.

3.18.2.3. (Added) Preference should be given to residences with off street parking, and ideally secured in some manner.

3.18.2.4. (Added) Entrance areas and apartment hallways should be illuminated.

3.18.2.5. (Added) Entrances should have a substantial door.

- 3.18.2.6. (Added) Each entrance should have a capability to permit the occupant to identify visitors without opening the door.
- 3.18.2.7. (Added) Each entrance should have a deadbolt lock. A double cylinder lock should be used if placed within 40 inches of a glass side light or door window; fire safety rules should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- 3.18.2.8. (Added) Accessible window/opening should have a latching or locking mechanism.
- 3.18.2.9. (Added) Critical and High Threat Level Areas will also include the following (optional at lower threat levels):
- 3.18.2.9.1. (Added) Residences having multiple access routes to arterial roads should be given preference.
- 3.18.2.9.2. (Added) Grounds adjacent to the building façade and all entrance areas and apartment hallways should be illuminated.
- 3.18.2.9.3. (Added) Grills deemed adequate for local conditions are required on all accessible ground floor windows/openings where patterns of violence commonly used forced entry. Existing window barriers such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings can preclude the need for grills.
- 3.18.2.9.4. (Added) Grilled residences above the fourth floor require a secondary means of escape.
- 3.18.2.9.5. (Added) Residences should be alarmed to protect accessible window/openings and doors.
- 3.18.2.9.6. (Added) A safe haven should be considered where the threat includes forced entry into residences accompanied by physical harm to an occupant—residences above the first floor are excluded.
- 3.19.1. Consider using the CARVER matrix when conducting criticality and vulnerability assessments. Descriptions of the CARVER matrix and its use are contained in tab 3 of the Jul 98 J-34 Combating Terrorism AT/FP Installation Planning Template, Air Force Handbook 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*, and Field Manual 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*.
- 3.19.3. Where applicable, installation/site commanders will ensure residential security assessments for off-installation housing are conducted. Results of these evaluations, if conducted, must be documented and maintained on file for review by higher headquarters assessment officials pursuant to DoD Standard 6.
- 3.19.3.1. (Added) AMC assigned forces located within or transiting geographical CINC's AORs will comply with that CINC's established requirements and guidance governing off-installation billeting.
- 3.20.1. In addition to other applicable directives, use the AMC Passenger Terminal Design Guide when designing or upgrading air terminals.
- 3.20.2. Refer to the Interim Department of Defense Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standard.
- 3.20.2.1. (Added) Installation/site commanders may convene the FP decision making body, e.g., ISC, FPWG, for additional expertise in the review and coordination of new construction projects and existing building rehabilitation plans.
- 3.21.2. These inputs shall be used to determine if facilities/sites, either currently occupied or under consideration for occupancy by DoD personnel, can adequately protect occupants against terrorist attacks.

3.22.2. The AMC Threat Working Group (TWG) will conduct pre-deployment assessments of contingency or forward operating locations, and ensure the most current terrorism, criminal, and military threat information is available via the classified HQ AMC Intelligence homepage.

3.23.3.1. Installation commanders will program funds for training courses such as Level II Installation AT Officer/NCO Training, Dynamics of International Terrorism, Combating Terrorism on Military Installations, and the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course. **NOTE:** Do not request funding quotas for Air Education and Training Command funded schools as these are not funded locally.

3.23.4. Installation/site commanders must appoint, in writing, a primary and alternate AT/FP Officer and NCO (recommended E-7 or above) to serve as the Installation AT/FP subject matter experts and advisors. These positions should be full time positions assigned at wing/installation level, directly responsible to the installation/site commander. The installation commander, based on mission need, may waive target grades, however, it must be done in writing. Once the primary and alternate Wing AT/FP Officer and NCO have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter containing the names, SSNs, security clearances, duty phone numbers and e-mail addresses to HQ AMC/SFOP. Update appointment letters as changes occur; pen and ink changes are not authorized.

3.23.4.1. (Added) Individuals appointed as installation AT/FP Officers or NCOs should attend Level II training within 90 days of appointment, or as soon as possible.

3.23.4.2. (Added) All host/tenant units/organizations must appoint, in writing, a primary and alternate AT/FP Officer or NCO (recommended E-7 or above) to serve as the AT/FP subject matter expert and advisor. Once the primary and alternate AT/FP Officer or NCO have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter containing the names, SSNs, security clearances, duty phone numbers and e-mail addresses to the Wing AT/FP Officer or NCO. Update appointment letters as changes occur; pen and ink changes are not authorized.

3.24. Antiterrorism awareness training is required for travel to Puerto Rico even though it is a US territory.

3.24.8.1. Commanders will develop written procedures to verify Level I training is conducted prior to overseas TDY, PCS, or leave. Personnel, to include family members, who have not completed Level I AT/FP training with special emphasis on AOR-specific threat, to include medical threats, will not be issued orders for overseas travel (deployed, PCS, TDY or leave). The Joint Staff Guide 5260 is available via GCCS on the J-34 Combating Terrorism web site <http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/~dj3cleap/j34pubsdocs/j34/pubsdoc.html>. Local reproduction is authorized. Although losing commanders cannot mandate family members complete Level I training, gaining commanders may deny their travel within their AOR.

3.24.8.4. Annual force protection training, at a minimum, will include the same course of instruction as AT/FP Level I training. Items such as theater specific training requirements, use and maintenance of personal protective equipment, and weapons familiarization should be included. Ensure all training is documented in the same manner as Level I training.

3.24.9. Units will schedule Level II training through HQ AMC/SFXT. Personnel selected to attend the Level II course must be prioritized as follows: (1) installation AT/FP Officer/NCO and alternate, (2) key personnel assigned to UTCs, and (3) other specialties on the installation key to successful UTC deployment, i.e., combat logistics, communications, prime beef, medical personnel and other unique teams. Submit prioritized Level II training requests to HQ AMC/SFXT through the Installation AT/FP Officer/

NCO. Requests must include full name, rank/grade, SSN, security clearance, and duty phone to facilitate orders preparation.

3.24.9.2. The 421st Ground Combat Readiness Squadron will report numbers no later than the first Friday of every month to AMC/SFXT.

3.24.12. All AMC military, civilian, and contractor personnel are responsible for understanding the AT/FP concept and the terrorist threat to AMC personnel and facilities. Each person must apply this understanding daily when carrying out their assigned duties. Unit antiterrorism awareness training programs must be designed to foster a continuing appreciation of the importance of AT/FP in this command.

3.25. AFI 31-210, Attachment 5, contains a list of web sites for AOR specific training requirements, and DoDI 2000.14, Enclosure 2, provides a list of other courses personnel may use to provide requisite training prior to arrival in high-threat areas.

3.25.3. Procedures will prohibit the issuance of orders for overseas travel (deployed, PCS, TDY or leave) for those personnel who have not received AT/FP training with special emphasis on AOR-specific threat and medical threats.

3.25.3.1. (Added) For AMC aircrews, accomplish annual AT/FP training IAW AFI 31-210, *The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards* and MDS specific AFI 11-2 series training instructions. Document this training as AFORMS Code G110.

3.25.3.2. (Added) Pre-Mission AT/FP training will be accomplished as part of the aircrew intelligence briefing. Prior to departing home station on missions outside the CONUS, crews will receive a briefing emphasizing terrorist, enemy, and friendly political and military developments in the area in which they will be operating. This briefing will also include AOR specific AT information as directed by the geographic CINCs. Once in theater, aircrews should receive an intelligence update upon initial arrival at a forward operating location (FOL) or enroute stop, and thereafter as significant developments occur. Aircrews who have not traveled outside the CONUS within the last 6 months or have not received G110 training within the previous 6 months must accomplish the required training before departing home station.

3.25.3.3. (Added) Aircrews and Phoenix Raven personnel who have received Level I AT/FP training in the past year, regularly deploying to OCONUS locations, retain an AT/FP training status similar to individuals deployed (TDY/PCS) continually to overseas locations. This training status remains in effect as long as they have traveled OCONUS within the past 6 months. Individuals who experience a break in travel of more than 6 months do not fall into this category, and are required to accomplish the required training prior to deployment.

3.26. In accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 2000.14, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures*, June 15, 1994, commanders and Headquarters AMC Staff Directors will conduct annual reviews of high-risk billets and identify all high-risk personnel assigned to their units. When feasible, these designated persons should attend a regional orientation course (Middle East Orientation Course, Latin America Orientation Course, etc.) at the United States Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field FL. Other available courses include the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or another service-approved equivalent sponsored Senior Officer Seminar at International Training Incorporated, Westpoint VA. Emergency response and medical incident command system officers are encouraged to attend terrorism response courses developed by the Department of Justice and Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA). FEMA's National Emergency Training Center and National Fire Academy (NFA), Emmitsburg, MD provides this training. A self-study course for emergency responders is also available for unit/individual use from the NFA at no cost. AMC installation/site commanders deployed or deploying outside the continental United States will designate high-risk personnel based on localized threats at the deployed location.

3.26.2. All AMC general officers and senior executive schedule equivalents are designated "high-risk" personnel when assigned to high-risk/high-threat areas.

3.26.4. Executive officers, executive secretaries, and others responsible for accomplishing itineraries for general officers and DAF civilian equivalents are responsible for marking travel itineraries for official use only (FOUO) or classifying the itineraries confidential when required.

3.26.6.1. (Added) Determine classification using the three criterion listed below:

3.26.6.1.1. (Added) The foreign threat assessment (provided by AFOSI 3rd Field Investigative Region or AMC TWG).

3.26.6.1.2. (Added) Whether the general officer or DAF civilian equivalent is traveling to a country designated by the State Department as a special interest area (listed in the foreign clearance guide).

3.26.6.1.3. (Added) The foreign clearance guide guidance for the particular country. "The detailed foreign travel itineraries of DOD civilian officials, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, members of the Joint Staff, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (including service chiefs and vice chiefs), shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL with declassification upon trip completion.

3.26.6.2. (Added) Only the composite itinerary that contains the overall schedule, including arrival and departure times and places, is classified when associated with the DOD official. Necessary coordination and administrative arrangements to develop and execute the elements of the itinerary may be handled on an unclassified basis."

3.27. In medium, high, and critical threat locations, installation/site commanders will ensure DoD/civilian personnel, and family members under their control receive annual guidance on appropriate conduct in the event they are taken hostage.

3.28.3. As a part of the response plan, commanders are encouraged to develop a set of recognizable alarms for potential emergencies. Each alarm should have its own set of reactions and a means to immediately sound the alarm. Commanders should conduct frequent drills to familiarize all personnel with individual responsibilities during a potential emergency.

3.29.1. Commanders of AMC tenant units will ensure procedures for the protection of AMC personnel are included in the host installation's terrorist incident response plan.

3.29.2. In the event the terrorist threat in an area under their control increases to medium, high, or critical, installation/site commanders may need to include special security arrangements to protect DoD personnel and their family members living in off-installation housing. Close coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and local authorities is essential to ensure effective allocation of security resources and protection of DoD personnel.

3.30.3. Installation/site commanders shall consult with their servicing AFOSI detachment if executive protection/protective services are needed.

3.31.1. Installation/site commanders shall task the appropriate intelligence/counterintelligence organization under their command to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information pertaining to the potential terrorist use of WMD. Commanders at all levels shall ensure personnel under their command report information in a timely manner on events, or situations that could pose a threat to the security of DoD personnel and resources.

3.32.1. As a minimum, assessments should include information from intelligence, logistics, medical, physical security, facility engineering, meteorological, explosive ordnance disposal, and NBC staff elements. The entire range of potential terrorist WMD should be considered when conducting assessments. Threats from commercial chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological sources should be included as well as traditional military agents. Examples of factors to consider include: (1) Individual protective clothing and equipment, (2) Collective protection equipment and facilities, (3) Medical response and emergency services capability, (4) Training of personnel, (5) Physical security and protective barriers, (6) Facility design and construction, (7) Early warning and detection, (8) Alarms and attack warning, (9) Threat intelligence, (10) Preventive medicine and vaccination programs, (11) Sustainment operations and follow on support, (12) Storage of bulk hazardous material, (13) Explosive ordnance disposal response capability/availability and (14) Food and water sources.

3.33.2.1. Reports will be sent to HQ AMC/SFOP who will in turn pass the information to AFSFC/SFP.

3.33.2.7. (Added) As a part of the overall installation/site AT/FP plan, commanders should address the WMD threat and exercise the WMD part of the plan to determine its effectiveness in mitigating the effects of an attack. In addition to providing crisis action and consequence management procedures, planning should include pre-attack measures and consideration for collateral damage a WMD may have on adjacent facilities and surrounding communities. Plans should provide sufficient detail to permit organizations to rapidly recognize and respond to any terrorist event using WMD.

4. (Added) DoD AT/FP Recognition Program Awards. Each year, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC) recognizes outstanding AT efforts and installation programs that clearly set precedence in the field of AT/FP.

4.1. (Added) Units wishing to submit nomination packages for these awards must forward them to HQ AMC/SFOP no later than 20 February of the current calendar year.

4.2. (Added) Nomination packages should include details covering the previous calendar year. HQ AMC/SFOP will forward specific details and a notification message to AMC units each year.

Attachment 6 (Added)

SAMPLE AT/FP BUDGET SUBMISSION FORMAT

AT/FP (AT) BUDGET SUBMISSION FORMAT

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AMC/SFOP

102 East Martin Street, Suite 110
Scott AFB, IL 62250-5318

FROM: (Unit)
(Street Address)
(City/Base, State, & ZIP Code)

SUBJECT: AT/FP Budget Submission

1. Point of contact information:
 - a. AT Officer/NCO:
 - b. Duty phone (DSN):
 - c. E-mail address:

2. AT requirements:
 - a. Requirement One (Narrative)
 - (1) Project/item name and project number (if applicable)
 - (2) Description of the project, justification, and the AT vulnerability addressed
 - (3) Cost
 - (4) Special identifiers
 - (a) Project by Contract Management System project number and Facility Investment Metric rating (for Operations and Maintenance Real Property Maintenance by Contract projects only)
 - (b) Program Design Construction project number (for Military Construction facility projects only)
 - (c) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Requirement Document number (for communications and computer projects only)
 - (d) Document numbers (for "Memo Due Out" items only)
 - (e) Will the item be purchased using the International Purchase Authorization Card?
 - (5) Ranking on the wing commander's priority list
 - (6) Impact if unfunded
 - b. List additional requirements using the format above.

[Wing CC]
[Signature Block]

DENNIS A. HUNSINGER, Colonel, USAF
Director of Security Forces