BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

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Transportation

AMC PASSENGER TERMINAL FORCE PROTECTION

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction establishes policy and procedures for implementation of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Passenger Terminal Force Protection Program. It is applicable to all terminals operating under AMC guidelines as directed by the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), including AMC air terminals, Navy-operated AMC terminals, contracted air terminal operations (CATOs), station manager locations, permanent remote processing locations, Air Force Reserve terminals, and Air National Guard terminals (as applicable).

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This Interim Change (IC) FY04-2 changes the requirement for screening checked and hand-carried baggage utilizing the Ion Track Instrument. Placement of amnesty box in baggage claim area. Approval of purchase/lease of scanning equipment. Add TSA to the Abbreviations and Acronyms page. Delete the requirement to submit quarterly mitigation plan to HQ AMC. **A bar (|) indicates revision from the previous edition.**

1. AMC Passenger Terminal Force Protection (FP) Program:

1.1. The goal of the AMC Passenger Terminal FP Program is to deter terrorist and criminal activity and to ensure, should deterrence fail, that damage to aircraft and facilities and injuries to personnel are minimized.

1.2. AMC personnel will prevent entry of unauthorized weapons or explosives onto Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft. Personnel involved in all phases of passenger terminal operations must be keenly aware of any unusual conduct of persons within the terminal and alert to the possibility of concealed weapons or explosive devices.

2. Scope:

2.1. Commanders or air terminal managers governed by this instruction will establish a Passenger Terminal FP Program.

2.2. This instruction does not apply to mobility passenger processing facilities that are separate from the passenger terminal. When deploying passengers process through the passenger terminal, they will be processed in accordance with AMCI 24-101, Vol. 14.

3. Objective:

3.1. To minimize the possibility of mass casualties in AMC passenger terminals, prevent damage or destruction of AMC aircraft, and protect passenger terminal operational capability from terrorist actions. The standards identified in this instruction are base-line requirements. Installation and unit commanders may choose to implement additional measures where local threat analysis warrants.

4. Mitigation Measures:

4.1. Standoff from roadways and parking areas:

4.1.1. Standoff is designed to provide a survivable structure in the event of a vehicle bomb. For conventional construction, the standoff is expected to protect the structure from progressive collapse if a 25 kg (55 lbs)-TNT-equivalent blast event occurs. The structure will potentially be non-repairable, with major damage to structural members, but will not collapse.

4.1.2. Minimum standoff is 25 m (82 ft) from inhabited portions of the facility to the edge of the parking or roadway pavement. Portions of the facility that are normally uninhabited (such as mechanical or storage rooms) may be within the standoff area, providing they are secured against unauthorized entry.

4.1.3. Access drives (such as for deliveries and maintenance vehicles) within the standoff area are allowed if they can be controlled at all times by gates, drop arms, etc. Standoff is not required on a controlled flightline.

4.1.4. If a parking area or roadway infringes on the 82 ft standoff distance, the passenger terminal structure must be improved (hardened) or additional physical protective measures must be implemented to provide the additional protection. Adequate analysis by a competent expert, such as but not limited to security forces (SF), Office of Special Investigation (OSI), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and civil engineering (CE), must be completed to ensure the facility can meet the intent of this mitigation measure as outlined in paragraph **4.1.**

4.2. Standoff from external containers:

4.2.1. For conventional construction, the standoff will protect the structure from progressive collapse if a 25 kg (55 lbs.)-TNT-equivalent blast event occurs. (See paragraph **4.1.** for further clarification.)

4.2.2. Minimum standoff is 25 m (82 feet) from inhabited portions of the facility to external containers. “External containers” include but are not limited to trash containers (e.g., trash cans, butt cans, dumpsters) and external baggage storage lockers.

4.2.3. If the standoff distance is not achievable, hardening of external container enclosures or improvement of the passenger terminal structure to mitigate the direct blast and secondary fragment effects on the building are acceptable if analysis by competent experts (such as but not limited to SF, OSI, NCIS and CE) proves that it meets the intent of this mitigation measure.

4.2.4. External containers will be placed to be easily observable and checked or serviced regularly by terminal workers or responsible agencies.

4.2.5. Eliminate amnesty boxes if possible. If an amnesty box is required by an outside agency, it must be easily observed and checked regularly by the responsible agency. Minimum standoff is 25 m (82 feet) from inhabited portions of the facility.

4.2.5.1. If an amnesty box for arriving passengers is required by an outside agency for arriving passengers to dispose of prohibited items, an amnesty box may be placed in the baggage claim area. The requesting agency is responsible for providing, maintaining, and removing deposited items.

4.3. Increased standoff in higher force protection conditions (FPCONs):

4.3.1. During increased FPCONs, additional standoff or additional measures may be required to provide increased protection. Coordinate with local SF.

4.4. Unobstructed space:

4.4.1. Unobstructed space around the facility allows for easier visual detection of explosive devices.

4.4.2. Obstructions within 25 m (82 ft) of the facility should not allow for concealment of explosive devices 150 mm (6 in) or larger. Site furnishings or plantings are allowed within this area as long as any explosive devices placed in this area would be observable by the casual passer-by.

4.5. Windows, glass doors, and glazing:

4.5.1. Minimize the hazard to human life from flying glass fragments.

4.5.2. Install a minimum of 6 mm (1/4 in) nominal laminated glass at all exterior windows and doors containing glazing. The glass shall contain a minimum of two, 3 mm (1/8 in) nominal glass panes bonded together with a minimum of .75 mm (30 mil) polyvinyl-buteryl interlayer. For insulated glass units, the inner pane must meet these specifications.

4.5.3. Where new laminated glass is not feasible, a fragment retention film (FRF) can be installed over the existing glazing and windows. The FRF must be no less than 4 mil thick and attached to the inside of the window and frame according to the manufacturer’s directions. If FRF is used in lieu of laminated glass, properly anchored catch bars must be installed to meet the intent of this mitigation measure. Competent experts (such as but not limited to SF and CE) must analyze any

solution that provides protection from flying glass fragments to ensure it meets the intent of this mitigation measure. A certificate of compliance (C of C) from the installer/manufacturer should be kept in the FP evaluation file. C of C should include thickness/type/size of existing glazing and thickness of FRF.

4.5.4. When new construction or major renovations are accomplished, limit the total window area to 15 percent or less of the total exterior wall area and minimize the amount of windows on the front side of the building.

4.5.5. Skylights and glass blocks provide daylight to the interiors of the facility and are an alternative solution to windows. When used, competent experts (such as but not limited to SF and CE) must analyze and ensure that the placement, construction, and materials do not increase the potential for building damage or personal injuries. Skylights must comply with the same standards as windows.

4.5.6. Glass doors must comply with the same standards as windows.

4.5.7. Interior glass in close proximity to the exterior walls or in areas likely to be exposed to major blast effects must comply with the same standards as exterior glass and windows.

4.6. Observation and monitoring:

4.6.1. Monitor areas that are vulnerable or prone to a terrorist attack and criminal activity. The following areas will be considered: vehicle approaches, the primary entrance, out-bound area, areas housing critical functions, and any area that is difficult to observe and poses a significant risk.

4.6.2. If a closed circuit television (CCTV) fulfills a monitoring requirement outlined in this instruction, the CCTV will be monitored at all times.

4.6.3. If CCTV is not used, the areas to be monitored will be observable by terminal personnel at all times.

4.6.4. Circulation spaces within the facility should allow for the visual detection of unauthorized personnel approaching controlled areas. Clear lines of sight from the entrances and exits allow for the early detection of approaching vehicles and people.

4.7. Public address (PA) system:

4.7.1. The facility must have a means to provide timely notification of threats to occupants and instruct them of required actions.

4.7.2. Install a PA system with selective polling in all public areas, including the exterior of the building at gathering spaces, such as the main entrance. (In small terminals, a PA system without selective polling may be used.) For convenience, the PA system may be configured with taped messages running at set intervals. Additionally, PA microphone access for authorized persons at selected points within the terminal is encouraged.

4.7.3. If a PA system is impractical (such as at smaller locations) alternative means of mass notification are acceptable.

4.8. Duress alarm:

4.8.1. Allows terminal personnel to discreetly contact SF.

4.8.2. Install duress alarm activation switches at the single point of entry (SPE) and/or check-in counter. Additional locations that should be considered are the information desks, PSC counter, CCTV monitoring area, departure gate, and customs/immigration area. Hard-wired or wireless systems are both acceptable; however, they must be coordinated with base-level CE and SF personnel to ensure compatibility with base standards.

4.9. SPE into the terminal is optional and the decision to implement or maintain SPE will be made no lower then the local squadron/detachment commander level. Maintaining or implementing SPE should be based on force protection conditions, budget, personnel, facility, and local threat considerations.

4.9.1. If SPE is implemented, the entire terminal will be sterile.

4.9.2. Non-SPE terminals will maintain sterile passenger boarding gates and controlled baggage build-up areas.

4.9.3. HQ AMC/A43E will approve all scanning equipment prior to purchase/lease.

4.9.4. All personnel and their belongings must be screened/scanned at the SPE.

4.9.5. Personnel operating scanning equipment must be trained utilizing the manufacturer's user guide.

4.10. Scanning equipment:

4.10.1. Scanning equipment (e.g., magnetometers, trace explosives detection equipment, hand-held magnetometers, X-ray machines) detects unauthorized materials on individuals and within their baggage before entering the sterile area.

4.10.2. If SPE is maintained scanning equipment will be at the SPE. The scanning equipment must be placed at a location that ensures all personnel entering the terminal and the aircraft have been scanned. Once scanned, personnel will be kept in a sterile area, i.e., they will not have any access to, or the ability to receive, unauthorized material, and will not be able to come in contact with personnel who are not sterile.

4.10.3. “For non-SPE terminals, scanning equipment will be located to ensure passengers and their carry-on items are screened prior to entering the departure gate. Checked baggage will be screened at check-in, or in the baggage build-up area.

4.10.4. HQ AMC/A43E will approve all scanning equipment prior to purchase/lease.

4.10.5. Personnel operating scanning equipment must be trained using the manufacturer's user guide.

4.11. Back-up power:

4.11.1. Provide the ability to continue operations during a power outage.

4.11.2. Insure back-up power has the ability to run essential systems, such as emergency lighting, computers, scanning equipment, PA and CCTV.

4.11.3. If portable generators are used, the passenger terminal must be on the base-wide CE generator plan and the generator must be installed within 2 hours of loss of power.

4.11.4. Where it is not feasible to locate (or relocate) air intakes as specified in paragraph **4.11.3.**, ensure that the area is easily observed (or monitored) and incorporate inspection of this area into normal security patrols and random antiterrorism measures (RAM) (see paragraph **4.13.**).

4.11.5. Terminal lighting will be sufficient to allow monitoring by personnel and CCTV.

4.12. Utilities:

4.12.1. Prevent tampering of critical building utilities and environmental systems.

4.12.2. Limit access to mechanical rooms, power/telephone cabinets, and power shutoffs (other than those required for safety reasons) through the use of door locks or padlocks, or locate them in areas that are not accessible by the general public. Power disconnect switches should be reviewed with CE and SF to determine whether the need to secure them outweighs the need to quickly terminate power to the equipment.

4.12.3. Air intakes for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems should be located on the roof or greater than 3 meters (10 ft) from the ground. Provide an emergency air distribution shutoff that is easily accessible by building inhabitants (but not the general public) that immediately shuts down air distribution throughout the facility.

4.12.4. Where it is not feasible to locate (or relocate) air intakes as specified in paragraph **4.12.3.**, ensure that the area is easily observed (or monitored) and incorporate inspection of this area into normal security patrols and random antiterrorism measures (RAMs) (see paragraph **4.14.**).

4.12.5. Terminal lighting will be sufficient to allow monitoring by personnel and CCTV.

4.12.6. Where feasible, create an entrance into the facility that is perpendicular to the street or drive to reduce facility vulnerability to moving vehicle bombs. A protective wall may provide additional protection from attack.

4.12.7. Eliminate exterior roof access by providing controlled access from internal stairways, ladders, or through mechanical rooms. Where exterior access cannot be eliminated, secure the ladder or stairway with a locked cage or similar mechanism.

4.12.8. When the special category lounge is part of the passenger terminal, the special category lounge will be part of the terminal sterile area. Distinguished visitors (DVs) may use an alternate entrance other than the SPE. This entrance must be controlled to prevent unauthorized access. DVs and their baggage must be screened before entering the sterile area or the aircraft.

4.12.9. Protect pallet build-up and staging area from unauthorized access. Unless areas are already controlled areas such as the flightline, fence and secure outdoor pallet build-up area, and consider monitoring this area with CCTV if it is not easily observable.

4.12.10. The Aerial Port, Transportation, or AMS commander or terminal manager may issue an entry authorization list for on-duty passenger terminal personnel or personnel directly involved with passenger terminal operations on a routine and recurring basis, e.g., ramp controller and border clearance officials who may bypass SPE scanning and screening. This list must be kept to an absolute minimum.

4.12.11. Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES)/vendor restocking operations and maintenance personnel entering the sterile area will be adequately screened and closely monitored.

4.12.12. Post warning signs in English and host nation's language to prevent accidental unauthorized entry into restricted/nonpublic areas.

4.13. Personnel access:

4.13.1. Eliminate unauthorized access to all parts of the passenger terminal.

4.13.2. At passenger terminals with SPE, security screening of all personnel and their belongings is required for entry into the passenger terminal. At passenger terminals without SPE, security screening of all personnel and their belongings is required for entry into any preboarding sterile areas.

4.13.3. At passenger terminals with SPE, limit the number of exits to those that are required. Public exits must be located near the SPE or be configured to prevent unauthorized access to the terminal. Other entries/exits for terminal personnel must be secured by the use of locks, cipher locks, electronic card access, etc. If the building is a multifunction facility, all access from nonsterile areas must be similarly controlled. The windows in the sterile area will be secured so that nothing can be passed into the sterile area.

4.13.4. Install intrusion detection systems (IDS) on all secured entries and exits. The IDS should use a local audible and visual alarm to alert terminal personnel of the location of the intrusion or unauthorized exit.

4.13.5. At SPE terminals locate baggage storage lockers, if provided, inside the sterile area out of the normal flow of traffic, or outside the terminal beyond the standoff distance. At non-SPE terminals, storage lockers will be located outside the terminal beyond the standoff distance.

4.13.6. Where feasible, create an entrance into the facility that is perpendicular to the street or drive to reduce facility vulnerability to moving vehicle bombs. A protective wall may provide additional protection from attack.

4.13.7. Eliminate exterior roof access by providing controlled access from internal stairways, ladders, or through mechanical rooms. Where exterior access cannot be eliminated, secure the ladder or stairway with a locked cage or similar mechanism.

4.13.8. At SPE terminals, when the special category lounge is part of the passenger terminal it will be part of the terminal sterile area. Distinguished visitors (DVs) may use an alternate entrance other than the SPE. This entrance must be controlled to prevent unauthorized access. DVs and their baggage must be screened before entering the sterile area or the aircraft.

4.13.9. Protect pallet build-up and staging area from unauthorized access. Unless areas are already controlled areas such as the flight line, fence and secure outdoor pallet build-up area, and consider monitoring this area with CCTV if it is not easily observable.

4.13.10. The Aerial Port, Transportation, or AMS commander or terminal manager may issue an entry authorization list for on-duty passenger terminal personnel or personnel directly involved with passenger terminal operations on a routine and recurring basis, e.g., ramp controller and border clearance officials who may bypass scanning and screening. This list must be kept to an absolute minimum.

4.13.11. At SPE terminals, Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES)/Navy Exchange (NEX) vendor restocking operations and maintenance personnel entering the sterile area will be ade-

quately screened and closely monitored. At non-SPE terminals, a visual security inspection of the sterile area will be performed after vendors leave the departure gate area.

4.13.12. Post warning signs in English and host nation's language to prevent accidental unauthorized entry into restricted/nonpublic areas.

4.14. Random Anti-Terrorist Measures (RAMs) and workforce awareness:

4.14.1. Provide additional protection by developing a set of local RAMs. RAMs should be part of the installation FP program.

4.14.2. Develop RAMs in coordination with local SF personnel. RAMs may be accomplished only by passenger terminal personnel or in conjunction with SF assistance. RAMs must be developed for all FPCONs. Develop procedures for selecting and implementing RAMs. Final determination of RAMs must be coordinated with host SF personnel.

4.14.3. Possible RAMs include: security patrols around the building, use of military working dogs to search baggage/packages, physical searches of baggage/packages, ID checks, and use of trace explosives detection equipment,.

4.14.4. All terminal personnel will receive initial and recurring antiterrorism/force protection, security training and recurring security briefings. Antiterrorism/force protection and security awareness literature and visual aids should be posted throughout the terminal.

4.15. **General.** The Ion Track Instrument (Itemiser3 and/or VaporTracer2) will be used to randomly screen checked baggage and suspect hand-carried baggage for trace particles of explosives. The x-ray equipment will be used to screen hand-carried baggage. If x-ray equipment is not available, hand-carried baggage will be physically screened. Establish local procedures, in coordination with SF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, for responding to positive explosive detections.

4.15.1. Checked baggage will be randomly screened for explosive material based on the following formula: FPCON Alpha – 10%, FPCON Bravo – 25%, FPCON Charlie – 75%, FPCON Delta – 100%.

4.15.1.1. Hand-carried baggage will be screened for prohibited items utilizing x-ray equipment or hand-searched. Suspect hand-carried baggage will be screened for explosive material utilizing the ION Track Instrument.

4.15.2. Use the Itemiser3 or VaporTracer2 Portable Explosive Detector as needed to inspect objects for trace particles of explosives through wiping handle, lock mechanism, and top of bag by hand or use optional wand. The detection analysis takes approximately 5 seconds.

4.15.3. If a positive detection for explosives is received from any explosive detection method, e.g., Itemiser3, VaporTracer2, explosives detection canine unit, or visual inspection, follow local procedures.

4.15.4. If a bag or other container is found unattended and attempts to locate owner are unsuccessful, follow local unattended baggage procedures. If the VaporTracer2 is available, use it to examine for trace amounts of explosive material. If the Itemiser3 is used, provide the hand sampling unit to the agency (SF, EOD) inspecting the unattended bag/container.

4.15.5. The Itemiser3 and VaporTracer2 may be made available to local SF and OSI agents for examination of suspected explosives. This should be done only when it will not impact the AMC mission.

5. Antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) vulnerability self-assessment:

5.1. The AT/FP vulnerability self-assessment tool, found at **Attachment 3**, provides the commander or terminal manager with a tool to assess the passenger terminal facility's potential vulnerability and assist in developing measures to mitigate the threat. All commanders or terminal managers will perform the self-assessment quarterly using the instructions provided in the tool. Note: This self-assessment is not a commander's report card, but rather a tool. It will allow the commander or terminal manager to zero in on specific problem areas he or she needs to fix. The self-assessment must be accurate and forthright.

5.2. Mitigation plans. Passenger terminal managers will submit a mitigation plan quarterly as shown in **Attachment 4**, to their respective unit commander or air terminal manager. The first entry will be the overall terminal score. This will be followed by assessments of each major category to include:

5.3. DELETE.

5.3.1. DELETED.

5.3.2. DELETED.

5.3.3. DELETED.

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Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

Department of Defense Antiterrorism Construction Standards, 16 December 1999

DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation* (DTR)

DOD Handbook O-2000.12H, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism*

AFPAM 90-902, *Operational Risk Management Guidelines and Tools and Political Turbulence*

AMCI 24-101, Vol. 14, *Military Airlift Passenger Service*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAFES—Army Air Force Exchange Service

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AT/FP—Antiterrorism/Force Protection

CATO—Contracted Air Terminal Operation

CCTV—Closed Circuit Television

C of C—Certificate of Compliance

CE—Civil Engineering

DOD—Department of Defense

DTR—Defense Transportation Regulation

DV—Distinguished Visitor

ECD—Estimated Completion Dates

FP—Force Protection

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

FRF—Fragment Retention Film

GOV—Government Owned Vehicle

HVAC—Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IDS—Intrusion Detection Systems

IECP—Installation Entry Control Point

NCIS—Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NAF—Numbered Air Force

ORM—Operational Risk Management

OSI—Office of Special Investigation

PA—Public Address

POV—Privately Owned Vehicle

RAM—Random Antiterrorism Measure

SF—Security Forces

SPE—Single Point of Entry

TSA—Transportation Security Agency

Terms

Conventional Construction:—Building construction that is not specifically designed to resist weapons or explosive effects. Conventional construction is designed only to resist common loadings and environmental effects such as wind, seismic, and snow loads. Unreinforced masonry is not considered conventional construction for the purposes of these standards.

Parking:—Areas designated for privately owned vehicle (POV) and government owned vehicle (GOV) parking.

Passenger terminal:—All parts of the facility where AMC passenger terminal operations take place, to include offices, AAFES operations, and other organizations within the sterile area.

Roadways:—Any common use surface intended for motorized vehicle traffic.

Standoff distance:—A distance maintained between the outer wall of the inhabited portions of a building and the potential location for an explosive detonation.

Sterile area:—A location in which screened passengers, baggage, or cargo are isolated in such a way that prohibited and/or restricted items can not be received by passengers or inserted into baggage or cargo.

TNT-equivalent weight:—The weight of TNT that has an equivalent energetic output to that of a different weight of another explosive compound.

Attachment 2

INTRODUCTION TO AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AT/FP VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL

A2.1. Purpose. The Passenger Terminal AT/FP Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool was developed to assess passenger terminal facility AT/FP vulnerability and assist in developing mitigation plans. Accomplishing a facility vulnerability assessment allows a realistic determination of passenger terminal AT/FP strengths and limitations and an acceptable level of risk.

A2.2. Supporting Guidance. The tool was developed using ORM principles contained in AFPAM 90-902, *Operational Risk Management Guidelines and Tools*, FP guidance from the DOD Handbook O-2000.12H, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence,* and the *Department of Defense Antiterrorism Construction Standards.*

A2.3. Methodology.

A2.3.1. The tool divides vulnerabilities into four major categories: Installation, Facility Access, Facility Architecture and Other Factors. These major categories are weighted according to the relative risk they impose and are assigned point values as follows:

1. Major category title;
2. Standard point spreads for that major category;
3. The assessed vulnerability score;
4. The following for each sub area:

4a. The points possible and achieved,

4b. Interim and permanent planned improvements,

4c. Estimated completion dates (ECDs),

4d. Estimated cost,

4e. Affect on assessment points.

5. The mitigation plan will conclude with an improvement timeline and comments if desired.

A2.3.2. These four major categories are further divided into subareas, each of which is assigned a portion of its major category's points, depending on the relative risk each imposes, as follows:

Table A2.1. Self-Assessment Tool Interim Tally Sheet (Checklist).

Installation	20%	(75 points)
Facility Access	33%	(124 points)
Facility Architecture	26%	(97 points)
Other Factors	21%	(79 points)
Total	100%	(375 points)

A2.3.3. Using the tool. To apply the tool, simply use **Table A2.1.** as a checklist and **Table A3.1.** as the final tally sheet, following the instructions given for each subarea in **Attachment 3**. Write the number of points that accurately reflects the terminal's rating in the blank space for each subarea. Add the total points in each major category and put these four numbers in the spaces provided in **Table A3.1.** Finally, add the values in the four major categories to obtain the final number at the bottom of **Table A3.1.**

A2.3.4. Vulnerability assessment. Finally, compare these scores to the ranges of scores provided in the final Tally Sheet to determine the terminal's level of vulnerability, either high, medium or low – the higher the number, the lower the vulnerability, and vice versa.

Attachment 3

AT/FP VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL

A3.1. Installation

A3.1.1. **Installation Threat Assessment Level.** Facility vulnerability directly relates to the overall threat level for the installation. The installation threat level is assessed approximately every 6 months. This threat level should not be confused with the current FPCON posture. Request this information from the local OSI, SF Squadron or NCIS.

Major Category	Sub Area	Max Score	Total %	Achieved Score
INSTALLATION	Threat Assessment Level	25	7%	
	Criminal Assessment Level	25	7%	
	Installation Access	25	6%	
Sub Total				
FACILITY ACCESS	Distance	25	7%	
	Standoff	28	7%	
	Orientation to Roads	14	4%	
	Natural Barriers & Landscaping	9	2%	
	Control Points & Physical Barriers	12	3%	
	Parking	10	3%	
	Service Access	10	3%	
	Utilities	16	4%	
Sub Total				
FACILITY ARCHITECTURE	Exterior Building Form	10	3%	
	Exterior Envelope	10	3%	
	Exterior Windows	18	4%	
	Exterior Doors	14	4%	
	Space Planning	19	5%	
	Signs	4	1%	
	Monitoring & Intrusion Detection System	22	6%	
Sub Total				
OTHER FACTORS	Sterile Areas	35	9%	

Major Category	Sub Area	Max Score	Total %	Achieved Score
	Communications	6	2%	
	Workforce Awareness	13	4%	
	Security Drills & Response	20	5%	
	Key Control & Maintenance	5	1%	
Sub Total				
GRAND TOTAL		375	100%	

A3.1.2. **Installation Criminal Assessment Level.** Facility vulnerability directly relates to the overall criminal threat for your installation. Request this information from the local OSI, SF Squadron or NCIS.

25 points	Negligible	OR
20 points	Low	OR
10 points	Moderate	OR
5 points	Significant	OR
0 points	High	
_____	Total points for this section	(Max possible points – 25)

25 points	Negligible	OR
20 points	Low	OR
10 points	Moderate	OR
5 points	Significant	OR
0 points	High	
_____	Total points for this section	(Max possible points – 25)

A3.1.3. **Installation Access Control.** Secure installation access is the first line of defense in any physical security system and increases the overall protection of the installation and its facilities. It is understood that most passenger terminals are located on installations with perimeter barriers (e.g., fencing, wall) to deter unauthorized access. The level and integration of physical security varies. Request any needed information from the local security agency. The installation may have more than one of these items in place. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section. Note: an active barrier requires action by personnel to permit entry, (e.g., moving/removing a traffic gate/beam).

15 points Installation entry control points (IECP) with:
1. An active barrier system and an armed sentry,
2. Vehicles are searched, and
3. Personnel are ID checked prior to installation entry

OR

13 points IECP with:
1. An active barrier system or an armed sentry,
2. Vehicles are searched, and
3. Personnel are ID checked prior to installation entry

OR

10 points IECP with:
1. An active barrier system or an armed sentry,
2. Personnel are ID checked prior to installation entry

5 points IDS are used to monitor installation perimeter

5 points Fence/wall that fully encloses the installation perimeter, and meets DOD standards

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 25)

A3.2. Facility Access.

A3.2.1. **Distance.** While many different measures can be used to provide FP, distance is the most effective and desirable in accordance with DOD guidance; facilities must be at least 150 feet from the installation perimeter and/or 25 m (82 feet) from other buildings. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

15 points Minimum of 150-feet from installation perimeter

10 points Minimum of 25 m (82 feet) from other buildings

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 25)

A3.2.2. **Standoff.** Standoff zones provide areas of controlled access, heightened visibility, and reduce vehicle bomb vulnerability for a conventional construction facility. The goal is to obtain a minimum standoff distance to provide "low level" protection from the blast effects of a 55-pound net explosive weight bomb. If the facility does not meet any of the minimums, score 0 points for this section.

20 points	Minimum 82 feet standoff zone around the facility, excluding the controlled flightline
8 points	External containers (e.g., trash cans, dumpsters) are placed greater than 82 feet from the facility
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 28)

A3.2.3. **Facility Orientation and Relationship to Roads.** Facility location and access road design can reduce facility vulnerability to moving vehicle bombs. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

6 points	No direct or straight-line vehicle access to facility
4 points	Two or less access roads to facility, not including flightline access
4 points	Approach road is curved to reduce vehicle speed
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 14)

A3.2.4. **Natural Barriers and Landscaping.** Low berms, shallow ditches, trees, and shrubs can provide screening to protect the facility and keep stationary vehicle bombs at a distance. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

4 points	Berms, walls, shallow bodies of water, ditches, etc. are used to reduce access to facility and standoff area
3 points	Landscape vegetation (trees/shrubs) grouped to reduce facility access
2 points	No surrounding terrain within a mile is higher than the facility site
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 9)

A3.2.5. **Control Points and Physical Barriers.** These are active measures to restrict the ability of vehicle bombs to reach the facility. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

6 points	A vehicle crash resistance system is in place (e.g., pop-up bollards, cable beam barrier)
6 points	Passive vehicle barriers are used at facility entries and drives (e.g., high curbs, highway medians, fences, posts, sandbags, guardrails)
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 12)

A3.2.6. **Parking.** Location of vehicle parking areas can reduce the threat of stationary vehicle bombs. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If your facility does not meet this standard, score 0 points for this section.

10 points All vehicle (POV, GOV and DV) parking outside your standoff zone, away from facility

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 10)

A3.2.7. **Service Access.** Having a single entry to your facility reduces access to the facility and personnel exposure to a possible threat. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

10 points No separate entrance for deliveries – everyone uses SPE

OR

5 points Separate secured/monitored service & delivery access

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 10)

A3.2.8. **Utilities.** Protecting facility utilities from tampering is vital to sustain operations. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points Underground utilities

5 points Automatic switchover capability to permanently installed back-up generators

OR

3 points Quick connects for portable generators

3 points Locked or protected utilities (e.g., transformers, mechanical rooms, junction/breaker boxes, generators)

3 points Fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from facility or fuel storage tanks buried underground

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 16)

A3.3. Facility Architecture

A3.3.1. **Exterior Building Form.** Structural elements and building position can reduce blast effects. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

3 points	No eaves or overhangs on building façade
	OR
2 points	Eaves and/or overhangs designed to withstand blast effects
3 points	No exposed structural elements (e.g., weight-bearing columns)
	OR
2 points	Structural elements (e.g., columns) are protected with reinforced wall panels
2 points	Building oriented so that the least profile is exposed to the street
2 points	Single story building (reduced profile)
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 10)

A3.3.2. **Exterior Envelope.** Building construction provides significant blast protection and is considered among the most effective means of shielding the facility. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

10 points	Building constructed over and above conventional construction standards to withstand blast effects
	OR
5 points	Sacrificial exterior wall panels designed to absorb blast
5 points	Sacrificial roof designed to absorb blast
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 10)

A3.3.3. **Exterior Windows.** Conventional glass windows are a primary cause of injuries during a blast due to flying glass fragments. Windows also present an opportunity for introduction of unauthorized personnel and items into the facility. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

18 points	No exterior windows on the building, take maximum 18 points, nothing else applies
5 points	Less than 15% of the building exterior has windows
7 points	All windows have ballistic-resistant or polycarbonate or acrylic glazing
	OR
5 points	All windows have laminated glazing
	OR
5 points	All window interiors have polymer film (4-mil thickness) applied with properly installed catch bars
2 points	All exterior windows made to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel and items (e.g., windows installed above 10 feet, locks, screens or meshwork installed on all windows)
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 18)

A3.3.4. **Exterior Doors.** Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points	All doors are blast-resistant with steel frames installed
3 points	All door hinges are installed to be tamper resistant from the exterior
3 points	All emergency exits facilitate exiting only
3 points	All roof access ladders and hatches are secured
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 14)

A3.3.5. **Space Planning.** Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

8 points	Secure and separate inbound passenger holding areas (lounge, baggage claim, customs & immigrations)
8 points	Entry foyer has reinforced concrete walls and offset interior and exterior doors
3 points	Interior barriers used to establish boundaries and prevent unauthorized entry into nonpublic areas within the facility (e.g., restricted access to dispatch area, baggage handling area)
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 19)

A3.3.6. **Signs.** Select if item applies and add to the total points. If your facility does not meet this standard, score 0 points for this section.

4 points	Warning signs used to prevent accidental unauthorized entry into restricted/nonpublic areas
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 4)

A3.3.7. **Monitoring and IDS.** Proper lighting, duress alarms, intrusion detection, and surveillance monitoring are essential to protect the facility from criminal activities. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

4 points	Security surveillance monitoring of interior facility areas through CCTV or designated surveillance personnel
4 points	Security surveillance monitoring of exterior facility areas through CCTV or designated surveillance personnel
4 points	Adequate lighting to monitor perimeters, parking areas, entrances, and storage areas during hours of darkness
3 points	Manually activated duress alarms, fixed and/or portable
3 points	IDS with audible alarm (e.g., door alarms)
2 points	Interior emergency lighting at required locations
2 points	Exterior emergency lighting at required locations
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 22)

A3.4. Other Factors

A3.4.1. **Sterile Areas.** Safeguarding aircraft is an AMC priority. Using security equipment at the SPE or sterile boarding gate is the principal method to protect aircraft. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

8 points	Walk-through and/or hand-held magnetometers used to scan personnel prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, i.e., prior to entering any sterile area
8 points	X-ray machines used to inspect baggage and hand-carried items prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area
	OR
8 points	100% hand-inspection of baggage and hand-carried items accomplished prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area
8 points	Trace explosive detection system (e.g., ion scanner) used to inspect baggage and hand-carried items prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area
11 points	Procedures are in place to insure sterile areas remain sterile, i.e., to ensure zero "leakage" into or out of sterile areas

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 35)

A3.4.2. *** Communications.** Communications capabilities are key for incident response and notification to both SF and personnel in the terminal area. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

2 points Dedicated phone lines to security response forces (hot lines)

2 points Multiple communications capability (radios, telephones, etc.)

2 points PA system

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 6)

A3.4.3. **Workforce Awareness.** Personnel awareness is vital to identifying and preventing security incidents. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points All terminal personnel (civilian, military, and contract) receive initial and recurring AT/FP and security training

5 points All terminal personnel (civilian, military, and contract) receive initial and recurring security briefings

3 points AT/FP and security awareness literature and visual aids are posted

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 13)

A3.4.4. **Security Drills and Personnel Response.** Practicing security incident response is key to maintaining terminal personnel training/awareness and evaluating response performance. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

8 points All terminal personnel trained and drilled to identify and respond to unattended baggage and suspicious packages, personnel and vehicles within/around the terminal facility

6 points SF performs random periodic infiltration drills to test terminal security/surveillance (e.g., attempt entry with a weapon; leave unattended baggage/packages)

6 points SF performs random periodic baggage check with bomb sniffing dog for bomb detection

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 20)

A3.4.5. **Key Control and Lock Maintenance.** Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points Formal key control program implemented

OR

5 points Access cards or cipher lock combinations are changed every 3 months and as required

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 5)

A3.4.6. **Key Control and Lock Maintenance.** Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points Formal key control program implemented

OR

5 points Access cards or cipher lock combinations are changed every 3 months and as required

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 5)

Table A3.1. AT/FP Vulnerability Self-Assessment Final Tally Sheet

RED	YELLOW	GREEN
INSTALLATION		Total points for this section_____
0 – 29	**30-34**	**35 – 75**
High vulnerability	Med.	Low vulnerability
FACILITY ACCESS		Total points for this section_____
0 – 62	**63 – 90**	**91 – 124**
High vulnerability	Medium vulnerability	Low vulnerability
FACILITY ARCHITECTURE		Total points for this section_____
0 – 35	**36 – 59**	**60 – 97**
High vulnerability	Medium vulnerability	Low vulnerability
OTHER FACTORS		Total points for this section_____
0 – 66	**67–71**	**72 – 79**
High vulnerability	Med.	Low
FINAL SCORE		Total points_____
0 - 192	**193 – 254**	**255 – 375**
High vulnerability	Medium	Low vulnerability

Commander's verification:_____ _____

Signature Date

SAMPLE MITIGATION PLAN

Vulnerability Mitigation Plan for
Somewhere AFB Passenger Terminal
a/o 31 Mar 01

I. Overall Terminal Score: 210 (Yellow)

II. Major Category: INSTALLATION (format as in major category "FACILITY ACCESS" below)

III. Major Category: FACILITY ACCESS

Standard Point Spread:

0-62	63-90	91-124
High Vulnerability	**Medium Vulnerability**	**Low Vulnerability**

- Assessed Vulnerability Score: 50 (Red)
- Subarea Scores
  -- Distance: 25 of 25
  -- Standoff: 0 of 28
  -- Facility Orientation: 6 of 14
  -- Natural Barriers and Landscaping: 2 of 9
  -- Control points/barriers: 6 of 12
  -- Parking: 0 of 10
  -- Service Access: 5 of 10
  -- Utilities: 6 of 16

- Interim and Permanent Planned Improvements
  -- Standoff*
  --- Interim – Place barriers to close off the road in front and alongside the facility and first row of parking to gain 82 foot standoff. ECD: 1 Oct 01. Cost: $10,000. Gain: 20 points
  --- Permanent – Move external containers (i.e. trash receptacles) at least 82 feet away from the facility. ECD: 1 Oct 01. Cost: $12,000. Gain: 8 points
  -- Facility orientation – None planned**
  -- Natural barriers and landscaping
  --- Permanent – Coordinate with CE to determine appropriate vegetation to provide protection; order and plant appropriate trees/shrubs. ECD: 1 Dec 01. Cost: $5,000. Gain: 3 points
  -- Control points/barriers
  --- Interim – Add a guardrail along the service entry road. ECD: 30 Oct 01. Cost: $3,500. Gain: 6 points
  -- Parking – None Planned

--- See “Standoff” above. ECD: 1 Oct 01. Gain: 10 points***

-- Service access

--- Permanent – Install Fence and controlled entry into service area

ECD: 15 Apr 02. Cost: $20,000. Gain: 5 points

-- Utilities – None planned

IV. Major Category: FACILITY ARCHITECTURE (format as in major category “FACILITY ACCESS" above)

V. Major Category: OTHER FACTORS (format as in major category “FACILITY ACCESS” above)

VI. Improvement timeline:

- 1 Oct 01, gain of 38 points to a total of 248; remains YELLOW
- 30 Oct 01, gain of 6 points to a total of 254; remains YELLOW
- 1 Dec 01, gain of 3 points to a total of 257; turns to GREEN
- 15 Apr, gain of 5 points to a total of 262; still GREEN

VII. Comments:

- One cost not readily apparent is the $3,500 for the guardrail on the service access road. The road does not have curbs and vehicles admitted through the checkpoint have ready access to any point around the terminal. The guardrail is 25% as expensive as high curbs.
- Funds for the barriers, guardrail, shrubbery and service area fence are available, however, the $12,000 required for construction of new dumpster area is not available at base level. Any assistance you can provide will be appreciated.

* Note that only the subareas which score less than maximum need to be included in the Interim and Permanent Planned Improvements discussion. In this example, the “Distance” subarea was not included because it had earned 25 of 25 points.

** Even though every less-than-maximum subarea is included, there is no requirement to have planned improvements in every one. The goal is an overall level of acceptable risk. i.e., to have the area “green,” even though there may still be some specific requirements unmet. Remember, the higher the terminal rises in the green category, the less the risk to your people and facilities. Don’t stop striving for improvement if, like this sample terminal did on 30 Oct 01, you just barely make green.

*** Some improvements will provide points in two separate areas. Note that the cost is not repeated to ensure total fiscal requirements are not skewed.

Attachment 4

IC 2003-01 TO AMCI 24-101, VOLUME 24, AMC PASSENGER TERMINAL FORCE PROTECTION

21 July 2003

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This interim change (IC) FY03-1 incorporates changes for single point of entry from mandatory to optional, and provides guidance for using Ion Track Instruments, Itemiser3 and/or VaporTracer2.

4.8.2. Install duress alarm activation switches at the single point of entry (SPE) and/or check-in counter. Additional locations that should be considered are the information desks, PSC counter, CCTV monitoring area, departure gate, and customs/immigration area. Hard-wired or wireless systems are both acceptable; however, they must be coordinated with base-level CE and SF personnel to ensure compatibility with base standards.

4.9. SPE into the terminal is optional and the decision to implement or maintain SPE will be made no lower then the local squadron/detachment commander level. Maintaining or implementing SPE should be based on force protection conditions, budget, personnel, facility, and local threat considerations.

4.9.1. If SPE is implemented, the entire terminal will be sterile.

4.9.2. Non-SPE terminals will maintain sterile passenger boarding gates and controlled baggage build-up areas.

4.10. Scanning equipment:

4.10.1. Scanning equipment (e.g., magnetometers, trace explosives detection equipment, hand-held magnetometers, X-ray machines) detects unauthorized materials on individuals and within their baggage before entering the sterile area.

4.10.2. If SPE is maintained scanning equipment will be at the SPE. The scanning equipment must be placed at a location that ensures all personnel entering the terminal and the aircraft have been scanned. Once scanned, personnel will be kept in a sterile area, i.e., they will not have any access to, or the ability to receive, unauthorized material, and will not be able to come in contact with personnel who are not sterile.

4.10.3. “For non-SPE terminals, scanning equipment will be located to ensure passengers and their carry-on items are screened prior to entering the departure gate. Checked baggage will be screened at check-in, or in the baggage build-up area.

4.10.4. HQ AMC/LGTV will approve all scanning equipment prior to purchase.

4.10.5. Personnel operating scanning equipment must be trained using the manufacture’s user guide and to Transportation Security Agency (TSA) or other applicable federal standards.

4.11. Back-up power:

4.11.1. Provide the ability to continue operations during a power outage.

4.11.2. Insure back-up power has the ability to run essential systems, such as emergency lighting, computers, scanning equipment, PA and CCTV.

4.11.3. If portable generators are used, the passenger terminal must be on the base-wide CE generator plan and the generator must be installed within 2 hours of loss of power.

4.12. Utilities:

4.12.1. Prevent tampering of critical building utilities and environmental systems.

4.12.2. Limit access to mechanical rooms, power/telephone cabinets, and power shutoffs (other than those required for safety reasons) through the use of door locks or padlocks, or locate them in areas that are not accessible by the general public. Power disconnect switches should be reviewed with CE and SF to determine whether the need to secure them outweighs the need to quickly terminate power to the equipment.

4.12.3. Air intakes for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems should be located on the roof or greater than 3 meters (10 ft) from the ground. Provide an emergency air distribution shutoff that is easily accessible by building inhabitants (but not the general public) that immediately shuts down air distribution throughout the facility.

4.12.4. Where it is not feasible to locate (or relocate) air intakes as specified in paragraph **4.12.3.**, ensure that the area is easily observed (or monitored) and incorporate inspection of this area into normal security patrols and random antiterrorism measures (RAMs) (see paragraph **4.14.**).

4.12.5. Terminal lighting will be sufficient to allow monitoring by personnel and CCTV.

4.13. Personnel access:

4.13.1. Eliminate unauthorized access to all parts of the passenger terminal.

4.13.2. At passenger terminals with SPE, security screening of all personnel and their belongings is required for entry into the passenger terminal. At passenger terminals without SPE, security screening of all personnel and their belongings is required for entry into any preboarding sterile areas.

4.13.3. At passenger terminals with SPE, limit the number of exits to those that are required. Public exits must be located near the SPE or be configured to prevent unauthorized access to the terminal. Other entries/exits for terminal personnel must be secured by the use of locks, cipher locks, electronic card access, etc. If the building is a multifunction facility, all access from nonsterile areas must be similarly controlled. The windows in the sterile area will be secured so that nothing can be passed into the sterile area.

4.13.4. Install intrusion detection systems (IDS) on all secured entries and exits. The IDS should use a local audible and visual alarm to alert terminal personnel of the location of the intrusion or unauthorized exit.

4.13.5. At SPE terminals locate baggage storage lockers, if provided, inside the sterile area out of the normal flow of traffic, or outside the terminal beyond the standoff distance. At non-SPE terminals, storage lockers will be located outside the terminal beyond the standoff distance.

4.13.6. Where feasible, create an entrance into the facility that is perpendicular to the street or drive to reduce facility vulnerability to moving vehicle bombs. A protective wall may provide additional protection from attack.

4.13.7. Eliminate exterior roof access by providing controlled access from internal stairways, ladders, or through mechanical rooms. Where exterior access cannot be eliminated, secure the ladder or stairway with a locked cage or similar mechanism.

4.13.8. At SPE terminals, when the special category lounge is part of the passenger terminal it will be part of the terminal sterile area. Distinguished visitors (DVs) may use an alternate entrance other than the SPE. This entrance must be controlled to prevent unauthorized access. DVs and their baggage must be screened before entering the sterile area or the aircraft.

4.13.9. Protect pallet build-up and staging area from unauthorized access. Unless areas are already controlled areas such as the flight line, fence and secure outdoor pallet build-up area, and consider monitoring this area with CCTV if it is not easily observable.

4.13.10. The Aerial Port, Transportation, or AMS commander or terminal manager may issue an entry authorization list for on-duty passenger terminal personnel or personnel directly involved with passenger terminal operations on a routine and recurring basis, e.g., ramp controller and border clearance officials who may bypass scanning and screening. This list must be kept to an absolute minimum.

4.13.11. At SPE terminals, Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES)/Navy Exchange (NEX) vendor restocking operations and maintenance personnel entering the sterile area will be adequately screened and closely monitored. At non-SPE terminals, a visual security inspection of the sterile area will be performed after vendors leave the departure gate area.

4.13.12. Post warning signs in English and host nation's language to prevent accidental unauthorized entry into restricted/nonpublic areas.

4.14. Random Anti-Terrorist Measures (RAMs) and workforce awareness:

4.14.1. Provide additional protection by developing a set of local RAMs. RAMs should be part of the installation FP program.

4.14.2. Develop RAMs in coordination with local SF personnel. RAMs may be accomplished only by passenger terminal personnel or in conjunction with SF assistance. RAMs must be developed for all FPCONs. Develop procedures for selecting and implementing RAMs. Final determination of RAMs must be coordinated with host SF personnel.

4.14.3. Possible RAMs include: security patrols around the building, use of military working dogs to search baggage/packages, physical searches of baggage/packages, ID checks, and use of trace explosives detection equipment,.

4.14.4. All terminal personnel will receive initial and recurring antiterrorism/force protection, security training and recurring security briefings. Antiterrorism/force protection and security awareness literature and visual aids should be posted throughout the terminal.

4.15. **General.** The Ion Track Instrument (Itemiser3 and/or VaporTracer2) will be used in conjunction with X-ray equipment to screen checked and hand-carried baggage for trace particles of explosives. Explosives screening may be performed after baggage is x-rayed. Establish local procedures, in coordination with SF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, for responding to positive explosive detections.

4.15.1. All checked and hand carried baggage will be screened for explosive material prior to entering a terminal sterile area.

4.15.2. Use the Itemiser3 or VaporTracer2 Portable Explosive Detector as needed to inspect objects for trace particles of explosives through wiping handle, lock mechanism, and top of bag by hand or use optional wand. The detection analysis takes approximately 5 seconds.

4.15.3. If a positive detection for explosives is received from any explosive detection method, e.g., Itemiser3, VaporTracer2, explosives detection canine unit, or visual inspection, follow local procedures.

4.15.4. If a bag or other container is found unattended and attempts to locate owner are unsuccessful, follow local unattended baggage procedures. If the VaporTracer2 is available, use it to examine for trace amounts of explosive material. If the Itemiser3 is used, provide the hand sampling unit to the agency (SF, EOD) inspecting the unattended bag/container.

4.15.5. The Itemiser3 and VaporTracer2 may be made available to local SF and OSI agents for examination of suspected explosives. This should be done only when it will not impact the AMC mission.

Table A2.1. Self-Assessment Tool Interim Tally Sheet (Checklist).

Major Category	**Sub Area**	**Max Score**	**Total %**	**Achieved Score**
INSTALLATION	Threat Assessment Level	25	7%	
	Criminal Assessment Level	25	7%	
	Installation Access	25	6%	
Sub Total				
FACILITY ACCESS	Distance	25	7%	
	Standoff	28	7%	
	Orientation to Roads	14	4%	
	Natural Barriers & Landscaping	9	2%	
	Control Points & Physical Barriers	12	3%	
	Parking	10	3%	
	Service Access	10	3%	
	Utilities	16	4%	
Sub Total				
FACILITY ARCHITECTURE	Exterior Building Form	10	3%	
	Exterior Envelope	10	3%	
	Exterior Windows	18	4%	
	Exterior Doors	14	4%	
	Space Planning	19	5%	
	Signs	4	1%	
	Monitoring & Intrusion Detection System	22	6%	
Sub Total				
OTHER FACTORS	Sterile Areas	35	9%	
	Communications	6	2%	

Major Category	Sub Area	Max Score	Total %	Achieved Score
	Workforce Awareness	13	4%	
	Security Drills & Response	20	5%	
	Key Control & Maintenance	5	1%	
Sub Total				
GRAND TOTAL		375	100%	

A3.4.1. Sterile Areas. Safeguarding aircraft is an AMC priority. Using security equipment at the SPE or sterile boarding gate is the principal method to protect aircraft. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

8 points Walk-through and/or hand-held magnetometers used to scan personnel prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, i.e., prior to entering any sterile area

8 points X-ray machines used to inspect baggage and hand-carried items prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area

OR

8 points 100% hand-inspection of baggage and hand-carried items accomplished prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area

8 points Trace explosive detection system (e.g., ion scanner) used to inspect baggage and hand-carried items prior to facility entry or boarding aircraft, , i.e., prior to entering any sterile area

11 points Procedures are in place to insure sterile areas remain sterile, i.e., to ensure zero "leakage" into or out of sterile areas

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 35)

A3.4.2. Communications. Communications capabilities are key for incident response and notification to both SF and personnel in the terminal area. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

2 points Dedicated phone lines to security response forces (hot lines)

2 points Multiple communications capability (radios, telephones, etc.)

2 points PA system

_____ Total points for this section (Max possible points – 6)

A3.4.3. Workforce Awareness. Personnel awareness is vital to identifying and preventing security incidents. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points	All terminal personnel (civilian, military, and contract) receive initial and recurring AT/FP and security training
5 points	All terminal personnel (civilian, military, and contract) receive initial and recurring security briefings
3 points	AT/FP and security awareness literature and visual aids are posted
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 13)

A3.4.4. Security Drills and Personnel Response. Practicing security incident response is key to maintaining terminal personnel training/awareness and evaluating response performance. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

8 points	All terminal personnel trained and drilled to identify and respond to unattended baggage and suspicious packages, personnel and vehicles within/around the terminal facility
6 points	SF performs random periodic infiltration drills to test terminal security/surveillance (e.g., attempt entry with a weapon; leave unattended baggage/packages)
6 points	SF performs random periodic baggage check with bomb sniffing dog for bomb detection
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 20)

A3.4.5. Key Control and Lock Maintenance. Select all items that apply and add to the total points. If none applies, score 0 points for this section.

5 points	Formal key control program implemented
	OR
5 points	Access cards or cipher lock combinations are changed every 3 months and as required
_____	Total points for this section (Max possible points – 5)

Table A3.1. AT/FP Vulnerability Self-Assessment Final Tally Sheet

RED	YELLOW	GREEN

INSTALLATION			Total points for this section_____
0 – 29	**30-34**	**35 – 75**	
High vulnerability	Med.	Low vulnerability	

FACILITY ACCESS			Total points for this section_____
0 – 62	**63 – 90**	**91 – 124**	
High vulnerability	Medium vulnerability	Low vulnerability	

FACILITY ARCHITECTURE			Total points for this section_____
0 – 35	**36 – 59**	**60 – 97**	
High vulnerability	Medium vulnerability	Low vulnerability	

OTHER FACTORS			Total points for this section_____
0 – 66	**67–71**	**72 – 79**	
High vulnerability	Med.	Low	

FINAL SCORE			Total points_____
0 - 192	**193 – 254**	**255 – 375**	
High vulnerability	Medium	Low vulnerability	

Commander's verification:_____ _____

Signature Date

Attachment 5

IC 2004-01 TO AMCI 24-101, VOLUME 24, AMC PASSENGER TERMINAL FORCE PROTECTION

28 January 2004

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This interim change (IC) 2004-1 incorporates change clarifying the Ion Track instrument be used without the X-ray machine to screen checked baggage for trace particles of explosives. AMC's X-ray machines can not detect trace particles of explosives. **An asterisk indicates a change since the last edition.**

4.15. **General.** The Ion Track Instrument (Itemiser3 and/or VaporTracer2) will be used to screen checked baggage for trace particles of explosives. The X-ray equipment will be used in conjunction with the Ion Track Instrument to screen hand-carried baggage for trace particles of explosives. If X-ray equipment is not available, hand-carried baggage will be physically screened. Establish local procedures, in coordination with SF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, for responding to positive explosive detections.

JEFFREY W. ACKERSON, Colonel, USAF

Deputy Director of Logistics

Attachment 6

IC 2004-02 TO AMCI 24-101, VOLUME 24, AMC PASSENGER TERMINAL FORCE PROTECTION

19 May 2004

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This Interim Change (IC) FY04-2 changes the requirement for screening checked and hand-carried baggage utilizing the Ion Track Instrument. Placement of amnesty box in baggage claim area. Approval of purchase/lease of scanning equipment. Add TSA to the Abbreviations and Acronyms page. Delete the requirement to submit quarterly mitigation plan to HQ AMC.

4.2.5.1. If an amnesty box for arriving passengers is required by an outside agency for arriving passengers to dispose of prohibited items, an amnesty box may be placed in the baggage claim area. The requesting agency is responsible for providing, maintaining, and removing deposited items.

4.9.3. HQ AMC/A43E will approve all scanning equipment prior to purchase/lease.

4.9.5. Personnel operating scanning equipment must be trained utilizing the manufacturer's user guide.

4.10.4. HQ AMC/A43E will approve all scanning equipment prior to purchase/lease.

4.10.5. Personnel operating scanning equipment must be trained using the manufacturer's user guide.

4.15. **General.** The Ion Track Instrument (Itemiser3 and/or VaporTracer2) will be used to randomly screen checked baggage and suspect hand-carried baggage for trace particles of explosives. The x-ray equipment will be used to screen hand-carried baggage. If x-ray equipment is not available, hand-carried baggage will be physically screened. Establish local procedures, in coordination with SF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, for responding to positive explosive detections.

4.15.1. Checked baggage will be randomly screened for explosive material based on the following formula: FPCON Alpha – 10%, FPCON Bravo – 25%, FPCON Charlie – 75%, FPCON Delta – 100%.

4.15.1.1. Hand-carried baggage will be screened for prohibited items utilizing x-ray equipment or hand-searched. Suspect hand-carried baggage will be screened for explosive material utilizing the ION Track Instrument.

5.1. The AT/FP vulnerability self-assessment tool, found at **Attachment 3**, provides the commander or terminal manager with a tool to assess the passenger terminal facility’s potential vulnerability and assist in developing measures to mitigate the threat. All commanders or terminal managers will perform the self-assessment quarterly using the instructions provided in the tool. Note: This self-assessment is not a commander’s report card, but rather a tool. It will allow the commander or terminal manager to zero in on specific problem areas he or she needs to fix. The self-assessment must be accurate and forthright.

5.2. Mitigation plans. Passenger terminal managers will submit a mitigation plan quarterly as shown in **Attachment 4**, to their respective unit commander or air terminal manager. The first entry will be the overall terminal score. This will be followed by assessments of each major category to include:

1. Major category title;
2. Standard point spreads for that major category;
3. The assessed vulnerability score;
4. The following for each sub area:

4a. The points possible and achieved,

4b. Interim and permanent planned improvements,

4c. Estimated completion dates (ECDs),

4d. Estimated cost,

4e. Affect on assessment points.

5. The mitigation plan will conclude with an improvement timeline and comments if desired.

5.3. DELETED.

5.3.1. DELETED.

5.3.2. DELETED.

5.3.3. DELETED.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

TSA--Transportation Security Agency

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