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Intelligence

DEBRIEFING AND REPORTING



COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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(Capt Gregory M. Scrivner)
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(Lt Col Walderman)
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This instruction implements AFD 14-1, *Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations*. It gives procedural guidance and responsibilities for debriefing and reporting intelligence information from Air Mobility Command missions. It applies to all AMC intelligence personnel. This publication applies to the Air National Guard when published in the ANGIN 2 and United States Air Force Reserve Command units when published in AFRESIND 2. The reporting requirements in this directive are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph 2.11.1 of AFI 37-124, *The Information Collections and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections*.

This interim change (IC) 00-1 establishes the requirement to submit an Off-Station report when redeploying, as well as guidance on its submission. The following changes are effective immediately. All units are required to make the necessary annotations in the applicable publication.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

Major revisions include: Deletion of requirement for AUTODIN reporting, requirement for reporting via AMC/IN Homepage forms, deletion of INTSUM reporting guidance.

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1. Policy and Objectives.

- 1.1. Commanders, mission planners, command and control elements, aircrews, and intelligence personnel must work together to ensure the effective reporting and use of intelligence information.
- 1.2. The peacetime debriefing program compiles data acquired by aircrew, Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE), Air Mobility Element (AME), Tanker Task Force (TTF), or other personnel as a by-product of normal duties in a foreign country.
- 1.3. The wartime objective of the debriefing program is to derive information of value to friendly forces, to pass threat-related data to follow-on crews, and to report mission results.

2. Responsibilities. AMC intelligence units will:

- 2.1. Conduct post-mission debriefing of aircrews, CRAF crews, and other AMC personnel as specified in paragraph **3**.
- 2.2. Report debriefed information via a Mission Report (MISREP) and/or Intelligence Report (INTREP) IAW paragraph **5.2**. and **5.3**. respectively.
- 2.3. Support all Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) procedures IAW AMCI 10-450, Volume 2, *KC-135 SIOP Planning* and AFI 11-2K-135, Volume 3, Addenda B, *Nuclear Employment SIOP*.
- 2.4. Submit an after-action report to HQ AMC/INUS NLT 2 weeks after completion of individual deployments. Air Force Reserve units will send an information copy to HQ AFRC/DOI. The report will contain positive and negative data and lessons learned to improve unit cross-tell regarding the deployment process. The senior individual from each unit deployed is responsible for compiling inputs from all deployed personnel and submitting the report.

3. Debriefing.

- 3.1. Use the Essential Elements of Information (EEI) list (**Attachment 5**) as a guide for the type of information AMC personnel should provide debriefers.
 - 3.1.1. Units assigned via Change of Operational Control (CHOP) to a theater CINC must ensure theater EEIs are incorporated into the overall mission briefing, debriefing, and reporting program. Unless directed otherwise, units should tailor generic EEIs to the particular mission being briefed/debriefed.

3.2. All personnel returning from overseas duty will not be debriefed, however, AMC personnel returning from high interest missions will be. High interest missions include:

3.2.1. All missions conducted during hostilities, crisis, or contingency operations.

3.2.2. Any mission which experienced an attack or intercept.

3.2.3. All missions which encountered threat situations, including those from terrorist, civil unrest/disturbance, or other activities.

3.2.4. Aircrews and other personnel returning from, or transiting through, high interest areas as listed in the Secure Launch List and/or the Phoenix Raven List.

3.3. If no AMC intelligence assets are present at the recovery location, unit intelligence personnel are responsible for providing a debriefing POC and contact instructions.

3.4. Conduct all debriefings in as secure an area as possible.

3.5. If, during a debriefing, a debriefee provides information that meets any of the following criteria, the debriefee must advise Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) immediately. Inform the person during the debriefing of this responsibility IAW AFI 71-101, Volume 1, *Criminal Investigations, Counterintelligence, and Protective Service Matters*, chapter 3:

3.5.1. Any contact with any non-US employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment.

3.5.2. Any request by any person, regardless of nationality, to you or your dependents for controlled information.

3.5.3. Any contact which suggests you or others are the targets of any foreign intelligence service (FIS) or terrorist group.

3.5.4. Any information which indicates the compromise of controlled information.

3.5.5. Any offer to provide sensitive or controlled information.

3.5.6. Any information regarding intentions of terrorist groups.

3.5.7. Any information relating to actual or planned acts of sabotage.

3.6. When possible, all aircrew members should be present during the debriefing. As a minimum, intelligence personnel will debrief the individual(s) who witnessed an incident, or, if no incident was witnessed, the aircraft commander or other cockpit crewmembers representing the aircraft commander.

4. Classification of Reporting Content.

4.1. The fact intelligence personnel debrief aircrews following overseas travel is UNCLASSIFIED.

4.2. Classify comments which relate to matters other than operational activities/facilities IAW AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*, Attachment 1.

4.3. In a multinational or coalition environment, the theater command will determine classification requirements other than those stated above.

5. Reporting.

5.1. In-flight Report (INFLTREP). Aircrew will report mission results or any other time-sensitive, urgent information by filing an INFLTREP. Secure voice should be used if available. During hostilities, ORIs, and exercises, aircrews will report significant sightings via the INFLTREP to the nearest friendly command post, TACC, WOC, AME, or TALCE. During such situations, unit intelligence personnel should be alert for INFLTREPs transmitted to their own command posts.

5.1.1. INFLTREPs will be reported immediately via Mission Report (paragraph 5.2.) format.

5.2. Mission Report (MISREP). A MISREP is a concise report of flight operations which have potential intelligence significance determined by the EEIs as listed in Attachment 5. When chopped to theater CINC, units will comply with theater directives.

5.2.1. Release MISREPs no later than 2 hours after debrief completion. When chopped to a theater CINC, unit must abide by theater-directed time criteria if more restrictive.

5.2.2. If the debriefing revealed the aircrew had contacts which require reporting per paragraph 3.5., the MISREP must state you directed the member to report to the AFOSI IAW AFI 71-101. Additionally, send these MISREPs to your home station OSI detachment IAW Attachment 3.

5.2.3. Submit MISREPs via the AMC Homepage MISREP form. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available, submit MISREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN per Attachment 3.

5.2.4. HQ AMC/IG will provide specific reporting requirements during ORIs.

5.2.5. During exercises, deployed units will submit MISREPs to the addressees listed in the EXOPORD. Mark such MISREPs clearly at both the beginning and end of the message "EXERCISE MISREP."

5.2.6. If a debriefing reveals extremely critical, perishable information, notify the USTRANSCOM/JIC Watch immediately via the fastest means available.

5.2.7. Any re-transmissions of information derived from an 89 AW MISREP or INTREP will delete all reference to the source.

5.2.8. Classify MISREPs IAW the criteria in paragraph 4. Use AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*, Attachment 1 or OPORD/directive as the classification authority and declassify 10 years from the classification date (reference Executive Order 12958).

5.2.9. Do not delay MISREPs for verification or classification of information. Send additional details or corrections in an INTREP referencing the MISREP.

5.3. Intelligence Report (INTREP). The INTREP provides timely information regarding events that could have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations, or information that may be of timely interest at upper echelons of command, including the national level. Submit an INTREP when you acquire significant information which was not reported via other means. Examples include: enemy first use of chemical munitions at location, introduction of new threat tactics or weapon systems, attack on home station/deployed location, or information acquired by debriefing a member of an AME, TALCE, WOC, or other friendly source not pertinent to a post-flight mission report.

5.3.1. While at a deployed location, **if** directed by HQ AMC/IN, file an INTREP based on the Force Protection EEI listing in **Attachment 5**, paragraph **A5.3**. Coordinate with deployed SF and OSI to eliminate duplication of effort.

5.3.2. Transmit INTREPs immediately, and follow-up with all developed information NLT 24 hours after incident.

5.3.3. Submit INTREPs via the AMC Homepage INTREP form. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available submit INTREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN per **Attachment 3**.

5.3.4. HQ AMC/IG will provide specific reporting requirements during ORIs.

5.3.5. During exercises, the deployed unit will submit INTREPs to the addressees directed in the EXOPORD. Clearly mark such INTREPs at both the beginning and end of the message "EXERCISE INTREP."

5.3.6. Classify INTREPs IAW the criteria in paragraph **4**. Use AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*, Attachment 1 or OPORD/directive as the classification authority and declassify IAW EO 12958.

5.4. On-Station Report (OSTREP). Use the On-Station Report as an initial status/change report of deployed intelligence personnel and equipment.

5.4.1. Submit On-Station Reports via the AMC Homepage On-Station Report form immediately upon the establishment of connectivity at the deployed location. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available submit OSTREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN IAW **Attachment 4**.

5.4.2. HQ AMC/IG will provide specific reporting requirements during ORIs.

5.4.3. During exercises, deployed units will submit On-Station Reports to the addressees listed in the EXOPORD. Mark such reports clearly at both the beginning and end of the message "EXERCISE ON-STATION REPORT."

5.4.4. If the OSTREP contains Operational Security (OPSEC) information (i.e., rosters, phone numbers, shift schedules, etc.), classify the report CONFIDENTIAL. Unless otherwise directed by the OPORD, declassify the report upon conclusion of the war, contingency, or exercise.

5.5. Off-Station Report (OFFREP). Use the Off-Station Report as a status/change report for redeploying intelligence personnel and equipment.

5.5.1. Submit Off-Station Reports via the AMC Homepage Off-Station Report form prior to redeployment. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available submit OFFREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN IAW **Attachment 6**.

5.5.2. HQ AMC/IG will provide specific reporting requirements during EORIs.

5.5.3. During exercises, redeploying units will submit Off-Station Reports to the addressees listed in the EXOPORD. Mark such reports clearly at both the beginning and end of the message 'EXERCISE OFF-STATION REPORT.'

5.5.4. If the OFFREP contains Operational Security (OPSEC) information (i.e., rosters, phone numbers, redeployment dates, etc.), classify the report CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise directed by the OPORD, declassify the report upon conclusion of the war, contingency, or exercise.

JAMES P. DE LOUGHRY, Colonel, USAF
Director of Intelligence

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

E.O. 12958, *Classified National Security Information*

AFI 11-2K-135, *Nuclear Employment SIOP*

AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*

AFI 37-124, *The Information Collections and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections*

AFI 71-101, *Criminal Investigations, Counterintelligence, and Protective Service Matters*

AFRESIND 2, *Air National Guard Index 2*

ANGIND 2, *Air Force Reserve Index 2*

AMCI 10-450, *KC-135 SIOP Planning*

AFPD 14-1, *Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA—Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigation

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AME—Air Mobility Element

AR—Air Refueling

ATO—Air Tasking Order

AW—Airlift Wing

CCTV—Closed Circuit Television

CHOP—Change of Operational Control

CINC—Commander In Chief

CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DAO—Defense Attaché Office

DZ—Drop Zone

ECP—Entry Control Point

EI—Essential Elements of Information

EO—Executive Order
EXOPORD—Exercise Operation Order
FIS—Foreign Intelligence Service
ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization
INFLTREP—In Flight Report
INTREP—Intelligence Report
INTSUM—Intelligence Summary
HQ—Headquarters
JIC—Joint Intelligence Center
LZ—Landing Zone
MISREP—Mission Report
MWD—Military Working Dog
NLT—No Later Than
OPORD—Operations Order
OPSEC—Operations Security
ORI—Operational Readiness Inspection
OSTREP—On-Station Report
RPG—Rocket Propelled Grenade
SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile
SIOP—Single Integrated Operations Plan
SIPRNET—Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
STRATLIFT—Strategic Airlift
TALCE—Tanker Airlift Control Element
TTF—Tanker Task Force
USTRANSCOM—United States Transportation Command

Attachment 2

MISSION REPORT (MISREP)

A2.1. Unless otherwise designated by HQ AMC/IN or Theater IN, format all MISREPs as shown below.

A2.2. Report Heading:

A2.2.1. Precedence (priority or higher).

A2.2.2. Originating agency (unit GENSER address).

A2.2.3. Action addressees: AIG 7110

A2.2.3.1. Theater-directed addressees

A2.2.3.1.1. Distribution within the deployed theater will be accomplished IAW the directions specified in the Operations Order ANNEX B, or as directed by HQ AMC

A2.2.3.2. OSI-directed addresses if criteria in paragraph 3.5. is met

A2.2.3.2.1. AFOSI REGION 3 SCOTT AFB IL//DTA// and HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SF//

A2.2.3.2.2. Homestation OSI unit

A2.2.4. Information addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//INO/INX//

A2.2.5. Security classification (IAW AFI 14-105).

A2.3. Report Format:

EXER/exercise name//or OPER/operation name or directive causing initiation of mission//

MSGID/MISREP/originator/message serial number (numbered sequentially starting over each zulu day)/day/month/year//

REF/originator/date-time group (used to reference other messages and documents, if applicable)//

AMPN/free text set to explain single preceding reference set//

NARR/free text to explain multiple preceding reference sets//

PERID/FROM: reporting period beginning/TO: reporting period end/AS OF: time report made//

MSNID/mission type (STRATLIFT, AIRLAND, AIRDROP, REFUEL)/mission number//

UNID/aircrew unit/name of aircraft commander or mission commander//

FLTDTAIL/aircraft call sign/departure location (ICAO code)/number of aircraft/aircraft type/

ZULU takeoff time/arrival station (ICAO code)/ZULU land time//

ROUTE/time/pos/time/pos/time/pos//

TGTPOS/target type (DZ[drop zone], LZ [landing zone], AR [air refueling orbit]/target name (from ATO, i.e. DZ-01 = 01, use ICAO or K-code for airfield or landing zone, and ATO designation for refueling track, or geocoord if no others apply)//

RESULT/(FULL, PART, or FAIL)/free text to explain mission results//

RMKS/free text (include any hostile actions/reactions, force protection measures at the airfield, type of threat system, location and time of incident; significant sightings/events, EEIs, and weather; debriefer's name, rank, phone number)/CLASS BY: AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*, Attachment 1, OPORD, **or** Directive//

DECL/10 years after date of MISREP or per instructions contained in other applicable directive//

Attachment 3

INTELLIGENCE REPORT (INTREP)

A3.1. Unless otherwise designated by HQ AMC or Theater IN, format all INTREPs as shown below.

A3.2. Report Heading:

A3.2.1. Precedence (priority or higher).

A3.2.2. Originating agency (unit GENSER address).

A3.2.3. Action addressees: AIG 7110

A3.2.3.1. Theater-directed addressees

A3.2.3.1.1. Distribution within the deployed theater will be accomplished IAW the directions specified in the Operations Order ANNEX B, or as directed by HQ AMC

A3.2.3.2. OSI-directed addresses if criteria in paragraph 3.5. is met

A3.2.3.2.1. AFOSI REGION 3 SCOTT AFB IL//DTA// and HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SF//

A3.2.3.2.2. Homestation OSI unit

A3.2.4. Information addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//INO/INX//

A3.2.5. Security classification (IAW AFI 14-105).

A3.3. Report Format:

EXER/exercise name//or OPER/operation name or directive causing initiation of mission//

MSGID/INTREP/originator/message serial number (numbered sequentially starting over each day)/
day/month/year//

REF/originator/date-time group (used to reference other messages, if applicable)//

AMPN/free text set to explain single preceding reference set//

NARR/free text to explain multiple preceding reference sets (as required)//

RMKS/free text (hostile actions/reactions, type of threat system, location and time of incident, significant sightings/events, EEIs, and POC, rank, phone number)/CLASS BY: AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*, Attachment 1, OPORD, or Directive//

NOTE: this constitutes the minimum message body possible. Summarize, in sufficient detail to be of value, information of significant intelligence value. Information should be clear, concise, and accurate. Make every effort to accurately report such things as time, location, nature, and impact of event or occurrence. Use separate paragraph for each significant item being reported.

DECL/Ten years after date of INTREP or per instructions contained in other applicable directive//

Attachment 4

ON-STATION REPORT (OSTREP)

A4.1. Unless otherwise designated by HQ AMC/IN, format all On-Station Reports as shown below.

A4.2. Report Heading:

A4.2.1. Precedence (priority or higher).

A4.2.2. Originating agency (unit GENSER address).

A4.2.3. Action addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//INU/INO/INX//, in-theater AMC units, or other agencies as directed by AMC/IN.

A4.2.4. Information Addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SC/SCT/SCY/SCX/SCYO//

A4.2.5. Security classification (IAW AFI 14-105).

A4.3. Report Format:

EXER/exercise name//or OPER/operation name or directive causing initiation of mission//

MSGID/GENADMIN/originator/message serial number (numbered sequentially starting over each day)/day/month/year//

REF/originator/date-time group (used to reference other messages, if applicable)//

AMPN/free text to explain preceding reference sets (as required)//

POC/name/rank/unit/LOC: (where are you)/TEL: (telephone number)//

SUBJ/ON-STATION REPORT (OSTREP)//

RMKS/

1. UNIT INFORMATION:

A. UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

B. LOCATION: BUILDING, OPERATING BASE/LOCATION/POSITION, COUNTRY CODE

C. MESSAGE ADDRESS: PLAIN LANGUAGE MESSAGE ADDRESS

D. SECURE EMAIL:

E. SECURE TEL:

F. SECURE FAX:

G. NONSECURE EMAIL:

H. NONSECURE TEL:

I. NONSECURE FAX:

J. SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: RANK, LAST NAME

2. PERSONNEL:

A. RANK LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, DUTY HOURS

- B. RANK LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, DUTY HOURS
- 3. EQUIPMENT (SIGNIFICANT INTEL/COMM EQUIPMENT)
 - A. (NOMENCLATURE/# OF EA/NUMBER OPERATIONAL, NUMBER DOWN)
 - B. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM /XX/XX/XX
 - C. CIS AA/XX/XX/XX
 - D. WINDOWS LAPTOP XX/XX/XX
 - E. STU-III /XX/XX/XX
 - F. etc.

CLASS BY/AMCI 14-102, OPORD, or Directive//

DECL/On conclusion of contingency/exercise//

Attachment 5

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEIS)

NOTE: Although this list is unclassified, do not disseminate widely because of depth of intelligence interest it reveals.

A5.1. Airfield Defenses

A. Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA).

1. Locate and identify all AAA sites in and surrounding airfield (type, number, status/condition).
2. How many personnel were manning each system?
3. Were AAA weapons used? If so:
 - a. Where was the location of fire?
 - b. What was the target aircraft and its location/altitude?
 - c. What type of weapons (size, color of tracers/bursts)?
 - d. What was the intensity (light, moderate, or heavy)?
 - e. What type of fire (barrage, curtain, radar-controlled)?
 - f. Was the fire accurate?
 - g. Was there fire coordination (sector, multi-directional)?
 - h. What was the altitude and effective range (tracer burnout)?

B. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites

1. Locate and identify all SAM sites in and surrounding airfield (type, number, status/condition).
2. How many personnel were manning each system?
3. Did a missile launch occur? If so:
 - a. Where was the location of fire?
 - b. What was the target aircraft and its location/altitude?
 - c. What missile system?
 - d. Number of missiles fired and sequence (i.e., two fired simultaneously, two fired 20 seconds apart, etc.)
 - e. Size of plume compared to missile, color of plume?
 - f. Method of aircraft identification (visual, electronic)?
 - g. Was the target hit? If not, why (i.e., counter measures, inaccuracy of fire, missile malfunction, etc.), and how close did the missile come to the target?

A5.2. Equipment/People on the Airfield

- A. Were there other aircraft at airfield (number, type, cargo, operational status, nationality)? Were they transiting the airfield or permanently based there? If they left the field, which direction did they head?
- B. Were there any camps or troop concentrations (list their actions, especially strange or unusual activity) on the field (provide compound diagram, noted defenses, and nationality)?
- C. Any signs of ground fighting (artillery flashes, tracers, explosions)? Provide detailed description.
- D. Were there any armored vehicles (size, type, location, formation, operational status, nationality)?
- E. Were there any military training, staging, and storage areas (list locations)?
- F. Was there any rail/highway traffic observed (note location, number of cars and cargo)?
- G. Was there any sea, harbor, and inland water transportation activity (location, ship type, number, cargo, nationality)?
- H. Was there significant construction or excavation (list equipment at site).

A5.3. Force Protection

- A. Perimeter
 - 1. FENCE/WALLS
 - a. Was the airfield completely fenced or walled (type, height, condition, gaps, etc.)?
 - b. Were there clear zones on each side of the fence/wall?
 - c. Was the area posted "No Trespassing" or "No Admittance"?
 - 2. OTHER PHYSICAL BARRIERS
 - a. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed.
 - b. Was the perimeter under close circuit TV (CCTV)?
 - 3. PATROLS
 - a. Was perimeter controlled by guards? Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?
 - b. What was the frequency/regularity of patrols? (Did the airport security force conduct patrols on a predictable schedule or randomly? If not on a regular schedule, was the variance purposeful (i.e., a security measure)?)
 - c. Were patrols made on foot, in vehicles or on animals?
 - d. How many people were in each patrol?
 - e. Did patrols use military working dogs (MWD)?
 - 4. ENTRY CONTROL POINTS (ECPs)
 - a. Number and location of ECPs into/out of airfield.

b. Number of guards at each ECP. Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?

5. WATCHTOWERS/FIXED GUARD POSITIONS

a. Number, location, and description (i.e., ground-level guard shack, elevated tower, fixed fighting positions/bunkers, etc.).

b. Number of guards at each location. Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?

6. ENTRANCE PROCEDURES

a. If entry was controlled, what type of identification was required?

b. Were private vehicles allowed?

(1) If so, what method of registration was required?

(2) Were all persons in a vehicle required to show identification?

c. What were visitor control and escort procedures?

d. To what degree are vehicles, personnel and their possessions searched?

e. Did any of the above procedures vary at night (i.e. all personnel must show identification at night when entering the installation, etc.)?

7. LIGHTING

a. Was the perimeter lighted at night?

b. Were additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/ECPs?

c. Were mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?

B. Flight Line/Ramp Security

1. FENCING

a. Was the flight line/ramp fenced? Describe the fence (type, height, condition, gaps, etc.).

b. Were there clear zones on each side of fence?

c. Was the area posted "No Trespassing" or "No Admittance"?

2. OTHER PHYSICAL BARRIERS

a. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed.

b. Was the flight/ramp under CCTV?

3. PATROLS

a. Was flight line/ramp controlled by guards? Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?

b. What was the frequency/regularity of patrols? (Did the airport security force conduct patrols on a predictable schedule or randomly? If not on a regular schedule, was the variance purposeful (i.e., a security measure)?)

c. Were patrols made on foot, in vehicles, or on animals?

d. How many people were in each patrol?

e. Did patrols use MWD?

4. ECPs

a. Number, location and description of ECPs at flight line/ramp.

- b. Number of guards at each ECP. Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?
 - 5. WATCHTOWERS/FIXED GUARD POSITIONS AROUND FLIGHT LINE/RAMP
 - a. Number, location, and description (i.e., ground-level guard shack, elevated tower, fixed fighting positions/bunkers, etc.).
 - b. Number of guards at each location. Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?
 - 6. FLIGHT LINE/RAMP ENTRANCE PROCEDURES
 - a. If entry is controlled, what type of identification was required?
 - b. Were private vehicles allowed?
 - (1) If so, what method of registration was required?
 - (2) Were all persons in a vehicle required to show identification?
 - c. What were visitor control and escort procedures?
 - d. To what degree were vehicles, personnel and their possessions searched?
 - e. Did any of the above procedures vary at night (i.e., all personnel must show identification at night when entering the installation, etc.)?
 - 7. LIGHTING
 - a. Was flight line/ramp lighted at night?
 - b. Were additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/entry points?
 - c. Were mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?
 - 8. PARKING
 - a. Were U.S. Government aircraft parked in special locations? If so, were additional guards posted?
 - b. Did security forces restrict public access to the aircraft? Were people/animals/vehicles allowed near aircraft?
 - c. Was the area clearly marked as a restricted area?
 - d. Were there any attempts by uncleared personnel to gain access to aircraft?
 - e. Were U.S. personnel authorized to have weapons on the flightline/ramp? If so, were weapons storage facilities available to transient crews?
- C. Security Force
- 1. FORCE LEVEL
 - a. How many guards were typically on duty during the day and night? Were they armed; if so, what types of weapons?
 - b. Were these guards from the host military unit, civilian police, or contract security personnel?
 - c. To what extent and for how long could this force be augmented by in-place/nearby personnel?
 - d. What was the shift duration and the shift change-over procedures/times?
 - e. What local customs might result in decreased security (e.g., national holidays, traditional daily rest periods, etc.)?

2. PERSONNEL

- a. Were personnel well trained and professional (did this vary by position; were the supervisory personnel better trained or more motivated)?
- b. What factors made individual members or groups susceptible to blackmail or bribery (i.e., low/irregular pay, mistreatment by senior leadership, etc.)?
- c. What was the predominant language/dialect spoken by security forces (also indicate what percentage spoke English, if applicable)?
- d. Did the security force appear friendly or hostile? To what degree were they willing to work with U.S./Allied personnel?
- e. Were security forces willing/able to provide increased security for U.S./Allied missions? If so, how were such arrangements made (i.e., through DAO office)?

3. EQUIPMENT

- a. What additional weapons were available to security forces (not weapons carried on the guard's person, but mounted near by or easily accessible to them, i.e., weapons mounted on vehicles, at entry points, guard towers, in a local arsenal, etc.)?
- b. What forms of communications gear did the security personnel use?

4. QUICK REACTION/COUNTERTERRORIST UNITS

- a. Did such a force exist?
- b. Was it on or near the airport?
- c. What was its reaction time?
- d. How large a force was it?
- e. To what degree was responsibility delegated in crisis situations?
- f. How was the force trained and equipped? Did it have higher morale than the regular guard force? Had it successfully conducted operations in the past?

D. Billeting/Route Security - The following areas pertain when AMC aircraft remain over night (RON) at foreign airfields.

1. BILLETING

- a. Did the US EMBASSY provide billeting in its compound?
- b. If billeting was unavailable at the compound, did the US EMBASSY maintain a list of hotels that met minimum security requirements?
- c. If the US EMBASSY maintains a standing list of recommended hotels, request the following information on each if available:
 - (1) Basic description (design, height, towers, interior/exterior entrances, number of rooms).
 - (2) General layout (parking areas, fencing, lighting, proximity to highways/major roads).
 - (3) Number of elevators/stairways (internal/external), building entrances/exits, vehicle entrances/exits.
- d. Were U.S. personnel billeted in the same areas of the hotel or are they separated?

e. How was the crew transported to and from the hotel?

2. SECURITY AT HOTEL

a. If hotel had organic security force, use section A5.3.B. SECURITY FORCE questions.

b. Were metal detectors/x-ray machines used at hotel entrances?

c. Were security forces available to escort crews transiting to/from airport? If so, what was required to arrange this?

3. ROUTE SECURITY

a. Distance from airport to hotel.

b. Number of different routes available from airport to hotel.

c. Route description(s).

(1) Choke points on route (to include excessive traffic lights, congestion).

(2) Number of lanes each way.

(3) Number and location of safe houses (i.e. police stations) along route.

(4) Did host nation regularly patrol these routes?

(5) Any bridges, overpasses, one-way streets, or tunnels along the route?

E. Other Areas

1. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS

a. What was the ethnic/religious composition of local area?

b. What were economic/living conditions like?

c. Local populace response/attitudes towards non-indigenous personnel.

d. Any military/militia/guerrilla units operating in the region?

2. PERSONNEL THREAT

a. Were dissidents known to operate in the area of the airport? Identify these groups by name and their leaders if known.

(1) Were dissidents known to possess stand-off weapons (SAMS, RPG, mortar, etc.)?

(2) Were these groups known to possess communications monitoring equipment (identify type and capability if known)?

(3) Were these groups known to have anti-U.S. sentiments?

(4) Did they have the support of the local populace?

b. Were there any riots, civil disturbances, political unrest, or potentially hazardous situations?

c. Were there any medical concerns (i.e., cholera, tuberculosis, malaria, etc.)?

3. PHYSICAL LOCATION

a. What natural/manmade obstacles were in the vicinity of the airport (i.e., power lines, tall buildings, etc.)?

b. Identify areas surrounding flight line parking which could be used by hostile elements to covertly survey airport operations or to launch attacks?

- c. How suitable was the surrounding terrain and vegetation for a stand-off attack?
Did this vary seasonally?

Attachment 6
OFF-STATION REPORT (OFFREP)

A6.1. Unless otherwise designated by HQ AMC/IN, format all Off-Station Reports as shown below.

A6.2. Report Heading:

A6.2.1. Precedence (priority or higher)

A6.2.2. Originating agency (unit GENSER address)

A6.2.3. Action addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//INY/INO/INX/IN//, in-theater AMC units, or other agencies as directed by AMC/IN.

A6.2.4. Information Addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SC/SCT/SCY/SCX/SCYO//

A6.2.5. Security Classification (IAW AFI 14-105).

A6.3. Report Format

EXER/exercise name/or operation name or directive causing initiation of mission//

MSGID/GEN ADMIN/originator/message serial number (numbered sequentially starting over each day)/day/month/year//

REF/originator/date-time group (used to reference other messages, if applicable)//

AMPN/free text to explain preceding reference sets (as required)//

POC/name/rank/unit/LOC: (where are you)/TEL: (telephone number)//

SUBJ/OFF-STATION REPORT (OFFREP)//

RMKS/

UNIT INFORMATION

DEPLOYED UNIT IDENTIFICATION

HOMESTATION UNIT IDENTIFICATION

UNIT MESSAGE ADDRESS/plain language message address

SECURE E-MAIL

SECURE FAX

SECURE TEL

NONSECURE E-MAIL

NONSECURE FAX

NONSECURE TEL

SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER/Rank, Last Name, First Name

PERSONNEL RETURNING TO HOMESTATION

Rank, Last Name, First Name

Rank, Last Name, First Name

DEPLOYMENT INFO

DATE DEPLOYMENT BEGAN/day, month, year i.e., XX XXX XXXX

DATE OFF-STATION/ day, month, year i.e., XX XXX XXXX

DEPLOYMENT LOCATION

EXERCISE/OPERATION NAME//

CLASS BY/ AMCI 14-102, OPORD, or DIRECTIVE//

DECL/on conclusion of contingency/exercise//

Attachment 7**IC 00-1 TO AMCI 14-102, INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEFING AND REPORTING*****SUMMARY OF REVISIONS***

This interim change (IC) 00-1 establishes the requirement to submit an Off-Station report when redeploying, as well as guidance on its submission. The following changes are effective immediately. All units are required to make the necessary annotations in the applicable publication.

5.4.1. Submit On-Station Reports via the AMC Homepage On-Station Report form immediately upon the establishment of connectivity at the deployed location. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available submit OSTREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN IAW **Attachment 4**.

5.5. **Off-Station Report (OFFREP)**. Use the Off-Station Report as a status/change report for redeploying intelligence personnel and equipment.

5.5.1. Submit Off-Station Reports via the AMC Homepage Off-Station Report form prior to redeployment. If SIPRNET connectivity is not available submit OFFREPs at priority or higher precedence via AUTODIN IAW **Attachment 6**.

5.5.2. HQ AMC/IG will provide specific reporting requirements during EORIs.

5.5.3. During exercises, redeploying units will submit Off-Station Reports to the addressees listed in the EXOPORD. Mark such reports clearly at both the beginning and end of the message 'EXERCISE OFF-STATION REPORT.'

5.5.4. If the OFFREP contains Operational Security (OPSEC) information (i.e., rosters, phone numbers, redeployment dates, etc.), classify the report CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise directed by the OPORD, declassify the report upon conclusion of the war, contingency, or exercise.

Attachment 6**OFF-STATION REPORT (OFFREP)**

A6.1. Unless otherwise designated by HQ AMC/IN, format all Off-Station Reports as shown below.

A6.2. Report Heading:

A6.2.1. Precedence (priority or higher)

A6.2.2. Originating agency (unit GENSER address)

A6.2.3. Action addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//INY/INO/INX/IN//, in-theater AMC units, or other agencies as directed by AMC/IN.

A6.2.4. Information Addressees: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SC/SCT/SCY/SCX/SCYO//

A6.2.5. Security Classification (IAW AFI 14-105).

A6.3. Report Format

EXER/exercise name/or operation name or directive causing initiation of mission//
MSGID/GEN ADMIN/originator/message serial number (numbered sequentially starting over each day)/day/month/year//
REF/originator/date-time group (used to reference other messages, if applicable)//
AMPN/free text to explain preceding reference sets (as required)//
POC/name/rank/unit/LOC: (where are you)/TEL: (telephone number)//
SUBJ/OFF-STATION REPORT (OFFREP)//
RMKS/
UNIT INFORMATION
DEPLOYED UNIT IDENTIFICATION
HOMESTATION UNIT IDENTIFICATION
UNIT MESSAGE ADDRESS/plain language message address
SECURE E-MAIL
SECURE FAX
SECURE TEL
NONSECURE E-MAIL
NONSECURE FAX
NONSECURE TEL
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER/Rank, Last Name, First Name
PERSONNEL RETURNING TO HOMESTATION
Rank, Last Name, First Name
Rank, Last Name, First Name
DEPLOYMENT INFO
DATE DEPLOYMENT BEGAN/day, month, year i.e., XX XXX XXXX
DATE OFF-STATION/ day, month, year i.e., XX XXX XXXX
DEPLOYMENT LOCATION
EXERCISE/OPERATION NAME//
CLASS BY/ AMCI 14-102, OPORD, or DIRECTIVE//
DECL/on conclusion of contingency/exercise//
JAMES P. DE LOUGHRY Colonel, USAF
Director of Intelligence