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Command Policy

**COMMAND LEVEL INSPECTOR GENERAL
ACTIVITIES**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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OPR: HQ AFMC/IGX (Lt Col Dean Jansheski)

Certified by: HQ AFMC/IG
(Colonel Dartanian Warr)

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This instruction implements AFD 90-2, *Inspector General--The Inspection System* and AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities* within Air Force Materiel Command. It provides guidance and procedures for AFMC Inspector General activities. These instructions apply to all AFMC members and Air Force Reserve Command Combat Logistics Support (Aircraft Battle Damage Repair and Rapid Area Distribution Support) units or members as described in **Attachment 5 (A5.2.4.)** and **Attachment 7 (A7.4.2.)** of this instruction.

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Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. Objectives. The HQ AFMC Inspector General (IG) is the "eyes and ears" of the AFMC Commander. As such, AFMC IG activities determine and report:

- 1.1.1. Ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ personnel and resources to support wartime or contingency operations.
- 1.1.2. Ability to defend against, and recover from, hostile actions directed at home stations and continue necessary operations under increased force protection conditions.
- 1.1.3. Compliance with federal laws, regulatory policies, and DoD/AF directives and instructions.
- 1.1.4. Compliance with contractual requirements and adequacy of contract preparation and performance evaluation.
- 1.1.5. Compliance with required safety, security, and reliability standards to manage nuclear resources.
- 1.1.6. Status of Air Force and command-level Special Interest Items.
- 1.1.7. Emphasis on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) detection and prevention.

1.2. Activities. The IG conducts, reviews, and oversees several types of inspection activities. Individual chapters in this document provide specific information on each activity as follows:

- 1.2.1. Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) and Limited Operational Readiness Inspection (LORI) ([Chapter 2](#)).
- 1.2.2. Unit Compliance Inspection (UCI) ([Chapter 3](#)).
- 1.2.3. Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program (MSEP) Inspection ([Chapter 4](#)).
- 1.2.4. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) ([Chapter 5](#)).
- 1.2.5. Special Interest Item (SII) ([Chapter 6](#)).
- 1.2.6. Commander-Directed Inspection (CDI) ([Chapter 7](#)).
- 1.2.7. Unit Self-Inspection ([Chapter 8](#)).

1.3. Applicability. All AFMC organizations are subject to applicable IG activities unless specifically exempted as outlined below.

- 1.3.1. Commanders may request a permanent or temporary exemption from all IG inspections, a specific inspection activity, or any portion of a specific inspection activity. The AFMC/CC must grant permanent exemptions; the AFMC IG may grant temporary exemptions.
- 1.3.2. Commanders may request exemptions based on the following or similar circumstances:
 - 1.3.2.1. Major organizational or mission changes.
 - 1.3.2.2. Real-world contingency deployments or commitments.

1.3.2.3. Weapon system modifications or conversions requiring extensive personnel training or modification(s) to maintenance procedures.

1.3.2.4. Limiting factors reported in an organization's Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) in relation to Design Operational Capability (DOC) statement(s).

1.3.3. Processing Exemption Requests:

1.3.3.1. Include a detailed justification for all exemption requests, specify inspection activities or portions to exempt, and send the request to the IG for processing.

1.3.3.2. For permanent exemptions, the IG will coordinate with relevant HQ AFMC staff office(s), prepare a recommendation, and forward to the AFMC/CC. The IG will forward the AFMC/CC's decision to the relevant HQ AFMC staff office(s) and the requesting organization.

1.3.3.3. For temporary exemptions, the requesting organization will include an expiration date. The IG will coordinate with relevant HQ AFMC staff office(s) before making a determination, inform the AFMC/CC and relevant HQ AFMC staff agencies, and forward the decision to the requesting organization.

1.4. Checklists and Guides:

1.4.1. The IG will use checklists and guides as required to conduct IG activities. The IG and HQ AFMC functional staffs share the responsibility to develop and revise checklists and guides. The IG and functional staffs will complete this task annually to ensure critical inspection criteria are current and accurate. Checklists will include the last update or review date.

1.4.2. Checklists and guides will supplement, but not replace, IG team members' expertise and judgment. Inspectors are not limited to evaluating only checklist items.

1.5. Logistical and Information Management Support:

1.5.1. When preparing for an inspection, the IG will provide the organization with primary IG points of contact (POC) and associated information as outlined in all attachments.

1.5.2. The inspected organization will appoint a project officer for the activity and provide the IG with the individual's name, office symbol, phone number, and e-mail address. The project officer will:

1.5.2.1. Coordinate the IG team's projected arrival, inspection, outbrief dates, and any other key activities with IG trip planner(s).

1.5.2.2. Coordinate all logistical, information management, or functional questions concerning the activity with IG trip planner(s).

1.5.2.3. Coordinate provision of items identified in this publication, as applicable, or as specifically identified by the IG trip planner.

1.5.2.4. Identify any limitations in the organization's ability to provide the IG's requested support.

1.5.2.5. Coordinate with the local communications center to ensure the IG team chief, trip planner, and report monitor have message release and pick up authority.

1.5.2.6. During the advance site visit, provide the IG trip planner a base phone book, base maps, and local area maps.

1.5.2.7. Confirm logistical and information management support availability for the IG team with phone and fax numbers for the IG workcenter NLT two weeks before the main team's arrival.

1.6. Funding.

1.6.1. The IG will budget for and fund per diem, travel, and lodging.

1.6.2. The inspected organization will budget for and fund all other logistical and information management support (see [Attachment 1](#) for more detail).

1.7. Pre-Inspection Activity.

1.7.1. The IG will notify the organization commander of the activities the IG will perform, the approximate dates, and IG team key POCs' names and phone numbers.

1.7.2. For major inspection activities, the IG team may coordinate and conduct an advance site visit to accomplish some, or all, of the following:

1.7.2.1. Resolve conflicts or confusion about the inspection or the functional areas and/or operations the IG will inspect.

1.7.2.2. Address questions and concerns about the activity.

1.7.2.3. Coordinate support requirements with the organization's project officer.

1.7.2.4. Accept any items the unit would otherwise mail to the IG (see [A1.4](#)).

1.7.3. For ORIs only, (does not apply to CLSS LORIs), the IG will send preparatory messages to the organization before the inspection to provide appropriate intelligence build-up and threat warnings. The IG will follow normal Crisis Action Procedures (Warning/Alert/Execute Orders).

1.7.4. Prior to the main team's arrival date, an advance team will arrive to verify the workcenter, lodging, and assigned vehicles are adequate, and resolve any last minute issues.

1.8. Execution:

1.8.1. Main team will arrive before the scheduled activity start and will coordinate with the inspected unit. Once the team arrives, the organization should provide the IG team with:

1.8.1.1. A short local orientation briefing on any safety, security, or procedural requirements unique to the installation, or other information the organization deems necessary.

1.8.2. Team Entry and Access Authority.

1.8.2.1. Upon arrival, the IG team chief will provide the organization's senior leadership an Entry Authorization Listing (EAL) IAW AFI 31-101, *Air Force Physical Security Program*. The organization will properly distribute the EAL. AFMC/IG will provide the EAL upon arrival.

1.8.2.2. The EAL will list each inspector's specific security clearance and special access authorizations.

1.8.2.3. The EAL allows inspectors to take photographs, as authorized by the local commander, and review any material related to the inspection commensurate with their security clearance and special access authorization(s). This includes audit reports, staff assistance visits, internal self-inspections, standardization and evaluation inspections, and quality control results.

1.8.2.4. Inspectors are authorized to review inspection reports on, and agreements with, associate organizations to ensure identified deficiencies and existing support problems receive adequate command attention.

1.8.3. The IG team chief will provide an executive inbrief to the organization's senior leadership covering inspection areas, team composition, and rating methodology.

1.8.4. As the activity is conducted, IG members may provide informal inbriefs, periodic status updates, and informal outbriefs to their counterparts. The status updates and outbriefs typically cover inspected areas, general observations, and potential Best Practices and Findings, but will not cover potential ratings.

1.8.5. The IG will inbrief applicable Special Interest Items (SII). See [Chapter 6](#) for additional information.

1.8.6. Prior to the outbrief, the activity trip planner will coordinate the outbrief and team departure with the organization's project officer.

1.8.7. The IG team chief will provide a ratings/observations summary and brief the organization commander before the formal outbrief.

1.8.8. The outbrief will summarize inspection results and highlight noteworthy observations and participants. The inspected organization will determine attendance. The IG trip planner will coordinate Distinguished Visitor seating, arrangements, arrival, and departure with the organization protocol office.

1.8.9. The IG will prepare a report (except CLSS LORI) and provide the inspected organization with copies before departing the installation.

1.9. Post-Inspection Activity. When the inspection is finished, the IG will:

1.9.1. Forward the AFMC/CC outbrief presentation to relevant AFMC staff functionals on inspection results before the AFMC/CC's staff meeting.

1.9.2. Brief the results to the HQ AFMC senior staff at an AFMC/CC staff meeting.

1.10. Reports.

1.10.1. AFMC IG reports document inspections in enough detail to accurately recognize strengths and effective discrepancy improvements. In each report section, the IG groups observations into the following categories:

1.10.1.1. Findings: Performance or process compliance discrepancies violating official guidance. The IG will describe the discrepancy, cite specific references, and identify the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and any Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR). The organization must formally reply in accordance with [Paragraph 1.11.](#)

1.10.1.1.1. If a Finding involves sufficient validated evidence of fraud, the IG team chief will exclude it from the report and refer it to AFMC/IGQ for action.

1.10.1.1.2. If a Finding involves sufficient validated evidence of waste or abuse, the description will include the following statement: "This was a waste (or abuse, or potential waste or abuse) item under the Air Force FWA Program."

1.10.1.1.3. Critical Deficiency and Major Deficiency will be used in accordance with AFI 90-201. These items warrant reporting to ensure unit(s) implement corrective actions. Critical and Major Deficiencies will be answerable to the MAJCOM. Minor Deficiency along with Recommended Improvement Area (RIA) and Cause Codes will also be utilized in accordance with AFI 90-201.

1.10.2. Strengths: Highly effective concepts, techniques, or management practices units should share with the rest of the center/base. Program must do more than meet compliance standards and the process must clearly exceed requirements.

1.10.3. Best Practices: Unique, successfully proven processes or techniques that enhance mission effectiveness and save time, energy, or resources. Ideally, these programs should have command-wide application.

1.10.4. Recommendations: Provide organization(s) an outside look at their processes and are designed to improve quality, effectiveness, or efficiency. The main focus is on the "should do" areas in an instruction.

1.10.5. Notes: Provide the rest of the story or more clarification to Findings.

1.10.6. Outstanding Performers/Teams:

1.10.6.1. Individuals or teams IG member(s) directly observe, whose contributions to the organization's mission accomplishment clearly exceed their peers, are recognized as Outstanding Performers.

1.10.6.2. The IG will validate each candidate's qualifications with the supervisor, first sergeant, or organizational commander.

1.10.6.3. Individual nominations are limited to personnel in grades E-6, O-3, WG-10, or GS-12 and below who meet all appropriate quality force standards. A UIF prohibits nomination of an individual.

1.10.7. Distribution: Electronically available to recipients with access to the AFMC IG secure web site at https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IG/secure_info.shtml. A site registration menu allows new users to request access. Recipients may download and distribute reports within their organizations as required.

1.10.8. Security

1.10.8.1. Mark and handle all IG reports IAW AFI 90-201, Paragraph 2.8. Report paragraph chapters for each particular inspection type contain specific inspection information release restrictions.

1.10.8.2. The AFMC/CC is the release authority for Commander Directed Inspections.

1.10.8.3. After an ORI, commanders from inspected units may authorize public release for the overall inspection ratings and for the major graded areas (Initial Response, Wartime Materiel Support, Force Protection, and Deployed Operations). Public release of sub-area ratings, verbatim Findings, or other data not authorized here, is prohibited.

1.10.8.4. After a UCI or MSEP, commanders from inspected units may authorize public release for the overall inspection ratings and for the major graded areas. Public release of sub-area ratings, verbatim Findings, or other data not authorized here, is prohibited.

1.10.9. Best Practices (BP) are forwarded to AFMIA for consideration/approval. View current Air Force BPs at <https://www.afmia.randolph.af.mil/mip/afbp/index.htm>. These and other items with command-wide interest are also included in the IG's quarterly CROSSTELL newsletter at <https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IG/crosstell.shtml>.

1.11. Candidates' Response to IG Findings:

1.11.1. Inspected organizations will use AFMC Form 21, **HQ AFMC/IG Finding Response** to reply to each HQ AFMC/IG finding once the final inspection report is officially issued. Initial replies are due to HQ AFMC/IGI NLT 60 days after final report delivery. Units must transmit Finding Response forms (e-mail or disc) through the office of the commander/vice commander or executive director. Finding Response forms will include the following:

1.11.1.1. Copy the Finding text as written in the original IG report.

1.11.1.2. The name, office symbol, and telephone number of the action officer.

1.11.1.3. A recommendation to either close or keep the Finding open.

1.11.1.3.1. To close, clearly describe corrective action(s) to prevent recurrence. Include the actual completion date.

1.11.1.3.2. To keep open, describe proposed actions or those taken or to correct the discrepancy to prevent recurrence. Include an estimated completion date.

1.11.1.4. Submit Finding Response forms in electronic format for each Finding (disk or e-mail is acceptable).

1.11.2. HQ AFMC/IG inspection deputy team chief, or designated representative, will:

1.11.2.1. Track the status of Findings, responses, and suspenses.

1.11.2.2. Forward base responses through appropriate channels, with a 30-day reply suspense, to the HQ AFMC staff and IG functional members.

1.11.2.3. Return non-concur actions to the base for re-evaluation with a 30-day reply suspense.

1.11.2.4. Notify appropriate organizational commanders and HQ AFMC staff functionals on the status of each Finding.

1.11.3. HQ AFMC staff functional will:

1.11.3.1. Review and assess the inspected unit's response(s).

1.11.3.2. Make a recommendation to either close or keep open the Finding.

1.11.3.3. Reply to HQ AFMC/IG in writing, through the appropriate IG functional, by the established suspense date. If the staff functional exceeds the suspense date, the HQ AFMC/IG will proceed with the process to close or keep the Finding open, as required.

1.11.4. IG functional staff members will:

1.11.4.1. Review the inspected unit response(s) and HQ AFMC staff functional recommendations.

1.11.4.2. Coordinate and resolve conflicts with HQ AFMC staff functionals.

1.11.4.3. Make the final determination to close or keep the Finding open.

1.11.4.4. Provide a final determination to the HQ AFMC/IG, through the IG deputy team chief, in writing.

1.11.5. Everyone must maintain appropriate security for all correspondence containing Findings or other excerpts from IG reports.

1.12. Rating Categories:

1.12.1. Ratings vary based upon the type of inspection.

1.12.2. Inspectors use checklists, assessment guides, governing directives, their own functional expertise, and criteria published in this instruction to subjectively determine ratings.

1.12.3. Ratings are not official until the IG or the appropriate team chief signs the final report. Any prior discussion(s) between IG and unit members will not constitute or imply a rating.

1.13. Unsatisfactory Ratings, Re-Inspections, and Follow-Up Inspections. When an organization receives an UNSATISFACTORY rating overall, or in a major graded area, the IG team chief will immediately notify HQ AFMC/IG, organizational senior leadership, and relevant HQ AFMC staff agencies. The IG team chief will decide whether to immediately re-inspect the area, schedule a follow-up, or to let the initial rating stand.

1.14. Observers

1.14.1. The inspected organization may allow observers from other organizations to watch the inspection processes on a non-interference basis. The inspected organization is responsible for any observers and they may not attend IG team meetings or view internal processes. The IG team must approve the specific number of observers, the processes they may observe, and rules of engagement they must obey.

1.14.2. The IG may invite non-AFMC observers, such as AFIA or the SAF/IG. The AFMC/IG is responsible for any observers they invite and they may observe all IG processes.

1.15. Trusted Agents:

1.15.1. The IG may request Trusted Agents from the inspected organization to help develop and execute, but not evaluate, inspection scenarios.

1.15.2. The IG will provide Trusted Agents with information concerning the nature and timing of inspection events, to the extent necessary, to achieve inspection objectives. Trusted Agents must not divulge IG-provided information to anyone within the inspected organization.

1.15.3. The IG will specify functional areas or capabilities desired for each Trusted Agent, and may request specific people based on inspection requirements and unit capabilities.

1.15.4. When possible, the inspected organization should select Trusted Agents who would otherwise have no active participation in the inspection.

1.15.5. Trusted agents will assist the IG and Fire Department Trusted Agents obtain any aircraft, facilities, casualties, or smoke generation devices required for exercises.

1.16. Augmentees:

1.16.1. Augmentees will be selected by the IG Team. IG augmentees will be selected from experts in functional areas throughout AFMC. IG will deconflict with functionals at HQ AFMC on individuals selected. IG will have final authority on augmentee selection.

Chapter 2

OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION (ORI)

2.1. Objectives:

- 2.1.1. Evaluate an organization's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ personnel and resources in support of wartime, steady state, or contingency operations.
- 2.1.2. Evaluate an organization's ability to defend against, and recover from, home station directed hostile actions, and continue necessary operations under increased Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs).
- 2.1.3. Evaluate compliance with federal laws, regulatory policies, DoD and AF directives and instructions, and execution of AFMC policies.

2.2. Description:

- 2.2.1. A multi-event, performance-based inspection divided into two phases. Phase I involves the organization's home-station reactions to national or local emergencies, and is conducted in actual locations with resources available at the installation. Phase II involves military force employment and is normally conducted at an installation-designated exercise area to simulate combat theater facilities. During Phase II, unit(s) use only deployed resources or those the IG specifically approved in advance.
- 2.2.2. The IG evaluates Phase I and Phase II performance in four major graded areas: Initial Response, Wartime Materiel Support, Force Protection, and Deployed Operations. Phase I includes the first three, and may involve anyone assigned to the installation, including civilian, military, or competitively sourced contractor personnel. Phase II evaluates the unit's Deployed Operations and involves only deployed military forces and other forces specifically approved by the IG. During a stand-alone Phase I ORI, the IG may inspect and grade some areas normally associated with Deployed Operations.

2.3. Applicability. The IG conducts ORIs at all Air Logistics Centers (ALC), Product Centers, Test Centers, and Air Base Wings.

2.4. Scheduling:

- 2.4.1. The IG schedules ORIs on a thirty month cycle. When practical, the IG combines ORIs for organizations supporting ACC or AMC flying missions with the tenant MAJCOM's ORI. The IG will consider AEF cycles when scheduling ORIs.
- 2.4.2. The complete inspection normally takes 10-12 days including the time required to prepare the final report and present the outbrief.

2.5. Special Logistical and Information Management Support. Organizations must provide Team Support outlined in [Attachment 1](#) and meet the ORI Special Support Requirements outlined in [Attachment 2](#).

2.6. Ground Rules and Simulations:

2.6.1. Organization personnel will carry out exercise tasks as realistically as possible, given available resources and the organization's specific responsibilities.

2.6.2. Ground rules and simulations define how units will demonstrate mission capability and the IG will evaluate them within inspection constraints. **Attachment 8** lists inspection ground rules and **Attachment 9** lists standard simulations.

2.6.3. To request additional simulations, the senior official responsible for the local exercise program must sign the letter to the IG. Clearly identify what the unit wants to simulate, why the simulation is necessary, and how the unit will demonstrate mission capability. Send multiple simulation requests under a single cover letter. Forward requests to the IG NLT 45 days before the ORI start date. **Attachment 10** specifies the format for a request letter.

2.7. Major Graded Areas:

2.7.1. Initial Response tests unit command and control, and the unit's ability to deploy military forces to a combat theater. The IG will exercise some or all of an installation's assigned unit type code (UTC) taskings. Base personnel will take all actions necessary to actually deploy people and equipment. The IG will stop just short of loading for final transportation off base. Initial Response exercises are part of Phase I and last for up to three days.

2.7.2. Wartime Materiel Support (WMS) involves accelerating an organization's core-mission operations in response to a wartime contingency. The IG will present wartime scenarios to materiel support organizations requiring acquisition acceleration, test acceleration, science and technology acceleration, or depot operations acceleration, depending upon the inspected unit. In addition, the IG will evaluate center and wing-level command and control over WMS scenarios. The WMS evaluation involves notification, planning, execution, and reporting phases including communications, requirements, priorities, plans, and schedules. The IG will also evaluate the unit's compliance with applicable policies and guidance. The WMS scenarios often call for simulated responses since actual acceleration is normally impractical or prohibitively expensive. Wartime Materiel Support scenarios are part of Phase I and typically last for four or five days.

2.7.3. Force Protection tests the organization's ability to defend against and recover from hostile actions directed against the home station, and to continue necessary operations under increased force protection conditions.

2.7.4. Deployed Operations focus on the deployed units' abilities to perform their wartime missions. Deployed Operations are Phase II and typically run 48-72 hours continuously.

2.8. REAL-WORLD Inspection Credit.

2.8.1. Generally, units do not receive inspection credit for REAL-WORLD taskings unless they submit a formal inspection request. Once coordinated and approved, a HQ AFMC/IG inspection team must observe a significant portion of the REAL-WORLD tasking to award credit.

2.8.1.1. Initial Response, Wartime Materiel Support (WMS, including Exchangeable/ Aircraft Surge), and Force Protection REAL-WORLD activities lend themselves to credit outside normal inspections. Rules to receive REAL-WORLD inspection credit include:

2.8.1.1.1. REAL-WORLD inspections are held no earlier than 6 months before a scheduled ORI within the planning and preparation windows.

2.8.1.1.2. The local IG must assess the magnitude of the effort and convey that information to HQ AFMC/IG to determine inspection feasibility.

2.8.1.1.3. The unit must immediately notify the local IG of the tasking(s). The local IG will contact HQ AFMC/IG regarding the potential REAL-WORLD inspection opportunity.

2.8.1.1.4. HQ AFMC/IG will decide whether or not to inspect based upon the REAL-WORLD activity's suitability, timing, and available resources. Previously scheduled inspections may take precedence over REAL-WORLD opportunities.

2.8.1.1.5. The local IG will provide the most current Wing/Center/SPO Initial Response, WMS, and Force Protection-related Operating Instructions and Plans to HQ AFMC/IG.

2.8.1.2. To receive credit for REAL-WORLD WMS activities, inspected unit(s) must maintain a continuity book (complete record) of all activities. It should include:

2.8.1.2.1. Tasking document(s), including time, date, source(s) of direction.

2.8.1.2.2. Meeting documents with attendance rosters and unit(s) represented.

2.8.1.2.3. Actions taken records.

2.8.1.2.4. Phone, fax, and e-mail contact documents.

2.8.1.2.5. Records of decisions made, including rationale.

2.8.1.2.6. Copies of decision briefs, status updates, and situation reports (SITREPS) submitted to the local battle staff.

2.8.1.2.7. Date/time all documents/records/copies for later review.

2.8.1.3. HQ AFMC/IG will dispatch a team with appropriate functional experts. The team will use standard criteria and documentation review to non-intrusively inspect or assess the unit. The team must observe a significant portion of the activity to award credit. The activity requires enough robustness for the IG team to thoroughly assess an organization's procedures and processes. These factors will drive the organization's overall readiness and capability assessment.

2.8.2. The AFMC/IG may note REAL-WORLD credit in the subsequent final ORI report as a separate chapter under the appropriate Tab. AFMC IG will issue a separate credit memo with appropriate observation(s). When a unit receives credit, the IG will not target the unit during a subsequent ORI, although the unit may get peripherally involved in inspection activities.

2.9. Criteria. ORI criteria are contained in [Attachment 7](#).

2.10. Limited Operational Readiness Inspection (LORI).

2.10.1. AFMC/IG may conduct a LORI instead of an ORI when a full ORI is not feasible or possible due to lack of host base support, actual commitments from support agencies, or the AFMC unit is a tenant on another MAJCOM base.

2.10.2. The difference between ORIs and LORIs predominantly involves Phase I. Record reviews and tabletop scenarios may replace actual Unit Type Codes (UTCs) mobilization. Reserve Combat Logistics Support Squadrons (CLSS) and Geographically Separated Units (GSUs) are prime candidates for LORIs. A LORI will evaluate portions of both Phase I and II.

2.10.3. HQ AFMC/IG considers all limiting factors to determine a LORI's scope. Inspections may encompass areas not observed during a REAL-WORLD credit observation. In a small unit inspection (i.e., AFRC CLSS) a LORI may review records in lieu of activating the full center or wing level mobility processing line. In all cases, HQ AFMC/IG determines the areas to inspect.

Chapter 3

UNIT COMPLIANCE INSPECTION (UCI)

3.1. Objectives:

- 3.1.1. Evaluate compliance with safety, federal law, executive order, Department of Defense and Air Force directives or instructions, and command policy directives and initiatives.
- 3.1.2. Evaluate an organization's ability to manage and execute critical daily activities leading to sustained, effective mission performance.
- 3.1.3. Identify obstacles to mission accomplishment.
- 3.1.4. Identify best practices.
- 3.1.5. Evaluate an organization's oversight of performance-based contracted services.

3.2. Description:

- 3.2.1. A UCI evaluates an organization's performance of mission critical taskings and assesses mandatory oversight of performance-based contracted services. Inspectors directly inspect processes and documents to assess compliance with higher headquarters or legal guidance. UCIs do not require extensive preparation; instead, they are designed to inspect a unit or contracted activity's day-to-day operations in designated critical compliance areas.
- 3.2.2. There are three major compliance areas corresponding to basic organizational structures in most AFMC centers: Command Staff, Product Support, and Air Base Wing Support. The major areas in the UCI are described in **Paragraph 3.7.**

3.3. Applicability:

- 3.3.1. AFMC/IG may conduct UCIs at Air Logistics Centers (ALC), Product Centers, Test Centers, the Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Base Wings, direct reporting units (DRU), geographically separated units (GSU), and the headquarters by themselves or in conjunction with other inspections. The inspection process may differ from one center to the next. This allows the IG to tailor the inspection to concentrate on each center's critical mission areas. The IG will work closely with the headquarters Executive Team (Chief Operating Officers and Functional Area Chiefs) and unit commanders when planning UCIs. Unit-level involvement in the planning process will depend, in part, on the amount of notice provided for a given inspection (see **Paragraph 3.4.1.**).
- 3.3.2. Unless specifically requested by the owning center, HQ AFMC/IG normally does not conduct inspections at center GSUs. The IG will develop an assessment strategy tailored for the GSU when it conducts a GSU inspection. The UCI trip planner will coordinate the GSU assessment with the parent organization's project officer. The project officer will notify the GSU of any necessary details. Coordination will include the following issues:
 - 3.3.2.1. GSUs to assess.
 - 3.3.2.2. GSU assessment dates.
 - 3.3.2.3. Specific support the GSU must provide to the UCI team.

3.3.3. Air Force Reserve Command IG conducts UCIs for AFRC units. This chapter does not apply to AFRC units.

3.3.4. AFMC/IG will evaluate government oversight of any performance-based service contracts written or administered by an AFMC contracting activity.

3.4. Scheduling:

3.4.1. UCIs are scheduled on a 30 – 36 month cycle. UCIs are conducted with limited (120 days) notice. When practical, AFMC/IG may combine UCIs with other inspections.

3.4.2. HQ AFMC/IG tailors the inspection scope and duration for each inspected unit. A major center inspection may take 7-8 days including final report preparation and outbrief presentation.

3.5. Special Logistical and Information Management Support:

3.5.1. Organizations must provide the IG Team with the support outlined in [Attachment 1](#) unless otherwise notified. Units must coordinate exceptions with the IG trip planner.

3.5.2. Organizations must meet any special support requirements outlined in [Attachment 3](#) or in the IG's notification letter.

3.5.3. AFMC contracting activities will provide HQ AFMC/IG with a list of all active contracts as outlined in [Attachment 3, A3.2.2.1.](#) HQ AFMC/IG will review the list and, in coordination with HQ AFMC/PK and other appropriate headquarters staff offices, will select a cross-section of contracts for inspection.

3.5.4. HQ AFMC/IG will select performance-based service acquisitions to evaluate government oversight of contracted services to ensure (1) compliance with DoD and non-DoD mandatory regulations; (2) organizations have qualified quality assurance personnel; and (3) effective government oversight of Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP).

3.5.5. The base Weight and Body Fat Management Program (WBFMP) monitor must contact the IG trip planner to arrange WBFMP inspection times and details NLT two weeks before the main team arrives.

3.6. Ground Rules:

3.6.1. HQ AFMC/IG may use sampling techniques to measure a center's performance. Before the IG team arrives, IG UCI leaders will solicit information from the center, HQ AFMC staff, and other pertinent offices to determine items to inspect within the major areas.

3.6.2. HQ AFMC/IG will provide units with enough information to efficiently conduct a UCI. Typically this will include the major areas the IG will inspect and other information needed to conduct UCI operations.

3.7. Major Inspection Areas. This section is a general overview; it is not an all-encompassing list.

3.7.1. Command Staff Functions: Includes safety, chaplain, financial management, contracting, plans, staff judge advocate, intelligence, medical, public affairs, and inspector general. **Note:** Chaplain and Medical fall under the ABW at Edwards AFB.

3.7.2. Product Support Functions: Includes engineering and technical management, acquisition management, combat logistics support, depot maintenance, science and technology, test and evaluation, information services, supply management, and bioenvironmental engineering.

3.7.3. Air Base Wing Support Functions: Includes personnel, civil engineering, transportation, services, base supply, force protection, information management, munitions, and medical. **Note:** Munitions falls under the Test Wing at Edwards AFB.

3.8. Ratings:

3.8.1. The IG uses a three-tier system to rate UCIs: In Compliance, In Compliance With Comment, Not In Compliance. The following defines each rating:

3.8.1.1. **In Compliance** : Few, if any discrepancies exist.

3.8.1.2. **In Compliance With Comment** : Resources and programs are relatively free of discrepancies; minor impact.

3.8.1.3. **Not In Compliance** : Resources and programs are not adequately managed and they do not adhere to one or more major program requirements, major mission and/or safety impact.

3.8.2. Rating Methodology: The IG will inspect AFMC organizations down to a level necessary to evaluate compliance. To support ratings at graded area or sub-area levels, the IG may assess functions within subordinate directorates, groups, divisions, squadrons, branches, or flights.

3.9. Criteria:

3.9.1. AFI 90-201 governs how IG teams conduct Compliance Inspections and provides an overview of Common Core Compliance areas reviewed during UCIs. In addition to these criteria, HQ AFMC Mission Area Chief Operating Officers, Functional Area Chiefs, and IG functional experts have developed detailed checklist criteria to guide the UCI process. These checklists are available on-line via the HQ AFMC/IG web site at

https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IG/check_lists.shtml through links to the functional web sites. These checklists are periodically reviewed and updated as laws, regulations, policies, and command emphasis changes. Units should refer to these checklists and contact the appropriate functional owner for any clarification.

Chapter 4

MAINTENANCE STANDARDIZATION AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (MSEP)

4.1. Objectives:

- 4.1.1. Evaluate an organization's aircraft and equipment maintenance program to focus on those areas requiring improvement.
- 4.1.2. Evaluate an organization's maintenance technician proficiency and the unit's equipment condition.
- 4.1.3. Evaluate compliance with all applicable DoD, AF, AFMC, and local directives, technical orders, and instructions.
- 4.1.4. Evaluate an organization's oversight of any maintenance-funded performance-based contracted services.

4.2. Description. An MSEP is a multi-event, performance-based inspection divided into four areas; maintenance management, technical data, tools/test equipment, and qualification and training. The IG will inspect each area to ensure compliance with all applicable directives, instructions, and effective government oversight on performance-based contracted services.

4.3. Applicability:

- 4.3.1. HQ AFMC/IG conducts MSEP inspections at Air Logistics Centers (ALC), Test Centers, and the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center. Specialized MSEP Inspection Teams also support inspections of center/base industrial or laboratory areas, and may inspect other AFMC maintenance organizations at the AFMC/CC's direction.
- 4.3.2. MSEP inspectors evaluate government oversight involving maintenance-funded performance-based contracted services, valued over \$100,000, written or administered by an AFMC organization or performed at the organization. AFMC contracting activities must provide a list to HQ AFMC/IG of all contracts as outlined in [Attachment 3, paragraph A3.2.2.1.](#) Inspected activities must forward this list to HQ AFMC/IG NLT 45 days before the scheduled MSEP.

4.4. Scheduling:

- 4.4.1. HQ AFMC/IG conducts MSEP inspections on a 30-month cycle. When practical, the IG can conduct MSEPs in conjunction with the host units' QA activities or other HQ AFMC/IG activities, e.g., Unit Compliance Inspections.
- 4.4.2. The inspection itself normally takes 12 days: 4 days of preparation/inbriefs, 5 days for the active inspection period, and 3 days to finalize the report/outbrief and present the outbrief.

4.5. Special Logistical and Information Management Support: Organizations must provide support as outlined in MSEP Special Support Requirements ([Attachment 5](#)).

4.6. Ground Rules:

4.6.1. General: IG inspectors representing various maintenance/support disciplines will inspect each site. The IG uses checklists derived from Air Force Instructions, AFMC Instructions, AFOSH Standards, and applicable technical order guidance.

4.6.2. Task Evaluations: MSEP inspectors conduct over-the-shoulder task evaluations on organization personnel performing on-going maintenance. Based upon scheduled activities during the inspection week, the IG may request personnel to perform special maintenance tasks. The MSEP team will coordinate critical tasks evaluations with the inspected organization at least one week in advance. The MSEP team also reserves the right to choose the technician(s) to perform the task based on a training records review.

4.6.3. Quality Verification Inspections (QVI): The IG may conduct a QVI involving after-the-fact or in-process maintenance.

4.7. Ratings:

4.7.1. HQ AFMC/IG uses a three-tier scale to rate checklist compliance items. Ratings are applied at the shop-level and are not rolled up. The three tiers are:

4.7.1.1. **In Compliance** : Few if any discrepancies exist.

4.7.1.2. **In Compliance With Comment** : Resources and programs are relatively free of discrepancies; minor impact.

4.7.1.3. **Not In Compliance** : Resources and programs are not adequately managed and they did not adhere to one or more major program requirements; major mission and/or safety impact.

4.7.2. HQ AFMC/IG rates Task Evaluations and QVIs based on AFI 21-101 as supplemented, AFMCI 21-115, and the local Quality Assurance Plan.

Chapter 5

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI)

5.1. Objective: Evaluate compliance with required safety, security, and reliability standards for management of nuclear resources.

5.2. Description:

5.2.1. An NSI is a compliance inspection covering all aspects of an organization's ability to manage nuclear resources. An Initial NSI (INSI) evaluates a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission, or evaluates and certifies new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities. A Limited NSI (LNSI) is limited in scope and evaluates specific NSI rating areas applicable to a unit.

5.2.2. The IG uses direct inspections, interviews, and exercises as required to meet inspection objectives. See **Paragraph 5.8.** for additional exercise information.

5.2.3. HQ AFMC/IG inspectors are not certified under the Personnel Reliability Program. Inspectors can not form their own Two-Person Team or form part of a Two-Person Team.

5.3. Applicability:

5.3.1. HQ AFMC/IG conducts NSIs at:

5.3.1.1. AFMC organizations preparing for, or currently certified to maintain, transport, or store nuclear weapons.

5.3.1.2. AFMC organizations providing host-base support to tenant units eligible for NSIs.

5.3.1.3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) flights providing direct support; units possessing a nuclear contingency mission; and Airborne Nuclear Command Control Units.

5.3.2. Select contractor facilities having Nuclear Surety responsibilities.

5.4. Scheduling:

5.4.1. NSIs are scheduled on an 18-month cycle, or when otherwise required.

5.4.2. NSIs and INSIs are prior-notice inspections. The IG may conduct NSIs, INSI, or LNSIs simultaneously with other major inspections at a given installation.

5.4.3. Each AFMC unit subject to NSIs may receive a minimum-notice LNSI between normally scheduled NSIs. Minimum-notice LNSIs will evaluate at least one rated area. HQ AFMC/IG will coordinate the area(s) to evaluation dates with HQ AFMC staff agencies on a Trusted Agent approval basis. The IG will reveal rated areas to the unit NET 72 hours before inspection start time.

5.4.4. HQ AFMC directorates with nuclear management responsibility may request an INSI or LNSI. Coordinate requests through HQ AFMC/LGM to the IG NLT 45 days before the desired inspection date. Include the following information:

5.4.4.1. Unit and specific inspection area(s) /system(s) and the desired inspection dates.

5.4.4.2. Reason why the INSI or LNSI is necessary.

5.4.4.3. Specific system-evaluation procedures and **Ready/Not Ready** criteria for INSI.

5.5. Coordination with Other Agencies:

5.5.1. AFMC NSI dates are coordinated with all AFMC units subject to NSIs, their host support organizations, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Air Force Safety Center, the Directorate of Nuclear Surety (AFSC/SEW), the AMC IG, and the ACC IG.

5.5.2. The AFMC and ACC IGs maintain a Letter of Agreement outlining guidance, procedures, and criteria for NSIs at Nellis AFB, and will review it prior to each joint NSI.

5.6. Special Logistical and Information Management Support. Organizations will provide team support outlined in [Attachment 1](#) and meet the NSI Special Support Requirements outlined in [Attachment 6](#).

5.7. Reports:

5.7.1. NSI reports are written and distributed IAW AFI 90-201.

5.7.2. The IG may identify observations not relating to the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems in a List of Minors. The IG will provide the List of Minors to senior leaders within the organization, but will not include it in the NSI report.

5.7.3. Report deficiencies IAW AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.

5.8. Exercises:

5.8.1. The IG will conduct these exercises during NSIs, and may conduct them during INSIs or LNSIs:

5.8.1.1. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF), if actual PNAF is not performed (announced).

5.8.1.2. Logistics Movement, if actual logistics movement is not performed (announced).

5.8.1.3. Weapons Storage Area Commercial Power Outage (announced).

5.8.1.4. Weapons Storage Area Fire (unannounced).

5.8.1.5. Terrorist Attack/Security Force Response (unannounced).

5.8.1.6. Broken Arrow (unannounced).

5.8.1.7. Enrollment Center Penetration (898 MUNS only) (unannounced).

5.8.2. Organizations may use exercise simulations where necessary to demonstrate mission capability without requiring inappropriate resource usage.

5.8.2.1. To request IG approval of additional simulations, the senior official responsible for the local exercise program must prepare and sign a letter to the IG in the format shown in [Attachment 10](#). Describe the item to simulate, the reason the simulation is necessary, and how the unit will demonstrate mission capability. Send multiple simulations under a single cover letter. Forward requests to HQ AFMC/IG NLT 30 days before the NSI start date.

5.8.2.2. HQ AFMC/IG will approve or disapprove the simulations NLT 15 days before the inspection and coordinate the decisions with the base and appropriate HQ AFMC functional staff.

5.8.2.3. Simulations reduce, but do not eliminate, exercise cost and complexity. Proper resource usage does not justify a simulation; only inappropriate use does so.

5.8.2.4. Final authority on what constitutes inappropriate use rests with the organization commander. If the commander and the IG disagree, the IG will note the issue in the NSI report and describe the impact on the inspection.

5.8.2.5. The IG may request a unit to demonstrate any simulated item to the extent necessary to assess unit capability.

5.8.3. The following ground rules apply during all AFMC NSIs:

5.8.3.1. The IG will not evaluate the entire installation's ability to respond to security threats during an NSI. The inspected unit may limit its reaction to any IG security exercises to those actions required in the immediate NSI area, and table-top command and control actions elsewhere.

5.8.3.2. Simulated casualties during the exercise will comply with IG directions, remove their helmets, and sit on the ground. Once hostilities are over, inspectors will direct all casualties to reposition in a sheltered area.

5.8.3.3. If contamination hazards occur during the Broken Arrow exercise, the IG may require personnel to demonstrate headgear, outer shirt, boots, and socks removal if the situation dictates. Personnel will simulate T-shirts, pants, or other clothing removal.

5.8.3.4. If an exercise requires key facilities evacuation, and evacuation will result in a significant mission impact, the IG will exempt the minimum number of personnel from evacuation.

5.8.3.5. The IG will query exempt personnel on procedural knowledge.

5.8.3.6. Exercise participants and IG members must obey normal speed limits and traffic control devices when responding to exercises. Emergency vehicle operators may use flashing lights but not sirens (unless local laws require both during a response on a public highway).

5.9. Graded Areas and Criteria:

5.9.1. The IG will evaluate the Nuclear Surety Inspection Areas listed in AFI 90-201, except for these areas which do not apply to AFMC:

5.9.1.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

5.9.1.2. Emergency Evacuation, Denial, and Command Disablement.

5.9.2. The IG may evaluate two areas not listed in AFI 90-201:

5.9.2.1. Fire Response Exercise.

5.9.2.2. Broken Arrow Exercise.

5.9.3. The IG uses the five-tier rating system in AFI 90-201 with these exceptions:

5.9.3.1. During NSIs and LNSIs, the IG rates these areas as either SATISFACTORY or UNSATISFACTORY:

5.9.3.1.1. Overall.

5.9.3.1.2. Condition of Stockpile.

5.9.3.2. During INSIs, the IG rates the organization as either READY or NOT READY.

5.9.4. In addition to rated areas described above, the IG will consider the six pass-fail criteria areas in T.O. 11N-25-1 and AFI 90-201. Any pass-fail condition violation will result in an overall UNSATISFACTORY rating for the entire inspection. The pass-fail criteria are further defined as follows:

5.9.4.1. Nuclear Safety: Safety of the nuclear weapon environment. If a deficiency could cause an explosion, radioactive contamination, unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming and fusing system, or physical damage to the weapon in a manner likely to lead to weapon rejection, the inspection will result in failure.

5.9.4.2. Nuclear Security: Security of the nuclear weapon environment. If the unit does not provide required weapon security, permits unauthorized personnel access or close proximity to the weapon, or a trend of security deficiencies exist, the inspection will result in failure.

5.9.4.3. System Reliability: Procedures to ensure a properly assembled weapon system functions as designed. If a deficiency in technical procedures would probably prevent the weapon from functioning as designed, the inspection will result in failure. System reliability pass-fail criteria do not apply to weapons with a retirement charge code.

5.9.4.4. Access Deficiencies: Prevention of unqualified or unauthorized personnel from close proximity. If a situation occurs resulting in a Two-Person Concept violation, the inspection will result in failure.

5.9.4.5. Resource Availability: Availability of personnel, equipment, or repair parts. If a unit is unable to accomplish required nuclear weapon technical functions due to shortages within the unit's control, the inspection will result in failure.

5.9.4.6. Overall Performance: The unit's overall ability to support a nuclear weapon mission in a safe, secure, and reliable manner.

5.9.5. NSI criteria and inspection areas are listed in AFI 90-201, T.O. 11N 25-1, paragraph 3.5., and [Attachment 6](#) of this instruction. All inspectors must understand these instructions and evaluate all applicable inspection areas.

Chapter 6

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM (SII) PROGRAM

6.1. Objectives. The Special Interest Item (SII) Program provides command-level visibility into the extent, impact, and status of specific known or suspected problems.

6.2. Description:

6.2.1. SAF/IG and the AFMC/CC designate areas or functions requiring particular assessment emphasis as SIIs. SIIs cover limited, specific subjects the IG reviews at all organizations. All Air Force and AFMC SIIs are identified by number and have prescribed expiration dates, typically 12 months from the initiation date.

6.2.2. HQ AFMC staff agencies recommend AFMC SIIs through the IG for AFMC/CC approval.

6.2.2.1. The AFMC staff OPR, in coordination with the IG and the functional inspection OPR, prepares and coordinates a proposed SII draft and any required additional guidance. The IG will provide the SII format.

6.2.2.2. Once the SII subject is approved, the IG sends the SII, a tasking letter, and any additional guidance to appropriate AFMC organization IGs to implement, self-inspect, and report. The SII tasking letter will identify specific requirements for organization IGs to follow, including required reporting dates and levels of detail.

6.2.3. The IG uses published checklists to conduct SII Reviews (SIIR) to verify reported status and identify specific strengths or deficiencies.

6.3. Applicability. All AFMC organizations are subject to applicable SIIs and to IG reviews of their SII program.

6.4. Scheduling:

6.4.1. The duration of each SII is specific to the particular item of interest being examined.

6.4.2. The IG can evaluate base SII Programs, and the status of each SII in effect, in conjunction with any inspection.

6.5. Special Logistical and Information Management Support. The IG evaluates SIIs during major inspections and does not require any further special support.

6.6. Process:

6.6.1. When the AFMC/IG evaluates a base's SII Program during an inspection, IG members will interview the organization's SII Monitor, the applicable Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR), and Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR) representatives for each SII.

6.6.2. Evaluation areas include the following:

6.6.2.1. Compliance with established procedures or directives for each current Air Force and AFMC SII.

6.6.2.2. Processes units use to distribute SIIs to functional OPRs, track responses to the IG, and verify or ensure compliance.

6.6.2.3. Identify deficiencies and take corrective actions.

6.6.2.4. Document and report open and closed SIIs.

6.7. Reports:

6.7.1. The IG will record a base's SII Program evaluation in an appendix to the inspection report. The appendix will summarize the SII process and the status of each current SII.

6.7.2. The IG distributes the SII appendix through the same channels as the report.

6.8. Ratings. The IG will use the SII tasking criteria to grade each open SII and the overall SII Program.

Chapter 7

COMMANDER DIRECTED INSPECTION (CDI)

7.1. Objective : To evaluate items required to meet the AFMC/CC's needs and expectations.

7.2. Description.

7.2.1. CDIs are organization- or process-specific projects tailored to meet the AFMC/CC's needs and expectations.

7.2.2. Since CDI processes and activities are dependent on the specific CDI objective, CDIs will vary greatly.

7.3. Process.

7.3.1. CDIs are initiated by order of the AFMC/CC.

7.3.2. The IG or selected Team Chief formulates a proposed plan, covers the information below, and forwards the proposal for AFMC/CC approval:

7.3.2.1. Specific objective.

7.3.2.2. Organization(s) subject to the CDI.

7.3.2.3. CDI duration at each organization and in total.

7.3.2.4. Specific functions the IG will inspect.

7.3.3. Once the AFMC/CC approves, the Team Chief will conduct the CDI IAW the approved plan.

7.3.4. The CDI Team Chief will discuss the following issues with the inspected organization:

7.3.4.1. How the IG will conduct the CDI.

7.3.4.2. Request interviews, data, reports, and briefings from the inspected organization.

7.3.4.3. Specific report information including format, data collection, findings process, rating criteria, response process, final report distribution, etc.

7.3.4.4. All logistical and administrative support the organization must provide.

7.3.4.5. Items the CDI team will provide to the organization including team rosters, schedule of events, pre- and post activity events, etc.

Chapter 8

UNIT SELF-INSPECTION

8.1. Objective. Provide a tool for commanders to internally assess unit health and complement external inspections and assessments.

8.2. Description. Center/Wing Commanders will establish a Unit Self-Inspection Program as an internal check on unit health. Tailor programs to each unit's structure and mission to adequately cover mission, resources, training, and people programs. Units should use the HQ AFMC Directorate UCI/MSEP and Self-inspection checklists available via the world-wide web for many functions/ organizations. (per AFI 90-201, paragraph 1.6. these checklists are required and all MAJCOM functions should have them). Units should use them as the basis to establish a local program, by conducting self-inspections at least annually. Units may conduct incremental inspections to minimize the impact. Center/Wing IGs should report unit self-inspection status as significant events occur and at the annual AFMC IG Conference.

Chapter 9

AFMC GATEKEEPER PROGRAM

9.1. Program Overview. HQ AFMC, along with other Air Force, DoD, and non-DoD agencies, conducts inspections, evaluation visits, staff assistance visits (SAV), and other types of visits to field units. HQ AFMC/IG is tasked as the AFMC Gatekeeper to monitor and regulate evaluation activities according to the Air Force Gatekeeper Program (AFI 90-201). Only visits that are of an inspection or evaluation nature are monitored and regulated under the gatekeeper program.

9.1.1. The AFMC Gatekeeper is the single point of contact to monitor and deconflict all inspection activity for AFMC units. The Gatekeeper has the authority to deconflict, combine or reschedule inspections. All inspection scheduling requests and notifications from outside agencies will be submitted to the AFMC Gatekeeper via the Internet

https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IG/visit_request.shtml by message or electronic mail to: HQAFMC.IG.GATE@wpafb.af.mil prior to the projected evaluation date. When requesting a visit, provide the following information:

9.1.1.1. Visitor information. Include organization, point of contact, e-mail address, commercial phone, and DSN phone.

9.1.1.2. Visit information. Include whether the visit is a trusted agent visit (i.e., not publicized, no-notice), host base, visited organization, start date, end date, team size, and purpose of visit.

9.2. Roles and Responsibilities.

9.2.1. HQ AFMC/IG will appoint an AFMC Gatekeeper who will:

9.2.1.1. Monitor all inspection visits to AFMC host installations, AFRL and specialized centers to minimize impact.

9.2.1.2. Evaluate visit requests to determine if visits are duplicative to other requested, scheduled, current, or recent efforts of other agencies. Work to combine evaluation visits with similar goals and recommend alternatives, if appropriate, to resolve conflicts.

9.2.1.3. Contact the AFMC host installation or other appropriate gatekeeper POC with requested visit data.

9.2.2. Personnel in HQ AFMC directorates, field operating agencies and special staffs planning evaluation visits to AFMC host installations will send the AFMC Gatekeeper the following information:

9.2.2.1. Name, DSN phone number, DSN fax number, and e-mail address of the gatekeeper POC for their respective organization.

9.2.2.2. A copy of the proposed inspection schedule for the upcoming fiscal year no later than 15 September. The schedule will include the following information:

9.2.2.2.1. The organization conducting the visit (including the POC name and DSN phone number).

9.2.2.2.2. The AFMC host unit being visited, visit dates, purpose and frequency, and the number of personnel traveling to the unit.

9.2.2.3. Updates to POC and schedule as necessary.

9.2.3. Personnel in HQ AFMC directorates, field operating agencies and special staffs planning inspection visits to an ANG or AFRC unit, or an AFMC tenant unit located on another MAJCOM installation, will coordinate with the NGB, AFRC, or that MAJCOM gatekeeper to resolve any conflicts. (The AFMC Gatekeeper maintains a list of addresses and phone numbers of MAJCOM, ANG, and AFRC gatekeepers at <http://www.ig.hq.af.mil/igq/Locator/IGQLocator.htm>.)

9.2.4. Host installation commanders, specialized center commanders and the AFRL director will appoint a gatekeeper POC and submit the POC name, DSN phone number, and e-mail address to the AFMC Gatekeeper.

9.2.5. Gatekeeper POCs will:

9.2.5.1. Work to resolve inspection visit conflicts and contact the AFMC Gatekeeper to assist in the resolution, if necessary.

9.2.5.2. Report unscheduled inspection visit notifications from outside agencies to the AFMC Gatekeeper.

9.2.5.3. Forward scheduling information to the AFMC Gatekeeper on major unit activities that could conflict with operational readiness inspections (ORI), unit compliance inspections (UCI), nuclear surety inspections (NSI) or Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program (MSEP) inspections (e.g. open houses, conferences, and deployments).

DARTANIAN WARR, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Attachment 1

TEAM SUPPORT

A1.1. General.

A1.1.1. Inspected organizations will provide the support outlined in this attachment for ORIs, UCIs, MSEPs, and NSIs at major AFMC installations. This support is required to facilitate multiple requirements and compressed schedules including reception, inprocessing, and inbriefing.

A1.1.2. Use this attachment as a starting point for support requirements for IG activities. Coordinate with the IG trip planner regarding specific reductions or non-applicable items, changes in requirements or limitations in the organization's ability to provide requested support.

A1.2. Transportation.

A1.2.1. The IG team will travel on military or commercial aircraft to the inspected installation or to a nearby airport or base, and return to HQ AFMC the same way. The IG team will coordinate and fund this portion of the travel.

A1.2.2. The inspected organization is responsible for providing transportation from the arrival location to the IG workcenter or other appropriate reception point, and for transportation back to the departure location at the completion of the inspection. In addition, the organization will:

A1.2.2.1. Provide buses with sufficient capacity for all IG team members, and a van or enclosed truck to transport IG Team support equipment and materials to the workcenter.

A1.2.2.2. Provide a detail to transport IG team baggage from the arrival location to the team members' assigned rooms on the day of arrival, and from the lodging office to the departure location on the day of departure. The detail leader must coordinate with the organization's inspection project officer, the IG Trip Planner, and the lodging office to obtain room assignment information prior to the team's arrival.

A1.2.3. The inspected organization is responsible for providing government-owned or government-leased vehicles for IG team use during the activity.

A1.2.3.1. The IG trip planner will determine the actual vehicle requirements for each inspection.

A1.2.3.2. Provide 4-door sedans for the AFMC IG and the IG inspection team chief. Other IG vehicles may be sedans, pickups, or vans.

A1.2.3.3. Provide local flightline safety briefings and driving orientation as required.

A1.2.3.4. All vehicles must contain a base map annotated with fuel-pump locations, local area map, phone number to call for vehicle problems, fuel key, and statement of the installation's Permissible Operating Distance and any local operating instructions.

A1.2.3.5. Ensure IG vehicles are allowed to operate on the flightline and in any controlled areas.

A1.2.4. The inspected organization will provide windshield placards, marked "Official Vehicle, AFMC IG Team" for all IG vehicles.

A1.3. Lodging.

A1.3.1. Provide priority on-base lodging in single rooms for all IG team members. Do not displace authorized personnel already residing in transient quarters for the sole purpose of accommodating the IG team.

A1.3.2. Lodge all team members in the same area, to the greatest extent practical. Provide appropriate quarters for IG team colonels or above and their equivalents, along with chief master sergeants.

A1.3.3. Upon arrival of the IG advance team, provide room keys in separate packets with each inspector's name and room number listed on the outside of the packet. Additionally, provide a list of every inspector's name, lodging building number, room number, and telephone number.

A1.4. Parking. Reserve parking spaces for IG team members at the IG workcenter, organization headquarters, and functional areas to be inspected. Do not reserve parking spaces at shopping, dining, recreational facilities.

A1.5. IG Workcenter.

A1.5.1. Provide space and equipment as identified below. Offices must be under one roof and preferably on the same floor. Provide three sets of keys to all offices.

A1.5.1.1. Four private offices: one for the AFMC IG; one for the inspection team chief; and two for the inspection team chief's key staff. Each office should be equipped with two desks or tables, six chairs, one whiteboard with markers, one Class A telephone, a staff directory, and a base telephone book.

A1.5.1.2. One main work area, with tables and chairs to accommodate 80 people. Area should be equipped with 4 internet-connected computers with standard MS Office software suite sharing one black and white networked duplex laser printer. Establish one group network account and password for access to the internet; individual network and email accounts will not be used. Individual accountability will be maintained via internal IG computer access logs. Additionally, provide 2 other black and white network laser printers and associated software, one for the IG mobile computer system and one to be connected as required upon team arrival. Other items required include five Class A telephones, five base telephone books, two off-base telephone books, two whiteboards with markers, three trash cans and trash bags, and coffee-making equipment. (The IG team will provide cups, coffee, sugar and creamer, etc.)

A1.5.1.3. One information management office, with workspace and typist chairs to accommodate five people. Office should be equipped with three internet-connected computers with standard MS Office Suite, one high-speed duplex printer, one color laser printer, one fax machine, two Class A telephones with access to all lines used in the IG work center, a staff directory, three base telephone books, an off-base telephone book, one whiteboard with markers, one high-speed, dual-sided copying machine with sorting capability, two trash cans and trash bags, and one large capacity shredder.

A1.5.1.4. One private area for the IG Presentation Manager. Office should be equipped with two tables, two chairs, and an internet-connected computer with standard MS Office software suite and access to information management office network printer. Additionally, provide four 25-foot multiple outlet extension cords, three monitors (at least one 20"), two keyboards, two mice, access to the printers in the information management area and one trash can and trash bags.

A1.5.2. Computer requirements: Totals: Internet-connected computers: 12 (4-IG and Team Chief/Deputies, 4-main area, 3-admin, 1-presentation):

A1.5.2.1. Trash cans: 10 (4-private offices, 3-main area, 2-admin area, 1-presentation area).

A1.5.2.2. B/W duplex network printers: 1 (main area).

A1.5.2.3. B/W high-speed duplex network printer: 1 (admin).

A1.5.2.4. B/W network printers: 3 (2-main area, 1-private offices).

A1.5.2.5. Color network laser printer: 1 (admin).

A1.5.2.6. High-speed duplex copier w/sorter: 1 (admin).

A1.5.2.7. High-capacity shredder: 1 (admin).

A1.5.2.8. Phones: 12 (5-main area, 4-private offices, 3-admin).

A1.5.2.9. 20 inch Monitors: 3 (presentation area).

A1.5.2.10. Keyboards: 2 (not including internet computers).

A1.5.2.11. Mice: 2 (not including internet computers).

A1.5.2.12. Fax Machine: 1 (admin).

A1.5.2.13. Class A telephones: 11 (5-main area, 4-private offices, 2-admin).

A1.5.2.14. Base phone books: 12 (5-main area, 4-private offices, 3-admin).

A1.5.2.15. Off-base phone books: 3 (2-main area, 1-admin).

A1.5.2.16. Whiteboards: 3 (2-main area, 1-admin).

A1.5.2.17. Coffee making equipment: 1 (main area).

A1.5.2.18. Extension cords (25 ft): 4 (presentation area).

A1.5.3. The IG Trip Planner/Administration will provide a list of office-supply requirements 30 days prior to the team arrival.

A1.5.4. Reference documents:

A1.5.4.1. Alpha roster for base civilian and military personnel (paper or electronic).

A1.5.4.2. Listing of all commanders and first sergeants, by unit, with duty-phone numbers.

A1.5.4.3. One large Base Grid map.

A1.5.4.4. One copy of each IG, audit, and staff assistance report from the previous three years, and related follow-up correspondence.

A1.5.4.5. One copy of the base supplement to AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel.

A1.6. Information Management Augmentees:

A1.6.1. Provide one Information Manager NCO (TSgt, MSgt, or civilian equivalent) for the duration of the activity, including overtime (24 hour operations) and weekends. The individual should be famil-

iar with the base and be authorized to obtain additional office supplies if needed. Specific responsibilities will include:

A1.6.1.1. Assisting the IG team's workcenter manager with workcenter operations.

A1.6.1.2. Acting as a liaison between the IG team and the base.

A1.6.1.3. Receiving and routing telephone calls and forwarding messages.

A1.6.1.4. Assisting in the preparation of the activity report and theater outbrief.

A1.6.2. Provide fully-qualified information managers (AFSC 3A0X1 or civilian equivalent) for the duration of the activity, including overtime and weekends. Coordinate with the IG Trip Planner to determine actual requirements for a given inspection.

A1.6.3. Information Managers who are tasked to provide administrative support must follow the guidelines of trusted agents, as specified in **Chapter 1, Paragraph 1.15**, of this instruction. Trusted Agents must not divulge any privileged information to anyone within the inspected organization.

A1.7. Communications Requirements.

A1.7.1. Provide two Security Forces radios, capable of transmitting and receiving appropriate frequencies, and a charger.

A1.7.2. Provide pagers, cellular phones, land-mobile radios, spare batteries, and chargers, or equivalent, as required for use by IG team personnel. The exact number of these items should be coordinated with the IG Trip Planner. Provide a list of call signs and frequency assignments for the land mobile radios.

A1.8. Photographic Support.

A1.8.1. Approximately 60 days before the inspection, the IG will send the organization's project officer a list of requested digital photos, a suspense date, and mailing instructions. All photos must meet these requirements:

A1.8.1.1. Must be taken with the camera held horizontally.

A1.8.1.2. Must be bright and sharp when projected on the base-theater screen.

A1.8.1.3. Must be current and reflect personnel assigned to the organization during the inspection.

A1.8.1.4. Should be "action shots," except commander or group photos.

A1.8.1.5. Must show more than one person unless otherwise specified. If person is in a one-deep position, show them with a customer.

A1.8.1.6. Photographed personnel must comply with AFI 36-2903, *Dress And Personal Appearance Of Air Force Personnel* and applicable Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standards. Ensure no controlled line or identification badges are visible.

A1.8.1.7. Label all photos as indicated in the tasking letter. Label each photo with the same number where multiple photos of the same subject are requested.

A1.8.1.8. Photos must be saved in .jpg format (resolution: 800x600x8-bitx24-bit compression low).

A1.9. Executive Inbrief/Outbrief Support. For the executive inbrief/outbrief, provide a video projector and computer capable of displaying Microsoft PowerPoint slides. Provide a technician familiar with the system for practice sessions.

A1.10. Theater Outbrief Support:

A1.10.1. Appoint one project officer (preferably from the local Comm Squadron) to manage the setup and testing of all equipment outlined in this section. This project officer will contact the IG trip planner prior to team arrival. The IG trip planner will provide detailed instructions at that time.

A1.10.2. This project officer will reserve the base theater or other appropriate facility for the day of the outbrief and the two days prior, and provide the facility keys to the IG trip planner for that period.

A1.10.3. At least three days prior to the outbrief, the project officer will:

A1.10.3.1. Provide organizational shields in electronic format for all assessed organizations down to the group or two-letter equivalent level. These shields must be Microsoft PowerPoint V4.0 objects and must have the same dark blue or black background. If an organization does not have a shield, use the parent organization's shield with the organization's name in place of parent organization's name.

A1.10.3.2. Set up and test a complete audio system comprised of:

A1.10.3.2.1. One podium (with light) with one corded microphone.

A1.10.3.2.2. One extra corded microphone.

A1.10.3.2.3. One dual-cassette deck.

A1.10.3.2.4. One compact-disc player.

A1.10.3.2.5. One amplifier.

A1.10.3.2.6. Four speakers (one at each corner of the theater/facility).

A1.10.3.3. Set up an IG workstation in the location determined by the IG Trip Planner.

A1.10.4. A unit focal point (possibly from the local IG or protocol office) will ensure that seating allocations for the outbrief have been coordinated among all center organizations.

A1.11. Report Production and Distribution.

A1.11.1. In most cases, the IG inspection team will produce the inspection report before departing. The IG will provide a limited number of hard copies and a read-only soft copy to the unit commander or Installation IG.

A1.11.2. After completion of the outbrief, the IG workcenter manager will release the report for distribution. The inspected organization will distribute internal copies while HQ AFMC/IG distributes external copies. HQAFMC/IG will post IG report on the IG website upon return to HQ AFMC.

Attachment 2

ORI SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

A2.1. General. Inspected organization will provide the support outlined in this attachment for ORIs, in addition to the items listed in [Attachment 1](#). Coordinate with the IG trip planner on any changes in requirements or limitations in the organization's ability to provide the requested support.

A2.2. Items to be provided to HQ AFMC/IG 45 Days in Advance of Inspection.

- A2.2.1. A description of any shortfalls in capability that are not reflected by unit SORTS reports.
- A2.2.2. List of installation deployment officer and unit deployment managers, including name, grade, office symbol, duty phone, and building and room numbers where assembly and processing takes place.
- A2.2.3. The base deployment plan, including Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) and Logistics Force (LOG-FOR) details.
- A2.2.4. Force Protection Condition (FPCON) procedures.
- A2.2.5. Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan.
- A2.2.6. Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Plan 10-2.
- A2.2.7. Communications C4 Restoral Plan.
- A2.2.8. Other local contingency plans or exercise guides.
- A2.2.9. Local exercise reports with replies for the past 12 months.
- A2.2.10. A list of non-UTC personnel, vehicles, equipment, and materials to be used in Phase II, and a brief explanation of why each is necessary. See [Attachment 8](#) for additional information.
- A2.2.11. Two copies of the base grid map. Annotate locations such as key control centers, mobility marshaling and processing areas, and Phase II play areas.
- A2.2.12. One copy of utility system drawings for the installation and Phase II play areas.
- A2.2.13. Two copies of a map showing the Phase II play areas, in a scale large enough to identify individual facilities. Annotate play-area boundaries, functions of all facilities involved in the inspection, and routes to the processing or contamination control areas. Two airfield charts to be used for plotting exercise airfield damage (CE core bases only).
- A2.2.14. A prioritized list of all facilities in the Phase II play area, including facility numbers, exercise priorities, using organizations, and descriptions of installed generators.
- A2.2.15. A team roster for the deployed civil engineers, if assigned, showing the names and AFSCs of personnel assigned to each team (i.e., "Mat Team," "DCC," and so on, not "Lead Team" or "Follow Team").
- A2.2.16. Names of Trusted Agents in the following areas:
 - A2.2.16.1. A minimum of one representative from each directorate and SPO familiar with programs subject to evaluation under Wartime Materiel Support.

- A2.2.16.2. Two assessor-qualified Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) Exercise Evaluation Team members.
- A2.2.16.3. One firefighter to assist with scheduling and conducting fire department exercises.
- A2.2.16.4. One each qualified electrician and power production technician to assist with turning off power to exercise areas or facilities.
- A2.2.16.5. Two communications representatives to assist in the scoping and execution of exercises involving voice, video, and data networks.
- A2.2.16.6. One Security Forces NCO to assist with local base/community coordination of exercises and equipment support.
- A2.2.16.7. One Services NCO or Services civilian to assist with local coordination of Mortuary Mass Fatality exercises.
- A2.2.16.8. One contracting representative familiar with the center's programs and supporting contracts to coordinate and advise on potential Wartime Material Support scenarios.
- A2.2.16.9. One medical unit Officer or NCO to assist with moulage team requirements.
- A2.2.16.10. Three EOD NCOs maximum or as required to assist with exercises and equipment support.
- A2.2.17. If applicable, send copies of the last five locally developed ABDR exercise plans, scenarios, damage descriptions, and associated estimated times in commission (ETICs). See **Paragraph A8.3.9.3** for additional information.
- A2.2.18. Provide a list of potential Civil Engineer job orders, with materials complete, which could be worked on in conjunction with bomb damage repair exercises (CE Core Bases only).
- A2.2.19. For Contract Civil Engineering organizations, provide one copy of Statement of Work for areas affected by potential exercises.
- A2.2.20. Provide a detailed computer network diagram including the location of all servers, Domain Name Servers, proxy servers, equipment in the de-militarized zone (DMZ), firewalls, connections to tenant units and all external connections. The diagram will include Protocol (IP) addresses for all applicable equipment. Additionally, provide separate diagrams for the location and design of wireless networks.

A2.3. Support Required During the Inspection.

- A2.3.1. Provide twenty total Hand-Held Radios (HHRs) with chargers and spare batteries preprogrammed with the appropriate frequencies, five HHRs with the frequencies listed below, plus medical, fire/crash, civil engineer readiness, and security forces frequencies.. The IG Trip Planner will provide a consolidated list of required frequencies to include IG and locally assigned frequencies. HHRs must be available during Phase I and Phase II. The following frequencies are reserved for IG use only.
- A2.3.1.1. 139.775 megahertz (MHz) for simplex operations.
- A2.3.1.2. 140.375 MHz for repeater transmit.
- A2.3.1.3. 143.475 MHz for mobile transmit repeater.

A2.3.2. For installations using trunking systems, the IG will require the HHRs to be programmed for a separate talk group solely for IG use.

A2.3.3. The following items are required for the Phase II portion only. Coordinate delivery procedures with the IG trip planner.

A2.3.3.1. Fifty (50) orange construction cones.

A2.3.3.2. One (1) M-256A1 Chemical Detector Kit Training Aid.

A2.3.3.3. Ten (10) M291 Skin Decontaminating Kits.

A2.3.3.4. Two (2) M295 Equipment Decontaminating Kits.

A2.3.3.5. Twenty-four (24) glow sticks (green).

A2.3.3.6. Forty smoke grenades, in any color except white (1330-00-289-xxxx).

A2.3.3.7. Forty (40) Artillery Ground Burst Simulators (GBS) (NSN 1370-00-752-8126) and/or Hand Grenade Simulators (M116A1-1370-00-752-8124).

A2.3.3.8. Ten (10) to twenty (20) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and three (3) to five (5) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training devices.

A2.3.3.9. Sandbag bunkers at appropriate locations throughout the play area, to be used as GBS detonation pits.

A2.3.3.10. If no permanent facility in the play area is available for use as an IG workcenter or staging area, set up a General Purpose (GP) medium tent or equivalent facility with lighting, power outlet plugs, and land-line or field phone connected to the Survival Recovery Center (SRC). Place the following items within the tent:

A2.3.3.11. Large container of ice water and drinking cups.

A2.3.3.12. Large plastic garbage bags and garbage receptacles.

A2.3.3.13. Six (6) tables with at least six (6) folding chairs each.

A2.3.3.14. Heaters/air conditioners as appropriate for weather conditions.

A2.3.3.15. Contracting/Financial Management: One tent or hard shelter near Contracting and Financial Management deployed facility with the following: two (2) tables with four (4) chairs each; lighted or battery operated lanterns provided; and heaters as appropriate for weather conditions.

A2.3.4. During Phase I, the unit will provide all Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support needed to inflict explosive damage to Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) training aircraft. This support should include, but not be limited to, funding for TDY for EOD personnel (if necessary), damage simulators, and personnel qualified to prepare the devices.

A2.3.4.1. Upon arrival, the Military Personnel Flight (MPF) will produce a roster indicating the AFSCs assigned to the installation. This roster will be sorted by unit indicating: name, CAFSC, duty status, deployment availability codes, date of separation, and total unit strength, authorized and assigned.

A2.3.5. During the ABDR exercises, the unit should provide:

- A2.3.5.1. One IG ABDR team work room, complete with one computer and printer.
- A2.3.5.2. Two personnel (one per 12-hour shift for 24 hr coverage) to serve as Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) during Phase II.
- A2.3.5.3. All necessary Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) (light-alls, LOPACs, heaters, etc.) to conduct 24-hour operations during Phase II exercises.
- A2.3.5.4. Not more than three exercise-support personnel per shift (will move and refuel AGE as simulated host-base support and act as supply personnel to support ABDR teams).
- A2.3.5.5. Access to TO1-1H-39, weapon-specific -39 series TOs, and TO 1-1A-8 (as a minimum).

A2.3.6. For the Security Forces function:

- A2.3.6.1. Provide identical items listed in **Paragraph A3.3.1.** of this document.
- A2.3.6.2. Provide the following to support BDOC and OPFOR operations during Phase II:
 - A2.3.6.2.1. Five M-16 rifles.
 - A2.3.6.2.2. Five M-16 blank adapters.
 - A2.3.6.2.3. Five M-16 MILES transmitters.
 - A2.3.6.2.4. Five MILES LBE harnesses.
 - A2.3.6.2.5. Five MILES headsets.
 - A2.3.6.2.6. Fifteen 9-volt batteries.
 - A2.3.6.2.7. Fifteen M-16 ammunition magazines.
 - A2.3.6.2.8. 1500 rounds of 5.56 blank ammunition.
 - A2.3.6.2.9. One tent/other facility to be used as the BDOC set up in/near the exercise play area. Ensure the tent is equipped with the following: scope shield radio, field phone with direct line to SF Sector Command Post, hard-line dial capability to main base (emergency contact use) or a cell phone with extra batteries, portable desk and 4 chairs.
 - A2.3.6.2.10. One tent for use by OPFOR personnel (place tent inside BDOC, OPFOR erect it).
 - A2.3.6.2.11. Five Sleeping cots.
 - A2.3.6.2.12. Five Sleeping bags.
 - A2.3.6.2.13. Twelve assorted glow sticks.
 - A2.3.6.2.14. Topographical map of exercise area.
 - A2.3.6.2.15. Additional items such as ammo pouches, web gear, flashlights, etc. if needed.

A2.4. Limited Operational Readiness Inspection (LORI) Requirements:

NOTE: Items to be provided to the HQ AFMC/IG NLT 45 Days in Advance.

- A2.4.1. A description of any shortfalls in capability that are not reflected on unit SORTS reports.

- A2.4.2. List of installation and unit deployment managers, including name, grade, office symbol, duty phone, and building and room numbers where assembly and processing takes place during local.
- A2.4.3. Base deployment plan, including Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) and Logistics Force (LOG-FOR) details.
- A2.4.4. Other local contingency plans, local operating instructions, or exercise guides.
- A2.4.5. Local exercise reports with replies for the past 12 months.
- A2.4.6. A list of non-UTC personnel, vehicles, equipment, and materials to be used in Phase II, and a brief explanation of why each is necessary. See **Attachment 8** for additional information.
- A2.4.7. One copy of the base grid map. Annotate locations such as key control centers, mobility marshaling and processing areas, and Phase II play areas.
- A2.4.8. List of all facilities in the Phase II exercise area, including facility numbers.
- A2.4.9. Names of Trusted Agents. Trusted agents will be two assessor-qualified Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) qualified personnel, and one administrative support person.
- A2.4.10. Trusted agents will be considered as part of the HQ AFMC/IG team and report directly to the team chief upon initiation of START-EX and will remain in this status until END-EX.
- A2.4.11. Send copies of the last five locally developed ABDR exercise plans, scenarios, damage descriptions, and associated estimated times in commission (ETICs). See **Paragraph A8.3.9.3.** for additional information

A2.5. CLSS Limited Operational Readiness Inspection (LORI) Support Required During the Inspection Period:

- A2.5.1. Minimum Office Supply Requirements:
 - A2.5.1.1. One (1) box of Pens, one (1) box of pencils, one (1) box of highlighters, writing paper, Post-It notes in varying sizes, and telephone message pads.
 - A2.5.1.2. Two (2) regular and one (1) heavy-duty stapler with staple removers and extra staples.
 - A2.5.1.3. Two (2) pencil sharpeners.
 - A2.5.1.4. One (1) each 2- and 3-hole punches.
 - A2.5.1.5. Two (2) in/out trays.
 - A2.5.1.6. One (1) box of copier paper.
 - A2.5.1.7. One (1) box of pocket folders.
 - A2.5.1.8. Pushpins, paperclips, and medium binder clips.
- A2.5.2. The following items are required for the Phase II portion only. Coordinate delivery procedures with the HQ AFMC/IG trip planner.
 - A2.5.2.1. Two (2) M291 Skin Decontaminating Kits.
 - A2.5.2.2. Two (2) M295 Equipment Decontaminating Kits.
 - A2.5.2.3. Ten (10) Glow Sticks (green).

A2.5.3. The following two items are preferred methods, however, may or may not be used and based on the unit's exercise area and local explosive safety instructions:

NOTE: Deviations from the preferred exercise method will be coordinated through HQ AFMC/IG.

A2.5.3.1. Ten (10) smoke grenades, in any color except white (1330-00-289-xxxx).

A2.5.3.2. Ten (10) Artillery Ground Burst Simulators (NSN 1370-00-752-8126) and/or Hand Grenade Simulators (M116A1-1370-00-752-8124).

A2.5.4. No less than Five (5) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and 2 IED training devices.

A2.5.5. Sandbag bunkers at appropriate locations throughout the play area, to be used as GBS detonation pits.

A2.5.6. If no permanent facility in the play area is available for use as an IG work center or staging area, set up a General Purpose (GP) medium tent or equivalent facility with lighting, power outlet plugs, and land-line or field phone. Place the following items within the tent:

A2.5.6.1. As a minimum, access to T.O. 1-1H-39, weapon-specific -39 series T.O.s, and T.O. 1-1A-8.

A2.5.6.2. Large container of ice water and drinking cups.

A2.5.6.3. Large plastic garbage bags and garbage receptacles.

A2.5.6.4. Six (6) tables with at least six (6) folding chairs each.

A2.5.6.5. Heaters/air conditioners as appropriate for weather condition

A2.5.6.6. During Phase I, the unit will provide all EOD support needed to inflict explosive damage to ABDR training aircraft. This support should include, but not be limited to, funding for TDY for EOD personnel (if necessary), damage simulators, and personnel qualified to prepare the devices

A2.5.6.7. During the ABDR exercises, the unit should provide:

A2.5.6.7.1. One IG ABDR team work room, (in clear view of the exercise play area, if possible) complete with two (2) computers and two (2) printers and a T.O library including as a minimum; One (1) set of ABDR technical orders both general and weapons system specific and a 1-1A-8.

A2.5.6.7.2. Two (2) personnel (one per 12-hour shift for 24 hr coverage) to serve as MOC during Phase II.

A2.5.6.7.3. All necessary AGE (light-alls, LOPACs, heaters, etc.) to conduct 24-hour operations during Phase II exercises.

A2.5.6.7.4. Six (6) sets of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) for IG use during the inspection period. At a minimum, this will include safety glasses, ear plugs/defenders and reflective belts or equivalent for use during hours of darkness.

A2.5.6.7.5. Not more than two (2) exercise support personnel per shift. Exercise support personnel will report and get direction from the designated HQ AFMC/IG team members (will move and refuel AGE as simulated host base support and act as supply personnel to support ABDR teams).

Attachment 3**UCI SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS****A3.1. General.**

A3.1.1. Provide the support outlined in this attachment for UCIs, in addition to the items listed in **Attachment 1**. Coordinate with the IG trip planner on any changes in requirements or limitations in the organization's ability to provide the requested support.

A3.2. Items to be Provided to the IG in Advance (Upon Notification) of Inspection.

A3.2.1. For all organizations and functional areas, down to the squadron, division, or equivalent three-letter level:

A3.2.1.1. Organization charts, including office symbols.

A3.2.1.2. Key personnel listings, including name, grade, office symbol, and phone number, if not identified on the organization charts.

A3.2.1.3. Mission statements.

A3.2.2. For the Contracting function:

A3.2.2.1. Current list of all active contracts. AFMC/IG will provide the format for this list to the unit's contracting activity 75 days from the scheduled UCI. The contracting activities will consolidate and update one list that will be forwarded to AFMC/IG 45 days from the scheduled UCI.

A3.2.2.2. Current list and description of all Performance Based Service Contracts (>\$100,000) from the Quality Assurance Program Coordinator (QAPC) with points of contact for all the quality assurance personnel assigned to each contract.

A3.2.3. For the Security Forces function:

A3.2.3.1. Installation Security Instruction and Installation Security Plan.

A3.2.4. For the organization's Weight Management Program (WMP):

A3.2.4.1. The name and phone number of a focal point to help administer the WMP assessment.

A3.3. Support Required During the Inspection:

A3.3.1. For the Security Forces function:

A3.3.1.1. Provide a private office for the inspectors within the Security Forces squadron. Place the following items within the office:

A3.3.1.1.1. Installation Security Council meeting minutes for the past year.

A3.3.1.1.2. Resource Protection Executive Committee minutes for the past year.

A3.3.1.1.3. Security Manager meeting minutes for the past year.

A3.3.1.1.4. Guard mount times and shift schedule.

A3.3.1.1.5. Security Forces Duty Officer (SFDO) reports and corrective actions for the past 90 days.

- A3.3.1.1.6. Desk blotters for the past 90 days. Highlight all visits by organization supervisors, installation commander, etc.
 - A3.3.1.1.7. Approved Request for Deviations, AF Form 116.
 - A3.3.1.1.8. Installation Security Instruction (ISI).
 - A3.3.1.1.9. Installation Security Plan (ISP) (unclassified portion only).
 - A3.3.1.1.10. Security Forces Automated System products (contact Security Police inspector upon arrival regarding required products).
 - A3.3.1.1.11. All unit Operating Instructions.
 - A3.3.1.1.12. Unit Manning Document (UMD) and Unit Manpower Position Roster (UMPR).
 - A3.3.1.1.13. Installation Vulnerability Survey.
- A3.3.1.2. Provide the following Security Forces Unit Type Code (UTC) items upon request:
- A3.3.1.2.1. On-the-Job (OJT) records.
 - A3.3.1.2.2. Designated Operational Capability (DOC) statements.
 - A3.3.1.2.3. Air Force Combat Level (C-Level) data collection sheets.
 - A3.3.1.2.4. Individual mobility folders.
 - A3.3.1.2.5. Country mission folders.
- A3.3.2. For the Contracting function:
- A3.3.2.1. Provide a private office for the inspectors within the Contracting facility.
 - A3.3.2.2. Provide the following items within the office:
 - A3.3.2.2.1. Federal Acquisition Regulation and supplements (hardcopy or on-line).
 - A3.3.2.2.2. All local contracting Operating Instructions/OIs, Policy Letters and procedures.
 - A3.3.2.2.3. Ratification log.
 - A3.3.2.2.4. Management reviews for the last six months, down to the three-letter level.
 - A3.3.2.2.5. Current manning listing, to include phone numbers, building location, and post numbers.
 - A3.3.2.2.6. Contract review checklists.
 - A3.3.2.2.7. Local contracting forms.
 - A3.3.2.2.8. Undefined Contract Action listing.
 - A3.3.2.2.9. Audit or inspection agency reports addressing contracting issues for the last three years.
- A3.3.3. For the Weight Management Program:
- A3.3.3.1. Set up two private rooms and a large screening area for conducting body fat checks.
 - A3.3.3.2. Ensure proper assessment equipment is available (two scales, two measuring tapes, and weight, height, and body fat charts).

A3.3.3.3. Provide four personnel (two females and two males) to assist in conducting weight, height, and body fat checks. Ensure assistants comply with all WMP requirements.

A3.3.3.4. When notified by the IG of the individuals to be screened within each unit, relay the notification to the affected units.

A3.3.4. For the Financial Management and Comptroller function:

A3.3.4.1. Provide a private office with DSN capable telephone within the FM facility for the inspectors.

A3.3.4.2. Provide a manning roster, to include phone numbers, building location, room numbers, and duty hours of personnel.

A3.3.4.3. Provide copies of all FM Operating Instructions and Policy Letters that pertain to checklisted items.

A3.3.5. For the Communications function:

A3.3.5.1. Provide a private office for the inspectors within the Communications facility.

A3.3.5.2. Provide the following items:

A3.3.5.2.1. Two DSN phones.

A3.3.5.2.2. Any local Operating Instructions/OIs and Policy Letters.

A3.3.5.2.3. Manning listing, to include duty title, phone number, building location, and post number.

A3.3.5.2.4. Network configuration maps/drawings to include server points/installation system block diagrams.

A3.3.5.2.5. Copy of base-wide network security policy.

A3.3.5.2.6. Copy of network security plan for base backbone.

A3.3.5.2.7. Copy of any MOUs, MOAs, SLAs outlining terms and conditions signed between NCC provider and recipient.

A3.3.5.2.8. CAMs Products to include open incident list, Master PMI Listing, Equipment Inventory Listing.

A3.3.5.2.9. Package including all requests, approvals, and other associated paperwork for foreign nationals with email and/or NIPRNET access.

A3.3.6. For the Civil Engineer Function:

A3.3.6.1. Provide a private office for the inspectors in the Civil Engineer facility including the following items:

A3.3.6.1.1. Telephone with DSN connection.

A3.3.6.1.2. Civil Engineer organizational chart and point of contact telephone numbers.

A3.3.6.1.3. Copies of the CE Contingency Response Plan and Disaster Preparedness Operation Plans.

A3.3.6.1.4. Copies of the facility board and space utilization minutes for the past two years.

A3.3.6.1.5. Copies of pre-fire/incident plans.

A3.3.6.1.6. Copy of fire management plans/standard operating guides.

A3.3.6.1.7. Fire protection manning and organizational charts.

A3.3.6.1.8. Copies of mutual-aide agreements and memorandums of understanding/agreement.

A3.3.7. For Product Support/Program Office Function:

A3.3.7.1. Provide a private workspace with a DSN capable telephone. The workspace should be within close proximity of the inspected office and be able to accommodate 4-6 inspectors.

A3.3.7.2. A more centrally located workspace, within proximity of multiple product support functions, may also be provided in lieu of several individual workspaces. It should be of adequate size to accommodate 8-12 inspectors.

A3.3.8. For the Intelligence function:

A3.3.8.1. Provide a private office for the inspectors within the Intelligence facility.

A3.3.8.2. Provide the following items within the office:

A3.3.8.2.1. Intelligence Oversight training plan and training records.

A3.3.8.2.2. A list of intelligence partners at the SPOs.

A3.3.8.2.3. Intelligence requirements or analysis reports for programs currently supported.

A3.3.8.2.4. AT/FP training plan and training records.

A3.3.8.2.5. Threat Working Group (TWG) Charter.

Attachment 4**NSI SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS****A4.1. General:**

A4.1.1. Provide the support outlined in this attachment for NSIs, in addition to the items listed in **Attachment 1**. Coordinate with the IG trip planner on any changes in requirements or limitations in the organization's ability to provide the requested support.

A4.2. Items to be Provided to the IG 45 Days in Advance:

A4.2.1. List of nuclear-related LIMFACs, simulations, deviations, and technical operation scenarios (including Use Control operations, Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations, and logistics movement) for both the base and Munitions Squadron (MUNS).

A4.2.2. Organization charts and office symbols for the base, down to the squadron level.

A4.2.3. The number of officers, enlisted, and civilians assigned to the base and MUNS.

A4.2.4. Base and MUNS key personnel information including the following: biographical information, full name, rank, position, and date assigned to the position, DSN and commercial phone numbers, and e-mail addresses. As a minimum, include information on the Security Force Commander, MUNS Commander, and the MUNS Depot Manager.

A4.2.5. A list of major commitments six months before and after the scheduled NSI. Include only those events that may have a major impact on the NSI (e.g. major exercises, significant deployments).

A4.2.6. Information regarding any on-going test programs or special projects potentially impacting the NSI.

A4.2.7. List of all Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) certifying officials.

A4.3. Support Required During the Inspection:

A4.3.1. Provide detailed weapon stockpile information to the maintenance inspectors upon IG team arrival. The stockpile information will list quantities by weapon type, modification number, charge code, and location. The IG will use this information to determine the stockpile sample size.

A4.3.2. Provide the following items in the IG workcenter. If not practical to locate in the workcenter, identify an office and phone number where publications are immediately available.

A4.3.2.1. Nuclear and Munitions related local regulations and operating instructions.

A4.3.2.2. PNAF and Logistic Movement support plans.

A4.3.2.3. DoD 5210.41M, (C) Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (U).

A4.3.2.4. Technical Order 00-110N-16, Equipment Authorized for Use with Nuclear Weapons.

A4.3.2.5. Technical Order 11N-25-1, Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System.

A4.3.2.6. HQ AFMC approved LIMFACs.

A4.3.2.7. Last Broken Arrow exercise report conducted by the base.

- A4.3.2.8. Summary of Nuclear Surety training provided all personnel in the last year.
- A4.3.2.9. Most recent nuclear surety-related Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) report.
- A4.3.2.10. Installation Security Plan.
- A4.3.2.11. Installation Vulnerability Survey.
- A4.3.2.12. Security Force Operating Plans and Instructions.
- A4.3.2.13. Blotters for the last 90 days. Highlight all Security Force supervisory post visits. Highlight all base, squadron, and flight level exercises.
- A4.3.2.14. All Permanent, Temporary and Technical security deviations.
- A4.3.2.15. Exchange badge issue roster.
- A4.3.2.16. Copies of interior and exterior sensor test procedures.
- A4.3.2.17. Copies of the sensor records for the past 60 days.
- A4.3.2.18. Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan.
- A4.3.2.19. Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Plan 10-2.
- A4.3.2.20. Summary of training for firefighters in MUNS area during the last 12 months (names, type training, number of hours).
- A4.3.2.21. Summary of fire prevention training provided MUNS personnel in the last year.
- A4.3.2.22. List of buildings belonging to MUNS as reflected in real-property records.
- A4.3.2.23. Host/Tenant Support agreements with summary of changes since last revision.
- A4.3.2.24. Status of construction of repair projects programmed, under design, or under construction for the MUNS.
- A4.3.2.25. Status and completion schedules for open civil engineer work orders and job orders for the MUNS.
- A4.3.2.26. Inspection and maintenance records from the last 18 months, for lighting protection systems, static grounds, hoists, mechanical doors, and other specialized facility support systems.
- A4.3.2.27. Contract and quality assurance documents for any contracted maintenance services for hoists, doors, and other facility support systems.
- A4.3.2.28. Copy of computer/network certification and accreditation packages.
- A4.3.2.29. Copy of C4 Restoral Plan.
- A4.3.2.30. Copy of network vulnerability scan reports for past 12 months and associated paperwork.
- A4.3.2.31. Provide the following records for all personnel on the Personnel Reliability Program: UPRG, PIF, Medical, Dental, Mental Health, Family Support Center, and records of civilian personnel filling PRP positions. Records will be made available in a single conference room.

Attachment 5**MSEP SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS**

A5.1. General. Inspected organizations will provide the support outlined on the MSEP website https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IG/New_MSEP/index.shtml. This support is needed to facilitate the compressed inspection schedule. Coordinate with the IG mission support planner on any changes in requirements or limitations in the organization's ability to provide the requested support.

Attachment 6

NSI CRITERIA

A6.1. Management and Administration (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.1).

A6.1.1. Command and Control:

A6.1.1.1. Leadership effectiveness, guidance, and attitude of commanders and key supervisors.

A6.1.1.2. OPREP-3 reporting process.

A6.1.1.3. Material Deficiency Reporting/Dull Sword reporting and tracking.

A6.1.1.4. Documentation management.

A6.1.2. Training and Quality Assurance:

A6.1.2.1. Adequacy and currency of unit-level lesson plans and ancillary training.

A6.1.2.2. Quality Assurance training, qualifications, and certifications.

A6.1.2.3. Effectiveness of Quality Assurance evaluations and evaluation requirements.

A6.1.2.4. Disaster Control Group training and qualifications.

A6.1.3. Safety: AFOSH Standards, OSHA, AF Safety Guidance, AFMAN 91-201, AFI 91-202, and 91-204, and Technical Orders may apply.

A6.1.4. Publications and Directives:

A6.1.4.1. Availability and currency of required guidance.

A6.1.4.2. 11N series Technical Order Distribution Office (TODO). A random List of Effective Pages (A Page) check will be conducted on at least 25 percent of assigned technical orders.

A6.1.4.3. AFTO Form 22 reporting and tracking.

A6.1.4.4. Control and handling of classified plans, manuals, records, reports and components.

A6.1.4.5. Elimination of waivers, exemptions, deviations, and exceptions.

A6.1.5. Local Plans, Guidance, and Instructions.

A6.1.5.1. Adequacy and currency.

A6.1.5.2. Weapon Movement.

A6.1.5.3. PNAF and SST Support.

A6.1.5.4. Disaster Preparedness, EOD, and Firefighting.

A6.1.5.5. Host-Tenant Agreements.

A6.1.6. Munitions Control.

A6.1.6.1. Plans and scheduling.

A6.1.6.2. Priority A key and lock control procedures.

A6.1.6.3. Maintenance management.

A6.1.6.4. Compliance with explosive siting and license requirements.

A6.1.6.5. Compliance with explosive and active material limits during storage, maintenance, and transportation.

A6.1.6.6. Elimination of explosive waivers and deviations.

A6.2. Technical Operations (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.2).

A6.2.1. Ground Rules:

A6.2.1.1. Inspectors will ask questions in such a manner as not to detract from the technical operation, and will not inject physical problems during an evaluation involving war reserve weapons.

A6.2.1.2. Inspectors may ask technicians to measure a defect to determine technicians' ability to properly determine defect size.

A6.2.1.3. Training weapons will be treated as war reserve when used in any evaluation. Any requested simulations must be approved in advance by the inspector.

A6.2.1.4. Although technical proficiency is the primary concern during these evaluations, individuals are not expected to exceed their normal responsibilities. If a situation is encountered requiring outside assistance (i.e., squadron and base supervisors, safety office, or higher headquarters staff), personnel are expected to seek this assistance.

A6.2.1.5. Actions to report nuclear systems deficiencies, seek assistance, etc., become an integral part of the technical evaluation. This does not relieve the evaluated team from the requirement to be capable of determining clear-cut accept and reject conditions.

A6.2.1.6. Evaluations will be limited to those operations on which personnel are required to maintain certification. All record actions and reporting normally associated with the operation will be evaluated.

A6.2.1.7. Quality Assurance personnel are subject to evaluation. To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they will normally be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility.

A6.2.1.8. Shop supervisors may also be required to demonstrate supervisory knowledge of the weapon system being evaluated.

A6.2.1.9. Observing one task may satisfy similar operations and weapons systems. See Technical Order 11N-25-1, Table 2-7 and HQ AFMC/LGMW Maintenance Capability Letter to determine specific tasks to be observed. HQ AFMC/IG will coordinate technical operation scenarios with the unit and HQ AFMC/LGMW prior to the inspection. The following types of operations will be evaluated:

A6.2.1.9.1. At least one major maintenance operation as tasked by HQ AFMC/LG-DRW Maintenance Capability Letter on each assigned weapon system. Typically a limited-life component exchange, disassembly, assembly, etc. Alterations may be evaluated in lieu of limited-life component exchange with prior approval from HQ AFMC/LG-DRW.

A6.2.1.9.2. At least one minor maintenance operation on each weapon system. Typically, receipt and verification inspection, preparation for shipment, preparation for storage, etc.

A6.2.1.9.3. Transfer operations will be evaluated for each weapon type. Typically, in or out-of-container or bolster, from or to out-of-container or alternate container, etc. Transfer operations may be conducted in conjunction with other technical operations.

A6.2.1.9.4. Evaluations will include requiring technicians and supervisors to demonstrate knowledge of the environmental requirements for managing waste generated from maintenance actions.

A6.2.2. Inspected Areas:

A6.2.2.1. Technician proficiency and technical performance.

A6.2.2.2. Training, qualifications, and certification records.

A6.2.2.3. Supervision and management.

A6.2.2.4. Effectiveness of Quality Assurance evaluator.

A6.2.2.5. Operation preparation.

A6.2.2.6. Technical order usage.

A6.2.2.7. Supply usage and availability.

A6.2.2.8. Hazardous-waste and mixed-waste disposal.

A6.2.2.9. Weapon-record entries and status-change reporting.

A6.2.2.10. Compliance with safety requirements for nuclear, explosive, ground, HAZMAT, intrinsic radiation, dosimetry, and related operations.

A6.3. Tools, Test, Tiedown, and Handling Equipment (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.3).

A6.3.1. Supervision and Management.

A6.3.2. Condition and serviceability.

A6.3.3. Inspections, calibrations, proof-loads, certifications, and documentation.

A6.3.4. Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE).

A6.3.5. Munitions-handling vehicles.

A6.4. Condition of Facilities (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.4).

A6.4.1. General: If continued use of unit-identified substandard facilities, utilities, or movement routes is necessitated because of operational considerations or budget constraints, the situation will be reported as a major deficiency or limiting factor for action by the appropriate major command headquarters.

A6.4.2. Construction Standards, Condition, and Maintenance.

A6.4.2.1. Storage structures and maintenance facilities.

A6.4.2.2. Munitions roads and hot cargo pads.

A6.4.2.3. Vegetation control.

A6.4.2.4. Emergency power systems (generators and Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)).

A6.4.2.5. Lightning protection systems.

A6.4.2.6. Static grounding system.

A6.4.2.7. Communications systems.

A6.4.2.8. Security systems (computer system for 898 MUNS).

A6.4.2.9. Fire-protection systems.

A6.4.2.10. Physical-security systems (fences, barriers, hasps, facilities, etc.).

A6.4.2.11. Utilities.

A6.4.3. Compliance with Facility Requirements.

A6.4.3.1. Munitions Control.

A6.4.3.2. Site Security Control Center.

A6.4.3.3. Command Post.

A6.4.3.4. Alert Fire Team facility.

A6.4.3.5. Entry Control Point.

A6.5. Storage Practices (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.4).

A6.5.1. General:

A6.5.1.1. This area will be only rated SATISFACTORY or UNSATISFACTORY.

A6.5.1.2. For active weapons, at least 25 percent of each weapon type will be given an in-depth inspection. For weapons with a retirement charge code, at least 10 percent of each weapon type will be given an in-depth inspection. Weapons not inspected in-depth are subject to a cursory safety inspection.

A6.5.1.3. Weapons will not be disassembled for the inspection; however, access panels and connector covers may be opened if allowed by technical data for routine inspection purposes.

A6.5.1.4. Units will be prepared to open all storage structures containing weapons.

A6.5.1.5. Units will provide each stockpile inspection team with a copy of the Location Inventory Listing (LIL) or similar listing. The listings will be used to verify location, part numbers, serial numbers, modification numbers, status, etc.

A6.5.2. Functions to Inspect:

A6.5.2.1. Supervision and Management.

A6.5.2.2. Condition of weapons.

A6.5.2.3. Condition, storage configuration, and saddlebag inventory of associated H-Gear and components.

A6.5.2.4. Maintenance and storage record accuracy, based on an inspection of at least 50 percent of Inspection Record Cards.

A6.5.2.5. Stockpile reporting.

A6.5.2.6. Facility housekeeping practices.

A6.6. Security Force Readiness (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.5).

A6.6.1. General:

A6.6.1.1. The overall rating for Security Force Readiness will be no higher than the rating received in Normal Security.

A6.6.1.2. MUNS personnel performing as security force personnel are subject to evaluation in this rated area.

A6.6.2. Normal Security:

A6.6.2.1. Supervision and Management.

A6.6.2.2. Identification of and compliance with Permanent, Temporary, and Technical Security.

A6.6.2.3. Elimination efforts will also be evaluated.

A6.6.2.4. Categories of deviations.

A6.6.2.5. Compensatory measures.

A6.6.2.6. Compilation of deviations.

A6.6.2.7. Intrusion Detection System documentation and management.

A6.6.2.8. Physical Security Systems.

A6.6.2.9. Physical security compliance.

A6.6.2.10. Approved deviations, and compensatory measures.

A6.6.2.11. Security systems (fences, barriers, hasps, facilities, etc.).

A6.6.2.12. Alarm systems.

A6.6.2.13. Security systems (computer system for 898 MUNS).

A6.6.2.14. Capability to prevent unauthorized access or procedures with the computer system (hacking) if warranted.

A6.6.2.15. Clear zones (including vegetation control and terrain features).

A6.6.2.16. Emergency power systems (generators and UPS).

A6.6.2.17. Manhole, gratings, and other non-priority key and lock control process.

A6.6.2.18. Security Forces communications systems.

A6.6.2.19. Military Working Dog employment, if applicable.

A6.6.2.20. Warning signs.

A6.6.2.21. Lighting checks.

A6.6.2.22. Entry Control Procedures and Systems.

A6.6.2.23. Automated Entry Control System (AECS).

A6.6.2.24. Controlled badge system (inventory, control, etc.).

- A6.6.2.25. Authorization lists.
 - A6.6.2.26. Exclusion and limited area authentication, entry, and exit procedures.
 - A6.6.2.27. Escort procedures.
 - A6.6.2.28. Duress systems.
 - A6.6.2.29. Pre-notification procedures.
 - A6.6.2.30. Package, material, and vehicle control.
 - A6.6.2.31. Two-Person rule application.
 - A6.6.2.32. Key and lock control and use.
 - A6.6.2.33. Security personnel performance.
 - A6.6.2.34. Knowledge of required actions.
 - A6.6.2.35. Effectiveness of performance.
 - A6.6.2.36. Condition of guard weapons, personal equipment, and communications.
 - A6.6.2.37. Competence of security personnel.
 - A6.6.2.38. Specialized training.
 - A6.6.2.39. Training.
 - A6.6.2.40. General.
 - A6.6.2.41. Security skills.
 - A6.6.2.42. Transportation security.
 - A6.6.2.43. Security supervisory personnel.
 - A6.6.2.44. Security Plans, Instructions, and Procedures.
 - A6.6.2.45. Physical security plan and instructions.
 - A6.6.2.46. Guard orders.
 - A6.6.2.47. Standing operating procedures and implementing instructions.
- A6.6.3. Advanced Readiness:
- A6.6.3.1. FPCON actions.
 - A6.6.3.2. Motor-vehicle convoy security.
 - A6.6.3.3. Concealment areas/convoy route.
 - A6.6.3.4. Condition of guard weapons, personal equipment, and communications.
 - A6.6.3.5. Guard orders and knowledge.
 - A6.6.3.6. Security force positioning.
 - A6.6.3.7. Temporary area entry-control procedures.
 - A6.6.3.8. Vehicle condition, quantity, communications, spacing, safety, and security considerations.

A6.6.3.9. Two-Person rule application.

A6.6.3.10. Convoy Briefing.

A6.6.4. Emergencies:

A6.6.4.1. Response Force.

A6.6.4.2. Backup Force.

A6.6.4.3. Augmentation Force.

A6.6.4.4. Reaction Times.

A6.6.5. Communications.

A6.6.5.1. Television Intrusion Detection Systems (TIDS) Maintenance.

A6.6.5.2. Supervision and management.

A6.6.5.3. Advanced Entry Control Integrated Intrusion Detection System/Advanced Entry Control System (AECS) performance (KUMMSC only).

A6.6.5.4. Documentation and management.

A6.6.5.5. Pre-planned product improvement and replacement program (MAJCOM/OPR).

A6.6.5.6. Sensors/alarms performance.

A6.6.5.7. Transmission-line security.

A6.6.5.8. Tamper-switch performance.

A6.6.5.9. Adversarial performance.

A6.6.5.10. Physical protection of cabling.

A6.6.5.11. Physical protection of terminal/junction boxes.

A6.6.5.12. Emergency-power systems (battery, generators, and UPS).

A6.6.5.13. Standard Maintenance Practices.

A6.6.5.14. Systems Configuration Management.

A6.6.5.15. Programs Management Review.

A6.6.5.16. INTRUSION Detection System (IDS) Environmental Requirements.

A6.6.5.17. Communications Systems.

A6.6.5.18. Security for radio data links.

A6.6.5.19. System Sharing.

A6.6.5.20. Radio Frequencies (RFs).

A6.6.5.21. RF-link compatibility.

A6.6.5.22. Information Assurance.

A6.7. Safety (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.6).

A6.7.1. General.

A6.7.1.1. Check compliance with Air Force and major command directives. Adherence to nuclear surety standards by assigned personnel shall be evaluated as a part of all operations involving maintenance, storage, handling, and security of nuclear weapons.

A6.7.1.2. Procedural deficiencies shall be charged against the specific inspected area where the violation was observed.

A6.7.2. Functions to Inspect.

A6.7.2.1. Supervision and management.

A6.7.2.2. Nuclear Surety Program Manager Qualifications.

A6.7.2.3. Spot and periodic inspections.

A6.7.2.4. Nuclear surety training programs.

A6.7.2.5. Intrinsic radiation program.

A6.7.2.6. Fire Safety and Prevention programs.

A6.7.2.7. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Program.

A6.7.2.8. Dosimetry Program.

A6.7.2.9. Nuclear certification status of vehicle fleet.

A6.8. Supply Support (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.7).

A6.8.1. Supervision and management.

A6.8.2. Accountability.

A6.8.3. Stock Control.

A6.8.4. Document Control.

A6.8.5. Status reporting.

A6.8.6. Stockpile Emergency Verification procedures.

A6.9. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.8).

A6.9.1. General:

A6.9.1.1. Focus is on the spirit and intent of the program, as well as the documentation. This inspection shall consist of reviewing pertinent records and questioning personnel to assure unit compliance with applicable DoD directives as implemented by Air Force and command directives.

A6.9.1.2. Evaluate 100 percent of all critical PRP records and 35-50 percent of records of personnel filling controlled PRP positions. The Team Chief, based on number and nature of discrepancies found, may elect to evaluate additional PRP related records.

A6.9.2. Functions to Inspect:

A6.9.2.1. Effectiveness of procedures to screen, certify, notify, suspend, and decertify at:

- A6.9.2.1.1. Medical facility.
- A6.9.2.1.2. Mission Support Squadron/Military Personnel Flight.
- A6.9.2.1.3. Civilian Personnel Office (for civilians under the PRP).
- A6.9.2.1.4. Security Forces.
- A6.9.2.1.5. Munitions Squadron.
- A6.9.2.1.6. Civil Engineering.
- A6.9.2.1.7. Office of Special Investigations.
- A6.9.2.1.8. Military Equal Opportunity.
- A6.9.2.1.9. Documentation.
- A6.9.2.1.10. Medical, Dental, and Life Skills records.
- A6.9.2.1.11. Personnel records.
- A6.9.2.1.12. Military Equal Opportunity and Family Advocacy records.
- A6.9.2.1.13. Investigative and security clearance documentation.
- A6.9.2.1.14. Personal Information File (PIF).

A6.9.2.2. Knowledge and awareness of:

- A6.9.2.2.1. Unit commanders.
- A6.9.2.2.2. Certifying officials.
- A6.9.2.2.3. Unit PRP monitors.
- A6.9.2.2.4. Individuals affected by the program.
- A6.9.2.2.5. Medical/Dental and Life skills providers.

A6.10. Logistics Movement (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.9).

A6.10.1. General. This evaluation includes all preparations associated with the breakout and convoy of nuclear resources as well as the receipt of these resources at the intended destination. At least one convoy between the Weapon Storage Area (WSA) and the flight line will be evaluated.

A6.10.2. Functions to Inspect:

- A6.10.2.1. Supervision and management.
- A6.10.2.2. Weapon Breakout/Storage procedures.
- A6.10.2.3. Weapon handling and tie-down.
- A6.10.2.4. Vehicles and Equipment.
- A6.10.2.5. Effectiveness of local procedures.
- A6.10.2.6. Safety.

A6.10.3. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Support.

A6.10.4. General. If actual or training PNAF mission is not available for evaluation, an exercise PNAF mission will be evaluated. For any type of PNAF mission, applicable support and security plans, procedures, and operating instructions will be evaluated.

A6.10.5. Functions to Inspect.

A6.10.5.1. Supervision and management.

A6.10.5.2. Logistics movement and convoy.

A6.10.5.3. Security support.

A6.10.5.4. Custody and accountability.

A6.10.5.5. Local procedures.

A6.11. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) (AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5.2.10, AFI 32-3001, AFMC Sup 1, Command Checklist).

A6.11.1. General:

A6.11.1.1. For each tasked weapon system, evaluate the following technical operations: render safe procedures (RSP), continuation of RSP, and component recovery.

A6.11.1.2. At the discretion of the inspector, evaluation of continuation of RSP and component recovery on similar systems may be used to satisfy the requirement for both systems.

A6.11.2. Functions to Inspect:

A6.11.2.1. Supervision and management.

A6.11.2.2. Technical operations.

A6.11.2.2.1. Safety. Evaluate procedures and methods of operation to validate adherence to prescribed safety precautions and warnings for nuclear weapon system and their associated hazards. A critical deficiency in safety could result in an unsafe or unreliable weapon, loss of life, or serious injury.

A6.11.2.2.2. Assessment. Evaluate procedures and methods of operation to conduct a reconnaissance, assess extent of damage, determine weapon condition, and report.

A6.11.2.2.3. Render Safe Procedures. Evaluate procedures and methods of operation to determine if personnel can perform nuclear weapons render safe procedures.

A6.11.2.2.4. Continuation Procedures. Evaluate procedures and methods of operation to determine if personnel can perform continuation procedures.

A6.11.2.2.5. Technical Competency. Unit must demonstrate the ability to perform the following:

A6.11.2.2.5.1. Properly identify and research system encountered.

A6.11.2.2.5.2. Understand the fusing and firing systems, hazardous and classified components for system encountered.

A6.11.2.2.5.3. Understand and safely perform procedures outlined in 60-series technical orders.

A6.11.2.2.5.4. Properly calculate hazard distances for environment present.

A6.11.2.2.5.5. Implement correct procedures from technical order.

A6.11.2.3. Technical orders and publications.

A6.11.2.4. Tools, equipment, and supplies.

A6.11.2.5. Training, qualifications, and certifications.

A6.11.2.6. Response and component recovery procedures.

A6.11.2.7. EOD participation in recapture /recovery exercise will figure into the overall EOD rating.

A6.11.2.7.1. Evaluate unit support to the disaster response force commander, i.e., safe withdrawal distance, EOD capabilities, protective measures and weapon vulnerabilities, and if initiated, EOD actions tasked in the Installation Security Plan (ISP).

A6.11.2.7.2. Evaluate unit performance of weapon assessment, clearance of improvised devices, and post recovery actions.

A6.12. Use Control:

A6.12.1. General: Observe one Permissive Action Link All Codes Re-code operation, one Command Disablement System Re-code operation, and one Active Protection System (if applicable).

A6.12.2. Functions to Inspect:

A6.12.2.1. Supervision and management.

A6.12.2.2. Technical operations.

A6.12.2.3. Tools and equipment.

A6.12.2.4. Reliability and proficiency.

A6.12.2.5. Handling and storage of classified material and equipment.

A6.12.2.6. Compliance with Verifiable Control Procedures.

A6.12.2.7. Facility-housekeeping practices.

A6.13. Fire Response Exercise.

A6.13.1. Fire Department actions.

A6.13.2. Medical personnel actions.

A6.13.3. Emergency entry procedures.

A6.13.4. Fire-fighting tactics.

A6.13.5. Evacuation procedures.

A6.14. Broken Arrow Exercise.

A6.14.1. Initial base-response actions.

A6.14.2. Contamination control and monitoring procedures.

A6.14.3. OPREP-3 reporting procedures.

A6.14.4. Service Response Force notification procedures.

A6.14.5. Service Response Force transition briefing.

Attachment 7

ORI CRITERIA

A7.1. Major Area - Wartime Materiel Support:

A7.1.1. During Wartime Materiel Support (WMS) inspections, the IG presents materiel support organizations with wartime scenarios that call for an acquisition acceleration, test acceleration, science and technology acceleration, or depot operations acceleration, depending upon the organization being inspected. The organization's response to the WMS scenario is evaluated. In addition, center- and wing-level command and control of the WMS scenarios are evaluated. Scenarios are selected and developed with help from local trusted agents who have insight into center programs. A goal is to develop scenarios with real-world value.

A7.1.1.1. To begin a WMS scenario, tasked units receive information pertaining to the specific scenarios through simulated message traffic. Once tasking is received, the unit determines any security, safety, or other concerns and organizes response teams to address the specific issues identified.

A7.1.1.2. The IG will not direct a specific course of action and cannot mandate the obligation of program funds. Units follow whatever process is deemed best to accomplish the mission (may include government or contract agencies inside or outside the unit). IG team members do not necessarily observe all unit activities, but will observe critical decision points in the process. Units must keep IG team members informed of all WMS activities.

A7.1.1.3. If possible, outside agencies will be included in the scenarios. However, communication with off-base agencies may be simulated. In these situations, the IG will receive "transmission" and provide "responses" (e.g. details from the user, field, HQs, etc.). Planning and execution will often continue up to the point of obligation of funds.

A7.1.2. Sub-Area - Acquisition Acceleration: The intent of the Acquisition Acceleration scenario is to exercise the ability of Product Centers, System Program Offices (SPOs), or a combination of SPOs to rapidly field a critical capability, correct a deficiency, accelerate delivery, or improve performance of a given product. Acquisition Acceleration involves two possible scenario types: Accelerated Acquisition and Acquisition Surge. An Accelerated Acquisition is a new program in response to specific wartime requirements. An Acquisition Surge is the acceleration of an on-going program to meet wartime requirements. Both types of Acquisition Acceleration use the same grading criteria (**Paragraph A7.1.5**).

A7.1.3. Sub-Area - Test Acceleration: Test Acceleration evaluates the ability of a test organization to accelerate the verification and validation of a given product or capability. Test Acceleration involves two possible scenario types: Accelerated Test and Test Surge. An Accelerated Test is a new test program in response to wartime requirements. A Test Surge is the acceleration of an existing test program to meet wartime requirements. Both types of taskings use the grading criteria presented in Paragraph **A7.1.5**.

A7.1.4. Sub-Area - Science and Technology Acceleration: Science and Technology Acceleration scenarios exercise the ability of the Air Force Research Laboratory to provide short-notice technology support to field a critical capability, correct a deficiency, accelerate delivery, or improve performance of a given product or technology. Technology Acceleration involves two possible scenario types:

Accelerated Technology Insertion and Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD) Surge. Accelerated Technology Insertion is the insertion of new or existing technology into a new application in response to wartime requirements. An ATD Surge is the acceleration of an existing program to meet wartime requirements. Both types of Technology Acceleration use the grading criteria presented in Paragraph [A7.1.5](#).

A7.1.5. Sub-Area - Grading Criteria for Acquisition, Test, and Science and Technology Accelerations. (**Note:** Criteria for the evaluation of center-level command and control (C2) of WMS exercises are listed in **Paragraph A7.3.1.4**. Center-level C2 for WMS is normally rated under the major graded area of Initial Response.

A7.1.5.1. Item - Notification.

A7.1.5.1.1. Dissemination of tasking message.

A7.1.5.1.1.1. Executed established and tested recall process.

A7.1.5.1.1.2. Notified appropriate people.

A7.1.5.1.2. Initial response.

A7.1.5.1.2.1. Showed appropriate urgency and "effectiveness under fire".

A7.1.5.1.2.2. Followed established procedures (i.e., convened tasking meeting).

A7.1.5.1.2.3. Demonstrated effective communications.

A7.1.5.1.3. Security issues (when applicable).

A7.1.5.1.3.1. Used secure communications.

A7.1.5.1.3.2. Used secure conference room for notification meeting.

A7.1.5.1.3.3. Verified clearances.

A7.1.5.1.3.4. Delivered clear threat/situation brief to all key players.

A7.1.5.2. Item - Planning.

A7.1.5.2.1. Efficient and effective teams and resource allocation.

A7.1.5.2.1.1. Considered available sources of expertise.

A7.1.5.2.1.2. Assigned project officers as appropriate.

A7.1.5.2.1.3. Identified fiscal, time, and personnel constraints.

A7.1.5.2.1.4. Identified alternatives; discussed risks; examined possibility for new effort.

A7.1.5.2.1.5. Discussed re-allocation trade-offs.

A7.1.5.2.1.6. Set timelines.

A7.1.5.2.2. Focused on objective.

A7.1.5.2.2.1. Defined problem.

A7.1.5.2.2.2. Analyzed/questioned user expectations and requirements.

A7.1.5.2.2.3. Assess intelligence needs.

A7.1.5.2.3. Properly established priorities and outside support.

A7.1.5.2.3.1. Identified all organizations that should/could support tasking.

A7.1.5.2.3.2. Implemented appropriate division of labor.

A7.1.5.2.4. Plan development.

A7.1.5.2.4.1. Determine intelligence deficiencies and enter into the WSISRD per AFI 14-111.

A7.1.5.2.4.2. Developed appropriate level of detail.

A7.1.5.2.4.3. Defined final product.

A7.1.5.2.4.4. Established go/no go criteria.

A7.1.5.2.5. Other factors.

A7.1.5.2.5.1. Addressed safety and security issues.

A7.1.5.2.5.2. Struck balance between quality and expediency.

A7.1.5.2.5.3. Established adequate and appropriate review process.

A7.1.5.2.5.4. Examined lessons learned.

A7.1.5.3. Item - Execution.

A7.1.5.3.1. Management effectiveness.

A7.1.5.3.1.1. Held status meetings with appropriate attendance.

A7.1.5.3.1.2. Ensured requirements, expectations, and products remained clear.

A7.1.5.3.1.3. Achieved consensus on responses/recommendations.

A7.1.5.3.1.4. Followed planned limits (e.g. time, resources, etc.).

A7.1.5.3.2. Information management.

A7.1.5.3.2.1. Maintained information flow with appropriate organizations.

A7.1.5.3.2.2. Disseminated new information.

A7.1.5.3.2.3. Maintained quality of input/output data.

A7.1.5.3.3. Adherence to plan.

A7.1.5.3.3.1. Followed go/no-go criteria.

A7.1.5.3.3.2. Followed success/exit criteria.

A7.1.5.3.3.3. Coordinated changes.

A7.1.5.3.4. Response to results.

A7.1.5.3.4.1. Discussed trade-offs.

A7.1.5.3.4.2. Defined and evaluated alternatives.

A7.1.5.3.4.3. Examined cost/benefit trades.

A7.1.5.3.4.4. Assessed objective accomplishment and efficiency.

A7.1.5.3.5. Operational requirements translated into developmental action.

A7.1.5.3.5.1. Followed planned execution.

A7.1.5.3.5.2. Optimized as appropriate.

A7.1.5.3.6. Effective and efficient solution.

A7.1.5.3.6.1. Met task objectives without unreasonable cost, schedule, or performance impacts.

A7.1.5.3.6.2. Produced quality products in a timely manner.

A7.1.5.3.7. Other Factors.

A7.1.5.3.7.1. Conducted safety review.

A7.1.5.3.7.2. Collected and analyzed lessons learned.

A7.1.5.4. Item - Reporting.

A7.1.5.4.1. Reporting of results.

A7.1.5.4.1.1. Presented clear picture of accomplished work.

A7.1.5.4.1.2. Reported and/or briefed appropriate level of detail.

A7.1.5.4.1.3. Developed appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

A7.1.5.4.2. Timely feedback to customers.

A7.1.5.4.2.1. Provided continuous updates and final brief to customers.

A7.1.5.4.2.2. Used customer feedback to enhance on-going efforts.

A7.1.5.4.3. Quality/adequacy of final results/products.

A7.1.5.4.3.1. Presented detailed, workable final results.

A7.1.5.4.3.2. Produced quality reports and documentation.

A7.1.5.4.4. Other factors.

A7.1.5.4.4.1. Demonstrated rapid recovery and readiness for additional tasking.

A7.1.5.4.4.2. Paid attention to reporting security issues.

A7.1.6. Sub-Area - Depot Operations Acceleration. Depot Operations Accelerations assess a depot's capability to ensure rapid and agile logistics support for combat commanders. The IG, working in conjunction with center trusted agents, will develop scenarios to test the items listed below. These scenarios will primarily involve tabletop solutions (e.g. exercise messages, briefings, exercise contracting documents) to the problems posed. The IG will not task any real-world production or delivery specifically in support of the ORI. The IG may observe and evaluate real-world activities as the opportunities arise.

A7.1.6.1. Item - Aircraft Acceleration/Compression.

A7.1.6.1.1. Control, direct, and re-assess required organization resources.

A7.1.6.1.2. Establish depot aircraft production levels.

- A7.1.6.1.3. Execute actions required to initiate and sustain required contingency depot aircraft production.
 - A7.1.6.1.4. Assess requirements and adjustments to organic and contractual actions.
 - A7.1.6.1.5. Resolve aircraft compression/acceleration limiting factors.
 - A7.1.6.1.6. Effective use of HQ AFMC-approved automated data systems for contingency production requirements (such as the Aircraft and Missile Maintenance Production Compression Report).
 - A7.1.6.1.7. Effective regeneration or use of aircraft or aircraft parts in permanent storage.
 - A7.1.6.1.8. Other activities to assist in transition from peacetime to wartime production.
- A7.1.6.2. Item - Exchangeable.
- A7.1.6.2.1. Effective control, direction, and reassessment of required center resources to meet selected contingencies/wartime requirements.
 - A7.1.6.2.2. Assess the repair determination process for all required items (including supporting documentation).
 - A7.1.6.2.3. Resolving limiting factors.
 - A7.1.6.2.4. Demonstrate ability to integrate DREP/EXPRESS and non-DREP/EXPRESS workloads.
 - A7.1.6.2.5. Demonstrate ability to manage asset allocation between DREP/EXPRESS and non-DREP/EXPRESS requirements.
 - A7.1.6.2.6. Accurate and timely status reporting of wartime production.
 - A7.1.6.2.7. Execute required action to provide sustained support to the combat theaters.
- A7.1.6.3. Item - Contracting Support.
- A7.1.6.3.1. Adequacy of contractual provisions for accelerated delivery and/or increased production of materiel and aircraft.
 - A7.1.6.3.2. Proper response to product directorates' requests for support.
 - A7.1.6.3.3. Development and maintenance of data on potential repair sources and associated capabilities which would ensure timely contracting actions.
 - A7.1.6.3.4. Procedures to realign workforce as required to support accelerated delivery or production schedules.
 - A7.1.6.3.5. Resolving Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) limiting factors.
- A7.1.6.4. Item: Communications.
- A7.1.6.4.1. Adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness when disseminating the organization's contingency production information through command and control networks.
 - A7.1.6.4.2. Effective and timely coordination between OPRs on overarching issues which impact more than one weapon system or subsystem.

A7.1.6.4.3. Report status of production, initial organic limiting factors and contractor limiting factors to the readiness center.

A7.1.6.4.4. Ensure compliance with statutory and regulatory restrictions through appropriate dialog with program offices.

A7.1.6.4.5. Prepare reports for SOS centers on repair program status, limiting factors, and get-well dates as applicable.

A7.1.6.4.6. Prepare reports on cost reimbursements required to meet increased production.

A7.1.6.5. Item - Acquisition Acceleration at ALCs: At ALCs where SPO or SPO functions are located, acquisition acceleration may be tested in accordance with Paragraph [A7.1.5](#) criteria.

A7.2. Major Area - Force Protection.

A7.2.1. Sub-Area: Installation Security Program. Evaluate the ability of base organizations to provide and support day-to-day and increased security for the installation and its resources. The focus is integration of all base organizations to protect installation resources. Specific Security Forces activities are rated separately.

A7.2.1.1. Item: Planning/Implementing Security Operations.

A7.2.1.1.1. Review installation security plans, implementing instructions and checklists for currency, completeness and thoroughness (specifically integration of all base functions).

A7.2.1.1.2. Observe and test the ability of the base to execute security plans as written and evaluate the effectiveness of the plans.

A7.2.1.1.3. Evaluate the availability and suitability of resources (equipment, personnel, materials) used in executing installation security plans.

A7.2.1.1.4. Assess the level of awareness of base personnel during increased Force Protection Conditions and their knowledge of required actions.

A7.2.1.1.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of installation traffic and barrier plans for increased Force Protection Conditions.

A7.2.1.2. Item: Intelligence Support.

A7.2.1.2.1. Evaluate the support given to the installation commander and senior base leadership from the base intelligence unit and the local AFOSI detachment.

A7.2.1.2.2. Evaluate the effectiveness of the collection and analysis of threat information.

A7.2.1.2.3. Evaluate the measures selected for implementation as a result of the intelligence analysis.

A7.2.1.3. Item: Critical Installation Facilities/Utilities. Assess the condition of critical base facilities for compliance with AT/FP structural requirements.

A7.2.1.4. Item: Intrusion Detection Systems. Assess the condition, use, support and overall effectiveness of IDS with emphasis on restricted areas. Include all base organizations that are involved with IDS.

A7.2.1.5. Item: Operations Security (OPSEC).

- A7.2.1.5.1. OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the ORI.
 - A7.2.1.5.2. Identification and dissemination of the Installation Critical Information List (CIL) to base populace.
 - A7.2.1.5.3. Use of open line and secure line procedures (telephone, cellular, fax).
 - A7.2.1.5.4. Use of radios, pagers, etc. in sensitive areas.
 - A7.2.1.5.5. OPSEC vulnerabilities identified and countermeasures pursued.
 - A7.2.1.5.6. OPSEC vulnerabilities associated with Automated Information Systems (AIS) to include internet/LAN handling of CI.
- A7.2.2. Sub-Area: Security Forces, Supporting Forces and Equipment.
- A7.2.2.1. Item: Security Forces.
 - A7.2.2.1.1. Assess the knowledge and proficiency of security force personnel with emphasis on Rules of Engagement, use of deadly force and weapons.
 - A7.2.2.1.2. Include READY and other personnel who perform armed SF duties in this evaluation.
 - A7.2.2.1.3. Knowledge of restricted area deficiencies and compensatory measures for priority resource areas.
 - A7.2.2.1.4. Knowledge of the Personnel Reliability Program and DoD Nuclear Security Safety Standards for nuclear capable units.
 - A7.2.2.1.5. Effectiveness of proficiency and upgrade training programs.
 - A7.2.2.1.6. Proficiency of SF supervisors in assigned positions to include knowledge of training programs.
 - A7.2.2.1.7. Awareness training to base population.
 - A7.2.2.1.8. Security post management to include location/areas of responsibility, use of personnel to sustain posting requirements, and use of posting priority.
 - A7.2.2.2. Item: Support Forces.
 - A7.2.2.2.1. Evaluate support forces as defined in AFI 31-101 chapter 10, paragraph 10.3 Detecting and reporting suspicious activities/security incidents.
 - A7.2.2.2.2. Protecting classified. Material and operations that could result in disclosure of classified information, whether of real intelligence value or relating to the ORI scenario, must be appropriately protected.
 - A7.2.2.2.3. Enforce owner/user controls in restricted and controlled areas.
 - A7.2.2.3. Item: Security Forces Equipment. Assess the availability, condition and use of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment and physical security aids (search mirrors, metal detectors, etc.).
- A7.2.3. Sub-Area - Resource Security. Assess the ability of security forces to protect base resources (both PL and non-PL resources). This includes the resources of associate organizations (tenants) where organic security forces are not available.

A7.2.3.1. Item: Command and Control.

A7.2.3.1.1. Assess the ability of SF control centers to provide command and control of posted security forces.

A7.2.3.1.2. Check currency, accuracy and use of maps, charts, status boards and checklists. Assess the knowledge and ability of supervisors/On-scene commanders.

A7.2.3.2. Item: Detect and Report. Evaluate SF capability to quickly identify and report threats.

A7.2.3.3. Item: Armed Response/Neutralize Threats. Assess SF capability to delay and destroy threats.

A7.2.3.3.1. Prioritization and handling of multiple event responses.

A7.2.3.3.2. Timeliness & effectiveness of response to include tactics.

A7.2.3.3.3. Adequacy of the numbers of forces dispatched.

A7.2.3.3.4. Proficiency of responding forces.

A7.2.3.4. Item: Capability of security forces to establish temporary restricted areas.

A7.2.4. Sub-Area - Contingency Response Exercises.

A7.2.4.1. Item - Force Protection Exercises. Test the installation and security forces' ability to defend against and recover from hostile actions and other contingencies that occur on the home station, and continue necessary operations under increased force protection conditions.

A7.2.4.1.1. Contingency planning for incidents.

A7.2.4.1.2. Notification and coordination with installation and outside agencies (local, state, federal).

A7.2.4.1.3. Installation and security forces command and control.

A7.2.4.1.4. Response actions to counter and contain threats to the installation.

A7.2.4.1.5. Follow-on recovery, sustainment operations, and base level support.

A7.2.4.2. Item - Fire Protection Exercises. The ability of firefighters to combat fires and rescue personnel will be evaluated using the guidance in this instruction and the accepted standards contained in the National Fire Codes and the International Fire Service Training Association's manuals. The following exercises may be included. Aircrew Extraction Exercises, Live Training Fire Exercises, Structural Fire Exercises, and Confined Space Rescue Exercises. Areas evaluated in all fire protection exercises are listed below.

A7.2.4.2.1. Dispatch.

A7.2.4.2.2. Safety/Safety Officer.

A7.2.4.2.3. Accountability System.

A7.2.4.2.4. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

A7.2.4.2.5. Command and control.

A7.2.4.2.6. Fire fighting techniques.

A7.2.4.2.7. Rescue.

A7.2.4.2.8. Sense of urgency.

A7.2.4.2.9. Driver/operator procedures.

A7.2.4.2.10. Water supply and re-supply.

A7.2.4.2.11. Ventilation.

A7.2.4.2.12. Salvage and overhaul.

A7.2.4.3. Sub-Item - Aircrew Extraction Exercises.

A7.2.4.3.1. Aircraft entry and engine shutdown procedures.

A7.2.4.3.2. Positioning of fire vehicles and turrets.

A7.2.4.3.3. Compliance with technical orders and pre-fire plans.

A7.2.4.3.4. Knowledge of air crew restraining equipment.

A7.2.4.3.5. For fighter aircraft, timing beginning when the first rescue member touches the aircraft and starts the climb to the cockpit, and ending when the last aircrew member is lifted to the canopy rails. Satisfactory extraction times will be IAW AFMC Fire Protection Guidelines.

A7.2.4.3.6. For medium and large frame aircraft, take an uncharged hose line to the farthest point from the aircraft entry door into the aircraft/cargo area. Demonstrate re-supply and sustained operation.

A7.2.4.4. Sub-Item - Live Fire Exercises.

A7.2.4.4.1. Pre-exercise briefing on the type of aircraft, situation, dissemination of alarm, vehicle response, simulated rescue, proper Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) application techniques from vehicle turrets and hand lines, on-scene re-supply of water and AFFF, overhaul, wind direction, fuel spillage, emergency withdrawal signals, and use of protective clothing and safety procedures.

A7.2.4.4.2. Demonstrated knowledge of vehicle crews in application of AFFF, vehicle positioning, and rescue crew actions.

A7.2.4.4.3. Safety in the training area.

A7.2.4.4.4. National Fire Protection Association Standard 1403, Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions as applicable.

A7.2.4.4.5. Compliance with OSHA Two-In-Two-Out Rule and use of Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC).

A7.2.4.5. Sub-Item - Structural Fire Exercises.

A7.2.4.5.1. Pre/Post-Fire Plans.

A7.2.4.5.2. Assessment of the situation, proper strategy and tactics for the situation.

A7.2.4.5.3. Response route and positioning of fire apparatus and equipment.

A7.2.4.5.4. Wear and use of Personal Protective Equipment.

A7.2.4.5.5. Demonstration of fire fighting, rescue, and property conservation.

A7.2.4.5.6. Demonstration of tool and equipment operation.

A7.2.4.5.7. Compliance with OSHA Two-In-Two-Out Rule and use of RIC.

A7.2.4.5.8. Demonstration of ability to secure utilities, if applicable.

A7.2.4.5.9. Demonstration of first-aid capabilities, if applicable.

A7.2.4.6. Sub-Item - Confined Spaces Rescue Exercises.

A7.2.4.6.1. Pre-entry procedures.

A7.2.4.6.2. Entry procedures.

A7.2.4.6.2.1. Assessment of the site, deployed site management, and incident command.

A7.2.4.6.2.2. Wear and use of Personal Protective Equipment.

A7.2.4.6.2.3. Air monitoring, knowledge, care, and use of equipment.

A7.2.4.6.2.4. Demonstrated use of confined space rescue equipment.

A7.2.4.6.2.5. Safety procedures.

A7.2.4.6.3. Strategies and tactics.

A7.2.4.7. Item - Full Spectrum Threat Response Exercises (FSTRs). The IG may test an organization's ability to respond to one or more contingencies that occur on or near the installation. Complex scenarios will involve full spectrum threat response as governed by AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations*. Simpler exercises that task only a single functional area will be evaluated under the section appropriate for that area.

A7.2.4.7.1. Sub-Item - Command and Control.

A7.2.4.7.1.1. Installation/Unit FSTR Planning, Resources, and Training.

A7.2.4.7.1.2. FSTR Reporting.

A7.2.4.7.1.3. Response process monitoring, control, and flexibility.

A7.2.4.7.1.4. Coordination, problem solving, and time management.

A7.2.4.7.1.5. Visibility over the status of personnel, resources, and actions.

A7.2.4.7.1.6. Coordination with other installations or non-DoD agencies.

A7.2.4.7.1.7. Effectiveness, completeness, flexibility and implementation of local plans and higher headquarters guidance for threat response, strategic mission support, and critical CONUS-sustaining missions.

A7.2.4.7.2. Sub-Item - Effectiveness of Response.

A7.2.4.7.2.1. Notification and mobilization procedures.

A7.2.4.7.2.2. Immediate response actions.

A7.2.4.7.2.3. Follow-on recovery or support.

A7.2.4.8. Item - SAFEHAVEN BROKEN ARROW Exercise. The IG may test the installation's ability to receive notification, and support a request for SAFEHAVEN from the Department of Energy or an emergency diversion of a Prime Nuclear Airlift Support aircraft where applicable. In

addition, tests the installation's ability to respond to a special weapons contingency operation as required.

A7.2.4.8.1. Sub-Item - Command and Control.

A7.2.4.8.1.1. Response process monitoring, control, and flexibility.

A7.2.4.8.1.2. Coordination, problem solving, and time management.

A7.2.4.8.1.3. Appropriate coordination with non-DoD agencies.

A7.2.4.8.1.4. Visibility over control of resources, personnel, and actions.

A7.2.4.8.1.5. Effectiveness, completeness, and flexibility of local plans for emergency response and mission support.

A7.2.4.8.2. Sub-Item - Effectiveness of Response.

A7.2.4.8.2.1. Notification and mobilization procedures.

A7.2.4.8.2.2. Immediate response actions of all appropriate organizations.

A7.2.4.8.2.3. Security Support.

A7.2.4.8.2.4. Follow-on support.

A7.2.4.9. Item - Aircraft Arresting System (AAS) Rewind Exercise. Tests the installation's ability to return the runway to full operation following aircraft engagement with AAS.

A7.2.4.10. Item - EOD Exercises.

A7.2.4.10.1. Sub-Item - Procedures on aircraft and associated weapons systems IAW applicable technical data.

A7.2.4.10.1.1. Use of technical data.

A7.2.4.10.1.2. Serviceability and adequacy of EOD equipment.

A7.2.4.10.1.3. Use of protective equipment and measures to include mitigation techniques.

A7.2.4.10.1.4. Overall safety of operations.

A7.2.4.10.2. Sub-Item - Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Procedures.

A7.2.4.10.2.1. Command, control, and employment of resources and teams.

A7.2.4.10.2.2. Protective measures.

A7.2.4.10.2.3. Employment of specialized tools.

A7.2.4.10.2.4. Neutralization RSP techniques.

A7.2.4.10.2.5. Overall safety of operations.

A7.2.5. Sub-Area: Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) pre-deployment planning and actions (outlined in AFOSII 90-201).

A7.2.6. Sub-Area: Associate (Tenant) Organization Security Awareness. These assessments will be conducted with the coordination of the associate organization commander and the organization's security liaison. If the ORI is joint/combined, coordinate with the parent command's IG Team Chief.

A7.2.6.1. Associate organizations will not receive a rating. Discrepancies are brought to the attention of the organization commander or parent command IG for joint/combined inspections.

A7.2.6.2. Additionally, assess this area a security force unit deploys in support of a flying organization or participates in an employment scenario.

A7.2.6.3. Assess the organization's security awareness program throughout the ORI with the assistance of the organization's security liaison.

A7.2.6.3.1. Proper wear/use of restricted and or controlled area badges.

A7.2.6.3.2. Challenging of individuals without badges or otherwise suspicious.

A7.2.6.3.3. Proper enforcement of escort procedures.

A7.2.6.3.4. Detecting and reporting suspicious activities/security incidents.

A7.2.6.3.5. Protecting classified. Material and operations that could result in disclosure of classified information, whether of real intelligence value or relating to the ORI scenario, must be appropriately protected.

A7.2.7. Sub-Area - Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). These exercises will test the unit's ability to ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of information and associated C4 systems. Exercises will evaluate the unit's responses during communications, computer, and information scenarios (outages, security, contingencies, etc.).

A7.2.7.1. Item - Operations and Maintenance.

A7.2.7.1.1. Safety.

A7.2.7.1.2. Sufficiency, availability, and interoperability of communications systems to meet mission requirements.

A7.2.7.1.3. Understanding of the entire communications system to fully exploit the full range of backup and redundant features available to minimize service disruption.

A7.2.7.1.4. Identification and prioritization of critical processors, computers, networks, servers, and communications systems.

A7.2.7.1.5. Ability to perform operations 24 hours a day.

A7.2.7.1.6. Proficiency of personnel to appropriately respond to emergency/contingency operations and perform their assigned responsibilities.

A7.2.7.1.7. Effectiveness and responsiveness of the unit control center and job control.

A7.2.7.1.8. Timeliness of problem resolution and/or appropriateness of solution alternatives and work-arounds.

A7.2.7.1.9. Restoral actions including alternate routing of circuits, reconstitution plans, and equipment repairs.

A7.2.7.1.10. Reliability of primary and backup communications links and local area networks.

A7.2.7.1.11. Availability, use, and control of documentation on computer system specifics, i.e., system parameters, hardware configurations, network connections, software instructions, and user's manuals.

A7.2.7.1.12. Alternate data processing and storage site, including location, security classifications, fire prevention equipment, alarm systems, and environmental controls.

A7.2.7.1.13. Correct message processing to include proper handling and delivery of classified messages.

A7.2.7.1.14. Written procedures for system backup and service restoration (C4 restoral plan).

A7.2.7.1.15. Availability of replacement equipment and parts.

A7.2.7.1.16. Availability, use and control of reference publications.

A7.2.7.1.17. Proper tracking and scheduling of maintenance actions along with quality assurance programs.

A7.2.7.1.18. Knowledge and proficiency of technicians performing maintenance.

A7.2.7.1.19. Management of deployable communications-computer equipment.

A7.2.7.2. Item - Information Assurance.

A7.2.7.2.1. Ability to protect and defend information and information systems.

A7.2.7.2.2. Use of OPSEC principles when communicating sensitive or classified data.

A7.2.7.2.3. Adherence to security procedures during service restoration and equipment use.

A7.2.7.2.4. Adherence to security procedures governing the approval to operate information systems and communications equipment.

A7.2.7.2.5. Sufficiency and overall implementation of the Information Operations Conditions (INFOCON) program.

A7.2.7.2.6. Proper implementation of directed security modifications (software patches, architecture, configuration, upgrades, etc.).

A7.2.7.2.7. Understanding of COMSEC/cryptographic procedures.

A7.2.7.2.8. Adherence to MINIMIZE procedures when in effect.

A7.2.8. Sub-Area - Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Pre-Deployment Planning and Actions: AFOSI common core criteria for the pre-deployment inspection phase is outlined in AFOSII 90-201.

A7.3. Major Area - Initial Response.

A7.3.1. Sub-Area - Command and Control.

A7.3.1.1. Item - Center and Wing Level Control Centers.

A7.3.1.1.1. Effectiveness of leadership, plans, and higher headquarters guidance.

A7.3.1.1.2. Coordination, problem solving, and time management.

A7.3.1.1.3. Visibility over the status of personnel, resources, and actions.

A7.3.1.1.4. Processing and handling of Emergency Action Messages.

A7.3.1.1.5. Preparation of required Operational Reports.

A7.3.1.1.6. Handling and protection of classified information and Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

A7.3.1.2. Item - Deployment and Unit Control Centers.

A7.3.1.2.1. Recall and availability of personnel to accomplish mission as required by the tasking message.

A7.3.1.2.2. Deployment process monitoring, control, and flexibility.

A7.3.1.2.3. Coordination, problem solving, and time management by Deployment Control Center and Unit Control Center staffs.

A7.3.1.2.4. Accuracy and availability of the Deployment Schedule of Events.

A7.3.1.2.5. Visibility over the status of personnel, resources, and actions.

A7.3.1.2.6. UTC management and consolidation to minimize the number of aircraft or vehicles required to deploy the force.

A7.3.1.2.7. Effectiveness of local plans and higher headquarters guidance.

A7.3.1.2.8. Timeliness, accuracy, and classification of reported SORTS data.

A7.3.1.2.9. Handling and protection of classified information and Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

A7.3.1.3. Item - Support Services. Currency, accuracy, and usefulness of services from Weather or other required areas.

A7.3.1.4. Item: Intelligence Support.

A7.3.1.4.1. Evaluate the support given to the installation commander and senior base leadership from the base intelligence unit. for the Threat Working Group (TWG), Battle staff and DCC deployment line.

A7.3.1.4.2. Evaluate the effectiveness of the collection and analysis of threat information.

A7.3.1.4.3. Evaluate the measures selected for implementation as a result of the intelligence analysis.

A7.3.1.5. Item - WMS Command and Control.

A7.3.1.5.1. Command.

A7.3.1.5.1.1. Established proper center priorities.

A7.3.1.5.1.2. Identified all projects/units that could execute and support tasking.

A7.3.1.5.1.3. Selected best candidates for acceleration or surge.

A7.3.1.5.1.4. Demonstrated effective leadership to communicate and control task execution.

A7.3.1.5.2. Control.

A7.3.1.5.2.1. Managed (top-level) development and execution of taskings.

A7.3.1.5.2.2. Coordinated and problem-solved with internal and external organizations.

A7.3.1.5.2.3. Achieved visibility over the status of units, personnel, resources, limiting factors, actions, etc.

A7.3.1.5.2.4. Managed classified information.

A7.3.1.5.2.5. Implemented higher headquarters contingency instructions.

A7.3.2. Sub-Area - Deployment.

A7.3.2.1. Item - Suitability for Movement.

A7.3.2.1.1. Sub-Item - Load Safety.

A7.3.2.1.1.1. Cargo Restraint.

A7.3.2.1.1.2. Hazardous cargo preparation, compatibility, documentation, and certification.

A7.3.2.1.1.3. Explosives handling procedures.

A7.3.2.1.1.4. Flight line safety precautions (FOD checks, wheel chocks, etc.).

A7.3.2.1.1.5. Vehicle condition and appropriate placarding.

A7.3.2.1.1.6. Vehicle and Materiel Handling Equipment operation, operator qualifications, and use of required protective gear.

A7.3.2.1.1.7. Load planning within the constraints of selected mode of transportation.

A7.3.2.1.1.8. Night operations procedures (if applicable).

A7.3.2.1.1.9. Adherence to established safety standards.

A7.3.2.1.2. Sub-Item - Unit Material Selection and Preparation.

A7.3.2.1.2.1. General.

A7.3.2.1.2.1.1. Correct identification, availability, and serviceability of equipment to fill the logistics detail requirements of the UTC.

A7.3.2.1.2.1.2. Proper identification, packing, marking, and documenting of all general, hazardous, sensitive, and classified cargo per MILSTAMP and international requirements.

A7.3.2.1.2.1.3. Accurate increment identification markings as specified in higher headquarters and local guidance.

A7.3.2.1.2.1.4. Recognition, analysis, and resolution of resource shortfalls.

A7.3.2.1.2.2. Mobility Bags.

A7.3.2.1.2.2.1. Configuration and marshaling of mobility bags in response to a deployment tasking.

A7.3.2.1.2.2.2. Serviceability and sufficiency of mobility bag assets, regardless of method of storage. If assets are not available, demonstration of appropriate procedures to fill shortfalls.

A7.3.2.1.2.2.3. Shipment of mobility bags for all personnel tasked to deploy, regardless of method of storage or issue.

A7.3.2.1.2.2.4. Provision of required "C-1 mini bag" Chemical Warfare Defense Equipment (CWDE) to all deploying personnel.

A7.3.2.1.2.3. Weapons.

A7.3.2.1.2.3.1. Configuration and marshaling of weapons.

A7.3.2.1.2.3.2. Packaging of weapons for deployment.

A7.3.2.1.2.3.3. Cleanliness and serviceability of deployed weapons, and availability of weapons support kits.

A7.3.2.1.2.3.4. Availability and accuracy of weapon serial number listings for each container subject to deployment.

A7.3.2.1.2.3.5. Procedures to issue weapons and ammunition.

A7.3.2.1.3. Sub-Item - Unit Personnel Selection and Preparation.

A7.3.2.1.3.1. Eligibility and availability of deploying personnel.

A7.3.2.1.3.2. Accuracy and timeliness of personnel listings.

A7.3.2.1.3.3. Recognition, analysis, and resolution of resource shortfalls.

A7.3.2.1.3.4. Provision of required individual equipment.

A7.3.2.1.3.5. Currency and effectiveness of required training for troop commanders, couriers, custodians, and all deploying personnel.

A7.3.2.1.3.6. Compliance with provisions of AFI 10-215, *Personnel Support For Contingency Operations (PERSCO)*; AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning*; and AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System*.

A7.3.2.2. Item - Deployment Management.

A7.3.2.2.1. Sub Item - Equipment Management.

A7.3.2.2.1.1. Accuracy and timeliness of cargo documentation and transfer actions.

A7.3.2.2.1.2. Recognition, analysis, and resolution of resource shortfalls.

A7.3.2.2.1.3. Training, appointment, and briefing of couriers and custodians prior to deployment.

A7.3.2.2.1.4. Accountability of deployed equipment and mobility bags.

A7.3.2.2.1.5. Security and accountability of deployed weapons.

A7.3.2.2.2. Sub-Item - Personnel Management.

A7.3.2.2.2.1. Accuracy and timeliness of all products (e.g. personnel documentation).

- A7.3.2.2.2.2. Recognition, analysis, and resolution of resource shortfalls.
- A7.3.2.2.2.3. Preparation and authentication of Contingency, Exercise, and Mobility (CEM) orders.
- A7.3.2.2.2.4. Preparation of emergency data cards, identification cards, Geneva convention cards, and dog tags as required.
- A7.3.2.2.2.5. Accountability of deploying personnel from the time they arrive at the deployment processing organization until they depart home station.
- A7.3.2.2.2.6. Updating of TDY deployment data in the Personnel Data System (PDS) and departure confirmation in MANPER-B.
- A7.3.2.2.2.7. Provision of Personnel Accountability Kits (PAKs) to troop commanders or team chiefs.
- A7.3.2.2.3. Sub-Item - Medical Support.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.1. Pre-deployment medical/dental record screening.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.2. Determination of immunization requirements for deploying personnel.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.3. Administration/documentation of immunizations.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.4. Qualification and training of medical support personnel.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.5. Emergency procedures.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.6. Operating instructions and checklists.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.7. Provision of Summary of Care for deploying personnel (AF Form 1480A or AF Form 2766).
 - A7.3.2.2.3.8. Medical Intelligence briefings, specific medical and personnel risks, and individual countermeasures.
 - A7.3.2.2.3.9. Ability to issue chemical warfare antidotes and ensure deploying personnel are aware of proper procedures for the use of antidotes.
- A7.3.2.2.4. Sub-Item - MANPER-B Operations/Reports Management.
 - A7.3.2.2.4.1. Timeliness and accuracy of all products.
 - A7.3.2.2.4.2. System configuration to include correct and current database files and Air Force MANPER-B Configuration Management Board authorized software.
 - A7.3.2.2.4.3. Management of the following, in coordination with the Manpower Office.
 - A7.3.2.2.4.3.1. Manpower Force Element Listing (MANFOR), Manpower Data Extract (MDX), Plans and Mobility Files, and Unit Mobility Tasking (UMT) file (PRC will perform when local manpower office is not available).
 - A7.3.2.2.4.3.2. Personnel Resource File (PRF) and Routing Indicator Table.
 - A7.3.2.2.4.3.3. Effectiveness of accountability, outage, and virus reporting procedures.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.4. Management of MPF MANPER-B systems, including establishing a MANPER-B Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) account with the communications organization, maintaining a current risk analysis and inventory MANPER-B system, and maintaining these systems in a mission ready status.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.5. Timeliness and accuracy of all products.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.6. Ability to run standard reports and to develop, edit and print locally defined reports (single and related databases).

A7.3.2.2.4.3.7. Transmission of required PERSCO Status Reports.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.8. Update of TDY deployment data into the Personnel Data System (PDS) and update of personnel information from PDS to MANPER-B.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.9. Projection of mini-records, confirmation of departure, and completion of TDY.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.10. Processing and management of incoming and outgoing AUTODIN messages (only when a local Manpower Office is not available).

A7.3.2.2.4.3.11. Coordination of communication requirements.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.12. Preparation of message reports when AUTODIN or MANPER-B is not available.

A7.3.2.2.4.3.13. Effectiveness of system management procedures, including backup, virus detection and reporting, diagnostics and preventive maintenance, system outage reporting and correction, and requesting replacement components.

A7.3.2.2.5. Sub-Item - Family Care Plans.

A7.3.2.2.5.1. Accuracy and timeliness of family care documentation.

A7.3.2.2.5.2. Individual training and re-certification procedures.

A7.3.2.2.5.3. Certification of workability of plans.

A7.3.2.3. Item - Departure Timing.

A7.3.2.3.1. Prioritization of UTCs and increments, use of support transportation, and handling of classified/sensitive cargo (including weapons and ammunition) are factored into the overall grade for Departure Timing. A Chalk will be considered on time if all unit actions are complete 30 minutes prior to airlift's scheduled take-off.

A7.3.2.3.2. Percentage of chalks meeting scheduled loading times for actual or simulated support transportation according to the published Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE), as follows.

Table A7.1. Departure Timing

OUTSTANDING	95% to 100%
EXCELLENT	88% to 94.9%
SATISFACTORY	80% to 87.9%
MARGINAL	70% to 79.9%
UNSATISFACTORY	69.9% and less

A7.3.2.3.3. Sub-Item - Support Airlift/Support Airlift (Simulated).

A7.3.2.3.3.1. The items listed below will be assessed at cargo load start time per the DSOE.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.1. All cargo and equipment sequenced IAW the aircraft load plan. Weapons, munitions, narcotics, and classified cargo may be located in a separate sensitive holding area.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.2. Load plan must have actual weights, (except for baggage and passenger totals).

A7.3.2.3.3.1.3. Load team to include required MHE.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.4. All required documentation, including cargo manifest, DD Form 1387-2, Shipper's Declaration For Dangerous Goods Forms (if used), cargo waivers, DD Form 2133 (if used), etc.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.5. Documentation errors identified during this review should not preclude cargo from being accepted for loading, unless these errors jeopardize load safety or alter aircraft cargo load sequencing. Documentation errors must be corrected prior to aircraft departure.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.6. The aircraft center of balance station will be computed based on a planned passenger count.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.7. All passengers must be available at passenger load start time with final copies of the passenger manifest and the "final" aircraft load plan. Use actual or interrogated weights for baggage and passenger travel by both CRAF and military aircraft.

A7.3.2.3.3.1.8. Note: The above criteria will also apply to Joint Airborne Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) static loader missions. However, all cargo, equipment, and passengers (to include baggage) must be loaded, and final documentation must be available NLT 30 minutes prior to aircraft departure time.

A7.3.2.3.4. Sub-Item - Ground Movement/Ground Movement (Simulated).

A7.3.2.3.4.1. When organizations mobilize and deploy via ground operations (normally commercial trucking), the organization will schedule all actions and request support transportation to meet available to load date at Point of Embarkation (POE).

A7.3.2.3.4.2. The items listed below must be available at cargo load start time per the organization's DSOE.

A7.3.2.3.4.2.1. Load plan.

A7.3.2.3.4.2.2. Cargo manifest.

A7.3.2.3.4.2.3. Deployment Assistance Package (e.g. maps, routes, DD Form 626 (if applicable)).

A7.3.2.3.4.2.4. Load team personnel to include required MHE.

A7.3.2.3.4.2.5. Required blocking and bracing material.

A7.3.2.3.4.2.6. All required documentation (e.g. truck manifest, Government Bills of Lading (GBLs), Commercial Bills of Lading (CBLs), standing routing orders (SROs).

A7.3.2.3.4.2.7. All passengers must be available at passenger load start time with a PAX manifest

A7.3.3. Sub-Area - STAMP/STRAPP (Standard Munitions Pallet Package/Standard Racks, Adapters, and Pylons Package): The munitions unit will be evaluated on its ability to breakout, buildup, and deliver tasked munitions to meet operational tasking IAW unit plans. Adequacy of munitions plans, deployment planning, technical data, tools/equipment, buildup training programs, and management and control procedures will be included in this evaluation. Sound safety practices must be enforced during all operations. All operations must conform to established site or waived explosives limits, and will be exercised over a sustained period beginning on day one of conventional operations.

A7.3.3.1. Item - Command and Control.

A7.3.3.1.1. Sub-Item - Munitions Supervision.

A7.3.3.1.1.1. Evaluate effectiveness of leadership, planning, and implementation of higher headquarters guidance.

A7.3.3.1.1.2. Evaluate effectiveness of Quality Assurance and munitions training programs.

A7.3.3.1.2. Sub-Item - Munitions Control.

A7.3.3.1.2.1. Evaluate effective control of munitions personnel and operations.

A7.3.3.1.2.2. Evaluate tracking of status of vehicles and progress of munitions taskings.

A7.3.3.1.2.3. Evaluate and determine effectiveness of communications between munitions personnel, Munitions Control, Maintenance Supervision, and appropriate base agencies during contingencies.

A7.3.3.2. Item - Munitions Handling: Evaluate their capability to breakout and deliver munitions components to buildup locations in sufficient quantities to meet buildup schedules.

A7.3.3.2.1. Sub-Item - Munitions Buildup.

A7.3.3.2.1.1. Evaluate their capability to assemble/prepare tasked munitions IAW unit Oplans.

A7.3.3.2.2. Sub-Item - Munitions Delivery.

A7.3.3.2.2.1. Evaluate their capability to deliver the appropriate munitions in sufficient quantities to meet exercise scenario requirements. Munitions delivery will be demonstrated by the movement of trailers/delivery vehicles to the hot pad or designated staging area and returning them to the trailer loading/storage location when considered empty.

A7.3.3.3. Item - Munitions Supply: Munitions supply activities will be evaluated on their ability to submit a status report IAW AFI 21-206 during contingencies to account for decreases in STAMP/STRAPP package availability.

A7.3.3.3.1. Sub-Item - WRM Munitions Accountability.

A7.3.3.3.1.1. WRM details established according to directives and quantities loaded according to Wartime Consumable Distribution Objectives (WCDO) document.

A7.3.3.3.1.2. WRM detail quantities inventoried and date of last inventory updated semi-annually.

A7.3.3.3.2. Sub-Item - Wartime Reporting.

A7.3.3.3.2.1. Unit OPlans, AFI 21-202, AFI 21-203, AFI 21-208, AFI 25-101 and AFM 10-206 (as applicable) on hand and current. Applicable OPlans must also be reviewed at least quarterly.

A7.3.3.3.2.2. Knowledge of reports required by higher headquarters (Items of Special Interest Report (ISIR), RCS: HAF-LGS(D)7109, LIMFACs, LOGSTAT, etc.).

A7.3.3.3.2.3. All munitions control personnel trained in wartime reporting.

A7.3.3.3.3. Sub-Item - Pre-direct Reception and Outload.

A7.3.3.3.3.1. Ensure munitions operations responsibilities are included in the units local OI for established predirect munitions.

A7.3.3.3.3.2. Ensure munitions operations responsibilities are included in the collocated operating base or main operating base (MOB) reception plan.

A7.3.3.3.3.3. All AFK personnel trained in manual accounting procedures.

A7.4. Major Area - Deployed Operations.

A7.4.1. Sub-Area - Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO).

A7.4.1.1. Item - Survival Recovery Center. (If the air base wing or support group has deployable UTC taskings for senior leaders, or uses non-UTC personnel acting as host nation support, this area will be rated.)

A7.4.1.1.1. Collection, display, analysis, and dissemination of information essential to ATSO.

A7.4.1.1.2. Effectiveness of actions taken based upon analysis of information.

A7.4.1.1.3. Support to and coordination with the Wing Operations Center (WOC).

A7.4.1.1.4. Prioritization of response actions.

A7.4.1.1.5. Direction to and coordination with subordinate organization control centers.

A7.4.1.1.6. Effectiveness and redundancy of local alarm system under attack situations.

A7.4.1.1.7. Coordinated self-defense measures for support forces (e.g. procedures to identify friend/foe, rules of engagement, and methods to report hostile actions).

A7.4.1.2. Item - Self-Aid and Buddy Care (SABC).

A7.4.1.2.1. Initiation of search and rescue efforts for casualties.

A7.4.1.2.2. Skill, timeliness, and resourcefulness while performing SABC.

A7.4.1.2.3. Provision of emergency care to all casualties.

A7.4.1.2.4. Placing of protective masks on casualties, if indicated.

A7.4.1.2.5. Administration of simulated CW antidotes, if indicated.

A7.4.1.2.6. Prevention of additional injuries to casualties.

A7.4.1.2.7. Transportation of casualties to medical personnel.

A7.4.1.3. Item - Passive Defense Measures.

A7.4.1.3.1. Effectiveness of dispersal plans and actions taken to reduce the severity of damage from individual attacks.

A7.4.1.3.2. Effectiveness of hardening plans and actions taken to increase the survivability of resources which are attacked.

A7.4.1.4. Item - Passive Defense Response.

A7.4.1.4.1. Reaction to alarm signals and to the presence of conventional or NBC hazards.

A7.4.1.4.2. Performance of wartime tasks while wearing conventional and NBC protective equipment.

A7.4.1.4.3. Identification, marking, and reporting of UXO, and contamination.

A7.4.1.4.4. Assessment and reporting of fires, damages, and casualties.

A7.4.1.4.5. Proficiency in detecting and reporting the presence and characteristics of chemical agents.

A7.4.1.4.6. Contamination avoidance.

A7.4.1.4.7. Personnel and limited decontamination of areas and vehicles.

A7.4.1.4.8. Availability, adequacy, and use of plans, checklists, and equipment.

A7.4.1.4.9. Contamination Control Area (CCA) procedures.

A7.4.2. Sub-Area: Combat Logistics Support.

A7.4.2.1. Item - Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) Team.

A7.4.2.1.1. Sub-Item - ABDR Team Chiefs.

A7.4.2.1.1.1. Knowledge and proficiency in safely controlling, coordinating, and monitoring all CLSS activities, including re-deployment of some or all employed team members to additional locations from initial deployed locations.

A7.4.2.1.1.2. Response to immediate hazards and casualties.

A7.4.2.1.1.3. Control of personnel and equipment.

A7.4.2.1.1.4. Knowledge of the mission, UTC tasking requirements, and team members' training requirements.

A7.4.2.1.1.5. Effectiveness of cross-utilization of skills in accomplishing ABDR repairs.

- A7.4.2.1.1.6. Equipment, small arms, and ammunition control and serviceability.
- A7.4.2.1.1.7. Coordination with ABDR engineers, maintenance control center, and the SRC.
- A7.4.2.1.1.8. Knowledge of Command and Control (C2) team mission and how C2 operates with deployed teams.
- A7.4.2.1.1.9. Demonstrate the ability to accomplish necessary forms documentation to include AFTO 97 and AFTO 97A forms, IAW ABDR technical orders.
- A7.4.2.1.2. Sub-Item - ABDR Assessors.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.1. Determination of aircraft damage.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.2. Development of repair proposals based on availability of resources and criticality of the aircraft.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.3. Use of substitute materials that would be available at the deployed location, if appropriate.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.4. Restoration of required systems, performance characteristics, and structural integrity.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.5. Identification of how repairs affect flight characteristics.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.6. Design of repairs IAW technical orders.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.7. Provision of realistic Estimated Times In Commission (ETIC) to the team chief. The actual return to commission times will be compared to the ETICs.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.8. Verify the quality of repairs performed.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.9. Ensure safety of personnel performing repairs.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.10. Display adequate knowledge of the availability of tools, parts, and consumable materials.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.11. Demonstrate the ability to accomplish necessary forms documentation to include AFTO 97 and AFTO 97A forms, IAW ABDR technical orders.
 - A7.4.2.1.2.12. Ability to perform “generic” multi-weapon system maintenance.
- A7.4.2.1.3. Sub-Item - ABDR Technicians.
 - A7.4.2.1.3.1. Perform repairs IAW technical orders and engineer's instructions.
 - A7.4.2.1.3.2. Verify the quality of repairs performed.
 - A7.4.2.1.3.3. Ensure safety of personnel while performing repairs.
 - A7.4.2.1.3.4. Display adequate knowledge of the availability of tools, parts, and consumable materials.
 - A7.4.2.1.3.5. Demonstrate the ability to accomplish necessary forms documentation to include AFTO 97 and AFTO 97A forms, IAW ABDR technical orders.
- A7.4.2.1.4. Sub-Item - Forms Documentation.
 - A7.4.2.1.4.1. 781 H “Status Today” block reflects the current aircraft condition.

A7.4.2.1.4.2. Block 16 of the AFTO Form 97 “Unexploded Ordinance Inspection” (UXO) block was signed off prior to starting repairs.

A7.4.2.1.4.3. Damage number in block 17 of the AFTO Form 97 matches the aircraft damage number.

A7.4.2.1.4.4. Block 18 of the AFTO Form 97 reflects the proper damage category.

A7.4.2.1.4.5. Block 19 of the AFTO Form 97 reflects the accurate damage class.

A7.4.2.1.4.6. Block 22 of the AFTO Form 97 is accurate and complete to include exact damage location and extent of damage.

A7.4.2.1.4.7. Block 25 of the AFTO Form 97 is accurate and complete to include materials to be used, fastener layout, and T.O. figure and index references, if applicable.

A7.4.2.1.4.8. Part IV, Repairs Completed By Repair Technician blocks are completed correctly.

A7.4.2.1.4.9. Part IV, Team Lead/Assessor block is documented correctly.

A7.4.2.1.4.10. Ensure AFTO Form 97A is documented properly, if applicable.

A7.4.2.1.4.11. Ensure all AFTO 781 series forms are documented correctly when applicable.

A7.4.2.2. Item - ABDR Engineers.

A7.4.2.2.1. Qualification of team members, including but not limited to proper AFSC for positions, completion of required technical courses, and associated refreshers.

A7.4.2.2.2. Response to immediate hazards and casualties.

A7.4.2.2.3. Determination of aircraft damage.

A7.4.2.2.4. Development of repair proposals based on availability of resources and criticality of the aircraft.

A7.4.2.2.5. Restoration of required systems, performance characteristics, and structural integrity.

A7.4.2.2.6. Identification of how repairs affect flight characteristics.

A7.4.2.2.7. Provision of realistic repair designs to the ABDR repair team.

A7.4.2.2.8. Ensure safety of personnel performing repairs.

A7.4.2.2.9. Coordination with ABDR team chief, assessors, the maintenance control center, and the SRC.

A7.4.2.2.10. Currency of engineer's wartime mission training.

A7.4.2.2.11. Accuracy, appropriateness, and correctness of engineering calculations and documentation for each repair involving engineering assistance.

A7.4.2.2.12. Demonstrate C2 team knowledge.

A7.4.2.2.13. Ability to perform “generic” engineering tasks on multiple weapon systems.

A7.4.2.2.14. Demonstrate the ability to accomplish necessary forms documentation to include AFTO 97 and AFTO 97A forms, IAW ABDR technical orders.

A7.4.2.3. Item - Rapid Area Distribution Support (RADS) Teams.

A7.4.2.3.1. Sub-Item - Combat Supply Activities.

A7.4.2.3.1.1. Demonstrate ability to provide specialized materiel storage and distribution support to the combat supply activity at the deployed location.

A7.4.2.3.1.2. Display effective use of skills to provide supply support under adverse conditions.

A7.4.2.3.1.3. Demonstrate knowledge of Standard Base Supply Systems (both automated and manual backups).

A7.4.2.3.1.4. Perform proper handling and processing procedures, establishing a warehouse and assigning bin locations.

A7.4.2.3.1.5. Provide supply site activation support COB or bare base locations.

A7.4.2.3.1.6. Provide in-transit visibility utilizing numerous sources to include telecommunications and ITV databases from each of the services.

A7.4.2.3.1.7. Perform proper handling and processing procedures for the DD Form 1348-1; DD Form 1348-6, and AF Form 2005.

A7.4.2.3.1.8. Demonstrate team member's ability to re-deploy to another in-theater location to accomplish recovery and/or expeditionary missions as directed by the theater commander and/or augment operations at the MOB, COB, SB, LB, and BB.

A7.4.2.3.2. Sub-Item - Combat Transportation Tracking and Packaging.

A7.4.2.3.2.1. Demonstrate ability to integrate with the unit level transportation cargo movement operations during wartime contingency or military operations.

A7.4.2.3.2.2. Implement proper procedures for providing total asset visibility support using In-Transit Visibility (ITV) systems to include recovery and tracking of inbound and retrograde assets in the Defense Transportation System (DTS), federal agencies, commercial supply, and transportation pipeline systems.

A7.4.2.3.2.3. Perform all base level and /or specialized packaging functions to include.

A7.4.2.3.2.3.1. Certifications of hazardous cargo.

A7.4.2.3.2.3.2. Determination of methods for packaging supplies and equipment.

A7.4.2.3.2.3.3. Construction of crates and boxes.

A7.4.2.3.2.3.4. Use of skids.

A7.4.2.3.2.3.5. Use of existing containers as required.

A7.4.2.3.2.4. Display the ability to locate, interpret, and use Special Packing Instructions (SPIs).

A7.4.2.3.2.5. Perform limited freight operations to include.

A7.4.2.3.2.5.1. In-checking.

A7.4.2.3.2.5.2. Storage.

A7.4.2.3.2.5.3. Delivery.

A7.4.2.3.2.5.4. In-Transit Visibility (ITV) - utilizing numerous sources to include telecommunications and ITV databases from each service.

A7.4.2.3.2.6. Demonstrate loading, blocking, and bracing of outbound cargo.

A7.4.2.3.2.7. Demonstrate team member's ability to re-deploy to another in-theater location to accomplish recovery and/or expeditionary missions as directed by the theater commander and/or augment operations at the MOB, COB, SB, LB, and BB.

A7.4.3. Sub-Area - Aircraft Operations Support.

A7.4.3.1. Item - Weather Operations.

A7.4.3.1.1. Timeliness and dissemination of observations and forecasts.

A7.4.3.1.2. Satisfaction of special and local criteria and customer requirements.

A7.4.3.1.3. Accuracy of objective measurable elements of the observation.

A7.4.3.1.4. Specification criteria and amendment criteria being used.

A7.4.3.1.5. Horizontal consistency between weather warnings, advisories, and customer products.

A7.4.3.1.6. Utilization of available centralized products and services.

A7.4.3.1.7. Tactical Communications (TACCOM) and Tactical Meteorological Equipment (TACMET).

A7.4.3.1.8. Set up and operate tactical observation and weather data equipment.

A7.4.3.1.9. Ability to construct tactical visibility chart.

A7.4.3.1.10. Limited Data Analysis and Forecasting.

A7.4.3.1.11. Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) and elevation determination.

A7.4.3.1.12. Use of all available data sources for obtaining weather information to include - radar, satellite, PIREPS, AIREPS, indigenous sources, etc.

A7.4.4. Sub-Area - Civil Engineering (For Core CE Units).

A7.4.4.1. Item - Base Recovery.

A7.4.4.1.1. Sub-Item - Damage Assessment and Analysis.

A7.4.4.1.1.1. Post-attack discovery and reporting of damages, fires, UXO, contamination, and casualties.

A7.4.4.1.1.2. Accuracy, depth, and completeness of reports by specialized assessment teams.

A7.4.4.1.1.3. Analysis of reported information to assess mission impact.

A7.4.4.1.1.4. Analysis of maps, facility and utility drawings, or other information to assess potential for collateral or hidden damage.

A7.4.4.1.1.5. Selection of candidate minimum operating strips (MOS) and airfield repair tasks, considering the following.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.1. Repair quality and airfield size requirements of aircraft expected to use the airfield.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.2. Access to and from runway, munitions, fuel, or other essential items.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.3. Hazards and render safe priorities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

A7.4.4.1.1.5.4. Necessary repairs or adjustments to airfield markings, lighting, or arresting systems.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.5. Time and resources required to perform all proposed tasks.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.6. Prioritization of emergency response actions.

A7.4.4.1.1.5.7. Analysis of prior temporary repairs and determination of permanent repair priorities, methods, and schedules.

A7.4.4.1.2. Sub-Item - Rapid Runway Repair (RRR).

A7.4.4.1.2.1. Command and control, sense of urgency, and teamwork by all responding personnel.

A7.4.4.1.2.2. Overall safety of RRR operations.

A7.4.4.1.2.3. Marshaling of personnel and equipment.

A7.4.4.1.2.4. Debris removal and crater repair.

A7.4.4.1.2.5. Assembly, towing, and anchoring of AM-2 and folded fiberglass mats.

A7.4.4.1.2.6. Airfield striping and sweeping.

A7.4.4.1.2.7. Timing to repair and cover one crater, beginning when the MOS is approved and free of UXO and ending when all necessary striping and sweeping has been completed. The mat anchor time is the average demonstrated time necessary to perform one anchor multiplied by the number of anchors required.

Table A7.2. RRR Timing

RATING	Time (Hrs)
OUTSTANDING	< 3:00
EXCELLENT	3:01 to 3:30
SATISFACTORY	3:31 to 4:00
MARGINAL	4:01 to 4:30
UNSATISFACTORY	> 4:30

A7.4.4.1.3. Sub-Item - Base Damage Response.

A7.4.4.1.3.1. Command and control, sense of urgency, and teamwork by all responding personnel.

A7.4.4.1.3.2. Isolation of affected utilities.

A7.4.4.1.3.3. Clearing of roadways to aid mission critical vehicle movement.

A7.4.4.1.3.4. Stabilization or cordoning of damaged facilities to prevent further damage or injury.

A7.4.4.1.3.5. Containment of dangerous spilled fluids or materials.

A7.4.4.1.3.6. Expedient repair of damaged facilities and utilities.

A7.4.4.1.3.7. Construction of temporary facilities and utilities for critical functions.

A7.4.4.1.3.8. Development of long-term recovery priorities, methods, and schedules for completing permanent repairs or demolishing unsalvageable facilities.

A7.4.4.1.3.9. Safe removal and transport of UXO to predetermined holding or disposal sites.

A7.4.4.2. Item - Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). A unit's ability to demonstrate its EOD function in a major theater war (MTW) contingency environment. The following subitems will be evaluated - Command and Control, Employment, Technical Operations, and Bomb Removal and ratings assigned as follows.

A7.4.4.2.1. Rating - EOD.

A7.4.4.2.1.1. OUTSTANDING. Technical Operations and one other subitem OUTSTANDING with remaining subitems at least EXCELLENT.

A7.4.4.2.1.2. EXCELLENT. Technical Operations and on the subitem at least EXCELLENT with two remaining subitems at least SATISFACTORY.

A7.4.4.2.1.3. SATISFACTORY. Technical Operations and one other subitem at least SATISFACTORY with two remaining subitems at least MARGINAL.

A7.4.4.2.1.4. MARGINAL. Technical Operations and on other subitem at least MARGINAL or and two subitems at least UNSATISFACTORY.

A7.4.4.2.1.5. UNSATISFACTORY. Does not meet other criteria.

A7.4.4.2.2. Sub-Item - Command and Control. Senior EOD member must demonstrate the appropriate actions necessary to interrogate, render safe, dispose, neutralize, and mitigate the hazards to enable the wing to survive and operate.

A7.4.4.2.2.1. Element—Communication.. Senior EOD member must effectively communicate to all levels; airfield damage assessment team (ADAT) actions, ordnance encountered, unexploded ordnance (UXO) render safe actions, bomb removal actions, mitigation of hazards, and actions necessary to protect forces and resources. Unit must demonstrate effective two-way communications with all ADAT, UXO, and bomb removal teams (BRT), to include communications outage procedures, without compromising operations security or critical information. Unit must have an effective method for communicating emergency destruction of classified EOD render safe publications. Additionally, unit must demonstrate the ability to effectively coordinate at all levels to meet theater operations, (I.e., damage assessment routes, UXO holding areas, airfield trenches, and UXO disposal areas).

A7.4.4.2.2.2. Element - Problem Resolution. Senior EOD member must demonstrate the ability to provide constant monitoring of field activities to mitigate the threats. Unit must also demonstrate an effective method for identifying, communicating, and monitoring unit shortfalls and limiting factors.

A7.4.4.2.2.3. Element - Resources. Senior EOD member must demonstrate effective use of personnel risk categories and effective control of all assigned personnel and resources to safely conduct EOD operations. The unit must demonstrate an effective plan for identifying to the base, ADAT routes, UXO holding areas, airfield trenches, and UXO disposal areas. The unit must have an effective method for ensuring sufficient quantities of demolitions explosives and specialized tools are transported to UXO interrogation, mitigation, render safe, or disposal locations. Unit must have a system in place to effectively track demolition explosives, specialized tool expenditures, and other EOD resources, and replenishment requirements.

A7.4.4.2.3. Sub-Item--Employment. Evaluate unit's capability to interrogate, render safe, dispose, or otherwise neutralize or mitigate the hazards or to determine if the unit took appropriate measures to enable the wing to survive and operate. Additionally, personal actions to ensure individual survivability will be evaluated.

A7.4.4.2.3.1. Element—Airfield Preparation. Unit must demonstrate effective use and notification of pre-established ADAT and BRT routes. Unit must pre-identify all UXO disposal locations and any potential post disposal contamination areas. Unit must possess multiple methods for effectively and rapidly clearing numerous sub-munitions from minimum airfield operating surface (MAOS). Unit must demonstrate an effective system to monitor condition and communicate location of UXOs to other recovery teams and base personnel. Unit must disperse and splinter-protect non-team transported specialized, mitigation, render safe, and disposal resources.

A7.4.4.2.3.2. Element - Equipment. Unit must possess all required resources (i.e., demolition explosives; EOD publications; specialized interrogation, mitigation, render safe, and disposal tools; and personal protective clothing), to effectively interrogate, mitigate, render safe, and dispose of hazards within a period necessary to maximize the aircraft mission and/or base mission. Unit must demonstrate a high proficiency with all UTC assigned equipment (e.g., effectively prepare, employ, recover, and replenish all assigned equipment). Unit must demonstrate interrogation, mitigation, render safe, and disposal capabilities and equipment proficiency in all environments.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.1. Identification, safing, and removal of UXO.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.2. Knowledge of US and foreign ordnance.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.3. Proficiency with EOD specialized tools.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.4. BRAAT procedures.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.5. Wartime chemical operations.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.6. Procedures on aircraft and associated weapons systems IAW applicable technical data.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.7. Use of technical data.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.8. Serviceability and adequacy of EOD equipment.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.9. Use of protective equipment and measures to include mitigation techniques.

A7.4.4.2.3.2.10. Overall safety of operations.

A7.4.4.2.4. Sub-Item - Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Exercise.

A7.4.4.2.4.1. Command, control, and employment of resources and teams.

A7.4.4.2.4.2. Protective measures.

A7.4.4.2.4.3. Employment of specialized tools.

A7.4.4.2.4.4. Neutralization RSP techniques.

A7.4.4.2.4.5. Overall safety of operations.

A7.4.4.2.5. Sub-Item—Technical Operations. Unit actions to interrogate, render safe, dispose, or otherwise neutralize or mitigate the hazards will be evaluated to determine if the unit took appropriate measures to enable the wing to survive and operate.

A7.4.4.2.5.1. Element—Safety. Evaluate procedures and methods of operation to validate adherence to prescribed safety precautions and warnings for munitions, explosives, and their associated hazards. A major safety deviation is one that, if violated, could result in loss of life or serious injury.

A7.4.4.2.5.2. Element—Technical Order Compliance. Unit must demonstrate compliance with technical order procedures. Render safe procedures are only to be deviated from when approved by proper authority and when the situation clearly renders the primary or its alternate(s) unworkable.

A7.4.4.2.5.3. Element—Technical Order Competency. Unit must demonstrate the ability to (1) Properly identify and research ordnance encountered, (2) Understand the fusing and firing systems for ordnance encountered, (3) Understand and be able to perform procedures as outlined in 60-series technical orders, (4) Properly calculate fragmentation and blast distances for contingency environments, (5) Implement correct procedures from technical order or logically deviate, if required, and (6) Perform all steps available in exploiting unknown ordnance and forwarding information.

A7.4.4.2.5.4. Element—Protective Works. Unit must demonstrate the effective and appropriate employment of protective measures. Vulnerable resources must be protected from potential shock, blast and fragmentation hazards.

A7.4.4.2.5.5. Sub Item—Bomb Removal Team (BRT) Unit must demonstrate the ability to remove unexploded ordnance at the direction of the SRC. Trained augmentation force must demonstrate the capability to safely and effectively identify two UXOs for removal, prepare UXOs for movement, pick-up, and secure UXOs and transport to holding area. Unit must demonstrate the ability to train augmentation force to perform BRT using an approved lesson plan.

A7.4.4.3. Item - Field Operations.

A7.4.4.3.1. Sub-Item - Mission Management.

A7.4.4.3.1.1. Management and control of CE personnel, equipment, vehicles, and materials.

A7.4.4.3.1.2. Development and coordination of CE work requirements and priorities.

A7.4.4.3.1.3. Effectiveness of internal and external communications.

A7.4.4.3.1.4. Continuity between shifts.

A7.4.4.3.1.5. Capability to re-deploy to another contingency location.

A7.4.4.3.1.6. Integration of appropriate real-world deployed location procedures, requirements, and constraints into planning documents.

A7.4.4.3.2. Sub-Item - Beddown Planning.

A7.4.4.3.2.1. Functionality of the basic site plan and facility locations, with respect to operational, environmental, and safety considerations.

A7.4.4.3.2.2. Scope and depth of plans for facilities, utilities, and site improvements.

A7.4.4.3.2.3. Demonstrated familiarity with the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of bare base assets.

A7.4.4.3.2.4. Feasibility of the bed down schedule.

A7.4.4.3.3. Sub-Item - Operations and Maintenance.

A7.4.4.3.3.1. Construction and maintenance of tents, revetments, field showers, and latrines.

A7.4.4.3.3.2. Installation and operation of electrical, water, and field phone systems.

A7.4.4.3.3.3. Use of mobile aircraft arresting systems and portable airfield lighting systems.

A7.4.4.3.3.4. Construction of roads, berms, or other site improvements.

A7.4.4.3.3.5. Response to support requests from other deployed organizations.

A7.4.4.3.3.6. Operation and maintenance of automatic-start and user-start generators, both in and out of the exercise play area.

A7.4.4.3.4. Sub-Item - Safety and Security.

A7.4.4.3.4.1. Integration of safety considerations into plans, procedures, and operations.

A7.4.4.3.4.2. Identification, correction, and prevention of field safety hazards.

A7.4.4.3.4.3. Security of work parties, resources, and cantonment area.

A7.4.4.3.4.4. Care, handling, and security of weapons and ammunition.

A7.4.4.3.4.5. Coordination with and support to local ground defense forces.

A7.4.4.4. Item - Fire Protection. The ability of the fire protection flight to combat fires and rescue personnel with limited resources in a simulated wartime environment will be evaluated. Fire protection flights will transition from a peacetime to a wartime mode of operation, commence pre-attack actions to conceal and protect resources, and provide post-attack suppression and rescue response to fire incidents that most seriously jeopardize the combat generation capability of

the wing. The exercises and criteria contained in this instruction will be conducted and evaluated in a wartime environment. In addition, the following sub-items will be evaluated: Firefighting Wartime Plans; Fire Prevention; Communications; Mission Management; and Fire Equipment and Logistics Support.

A7.4.4.4.1. Sub-Item - Firefighting Wartime Plans.

A7.4.4.4.1.1. Implementation of planned pre-, trans-, and post-attack firefighting actions in a wartime environment.

A7.4.4.4.2. Sub-Item - Fire Prevention.

A7.4.4.4.2.1. Involvement with engineers in beddown planning.

A7.4.4.4.2.2. Tent spacing and vegetation control.

A7.4.4.4.2.3. First aid firefighting training and procedures.

A7.4.4.4.2.4. Spacing of POL facilities.

A7.4.4.4.3. Sub-Item - Communications.

A7.4.4.4.3.1. Flow of information.

A7.4.4.4.3.2. Coordination of actions with the SRC, DCC, and senior fire officer.

A7.4.4.4.3.3. The communications network, communications security, physical security and operation of the primary and alternate fire control centers.

A7.4.4.4.4. Sub-Item - Mission Management.

A7.4.4.4.4.1. Demonstrate the ability to operate from dispersed locations.

A7.4.4.4.4.2. Senior fire officers will be evaluated on their ability to effectively use limited firefighting assets.

A7.4.4.4.5. Sub-Item - Fire Equipment and Logistics Support.

A7.4.4.4.5.1. Demonstrate the ability to maintain, inspect, test, and operate firefighting vehicles and equipment in a wartime environment.

A7.4.4.4.5.2. Availability of suitable quantities of firefighting agents, spare parts, and equipment to sustain wartime operations, plans, and procedures used to replenish critical firefighting assets.

A7.4.4.5. Item - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.

A7.4.4.5.1. Sub-Item - NBC Cells.

A7.4.4.5.1.1. Use automated plotting software.

A7.4.4.5.1.2. Collect, evaluate, plot, and disseminate NBC reports IAW ATP-45 requirements, and IAW NORADR 55-39 requirements, if tasked as a NORAD reporting activity.

A7.4.4.5.1.3. Provide accurate and timely advice to senior commanders on NBC hazards and special considerations which impact mission priorities.

A7.4.4.5.1.4. Maintain effective control of and communications with NBC reconnaissance teams.

A7.4.4.5.2. Sub-Item - Specialized NBC Reconnaissance Teams.

A7.4.4.5.2.1. Availability, adequacy, and use of detailed procedures and checklists.

A7.4.4.5.2.2. Preparation, placement, and use of teams and specialized equipment.

A7.4.4.5.2.3. Identification, monitoring, and marking of NBC hazards and contaminated areas.

A7.4.4.5.2.4. Timely reporting of findings to the appropriate control center.

A7.4.5. Sub-Area - Communications-Computer Systems.

A7.4.5.1. Item - Command and Control.

A7.4.5.1.1. Effective control and use of available personnel, equipment and supplies.

A7.4.5.1.2. Planning for the arrival of sustaining communications.

A7.4.5.1.3. Knowledge of capabilities and limiting factors.

A7.4.5.1.4. Timely dissemination of accurate information throughout the communications element.

A7.4.5.1.5. Maintenance of logs on all significant operations and maintenance events.

A7.4.5.1.6. Compliance with safety directives.

A7.4.5.1.7. Integration of appropriate real-world deployed location procedures, requirements, and constraints into planning documents.

A7.4.5.2. Item - Operations.

A7.4.5.2.1. Timely establishment and reliability of primary and backup communications links and local area networks.

A7.4.5.2.2. Proper setup and installation of communications equipment.

A7.4.5.2.3. Compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with systems from other units, commands, services, and the host nation.

A7.4.5.2.4. Understanding of the communications network and switchboard functions, i.e., inter-site and intra-site connectivity, trunking capability, and telephone services.

A7.4.5.2.5. Correct message processing to include proper handling and delivery, timely and appropriate service actions, and station and message continuity.

A7.4.5.2.6. Understanding of COMSEC/cryptographic procedures to include proper handling and use, equipment operations, and contingency procedures.

A7.4.5.2.7. Adherence to MINIMIZE procedures when in effect.

A7.4.5.2.8. Compliance with applicable security directives.

A7.4.5.2.9. Effective identification and mitigation of threats to continued operations.

A7.4.5.3. Item - Communications-Electronics Maintenance.

A7.4.5.3.1. Equipment/system condition including completeness of packages IAW TOs and other applicable directives.

A7.4.5.3.2. Restoral actions including alternate routing of circuits, reconstitution plans, equipment repairs, and actions required to exploit the full range of backup or redundant features available to minimize service disruption.

A7.4.5.3.3. Knowledge and proficiency in equipment restoral actions and reporting.

A7.4.5.3.4. Handling of COMSEC material.

A7.4.5.3.5. Availability, use, and control of reference publications.

A7.4.5.3.6. Supply discipline, accountability, and requisition procedures.

A7.4.5.3.7. Implementation of PMI schedule for continuous operations.

A7.4.5.3.8. Proper documentation of maintenance actions.

A7.4.5.3.9. Test equipment availability, accountability, condition, calibration, and proficiency of use.

A7.4.5.4. Item: Information Management.

A7.4.5.4.1. Proficiency in the proper use, protection, and minor maintenance of equipment used to perform the information management function.

A7.4.5.4.2. Communications management and mail distribution.

A7.4.5.4.3. Publications, forms, and record management.

A7.4.5.4.4. Administrative services.

A7.4.5.4.5. Proper handling, processing, and storage of information products commensurate with sensitivity and classification levels.

A7.4.6. Sub-Area - Contracting. Organizations will be evaluated on their capability to provide contracting support under a variety of scenarios. Refer to AFFARS Appendix CC, Contingency Contracting. If supporting surge of production and support requirements, see Appendix 5 to Annex D to AFMC Plan 70, or center supplements for items to consider during surges. For mission continuity and restoration, see Appendix 10 to Annex D to AFMC Plan 45, Part I, as supplemented.

A7.4.6.1. Establishment of an operational contracting capability to serve as a focal point for purchase of supplies/services from the local economy.

A7.4.6.2. Validation of requirements; coordination of appropriate funding; award of the appropriate type of contractual instrument; and enforcement of contract performance.

A7.4.6.3. Ensuring a source of finances (i.e., a paying agent) is linked with the contracting operation in order to negotiate and consummate the necessary contracting actions.

A7.4.6.4. Adequacy of contracting services and support provided by contracting personnel.

A7.4.6.5. Capability to relocate and operate from alternate locations.

A7.4.6.6. Compliance with applicable portions of AFFARS Appendix CC.

A7.4.6.7. Contracting support plans.

A7.4.6.8. Contingency Contracting Kits.

A7.4.6.9. Training program.

A7.4.7. Sub-Area - Medical Support.

A7.4.7.1. Item - Deployable Medical Facility.

A7.4.7.1.1. Ability of the deployed medical facility to provide or arrange emergency, outpatient, and inpatient medical care to deployed personnel. Use of field medical treatment protocols consistent with EMEDS concepts.

A7.4.7.1.2. Effective patient tracking, documentation of medical records, and appropriate patient disposition; to include aeromedical and land evacuation requests.

A7.4.7.1.3. Establishment of the deployed medical facility utilizing general purpose, TEMPER, Alaska tents, or standing facilities.

A7.4.7.1.4. Adequate staffing of CCP(s), patient retrieval team(s), patient decontamination (if required or at medical unit option), patient treatment, medical control center, survival recovery center (SRC) coverage, security, base support (BEE, Public Health).

A7.4.7.1.5. Effectiveness of the medical control center at coordinating medical operations.

A7.4.7.1.6. Communication between the deployed medical facility, patient retrieval team, CCPs, SRC, and Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO).

A7.4.7.1.7. Awareness of current NBC conditions, operations tempo, and force protection conditions.

A7.4.7.1.8. Public Health Support, including food safety services, field sanitation, disease and disease vector surveillance, assistance with local public health issues, medical intelligence, and disease and surveillance reporting.

A7.4.7.1.9. Bioenvironmental Engineering support, including monitoring of water supply for potability, survivability and vulnerability; monitoring of chemical, biological and radiological hazards; providing guidance for waste disposal, field sanitation, and hygiene; conducting field industrial hygiene; and monitoring environmental conditions and heat stress/cold stress injuries.

A7.4.7.2. Sub-Item - Casualty Collection Points (CCPs) (if required by UTC, or at unit option).

A7.4.7.2.1. Number, location, visibility, and accessibility of CCPs.

A7.4.7.2.2. Staffing (proper mix of officers and/or medical technicians with appropriate skills).

A7.4.7.2.3. Communication ability with SRC and deployed medical facility.

A7.4.7.2.4. Equipment and supplies.

A7.4.7.2.5. Ability to triage and provide appropriate medical care.

A7.4.7.2.6. Timeliness of casualty movement from the CCP to the deployed medical facility.

A7.4.7.2.7. Timeliness of casualty return to duty if indicated.

A7.4.7.3. Sub-Item - Patient Retrieval Teams (PRTs) (if required by UTC, or at unit option).

A7.4.7.3.1. Proper casualty movement, i.e., use of litters, vehicles, casualty loading.

A7.4.7.3.2. Coordination and communication with CCPs and deployed medical facility.

A7.4.7.3.3. Medical care during casualty movement.

A7.4.7.4. Sub-Item - Patient Decontamination (DECON) Team (if required by UTC, or at unit option).

A7.4.7.4.1. Establishment of a DECON area.

A7.4.7.4.2. Correct utilization of team members.

A7.4.7.4.3. Ability to properly utilize all required supplies and equipment.

A7.4.7.4.4. Ability to monitor patients' medical conditions.

A7.4.7.4.5. Ability to perform correct patient DECON procedures.

A7.4.7.4.6. Triage and disposition of patients.

A7.4.8. Sub-Area - Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO).

A7.4.8.1. Accountability of assigned and attached military and civilian personnel.

A7.4.8.2. Timeliness and accuracy of all products.

A7.4.8.3. Use of filler and replacement requests to identify personnel requirements.

A7.4.8.4. Updating of arrivals, departures, and duty status changes.

A7.4.8.5. Effectiveness of procedures to fill contingency personnel requirements and process personnel for deployment when the Personnel Deployment Function (PDF) is not active.

A7.4.8.6. Effectiveness of procedures to build a Deployment Requirements Document (DRD) when there is no manpower function.

A7.4.9. Sub-Area - Services.

A7.4.9.1. Item - Home Station Operations.

A7.4.9.1.1. Effectiveness of leadership, plans, and higher headquarters guidance.

A7.4.9.1.2. Coordination, problem solving, and time management.

A7.4.9.1.3. Visibility over the status of personnel, resources, and actions.

A7.4.9.1.4. Alternate control center or backup capability.

A7.4.9.2. Item - Deployed Operations.

A7.4.9.2.1. Sub-Item - Subsistence.

A7.4.9.2.1.1. Operation of a Troop Issue Facility.

A7.4.9.2.1.2. Determination of sustainability.

A7.4.9.2.1.3. Initiation of re-supply actions.

A7.4.9.2.1.4. Setup and operation of a Tactical Field Exchange (TFE).

A7.4.9.2.1.5. Demonstration cash handling procedures in TFE.

A7.4.9.2.2. Sub-Item - Food Service.

A7.4.9.2.2.1. Use of field equipment to prepare a minimum of two hot meals per day, including one using B rations, for the duration of the field training exercise.

- A7.4.9.2.2.2. Provision of Meals-Ready-to-Eat for other meals.
- A7.4.9.2.2.3. Effectiveness of initial supply, re-supply, and accountability procedures.
- A7.4.9.2.2.4. Sanitation.
- A7.4.9.2.2.5. Operation and maintenance of immersion heaters and M-2 burner units.
- A7.4.9.2.2.6. Quality of meals served.
- A7.4.9.2.3. Sub-Item - Lodging.
 - A7.4.9.2.3.1. Management of lodging assignments and terminations.
 - A7.4.9.2.3.2. Use of available resources.
 - A7.4.9.2.3.3. Plans for provision of adequate supply items.
 - A7.4.9.2.3.4. Effectiveness of locator service.
- A7.4.9.2.4. Sub-Item - Laundry.
 - A7.4.9.2.4.1. Feasibility and completeness of plans for organizational and personal laundry services.
 - A7.4.9.2.4.2. Site selection.
 - A7.4.9.2.4.3. Capability planning factors.
 - A7.4.9.2.4.4. Water, supply, and energy requirements.
- A7.4.9.2.5. Sub-Item - Mortuary Operations.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.1. Remains recovery actions and support of casualty care and morgue processing.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.2. Processing of remains to preserve identification media.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.3. Setup and operation of a temporary morgue.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.4. Movement of remains in the collection system.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.5. Sanitation and hygiene procedures.
 - A7.4.9.2.5.6. Planning and establishment of a mass/temporary burial site.
- A7.4.9.2.6. Sub-Item - Recreation Support.
 - A7.4.9.2.6.1. Setup and operation of a recreation support operation as appropriate for the tasked LWRR UTC.
 - A7.4.9.2.6.2. Use of available resources.
 - A7.4.9.2.6.3. Ability to plan for increased recreation activities as the base population increases.
 - A7.4.9.2.6.4. Feasibility and completeness of plans for handling cash for a retail outlet.
- A7.4.10. Sub-Area - Staff Support.
 - A7.4.10.1. Item - Public Affairs.

A7.4.10.1.1. Compliance with AFI 35-101, Chapter 12, *Wartime Readiness*, and Chapter 7, *Crisis Communication*.

A7.4.10.1.2. Compliance with and support of contingency plans, including local PA annexes to base support plans.

A7.4.10.1.3. Support to battle staff, disaster control group, or other command elements.

A7.4.10.1.4. Satisfaction of internal and external information needs during contingencies, at home station and deployed locations.

A7.4.10.1.5. Coordination of audiovisual documentation and media actions at the contingency location.

A7.4.10.1.6. Safeguarding of classified material at the contingency location.

A7.4.10.1.7. Production and timeliness of initial and follow-up news releases following significant incidents.

A7.4.10.1.8. Coordination with local authorities, senior leadership, and higher headquarters as required to determine what information can be released.

A7.4.10.1.9. Transmission of approved articles to home station or other locations.

A7.4.10.1.10. Provision of required reports to MAJCOM and SAF agencies.

A7.4.10.1.11. Release of appropriate information on military casualties and control of non-releasable information.

A7.4.10.1.12. Coordination with appropriate agencies on next-of-kin notification prior to release of names of casualties.

A7.4.10.2. Item - Legal Support.

A7.4.10.2.1. Ability of deployed forces to conduct operations in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and to recognize and report potential violations.

A7.4.10.2.2. Knowledge of deployed personnel concerning legal obligations with respect to targeting, employment of weapons, prisoners of war, noncombatant personnel or facilities, and neutral territory.

A7.4.10.2.3. Effectiveness of specialized training provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and security police.

A7.4.10.2.4. Availability and effectiveness of legal support provided to deployed commanders and personnel.

A7.4.10.3. Item - Pastoral Ministry.

A7.4.10.3.1. Ability to nurture the living, care for casualties, and honor the dead.

A7.4.10.3.2. Identification of areas of greatest needs, determination of resources, and provision of appropriate ministry.

A7.4.10.3.3. Setup and operation of a Chapel Control Center, easily accessible to the CCP, as primary location for counseling and religious activities.

A7.4.10.3.4. Coordination with medical staff to ascertain status of casualties, meet patient and staff needs, and provide appropriate spiritual triage.

A7.4.10.3.5. Communication and coordination with commanders and other functional areas.

A7.4.10.3.6. Visitation, counseling, and worship services for each shift.

A7.4.10.3.7. Capability to survive, sustain, manage, and provide security for CRTs and resources.

A7.4.11. Sub-Area - Supply.

A7.4.11.1. Item - Spares Support.

A7.4.11.1.1. Sub-Item - General.

A7.4.11.1.1.1. Effectiveness of operations in a wartime environment.

A7.4.11.1.1.2. Processing of Partial/Not Mission Capable Supply (P/NMCS) requirements.

A7.4.11.1.1.3. Ability to process intra-theater/CONUS lateral support requests.

A7.4.11.1.1.4. Tracking of reparable assets through the repair cycle.

A7.4.11.1.2. Sub-Item: Readiness Support Packages (RSP).

A7.4.11.1.2.1. Asset security, accountability, and documentation of transactions.

A7.4.11.1.2.2. Effectiveness of routine supply management.

A7.4.11.1.2.3. Effectiveness of actions taken to obtain assets not immediately available.

A7.4.11.1.2.4. Use of proper warehouse procedures.

A7.4.11.1.2.5. Ability to transfer records to the Air Force Contingency Supply Support Office (AFCSSO) as part of the final deployment, if required.

A7.4.11.1.2.6. Ability to use the Dyna-Metric Microcomputer Analysis System (DMAS) to prioritize maintenance cannibalizations.

A7.4.11.1.3. Sub-Item - International Marine/Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT).

A7.4.11.1.3.1. Setup and operation of the INMARSAT.

A7.4.11.1.3.2. Working knowledge of all aspects of the INMARSAT.

A7.4.11.1.3.3. Ability to transition to in-line connectivity, and to work using backup power.

A7.4.11.1.3.4. Ability to process transactions using manual post-post accounting procedures.

A7.4.11.1.3.5. Ability to relocate to alternate locations without degradation of mission support.

A7.4.11.2. Item - Fuels Support.

A7.4.11.2.1. Qualification on, awareness of, and compliance with all safety procedures/technical data during refueling operations and cryogenics operations.

- A7.4.11.2.2. Serviceability and safety of assigned equipment and facilities.
- A7.4.11.2.3. Personnel qualifications and system approvals for hot refueling and combat quick turn operations.
- A7.4.11.2.4. Safety and timeliness of refueling and cryogenics support.
- A7.4.11.2.5. Fuels expediter's familiarity with support requirements, service as a technical advisor, and monitoring of flight line refueling operations.
- A7.4.11.2.6. Resource Control Center's ability to manage and control fuels operations in a wartime environment.
- A7.4.11.2.7. Ability to properly detect, sample, and analyze suspected fuel/cryogenics contamination.
- A7.4.11.2.8. Use of in-place emergency power where applicable.
- A7.4.11.3. Item - Supply/Fuels Recuperation.
 - A7.4.11.3.1. Sub-Item - Command and Control.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.1. Monitoring, control, and flexibility of Supply and Fuels operations.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.2. Coordination, problem solving, and time management.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.3. Visibility over the status of personnel, resources, and actions.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.4. Effectiveness of local plans and higher headquarters guidance.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.5. Effectiveness of communication and power outage procedures.
 - A7.4.11.3.1.6. Ability to relocate to alternate locations without degradation of command and control or mission support.
 - A7.4.11.3.2. Sub-Item - Supply.
 - A7.4.11.3.2.1. Dispersal of Readiness Stores Package (RSP), Mission Support Kits (MSK), and for survivability.
 - A7.4.11.3.2.2. Ability to prioritize requirements and reconstitute and replenish RSP or MSK, damaged or lost due to fire, battle damage, etc., using the Dynamic Model Assessment System (DMAS).
 - A7.4.11.3.2.3. Identification of critical spares using DMAS.
 - A7.4.11.3.2.4. Preparation of destroyed RSP and MSK, and messages.
 - A7.4.11.3.2.5. Ability to adjust SBSS records.
 - A7.4.11.3.2.6. Ability to manage and locate deployed mobility bag assets using the Mobility Inventory Control and Accountability System (MICAS).
 - A7.4.11.3.3. Sub-Item - Fuels.
 - A7.4.11.3.3.1. Accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of petroleum deficiency reports.
 - A7.4.11.3.3.2. Identification of LIMFACs in the reports.
 - A7.4.11.3.3.3. Classification and security of the reports.

A7.4.12. Sub-Area - Transportation will be evaluated on the ability of its military deployable UTCs to provide vehicle management, vehicle maintenance, and TMO support during the Phase II exercise.

A7.4.12.1. Item - Vehicle Management.

A7.4.12.1.1. Vehicle asset support.

A7.4.12.1.2. Driver qualifications and licensing (i.e., wreckers, buses, multi-pax vehicles, etc.).

A7.4.12.1.3. Vehicle disbursement plan.

A7.4.12.1.4. Vehicle recall list/MEL (Mission Essential Listing).

A7.4.12.2. Item - Vehicle Maintenance.

A7.4.12.2.1. Maintenance priorities.

A7.4.12.2.2. Maintenance actions.

A7.4.12.2.3. Vehicle status reporting.

A7.4.12.2.4. Maintenance response times.

A7.4.12.2.5. Vehicle sustainability.

A7.4.12.3. Item - Traffic Management.

A7.4.12.3.1. Critical cargo handling (preparation, shipment and/or receipt, etc.).

A7.4.12.3.2. Passenger handling.

A7.4.12.3.3. Cargo packing, labeling, and documentation.

A7.4.12.4. Item - Transportation Control Center (TCC).

A7.4.12.4.1. Ability to meet mission tasking.

A7.4.12.4.2. Timely up-channeling of transportation related information (vehicle status, personnel availability, etc.).

A7.4.12.4.3. Personnel management.

A7.4.12.4.4. Relocation procedures.

A7.4.13. Sub-Area - Financial Management and Comptroller.

A7.4.13.1. Capability to provide comptroller support from a deployed location and adequacy of accounting, budgeting, and security principles applied to each scenario.

A7.4.13.2. Establishment of a secure disbursing agent operation.

A7.4.13.3. Adequacy of Logistics Detail Package (LOGDET).

A7.4.13.4. Ability to provide qualified personnel for disbursing agent operations.

A7.4.13.5. Ability to balance cashier and disbursing agent accounts.

A7.4.13.6. Establishment of a reliable source of sufficient US and local currencies.

A7.4.13.7. Quality of military pay, travel, check cashing, and accommodation exchange services for deployed personnel.

A7.4.13.8. Propriety of funds expenditures.

A7.4.13.9. Quality of agency accountability and turn-in operations.

A7.4.13.10. Quality of voucher payment procedures and maintenance of funding source documents.

A7.4.13.11. Ability to coordinate and work with contracting and other agencies as required.

A7.4.14. Sub-Area - Security Forces.

A7.4.14.1. Item - Air Base Defense: This item reinforces the Air Base Defense (ABD) Common Core Criteria guidelines provided in AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, and emphasizes the regulatory guidance provided in AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*; AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*; and AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*.

A7.4.14.1.1. Sub-Item - Command and Control.

A7.4.14.1.1.1. Effectiveness of planned procedures, terrain knowledge, friendly force location, and organization fire control.

A7.4.14.1.1.2. Supervision.

A7.4.14.1.1.3. Establishment of priorities of work, routines in defense, and track plans.

A7.4.14.1.1.4. Implementation of stand-to as required.

A7.4.14.1.1.5. Demonstration of troop leader procedures for preparation of five paragraph operations orders.

A7.4.14.1.1.6. Ability to exercise control over forces and understand the principles of detection, response force, fire, and maneuver.

A7.4.14.1.1.7. Consolidation and reorganization.

A7.4.14.1.1.8. Plan and execute convoy escort operations.

A7.4.14.1.1.9. Effectiveness of basic skills associated with cover, concealment, camouflage, noise and light discipline, and fire control.

A7.4.14.1.1.10. Familiarity with the terrain and knowledge of the location of friendly forces.

A7.4.14.1.1.11. Preparation of sector sketches, overlays, and reports.

A7.4.14.1.1.12. Identification of and response to enemy activity, and use of reinforcements from the mobile reserve or response force if required.

A7.4.14.1.1.13. Effectiveness of communications network using all available radio and telephone assets.

A7.4.14.1.2. Sub-Item - Ground Defense Forces.

A7.4.14.1.2.1. Individual proficiency in employment of assigned weapons, vehicles, communications, and individual equipment; cover, camouflage, concealment; maneuver under fire; and field craft skills.

A7.4.14.1.2.2. Capability to detect, report, tactically respond to, and neutralize security threats and attack exercises.

A7.4.14.1.2.3. Procedures and response in support of all other scenarios in the exercise area.

A7.4.14.1.2.4. Effectiveness of Defensive Fighting Positions (DFPs).

A7.4.14.1.2.5. Use of Air Force guidance and the appropriate Army Field Manuals when developing plans for DFPs.

A7.4.14.1.2.6. Establishment of camouflaged fighting positions with interlocking fields of fire and proper employment of weapons, range cards, tactical communications, early warning devices, and obstacles.

A7.4.14.1.2.7. Use of all available tactical radio and telephone systems.

A7.4.14.1.2.8. OP/LP tactics and procedures.

A7.4.14.1.2.9. Patrol organization, planning, preparation, and execution.

A7.4.14.1.2.10. Procedures to request indirect fire support.

A7.4.14.1.2.11. EPW actions.

A7.4.14.1.2.12. Equipment controls and resupply.

A7.4.14.1.2.13. Fire control discipline.

A7.4.14.1.2.14. Knowledge and use of the Rules of Engagement.

A7.4.14.1.2.15. Operate in an NBC environment.

A7.4.14.1.2.16. Military Working Dog teams.

A7.4.14.2. Item - Office of Special Investigations. The role of counterintelligence and special investigations (CI/SPI) in support of force protection functions are outlined in JCS Pub 2-01.2., *Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations*. Within the Air Force, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is responsible for providing CI/SPI functions in support of Air Force personnel, resources, and operations. AFOSI Detachment personnel will be rated against realistic wartime taskings and not penalized because of peacetime rules, commitments, and procedures that must be followed. The force protection criteria listed below will be evaluated by AFOSI Inspectors, specifically designated by HQ AFOSI/IG and coordinated with HQ AFMC/IG, using applicable AFOSI instructions.

A7.4.14.2.1. Sub-Item - Force Protection Operations (FPO).

A7.4.14.2.1.1. Overall management and supervision of Force Protection Operations under wartime conditions.

A7.4.14.2.1.2. Integration with Host Unit operations and optimization of the use of resources.

A7.4.14.2.1.3. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely, accurate, and relevant counterintelligence and criminal threat information to appropriate battle staffs, dispersed operating locations, higher headquarters, and joint service or host nation organizations.

A7.4.14.2.1.4. Effectiveness of coordination and feedback between workcenters and action agencies.

A7.4.14.2.2. Sub-Item - Force Protection Reporting.

A7.4.14.2.2.1. Clarity, completeness, and timeliness of reported information.

A7.4.14.2.2.2. Effectiveness of quality control procedures for reviewing content and accuracy prior to transmission.

A7.4.14.2.2.3. Compliance with applicable format, classification, and addressing requirements.

Attachment 8

ORI GROUND RULES

A8.1. General.

A8.1.1. Organization personnel are to carry out exercise tasks in as realistic a manner as possible, given available resources and the organization's specific responsibilities. Use simulations where necessary to demonstrate mission capability without requiring the inappropriate use of resources or the inappropriate restriction of real-world operations. Refer to [Attachment 9](#) and [Attachment 10](#) for pre-approved simulations and additional guidance.

A8.1.2. All AFMC personnel and facilities are subject to involvement in exercises, with the following exceptions.

A8.1.2.1. Classrooms or facilities where promotion testing is being conducted.

A8.1.2.2. Military court facilities.

A8.1.2.3. Portions of medical facilities providing real-world critical care to patients, and those portions providing routine care that have been specifically exempted by the hospital commander.

A8.1.2.4. Facilities occupied by non-AFMC organizations.

A8.1.2.5. Facilities where religious services are being conducted.

A8.1.3. The IG will not attempt to mislead organization personnel.

A8.1.3.1. IG members will not initiate exercises without announcing them as exercises.

A8.1.3.2. IG members will not use IG badges, hats, or entry authorization lists to inappropriately gain access to any area or information.

A8.1.3.3. When wearing IG badges or hats, IG members may cross cordon lines and bypass entry control points at exercise locations, and may carry briefcases or packages without submitting them for search by exercise participants.

A8.1.3.4. IG members must comply with all security requirements in real-world restricted or controlled areas.

A8.1.4. The IG will not use the term "exercise classified." All intelligence scenario traffic will have individual paragraph classification markings and will be transmitted via secure channels. Warning Orders, Time Phased Force Deployment Listings, and other exercise documents which are based on artificial scenarios and unclassified exercise planning databases will remain unclassified during AFMC ORIs.

A8.1.5. Prepare required exercise messages, but do not transmit them outside of the organization. Provide the IG with a copy of all exercise documents.

A8.1.6. Route requests for higher headquarters or off-base agency support to the IG, unless directed otherwise in the tasking instructions.

A8.2. ORI Phase I Ground Rules.

A8.2.1. Initial Response.

A8.2.1.1. All Air Force-Wide UTC Availability System (AFWUS) tasked deployable personnel and equipment packages are subject to exercise deployment (includes all DWS, DXS, DWX, and DXX coded UTCs).

A8.2.1.2. Take all actions that would be required to actually deploy people and equipment.

A8.2.1.3. UTC personnel and equipment that have been fully processed for deployment may not participate in further exercise play until the start of Transition Day during Phase II.

A8.2.1.4. Organizations tasked to deploy by air after ground movement to an Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) will prepare all cargo for air shipment. The ORI transportation inspector will act as Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), receive all requests for transportation, and provide the vehicle flow.

A8.2.1.5. For actual and simulated airlift, plan to work a Maximum on Ground (MOG) of two C-141 equivalents departing at one-hour intervals.

A8.2.1.6. Organizations unable to support a MOG of two will have supporting Higher Headquarters' documentation, be able to work a MOG of one C-141 equivalent, and have procedures developed to meet potential aircraft surge requirements.

A8.2.1.7. The assessment of suitability for movement will consider only those personnel and equipment items for which the organization has direct responsibility.

A8.2.1.8. Documentation errors identified during the loadmaster briefing (cargo load start time) will not preclude cargo from being accepted for loading, unless these errors jeopardize load safety or alter aircraft cargo load sequencing. Documentation errors must be corrected prior to aircraft departure (No later than PAX load complete time for simulated movements).

A8.2.1.9. Aircraft departure time is defined as the time a deployment aircraft is scheduled to take off. All cargo, equipment, passengers, and baggage must be loaded and final documentation available no later than 20 minutes prior to aircraft departure time.

A8.2.1.10. Do not transport class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives to the marshaling area without prior coordination with the Transportation inspector.

A8.2.1.11. Provide the IG with one copy of deployment documents generated during the exercise, such as the following.

A8.2.1.11.1. Package for each chalk to include load plans, deployment schedule of events, and deployment requirements data.

A8.2.1.11.2. Passenger manifests and special orders.

A8.2.1.11.3. Troop commander and cargo courier packages and station files.

A8.2.1.11.4. AF Forms 9, Government Bills of Lading, and Government Transportation Requests.

A8.2.1.11.5. Deployment Control Center logs.

A8.2.1.11.6. Equipment shortfall requests.

A8.2.1.11.7. Levy reclaim requests.

A8.2.1.11.8. List of personnel on leave or TDY.

A8.2.1.11.9. War Reserve Materiel (WRM) release requests.

A8.2.1.12. A major cargo safety violation is an unsafe act or condition that results in or could result in serious damage to aircraft or equipment and/or disabling injury or death to personnel. Examples of major cargo safety violations are incompatible cargo on the same pallet or aircraft, leaking fuel or corrosive material, unidentified hazardous cargo that changes the compatibility requirements of the increment or load, and improperly packaged hazardous materials.

A8.2.1.13. A minor cargo safety violation is an unsafe act or condition which results in or could result in damage to an aircraft, personnel or equipment that does not render it unsafe for transport, damage to other equipment that does not render it unsafe for use, or injury to personnel of a lesser degree than that cited as a disabling injury. An example of a minor cargo safety violation is an improperly affixed pallet top net.

A8.2.2. Wartime Materiel Support.

A8.2.2.1. The IG will coordinate with each center prior to the inspection to determine which organizations may be assessed. Organizations that undergo significant increases in operations while preparing for and supporting contingencies will be inspected and rated. Organizations that do not require significant changes from their peacetime operations may be inspected and not rated, or not inspected at all.

A8.2.2.2. The IG may conduct force protection and home station contingency exercises that directly impact the center's primary mission. The IG will evaluate center actions to restore or maintain production during and after the incident.

A8.2.2.3. Test Acceleration involves two possible scenario types: Accelerated Test and Test Surge. An Accelerated Test is a full test program in response to new requirements. A Test Surge is the acceleration of a previously planned program to reduce the time required to complete the test. Both types of Test Acceleration use the same grading criteria.

A8.2.3. Home Station Contingency Response.

A8.2.3.1. When required to verify compliance items, home station contingency exercises will involve events that have a reasonable probability of occurring. Possible scenarios include aircraft, vehicle, or industrial accidents; natural disasters; reception of transiting forces or non-combatants; or other events appropriate for a particular installation.

A8.2.3.2. Home station contingency exercises will be conducted in "real-world" locations. Organizations may use any available resources to respond, but may not use personnel or equipment that have already been "deployed" as part of the ORI.

A8.2.3.3. Exercise participants and IG members must obey normal speed limits and traffic control devices when responding to exercises. Emergency vehicle operators may use flashing lights but not sirens.

A8.2.4. Fire Department Exercises. The IG will coordinate with the organization's project officer and the fire department Trusted Agent on any aircraft, facilities, casualties, or smoke generation devices required for the exercises.

A8.2.4.1. Aircrew Extraction.

A8.2.4.1.1. Organizations may be evaluated on their capability to rescue personnel from mission assigned aircraft. The IG will conduct the exercise in accordance with applicable AFIs and organization supplements, aircraft technical orders, and Technical Order 00-105E-9, with special emphasis on all safety guidance.

A8.2.4.1.2. The aircrew, dressed in appropriate flight gear, must be at the aircraft 15 minutes prior to exercise initiation for a pre-brief on the scenario, crew responsibilities, and fire protection egress procedures.

A8.2.4.1.3. The IG will normally initiate the exercise through an input to the control tower, which will then activate the primary crash circuit and relay the exercise input.

A8.2.4.1.4. Exercise participants must climb down from the aircraft on their own. Rescue personnel will prepare and transport casualties to the top of the ladder or stairs, and then resume emergency care once the participants are on the ground.

A8.2.4.2. Aircraft Arresting System Reset.

A8.2.4.2.1. Organizations may be evaluated on their ability to recover an aircraft from an arresting gear and return the runway to operational status in a timely manner.

A8.2.4.2.2. For BAK-9 and BAK-12 arresting gear, engagements should be made by aircraft taxiing between 75 and 90 knots, with the speed/weight commensurate with regime I engagements for the arresting gear involved.

A8.2.4.2.3. For BAK-13 arresting gear, engagements should be made from either a landing or taxiing aircraft depending on operational conditions.

A8.2.4.2.4. For F-16 aircraft, the aircraft selected should not be configured with a centerline store as damage from the cable may result. Additionally, the barrier team will ensure that tail hook shear pins are available to repair the aircraft after the engagement.

A8.2.4.2.5. The exercise will normally be initiated when the pilot advises the tower of the simulated emergency condition.

A8.2.4.2.6. After the aircraft has been disengaged from the barrier, the aircraft may be towed to a suitable location to conduct an aircrew extraction or crash removal exercise.

A8.2.4.2.7. If actual aircraft are not available, the engagement may be simulated by using a truck to pull the cable out 800 feet.

A8.2.4.3. Aircraft Crash Rescue Live Fire.

A8.2.4.3.1. A pre-briefed training fire exercise may be conducted and evaluated using the organization's aircraft crash rescue training mockup to simulate the crash of a mission assigned aircraft.

A8.2.4.3.2. The IG will schedule the exercise at a time that will not interfere with the local operational flying schedule, and will give the fire chief 24 hours notice of the time the pit fire is to be conducted.

A8.2.4.4. Structural Fire Exercise.

A8.2.4.4.1. This exercise will normally involve a single structure requiring fire suppression, rescue, and ancillary fire fighting actions.

A8.2.4.4.2. The IG will notify the fire chief at least 30 minutes prior to the exercise.

A8.2.4.5. Structural Live Fire.

A8.2.4.5.1. A pre-briefed training exercise may be conducted using the organization's live fire structural training facility.

A8.2.4.5.2. The IG will notify the fire chief at least 24 hours prior to the time that the live fires are to be conducted.

A8.2.4.6. Auto Extrication Exercise.

A8.2.4.6.1. This exercise may involve one to three vehicles requiring fire suppression and rescue operations.

A8.2.4.6.2. The IG will notify the fire chief at least 30 minutes prior to the exercise.

A8.2.4.7. Confined Spaces Rescue.

A8.2.4.7.1. This exercise will be restricted to the fire department to evaluate rescue procedures and equipment usage on a confined space rescue operation.

A8.2.4.7.2. The exercise area will be in a base identified confined space area.

A8.2.4.7.3. The IG will notify the fire chief at least 30 minutes prior to the exercise.

A8.2.5. Weapon Safety During Force Protection Exercises.

A8.2.5.1. On duty personnel responding to exercises with weapons and LIVE AMMUNITION will adhere to special rules. As a minimum.

A8.2.5.1.1. M-16 rifles/shotguns may be brought to port arms (chamber empty, on safe, finger not in trigger guard) during exercises. Weapons will not be pointed, aimed, or handled in any manner that might endanger people or equipment.

A8.2.5.1.2. Belt-fed machine guns/automatic weapons will not be loaded or half-loaded. Weapons will not be pointed, aimed, or handled in any manner that might endanger people or equipment.

A8.2.5.1.3. Pistols will be kept in the holster during exercises. Sentries may assume the ready position (flaps, straps unfastened, hand on butt stock or grips) during challenging procedures.

A8.2.5.1.4. Emergency Services Teams (ESTs) may respond to exercise scenarios as they have trained, e.g. weapons drawn and pointed; however, weapons safety procedures must include additional steps that preclude LIVE AMMUNITION from being introduced into exercise scenarios.

A8.2.5.1.5. During force protection exercises, IG role players will.

A8.2.5.1.5.1. Not be readily identifiable as IG members.

A8.2.5.1.5.2. Not openly display simulated weapons or use them in a threatening manner.

A8.2.5.1.5.3. Not take any threatening action toward responding security police.

A8.2.5.1.5.4. Not attempt to flee, struggle against, or otherwise actively evade the response force.

A8.2.5.1.5.5. Not resist orders of the responding forces.

A8.2.6. EOD Exercises. The IG will coordinate with the organization's project officer and the EOD Trusted Agent on any aircraft, facilities, equipment or training aides. EOD response to base exercises involving aircraft accident response or IED response may be used to satisfy requirement for EOD aircraft or IED exercises as long as the criteria for these exercises are met.

A8.3. ORI Phase II Ground Rules.

A8.3.1. Personnel and Equipment.

A8.3.1.1. All UTCs deployed during Phase I will be evaluated during Phase II unless specifically exempted by the IG. Additional UTCs may be tasked for Phase II to "round out" unit capabilities. Units without deployable UTC taskings will not be evaluated during Phase II.

A8.3.1.2. If required to enhance realism, the evaluated organization may use non-UTC resources during Phase II with IG approval.

A8.3.1.3. At least 45 days prior to the ORI start date organizations must submit a list of non-UTC personnel, vehicles, equipment, and materials to be used in the exercise, and a brief explanation of why they are necessary. The IG will approve or disapprove each item and return the list to the organization at least 30 days prior to the ORI.

A8.3.1.4. Non-UTC personnel may be evaluated in all ATSO related areas such as casualty care and passive defense. Non-UTC personnel will not be evaluated in their functional area, unless that functional area has a tasked UTC participating in the exercise or a medical unit is assigned for base support to other required UTCs in order to facilitate more realistic procedures.

A8.3.1.5. Non-UTC vehicles, equipment, and materials are subject to the same exercise play as any other resource.

A8.3.1.6. Approved non-UTC vehicles, equipment, and materials may be left in real-world storage locations or pre-positioned near the Phase II play area, but may not be immediately adjacent to their intended point of use. Non-UTC assets may not be used until specifically requested by the deployed organization and released by the IG.

A8.3.2. General Scenario: Although specific details of each ORI scenario will vary, most will be based on the following.

A8.3.2.1. Transition Day: One day to demonstrate the organization's arrival, inprocessing, and setup at the deployed location. Transition Day represents Day 1 at the deployed location, regardless of when each unit processed for deployment. See paragraph [A8.3.8](#) for additional information.

A8.3.2.2. Wartime Operations: One to three days, around the clock, to demonstrate all wartime missions and tasks. The IG will advance the exercise clock by 30 days at the start of this portion of the exercise, so it represents Days 31, 32, and 33 at the deployed location. See paragraph [A8.3.9](#) for additional information.

A8.3.3. Play Area.

A8.3.3.1. Establish an area or areas in which all deployable personnel can exercise their wartime operations in as realistic a manner as practical. Provide physical separation and authorization as required to allow the use of ground-burst simulators and smoke grenades.

A8.3.4. Processing Area.

A8.3.4.1. Establish a parking and processing area to be used to control entry and exit from the play area during Wartime Operations. Establish procedures to advise incoming personnel of current alarm conditions, recognition codes, or other information needed before entering the play area.

A8.3.4.2. The Contamination Control Area and weapons armory may be located at this processing area.

A8.3.4.3. The IG may inspect activities at the processing area, but will not conduct hostile attack exercises there. Vehicles driving between the processing area and the play area are subject to all normal exercise play.

A8.3.4.4. Processing area facilities may be constructed prior to the inspection.

A8.3.5. Weapons and Ammunition.

A8.3.5.1. Personnel must deploy with their authorized weapons if required by tasking. Once personnel are at the deployed location, possession and use of weapons will be dictated by wartime conditions. Toy or simulated weapons may not be used.

A8.3.5.2. All weapons used in the exercise must be fitted with blank firing adapters. Note: if no ammo (live or blank) is to be used in the play area, then blank adapters are not required.

A8.3.5.3. Armory guards, real-world sentries, or other security forces equipped with live ammunition within the play area must be distinctively identified and may not participate in the exercise. Additionally, all live ammunition magazines in the play area must be either spray-painted red or have red tape affixed to them.

A8.3.5.4. Provide exercise participants and the IG with clear written instructions identifying the locations and organizations that have live ammunition, and the controls over its use.

A8.3.5.5. Blanks and real ammunition must not be mixed, and the handling of each must be closely monitored.

A8.3.6. External Agency Support.

A8.3.6.1. The IG will act as the higher headquarters, host nation, or any other external agency that could support the deployed organization in an actual contingency.

A8.3.6.2. Request guidance, additional resources, or any other necessary support using Optional Form 27, United States Government 2-Way Memo a similar locally-produced form, or the actual message or letter format that would be used in real life. Requests may be made in person if the appropriate IG member is available, but a written follow-up memo is recommended to maintain an audit trail.

A8.3.7. Movement In and Out of the Play Area.

A8.3.7.1. Non-players and non-play vehicles are not permitted in the play area without prior approval of the IG.

A8.3.7.2. Exercise participants may leave the play area on their own authority to obtain non-UTC resources from storage locations, when the IG has specifically authorized use of such resources.

A8.3.8. Transition Day.

A8.3.8.1. All deployed UTCs must demonstrate their arrival, inprocessing, and setup at the deployed location on Transition Day, regardless of when each unit processed for deployment. Timing of each UTC's arrival is at the discretion of the organization, within the following guidelines.

A8.3.8.1.1. No UTCs may arrive at the Phase II play area before 0600 local time.

A8.3.8.1.2. Civil engineers should arrive earlier than other teams that will operate from tents or other expedient facilities, to demonstrate the capability to arrive at a bare base in advance of supporting forces and prepare facilities for their own and others' use.

A8.3.8.1.3. PERSCO must develop and maintain accountability of exercise participants.

A8.3.8.1.4. All necessary processing and setup actions should be complete no later than 2400 local time.

A8.3.8.1.5. A security threat may exist, but there will be no initial threat of large-scale air or ground attacks.

A8.3.8.1.6. Deployed organizations are not required to use the parking and processing area on Transition Day.

A8.3.8.1.7. Deployed organizations are not required to stay in the play area on Transition Day after completing all necessary processing and setup actions. Commanders or team chiefs should notify their functional IG member of their expected completion time.

A8.3.9. Wartime Operations.

A8.3.9.1. General.

A8.3.9.1.1. All organizations must be prepared to respond to Wartime Operations exercises at 0001 on the day after Transition Day.

A8.3.9.1.2. Exercise participants coming on or off shift must enter and exit through the processing area.

A8.3.9.1.3. The full spectrum of threats may exist.

A8.3.9.1.4. If chemical/biological contamination exercises are conducted when the outside air temperature exceeds 75 degrees Fahrenheit, vehicle windows may be rolled down during Alarm Black.

A8.3.9.1.5. Simulated M-8 paper and M-9 paper is not required to be placed on vehicle painted surfaces or headlights.

A8.3.9.2. Air Base Defense.

A8.3.9.2.1. Security Force organizations will be evaluated against the deployment tasking message. Organizations must plan to demonstrate their ability to provide defense over a specific location IAW their Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statement for the full UTC tasking.

A8.3.9.2.2. Security Force live munitions pallets will be built, moved, evaluated, and released back to the unit during the Phase I, but will not be transported to the exercise site for Phase II.

A8.3.9.2.3. Exercises, which are not directly tied to the tasked UTC's ability to defend the designated locale, will not be applied to the Security Force rating.

A8.3.9.2.4. UTC team integrity will be maintained for the exercise. Additions of command and control elements, when required, will not be rated unless performing as an ABD Headquarters element.

A8.3.9.2.5. Specialized team and individual equipment assigned to the UTC must be used during the exercise. UTC mobility equipment listed in the applicable LOGDET, country mission folders for tasked locations, and individual mobility folders for each member must be available and deployable. All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) operators must be specially trained.

A8.3.9.2.6. Blanks and real ammunition must not be mixed, and the handling of each must be closely monitored.

A8.3.9.3. Combat Logistics Support.

A8.3.9.3.1. The AFMC IG will, when applicable, select Combat Logistics Support Squadron UTCs and ABDR engineer UTCs for evaluation during an ORI. Selected UTCs will demonstrate mission knowledge and task proficiency in ABDR operations for each assigned aircraft or system, and in supply and packaging augmentation and reconstitution. Evaluations may include interviews and documentation reviews at the home station as well as exercises at the unit's field training site or deployed location.

A8.3.9.3.2. ABDR exercises are developed and evaluated by the AFMC IG, with the assistance of Trusted Agents from the inspected organization. Trusted Agents will provide exercise scenarios, damage descriptions, and associated estimated times in commission (ETICs) used in the past five local exercises, provide the IG with depot, EOD, and other POCs, and assist with scenario execution.

A8.3.9.3.3. The actual engineered repair designs and calculations will be verified by IG Team ABDR engineers. The IG may use simulations and written testing to assess the engineer's capability.

A8.3.9.4. Civil Engineering.

A8.3.9.4.1. Equipment such as tents, generators, sandbags, netting, etc. can be pre-positioned at the play area, but no pre-construction at the play area will be conducted until transition day without prior authorization from the IG. This paragraph does not apply to bases without CE UTCs.

A8.3.9.4.2. Civil engineers must transport their personnel and UTC equipment from a central location to the exercise site using one or more convoys of approved non-UTC vehicles. The convoy route must be at least three miles long. Other personnel may use UTC vehicles, approved non-UTC vehicles, or a shuttle service established by the organization, and may take direct routes.

A8.3.9.4.3. During transition day, civil engineers may use only those facilities and utilities actually constructed or re-configured that day. During wartime operations, they may use pre-constructed facilities and commercial utilities.

A8.3.9.4.4. CE organizations will construct and operate expedient facilities and utility systems for use during the exercise, to the extent allowed by available resources and exercise

areas. Units are not required to acquire mobile aircraft arresting systems, bare base utility systems, or other assets not normally authorized for home station training, but may do so if desired. Units will be required to provide materials to construct and cover one hardback tent when directed by the IG.

A8.3.9.4.5. The IG may evaluate operation and maintenance of automatic-start and user-start generators, both in and out of the exercise play area. The ORI CE inspector and a Trusted Agent electrician will turn off power to the facilities or areas to be tested, and the inspector will evaluate the response to the loss of power over an extended period, typically 12 to 24 hours. Prior to the start of the ORI, the organization must identify any facilities which will require notice 30 minutes prior to the power outage to allow sensitive equipment to be shut down.

A8.3.9.5. Medical.

A8.3.9.5.1. AFMC medical units will provide, at a minimum, the following support to the deployed organizations.

A8.3.9.5.2. Deployed Medical Facility (DMF).

A8.3.9.5.3. Casualty Collection Point(s) (CCPs) if tasked with UTC, or at option of the unit.

A8.3.9.5.4. Patient Retrieval Team(s) (PRTs) if tasked with UTC, or at option of the unit.

A8.3.9.5.5. Patient Decontamination Team, if tasked with UTC or at option of the unit.

A8.3.9.5.6. The DMF will be established in the Phase II play area to provide initial triage and trauma stabilization. Treatment capabilities will not be extensive. Patients will be evaluated for return to duty or evacuation. Public Health and Bioenvironmental Engineering support will be provided.

Attachment 9

ORI STANDARD SIMULATIONS

A9.1. General.

A9.1.1. Some actions that would be required in a contingency must be or should be simulated in an exercise, to prevent inappropriate use of resources or inappropriate restrictions of real-world operations. This attachment lists pre-approved simulations that do not have to be specifically requested, and guidelines on requesting IG approval for additional simulations.

A9.1.2. Simulations reduce but do not eliminate the cost and complexity of exercises. The use of resources or the restriction of real-world operations does not justify a simulation; only inappropriate uses or restrictions do so.

A9.1.3. Final authority on what constitutes inappropriate use or restriction rests with the organization commander. If the commander and the IG disagree, the IG will note the issue in the ORI report and describe the impact on the inspection.

A9.1.4. The IG may request demonstration of any simulated item to the extent necessary to test actual capability.

A9.2. Pre-Approved Simulations.

A9.2.1. Closure of alert force routes or active runways.

A9.2.2. Transmission of messages outside of the inspected organization.

A9.2.3. Final processing of Purchase Requests, Government Transportation Requests, Government Bills of Lading, and other forms needed to acquire transportation or locally procured materiel.

A9.2.4. Contracting of commercial vehicles. Use government vehicles when available and appropriate to simulate commercial vehicles.

A9.2.5. Hiring of personnel required to fill shortages or previously deferred positions. Identify all such positions and generate at least one complete hiring package.

A9.2.6. Recall of individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs), except where actual recall is necessary and cost effective for both real-world and inspection requirements. Identify all such positions and generate at least one complete recall processing package.

A9.2.7. Realignment or movement of personnel in response to deferred, suspended, or abolished workloads. Identify all such positions and generate at least one complete realignment package.

A9.2.8. Recall of personnel from leave and TDY. Mark "LV" or "TDY" on deployment documents for personnel who could be realistically recalled, and process their individual mobility folders and shot records for deployment as substitutes for the actual personnel.

A9.2.9. Movement and issue of flight lunches and field rations, beyond those required for consumption during the exercise.

A9.2.10. Movement of drugs and narcotics.

A9.2.11. Substitution of legal tender (cash) with monetary props.

- A9.2.12. Removal of reflective tape or catalytic converters from deploying equipment.
- A9.2.13. Provision of all required AF Forms 1480, Summary of Care for deploying personnel. Provide copies of at least 20% of the required forms.
- A9.2.14. Provision of all required Standard Forms 88, Report of Medical Examination and AF Forms 1042, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty for applicable deploying personnel. Provide copies of at least 20% of the required forms.
- A9.2.15. Actual administration of the Yellow Fever immunization is a decision of the MTF commander.
- A9.2.16. Issue of actual chemical agent antidotes.
- A9.2.17. Authentication of special orders. Provide minimum distribution to the appropriate workstations.
- A9.2.18. Projection of exercise TDY data into the personnel data system.
- A9.2.19. Construction of all barriers or other facility hardening actions necessary to respond to increased security threats. Prioritize the actions that would be taken in an actual emergency and develop a schedule describing the required labor, equipment, material, funds, and estimated start and completion times for each. Complete all necessary coordination and documentation, and physically demonstrate a sample (chosen by the IG) of the scheduled actions.
- A9.2.20. Transport of actual ammunition to Phase II exercise locations, beyond that needed for real-world security.
- A9.2.21. Charging of hose lines during simulated structural and aircraft fire exercises, unless directed by the IG fire protection inspector.
- A9.2.22. Use of local training assets to simulate War Reserve Materiel that would realistically be available at the deployed location.
- A9.2.23. Availability of one Harvest Falcon Housekeeping Set, UTC XFBKA; one Bare Base Support Vehicle Package, UTC UFSWA; and one Rapid Runway Repair Vehicle Package, UTC UFSWK. Use assets in these UTCs to simulate replacement or expansion of actual on-hand capability.
- A9.2.24. Extensive geographic separation of the Contamination Control Area (CCA) from the exercise site.
- A9.2.25. Possession and use of replacement CWDE at the CCA.
- A9.2.26. Removal of battle dress uniforms, underwear, and boots at the CCA.
- A9.2.27. Use of replacement of filters for CWDE masks.
- A9.2.28. Use of actual M-8 and M-9 chemical detection paper and M291 personal decontamination kits in the field.
- A9.2.29. Use of hazardous decontamination agents.
- A9.2.30. Cutting contaminated Chemical Warfare Defense Ensembles (CWDEs) from patients.
- A9.2.31. Digging defensive fighting positions when prohibited by environmental constraints.
- A9.2.32. Erect built-up fighting positions if environmental constraints prohibit digging.

A9.2.33. Shelter hardening, stocking, and activation.

A9.2.34. Construction of complete sandbag revetments, camouflage nets, and other passive defense measures at all facilities. Demonstrate such actions completely on a sample of facilities, and use locally developed procedures to simulate the rest.

A9.2.35. Dig trenches to inter the dead. (Note: all actions preceding the actual dig, such as securing the equipment, determining the location and gridlines of the burial site, etc. should be performed unless local policies dictate otherwise.)

A9.3. Requesting Additional Simulations.

A9.3.1. To request IG approval of additional simulations, prepare a letter to the IG in the format shown in **Attachment 10**, signed by the senior official responsible for the local exercise program. Describe the item to be simulated, the reason the simulation is necessary, and how mission capability will be demonstrated. Send multiple simulations under a single cover letter. Forward requests to the IG no later than 45 days prior to the ORI start date.

A9.3.2. The IG will approve or disapprove requests based on their descriptions of the resources required to actually carry out the action and the methods for demonstrating mission capability. The IG will notify the organization of the approval status of each request no later than 10 days prior to the ORI start date.

A9.3.3. Organizations may request IG approval of unforeseen simulation requests during the ORI itself, but delays that could have been avoided by more thorough planning may impact the evaluation of the unit's performance.

A9.3.4. The IG will not approve simulation of the following actions.

A9.3.4.1. Processing only equipment needed for the exercise rather than the full UTC requirement.

A9.3.4.2. Marshaling and security of classified files, technical orders, Readiness Spare Packages (RSP), and sensitive equipment.

A9.3.4.3. Marshaling of microfiche readers, enlargers, printers, computers, remotes, and facsimile machines.

A9.3.4.4. Marshaling of protective masks, filters, and decontamination kits.

A9.3.4.5. Draining and purging of vehicles and equipment as required.

A9.3.4.6. Preparation of Personnel Accountability Kit (PAK) during processing.

Attachment 10

SAMPLE SIMULATION REQUEST LETTER

MEMORANDUM FOR: HQ AFMC/IG
4375 Chidlaw Road, Room N101
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5006

FROM: [Senior Official Responsible for the Local Exercise Program]

SUBJECT: Request for ORI Simulation

1 Please approve the following ORI simulation.

a. Action to be simulated: For example: Completion of all facility hardening actions identified in base resource protection plan.

b. Reason the simulation is necessary: For example: Actual completion of all identified tasks would require approximately \$4000 worth of rental equipment and 200 labor hours. The general tasks required for each facility are essentially the same, and completing them for multiple facilities would not provide additional training or inspection value.

c. Demonstration of mission capability: For example: We will prioritize the actions that would be taken in an actual emergency and develop a schedule describing the required labor, equipment, material, funds, and start and completion times for each. We will complete all necessary coordination and documentation, and physically demonstrate a sample (chosen by the IG) of the scheduled tasks.

d. Action officer and phone number.

2. Please contact our action officer if you need any additional information, and advise us of your decision.