

15 MAY 2002



Security

AIR BASE DEFENSE

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OPR: HQ AFSFC/SFOS  
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Supersedes AFI 31-301, 1 August 1996

Certified by: HQ USAF/XO  
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Pages: 33  
Distribution: F

This instruction implements AFD 31-3, *Air Base Defense*. It provides guidance for air base defense (ABD) mission execution, encompassing peacetime through wartime operations. Use it in conjunction with applicable joint and Department of Defense (DoD) publications to include: Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*; Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*; DoD 2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Disturbance*; and AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*. This publication applies to active duty Air Force members, and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel when published in the AFRCIND 2 and ANGIND 2.

**SUMMARY OF REVISIONS**

This revision provides expanded guidance for security forces commanders, ABD training and after action reporting procedures for exercises and contingencies. It corrects typographical and formatting errors and updates Air Force and ABD terminology. A bar “|” indicates revised material since the last edition.

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## Chapter 1

### AIR BASE DEFENSE (ABD) MISSION

**1.1. Mission.** Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines base defense as “the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities and resources are available to US forces.” The Air Force must be able to successfully defend its vital resources within the continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) locations. Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) operations may require the Air Force to deploy on short notice to air bases where combat support functions are not fully in place, to include urban, remote and, in rare cases, bare base environments. ABD forces must be organized and equipped to protect resources and personnel on the installation from attack irrespective of the environment to which deployed. The Air Force must provide ABD personnel, resources and capabilities to protect Air Force assets (resources and personnel) and non-Air Force assets if assigned, from the time of arrival in theater until departure. Therefore, preparedness and knowledge of the ABD mission are essential for the commander. The goal in defending air bases is to protect personnel, resources, and information from threats that could destroy, damage or compromise the capability of the Air Force to perform its assigned missions. These forces must be capable of defeating small-scale operations against the installation, up to delaying large enemy tactical forces until arrival of the tactical combat force (TCF). Installation ABD must be integrated into rear area security operations with other services, host nation (HN) and allied forces. Security forces must be prepared to support Air Force operations worldwide, from peacetime operations to major theater wars.

1.1.1. Defending US Air Force resources is the responsibility of all air base personnel. All USAF personnel must be trained in basic combat skills (as outlined in AFM 10-100, *Airman's Manual*) and will augment the overall ABD effort. The Defense Force Commander (DFC) is generally the senior security forces officer on station and must understand the capabilities of the base defense forces and ensure coordination with other functions and forces, on and off the installation. Support functions such as the AFOSI, intelligence, weather, base engineer emergency force, base services readiness, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), communications, and medical personnel--as well as joint and combined forces--are essential to mission accomplishment. Integration of these assets into the overall scheme of defense will enhance the ABD mission. Senior Air Force commanders at each base must carefully consider selective arming and augmentation programs. AFI 10-217 provides Resource Augmentation Duty (READY) program guidance. If the threat requires more armed personnel than are already in place, commanders must plan for time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) reinforcements.

1.1.2. The senior Air Force commander organizes, plans, trains and equips ABD forces. The commander secures ABD forces as necessary by arranging additional support from other US Services and HN support forces.

**1.2. The Threat.** Current and accurate threat information is vital for planning and executing ABD operations. The threat to air bases may take many forms, to include criminal acts by a single individual, an insider threat, operations against installation information systems, or physical attack against base personnel and resources. Asymmetric threats will increasingly challenge base defense

forces. Historically, elements such as special forces, light infantry, airborne, airmobile, terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular units have successfully employed unconventional warfare tactics to harass personnel and

destroy vital resources. An understanding of how these threat elements develop target information and conduct attacks is crucial to disrupting their operations before an attack can occur. Criminal activity, such as pilferage of critical items, information theft and violent crimes, may also have an impact on air operations. An active resource protection program will minimize these acts. At higher levels of conflict, the threat may also encompass nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as air-to-surface and surface-to-surface attacks with conventional weapons. The acquisition of technologically advanced equipment such as portable surface-to-air missiles, guided mortar munitions and night vision devices make these adversaries even more difficult to detect and neutralize. Threats to air bases are grouped into three levels, each denoting a responsibility for action. These threats may occur simultaneously and are not necessarily dependent on one another. Threat levels are illustrated in **Figure 1.1**.

**Figure 1.1. Threat Levels.**

<b>THREAT LEVELS</b>		
<b><u>THREAT LEVELS</u></b>	<b><u>EXAMPLES</u></b>	<b><u>RESPONSE</u></b>
<b>LEVEL I</b>	Agents, Saboteurs, Sympathizers, Terrorists	Base and Base Cluster Self-Defense Measures
<b>LEVEL II</b>	Small Tactical Units, Unconventional Warfare Forces, Guerrillas	Base and Base Cluster Self-Defense Measures and Response Force(s) with Supporting Fires
<b>LEVEL III</b>	Large Tactical Force Operations, Including Airborne, Heliborne, Amphibious, Infiltration, and Major Air Operations	May Require Timely Commitment of Tactical Combat Forces (TCF)

1.2.1. Level I threats are characterized as small-scale operations conducted by agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, partisans, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. Level I threats can be unorganized or well orchestrated and take the form of espionage, demonstrations, riots, random sniper incidents, or bombings. The most effective way to defeat the Level I threat is to disrupt the planning process through the use of sound antiterrorism/force protection techniques before an attack occurs. Base and/or base cluster defense forces must be capable of detecting and defeating Level I threats.


1.2.2. Level II threats include long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and the sabotage of air or ground operations conducted by special-purpose, guerrilla and unconventional warfare forces or small tactical units. Base/base cluster defense forces must be capable of disrupting or delaying Level II threats until the arrival of response forces. These response forces are normally military police units assigned to rear area commands.

1.2.3. Level III threats are major attacks by large tactical forces that can use airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and infiltration operations. Attacks can also come from aircraft and theater missiles armed with conventional and NBC weapons. This level of threat must be delayed by base or base cluster self-defense measures until the arrival of a TCF. The TCF is a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats.

1.2.4. An adversary can neutralize Air Force resources by penetrating the base perimeter, staging stand-off attacks or conducting information warfare. All types of attack require successful planning by an adversary force. The key to preventing any attack is to take advantage of the inherent weaknesses in their information collection and planning efforts. Penetrations allow attackers to defeat camouflage, deception and hardened systems designed to protect against air and stand-off attacks. Close-in attacks can generally inflict more precise damage than that caused by stand-off weapons. Detecting, assessing and engaging penetration attempts may be accomplished by the employment of patrols, sensors, defensive fighting positions, observation posts, controlling entry and internal circulation control, unmanned aerial vehicles, and mobile response forces. If the area of responsibility encompasses large areas, difficult terrain, or is subject to harsh weather conditions, mobility or lack thereof, becomes an important consideration towards successfully detecting and defeating the threat.

1.2.5. The stand-off attack is more difficult to detect and defeat, and can include attacks against resources outside the legal base perimeter (e.g., water lines, fuel lines, power grids). Historically, seventy-five percent of the attacks against air bases have been conducted with stand-off weapons making this the most likely threat to Air Force personnel and resources. As illustrated in [Figure 1.2.](#), the range of rockets, mortars, shoulder launched anti-aircraft weapons, and large caliber machine guns offer the potential adversary a large area beyond the perimeter fence from which to attack an air base, to include departing and recovering aircraft. **NOTE:** Weapon ranges depicted in [Figure 1.2.](#) may not be the actual maximum ranges for the weapons illustrated.

**Figure 1.2. Notional Threat Stand-off Footprint.**



**1.3. Theaters of Operation.** ABD operations are conducted worldwide, from mature theaters to austere regions. Air Force leadership must be able to adapt to a variety of ABD requirements. Some Air Force

resources may be geographically separated from the main airfield. For example, communications facilities are often isolated and sited on high ground to maximize their effectiveness. Regardless of the location, ABD forces employ the basic tactics, techniques and procedures as those employed at home station during day-to-day physical security/resource protection operations. As specific threats to base resources and personnel increase, base defense forces will transition to necessary ABD operations to meet the threat. Adjustments to standard operating procedures should be based on the specific threat to operations, the dynamics of operating in an international environment or the way ABD efforts are integrated with joint, combined, civilian, and host-nation forces.

1.3.1. A mature theater is an area where ABD operations are conducted on existing operational air bases or HN bases called collocated operating bases (COBs).

1.3.2. An austere region is an area where ABD forces may deploy to sites without existing US Air Force or HN facilities.

1.3.3. Rear areas of a theater are areas that assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics and command and control. Rear areas may be limited in landmass or encompass several national boundaries. They are vulnerable to a variety of enemy weapons systems, special operations forces and surveillance systems. Numerous other units and support facilities that contribute to sustained sortie generation operations may be targeted and must be defended.

**1.4. Joint Operations for ABD.** Most future conflicts will be a joint or combined campaign. Joint or combined campaigns are the integrated military activities of two or more service components: Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. MAJCOMs and units should refer to Joint Publications 3-10 and 3-10.1 for guidance on conducting ABD in a joint or combined rear area. The primary mission of a joint operation is to sustain the campaign and major operations of the joint force. The joint forces commander (JFC) designates the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC), who is responsible for the defense and security of the rear area. Rear area security operations are coordinated, controlled and executed through rear area operations centers (RAOCs) or rear tactical operations centers (RTOCs). In many cases, non-U.S. forces are deployed with US forces and the JRAC and RTOC can be designated the combined rear area coordinator and the combined rear tactical operations center, respectively. Joint operational functions include security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and HN support. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, provides additional references.

**1.5. Host Nation (HN) Support.** The JFC normally establishes a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate HN support for ABD. MAJCOMs and deployed units use this office to resolve issues when seeking HN support. Air Force senior commanders must actively solicit HN support. Component commanders are responsible for the use and employment of HN support IAW JFC directions and guidelines and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or similar documents.

## Chapter 2

### RESPONSIBILITIES

#### *Section 2A—General Responsibilities*

##### **2.1. Director of Security Forces (HQ USAF/XOF):**

- 2.1.1. Is the approval authority for SF force protection and ABD guidance.
- 2.1.2. Plans, develops and monitors all US Air Force ABD programs.
- 2.1.3. Serves as office of collateral responsibility with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations (HQ USAF/XO) in developing regulatory requirements for US Air Force arming policies.
- 2.1.4. Coordinates with war and mobilization plans (HQ USAF/XOXW) on theater operational plan (OPLAN) time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development to ensure consistency with ABD doctrine.
- 2.1.5. Manages distribution of ABD equipment, weaponry and vehicles received through central procurement.
- 2.1.6. Manages the ABD program objective memorandum funding process.

##### **2.2. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center (HQ AFSFC):**

- 2.2.1. Plans, develops and reviews programs concerning ABD training, employing resource augmentation duty program (READY) augmentees and selectively armed owner or user personnel in support of ABD.
- 2.2.2. Reviews ABD training requirements and recommends curriculum changes.
- 2.2.3. Coordinates with supporting MAJCOM/SF staffs for wartime deployment of ABD forces.
- 2.2.4. Monitors SF participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises.

##### **2.3. Headquarters Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (HQ USAF/XOI):**

- 2.3.1. Provides operational, planning, programming and budgeting guidance for Air Force intelligence support to force protection and ABD operations.
- 2.3.2. Provides an intelligence preparation of the battlespace and other intelligence threat information to the DFC upon request.

##### **2.4. Major Command Intelligence (MAJCOM/IN):**

- 2.4.1. Ensures the DFC receives real-time combat information and intelligence data about enemy forces in their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).
- 2.4.2. Upon request, reviews other ABD threat estimates, special subject summaries and related reports.
- 2.4.3. Collects and processes all source intelligence to help commanders during wartime and contingencies.

- 2.4.4. Plans, programs and budgets for intelligence resources necessary to support air base operations.
- 2.4.5. Provides theater-specific intelligence training and materials to unit personnel to support ABO.
- 2.4.6. Develops a command intelligence estimate for ABD planning and provides it and other ABO-related threat materials to units.

## **2.5. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):**

- 2.5.1. Provides counterintelligence (CI) activities to include collection/production of information concerning foreign intelligence, investigations of terrorism, sabotage and related acts, offensive operations against foreign intelligence services and antiterrorism (AT) services.
- 2.5.2. Provides the DFC CI information within the ABD TAOR as well as establishing an effective liaison with host nation intelligence, security and law enforcement sources.
- 2.5.3. Maintains the capability to respond to criminal activities.
- 2.5.4. Provides immediate, worldwide, complementing support to the deployed area commander by conducting specialized CI, AT and force protection operations.
- 2.5.5. Plans, programs and budgets for resources necessary to support force protection operations.

## **2.6. The National Guard Bureau (NGB):**

- 2.6.1. Organizes, trains and equips their SF units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SF and HQ USAF/XOF.
- 2.6.2. Ensures Air National Guard (ANG) SF personnel assigned to a Unit Type Code (UTC) identified in the Air Force-wide UTC availability and tasking summary (AFWUS) for MTW, contingency or steady-state deployments (AFWUS code îDWXî or îDWSî), complete ground combat skills (GCS) training identified in AFI 36-2225, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Program*, at least every 3 years, not to exceed 4 years.

## **2.7. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC):**

- 2.7.1. Organizes, trains and equips their SF units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SF and HQ USAF/XOF.
- 2.7.2. Ensures AFRC SF personnel assigned to a UTC identified in the AFWUS for MTW, contingency or steady-state deployments (AFWUS code îDWXî or îDWSî), complete GCS training at least every 3 years, not to exceed 4 years.

**2.8. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC):** Develops, operates and maintains initial SF training programs in coordination with HQ AFSFC. Refer to [Chapter 3](#) for training requirements.

## **2.9. Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (HQ AFCESA):**

- 2.9.1. Provides field expertise, recommendations and other input for structural, environmental, EOD, chem/bio and other engineer areas of expertise.

2.9.2. Ensures engineers have input in acquiring necessary equipment and resources by coordinating their conditions and limitations into Air Force requirements for research and development efforts.

2.9.3. Develops engineer-related force protection training standards and equipment requirements.

## **2.10. MAJCOM Directors of Security Forces:**

2.10.1. Under MAJCOM/CC direction, organize, train, equip, and maintain SF ABD elements according to this instruction, AFMAN 10-401, Volume 1, *Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation*; AFI 36-2225; AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*; AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*; and other planning documents.

2.10.2. Monitors manpower, equipment and performance of assigned UTCs.

2.10.3. Prepares plans and documents for acquisition of necessary ABD equipment.

2.10.4. Makes recommendations to HQ USAF/XOF on policies concerning organizing, training and equipping deployable SF UTCs.

2.10.5. Manages command SF participation in JCS, HQ USAF and MAJCOM exercises, and MAJCOM training center attendance.

2.10.6. Complete and forward RCS: HAF-SF(SA) 9378, Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report, to the requirements branch (HQ AFSFC/SFOR). Administrative guidance is contained in [Attachment 3](#).

## **2.11. Supported MAJCOMs:**

2.11.1. Develop TPFDD requirements to support theater OPLANs and contingency plans.

2.11.2. Ensure sustaining munitions quantities are consistent with authorizations and SF forces, including in-place and CONUS augmentation forces projected for deployment.

2.11.3. Identify equipment and resupply procedures for the deploying units in OPLANs that contain requirements for SF units.

2.11.4. Establish subsistence requirements with Headquarters Defense Commissary Agency to support theater taskings.

2.11.5. Advise supporting commands of requirements unique to the particular theater such as 40mm munitions mix for fighting load, unique vehicle or equipment needs.

2.11.6. Identify vehicle requirements for prepositioning and update requirements in TPFDLs.

2.11.7. Provide after-action reports (AAR) for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotation or replacement units to the operations division (HQ AFSFC/SFO), as outlined in AFI 31-201, *Security Police Standards and Procedures*, Attachment 5.

## **2.12. Supporting MAJCOMs:**

2.12.1. Apply guidance in the War Mobilization Plan (WMP)-1, Annex T, and AFI 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*, to maximize the number of active-duty personnel available for wartime deployment and make optimal use of augmentation and selectively armed personnel.

2.12.2. Organize, train, equip, and maintain the deployable units reported in WMP-3, Part 2.

- 2.12.3. Ensure UTCs from active and reserve components are deployable within the designed operational capability time.
- 2.12.4. Develop budget, requisition and accounting procedures for required weapons, munitions, equipment, and subsistence.
- 2.12.5. Include procedures for deploying WMP-3 committed units in command mobility planning documents.
- 2.12.6. Maintain a deployment database for use in time-critical directed deployments.
- 2.12.7. Provide AARs to HQ AFSFC/SFO for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotations or replacement units, as outlined in AFI 31-201, Attachment 5.
- 2.12.8. Provide additional personnel to CONUS bases (if necessary) from other bases in the command when all OPLAN deployment requirements are satisfied. Before using extra personnel from other bases, consider using local base READY and selectively armed owner or user personnel to fill shortfalls. In all cases, coordinate plans to deploy personnel from other bases with the MAJCOM personnel staff.

**2.13. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command.** In coordination with HQ USAF/XOF and Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine (HQ USAF/XOXS), it is the executive agent for developing and revising joint (Army and Air Force) ABD doctrine.

**2.14. Wing Commanders:**

- 2.14.1. Responsible for the defense of the installation. Other service components assigned to the installation for base defense will be under the wing commander's operational control.
- 2.14.2. Establish a base defense operations center.
- 2.14.3. Plan for employment of transient forces by ensuring base defense plans include provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base defense forces during an attack or when the base is threatened with attack.
- 2.14.4. Maintain liaison with adjacent bases, base clusters and supporting HN security agencies. Responsibilities for liaison may be retained by higher authority or delegated to subordinate commands as local circumstances dictate.
- 2.14.5. Develop base defense plans that incorporate tenant units.
- 2.14.6. Disseminate air, ground and missile attack warnings using established warning alarms.
- 2.14.7. Maintain communications with the designated reinforcing and TCF.
- 2.14.8. Integrate area security plans with the RAOC and RTOC, when activated.
- 2.14.9. Maintain communications with supporting emergency ordnance disposal unit.
- 2.14.10. Develop and request information requirements to support area defense operations.

**2.15. Base Tenant Units.** As directed by the wing commander, support may include READY manning or the selective arming of owner or user personnel to defend people and resources in their immediate work areas and the augmentation of other ABD forces.

**2.16. Security Forces Unit Commanders:**

2.16.1. Ensure all individual mobilization augmentees receive ABD GCS sustainment training. Training may be conducted at a MAJCOM training center, or an equivalent MAJCOM-level exercise, or JCS exercise at least once every 3 years, preferably every 2 years.

2.16.2. Ensure tasked UTCs maintain current deployment folders for locations under assigned OPLAN taskings. Deployment folders should include the installation security/base defense plan when available, country data, maps, photos, threat estimates (IN/OSI), and rules of engagement.

2.16.3. Ensure SF units develop and maintain standard operating procedures (SOPs) to enhance standardization and unity of effort. SOPs will be based on training references cited in AFI 36-2225.

**2.17. Defense Force Commander (DFC):**

2.17.1. The senior Air Force commander responsible for the air base normally delegates operational authority to conduct ABD to the DFC. The DFC exercises command and control through an established chain of command. All aspects of ABD operations are directed through flight leaders and the base defense operations center (BDOC) staff. The DFC is responsible to the installation commander.

2.17.2. The DFC:

2.17.2.1. Establishes a BDOC that serves as the focal point for ABD and security and designates an alternate BDOC. The BDOC is staffed by administrative (S1), combat information section (S2), operations (S3), and logistics personnel (S4).

2.17.2.2. Plans, directs, integrates, coordinates and controls all ABD efforts through the BDOC staff.

2.17.2.3. Coordinates ABD issues and requests for assistance with the RAOC or RTOC.

2.17.2.4. Submits situation reports through the wing operations center.

2.17.2.5. Disseminates rules of engagement to all ABD forces.

2.17.2.6. Primary advisor to installation leadership on all ABD/security matters.

2.17.3. If possible, the DFC exchanges liaison representatives with other US, HN, and allied forces within the area of operation. If this is not possible, the DFC must communicate closely with the RAOC, RTOC or other command and control elements of friendly forces.

***Section 2B—Responsibilities for Communications*****2.18. ABD Communications Support:**

2.18.1. SF units preparing for ABD operations need certain items such as cryptological material, approved frequencies for ground radios, approval to operate on other organization's frequencies and procedural guidance on accounting, maintenance and operational use of communications security (COMSEC) material to ensure secure communications. These items should be requested through their COMSEC manager.

2.18.2. Headquarters Directorate of Air Force Communications (HQ USAF/SC) coordinates and provides communications expertise to HQ USAF/XOF, other Air Staff and MAJCOM/SCs on communications issues and assists HQ AFMC with logistical support for communications-computer systems.

2.18.3. HQ USAF/XOF and MAJCOM/SF coordinate procurement of communications equipment for ABD and CONUS mobility forces with HQ USAF/SC or respective MAJCOM/SC.

2.18.3.1. MAJCOM/SFs plan and request frequency authorizations. They ensure SF units tasked with a mobility or in-place ABD mission provide a list of all communications equipment to the local and MAJCOM/SC communications unit. This list includes authorized equipment, items on hand and items on order. Local communications units then organize the necessary maintenance support.

2.18.4. Both supporting and supported commands provide wartime maintenance support for ABD communications and electronics equipment at deployed locations. Communications repair personnel maintain this equipment and:

2.18.4.1. Plan for setting up, maintaining and redeploying communications-electronics equipment at the deployment site.

2.18.4.2. Ensure communications maintenance UTCs are fully trained and supplied with bench test equipment they would need to maintain SF ABD tactical ground communications equipment.

2.18.4.3. Identify and plan for surge communications requirements according to theater planning.

2.18.4.4. Ensure essential communications and computer systems have established local maintenance.

2.18.4.5. During peacetime, ground combat radio systems are maintained by the base-level communications unit or through contract services. During wartime and contingency deployments, deployable communications UTCs (6KMQ8) or in-place supported command communications personnel maintain the radio systems.

## Chapter 3

### TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

**3.1. The Air Force Security Forces Academy.** The SF Academy includes GCS training as a permanent part of the curriculum for entry and career progression. Career development courses for enlisted 5 and 7 level training include GCS material.

**3.2. SF Personnel Assigned to Unit Type Codes (UTCs).**

3.2.1. Personnel, master sergeant through chief master sergeant and captains through colonels, assigned to a SF headquarters element UTC (QFEBA, QFEBB and QFEBS) identified in the AFWUS for MTW, contingency or steady-state deployments (AFWUS code ìDWXî or ìDWSî), must complete the Ground Defense Command Course. It is also highly recommended that all senior NCOs (MSgt through CMSgt) and officers (captain through colonel) not currently assigned to SF headquarters elements attend this course, when possible. Grade waivers submitted to the 342 TRS, through the respective MAJCOM/SF, are approved on a case-by-case basis.

3.2.2. SF personnel in the grades of senior airman through master sergeant assigned to a UTC identified in the AFWUS for MTW, contingency or steady-state deployment (AFWUS code ìDWXî or ìDWSî), must complete the GCS Level II course. This course is recommended for all other SF enlisted personnel in the ranks of senior airman through master sergeant.

3.2.3. SF personnel assigned to a primary mobility UTC position must complete the appropriate formal training course. Formal training course content may be reviewed at the Air Force Education and Training Command course announcements website located at URL: <http://etca.randolph.af.mil>.

3.2.4. SF personnel assigned to a UTC must receive arming and use of force training and must maintain firearms qualification training IAW AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*. Attachment 2 identifies the SF minimum weapon arming qualification requirements per weapon, per UTC. AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*, establishes the minimum training standards for qualification training for each arming group.

3.2.5. SF personnel identified by the commander to fulfill a SF unit UTC duty position identified in the AFWUS for MTW, contingency or steady-state deployment (AFWUS code ìDWXî or ìDWSî), must attend MAJCOM-level GCS training at a MAJCOM training center, an equivalent MAJCOM-level ABD exercise, joint regional training center or JCS exercise at least once every 3 years, preferably every 2 years. (Exception: ANG and AFRC UTCs will meet recurring ABD GCS training intervals as identified in paragraphs 2.6.2. and 2.7.2. respectively).

3.2.6. Training requirements identified in paragraphs 3.2.1., 3.2.2., and 3.2.5. will be fulfilled as training institution's student capacities allow.

3.2.7. SF training requirements are outlined in AFI 36-2225.

## Chapter 4

### ABD OPERATIONS

**4.1. Planning for ABD.** ABD planners must know the strategic intelligence and threats for their expected area of operation.

4.1.1. Plans must address the ground order of battle for each threat level. Focus on expected enemy force capabilities, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ensure the ABD plan (format in AFMAN 10-401, VI) details how to fight and defeat enemies with those capabilities. Incidents involving WMD must not only be survived, but the installation mission and security must continue. Refer to JP 3.07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, and *DoD 2000.12-H* to ensure defense plans contain measures for combating Level I and low-end Level II threats, during ABD operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW).

4.1.2. The plan must:

4.1.2.1. Describe the enemy, friendly situations and ABD force organization.

4.1.2.2. Outline the mission of the ABD force, DFCs concept of operation, logistics and administrative support, and appropriate command and signal information.

4.1.2.3. Outline the responsibilities of other US Air Force, DoD, allied, or HN forces available for ABD.

4.1.2.4. Tell how SF makes the transition from peacetime to wartime ABD operations.

4.1.2.5. Address how selectively armed owner or user security integrates into ABD during the transition.

4.1.2.6. Outline and assign areas of responsibility for ABD.

### **4.2. The Theater Combatant Commander:**

4.2.1. Oversees all joint rear area (JRA) operations.

4.2.2. Assigns responsibilities for defending the JRA and establishes the command or coordination method.

4.2.3. Exercises command authority or operational control over all theater joint forces.

4.2.4. Designates which service will provide external forces for each air base.

4.2.5. Defines the command and control relationship between subordinate area commanders and air base commanders.

4.2.6. Defines each base TAOR.

4.2.7. Establishes theater rules of engagement based upon guidance from SOFAs and the national command authorities through the Chairman of the JCS and combatant commander.

4.2.8. Appoints a JRAC who establishes an RTOC or RAOC, using joint force staff personnel and representatives from components operating in the joint rear area.

**4.3. Standardizing Employment.** To ensure standardized employment, procedures, concepts and tactics, units involved in ABD operations follow the guidance in AFH 31-302.

**4.4. Conducting ABD Operations.** Successful ABD depends on a clear division of terrain responsibility and the sound application of the five principles of defense: (1) aggressive defense, (2) defense-in-depth, (3) all-around defense, (4) integrated defense, and (5) defense organized around key terrain and vital resources.

4.4.1. Analyzing the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations enables ABD forces to mount the most effective defense.

4.4.2. The DFC organizes forces to defeat level I threats, disrupt or delay level II threats and delay level III threats. When a threat exceeds the ABD force capabilities, the BDOC notifies the echelon RAOC or RTOC, which coordinates the employment of a response force or a TCF as outlined in Joint Publication 3-10.1.

4.4.3. If an airborne threat exists to US Air Force air bases, COBs or bare bases, air defense assets will normally be assigned. Ensure any assigned Air Force assets, and non-Air Force assets (sister service, host nation) are incorporated into the overall ABD plan.

**4.5. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).** Operations outside the purview of war are considered MOOTW. MOOTW may include, but are not limited to, support to US, state and local governments, disaster relief, foreign humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and recovery operations. MOOTW may not be peaceful actions, may be of long duration, and typically have strict rules of engagement. The complexity of MOOTW requires flexible planning and leadership.

4.5.1. Activities that ABD forces could reasonably expect to conduct include, but are not limited to, physical security, law enforcement, resource protection, US customs, patrol and observer duties, security escorts, convoy operations, and force protection. Force protection encompasses everything US forces do to protect personnel, resources and property, and is not just the sole responsibility of security forces. Federal law, DoD regulations and service instructions restrict military support of civilian law enforcement in CONUS. Coordination with servicing staff judge advocate is necessary before engaging in such activities.

4.5.2. Some MOOTW missions may directly relate to the defense of air operations assets while others may not. Nearly all will be part of a joint or combined operation. Although a clearly defined rear area may not be established in MOOTW, coordination with the JRAC is essential in ensuring ABD support.

4.5.3. The political-military nature of MOOTW may require ABD leaders to coordinate their activities with a number of government and civilian agencies outside the DoD. These organizations can have a dramatic impact on the outcome of such an operation. Government agencies may include the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Customs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and US Embassy representatives. Private volunteer and nongovernmental organizations include the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, and other relief agencies. In most situations, coordination and contact with local and foreign governmental police and military organizations will be required. Leaders at all levels should become familiar with these organizations, their mission, and possible areas of mutual support.

**4.6. Enemy Prisoners of War.** The US Army is the lead agent in preparing for, receiving, processing and transferring enemy prisoners of war (EPW). USAF EPW procedures are outlined in AFI 31-304, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees*.

4.6.1. The US Air Force is responsible for EPWs under its control until they are released to the US Army. All persons captured will be treated as EPWs until their true status is determined. This includes initial processing, interim detention, medical treatment, and transfer to U.S. Army or appropriate HN authorities. EPW/detainee holding areas will not be collocated where EPW/detainees could observe or assess defense force operations. Principles of handling EPWs include firm control, humane treatment, accountability, and minimum field processing. Field processing includes search, segregate, silence, speed to the rear, and safeguard.

4.6.2. Properly tag and secure the individual, associated documents and equipment until transferred to the Army. Notify the servicing AFOSI unit upon seizure of documentation to ensure timely counterintelligence evaluation and analysis. Document the circumstances surrounding the capture.

## Chapter 5

### MOBILITY, EXERCISES, AND INSPECTIONS

**5.1. Security Forces (SF) Mobility.** Commanders at all levels must clearly and realistically project their wartime manpower requirements and assign each active duty and reserve SF unit a wartime mission consistent with the guidance in the USAF WMP-1, Annex T and AFI 10-400.

5.1.1. Several factors determine the number and type of deployable units maintained by CONUS commanders: (1) defense requirements at deployment destinations, (2) peacetime manpower authorizations at CONUS bases, (3) extent of CONUS wartime sustaining requirements, (4) fiscal constraints, (5) training limitations, and (6) use of augmentation manpower resources.

5.1.2. Deployable SF units are initially limited to those reported in the USAF WMP-3, Part 2. HQ USAF/XOF, in concert with supported and supporting MAJCOMs, directs training and equipping of replacement forces.

**5.2. Exercises to Test ABD.** Exercises that test the capability of US Air Force personnel to deploy to forward operating locations should also test ABD. When possible, MAJCOMs should incorporate ABD participation in US Air Force or joint service exercises. Provide exercise objectives and lessons learned to HQ AFSFC/SFO in accordance with AFI 31-201, Attachment 5. MAJCOMs integrate lessons learned into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System.

**5.3. Evaluations and Inspections.** During local or higher headquarters evaluations and inspections, determine the readiness of SF units as reported in WMP-3, Part 2. Review the training for personnel assigned to deployable units and the availability of required weapons, munitions and equipment. Correct any deficiencies reported.

**5.4. Forms Prescribed.** Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report (RCS HAF-SF(SA) 9378).

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF  
DCS, Air & Space Operations

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

DoD 2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Disturbance*

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*

Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*

Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*

Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*

AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*

AFPD 31-3, *Air Base Defense*

AFI 10-212, *Air Base Operability*

AFI 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*

AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*

AFI 31-201, *Security Police Standards and Procedures*

AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*

AFI 31-304, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*

AFI 36-2225, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Program*

AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*

AFM 10-100, *Airman's Manual*

AFMAN 10-104, Vol I, *Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation*

AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*

AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*

RCS; HAF-SF(SA) 9378, *Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report*

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**AAR**—after action report

**ABD**—air base defense

**ABO**—air base operability

**AEF**—aerospace expeditionary force

**AETC**—Air Education and Training Command

**AFCESA**—Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency  
**AFMC**—Air Force Materiel Command  
**AFOSI**—Air Force Office of Special Investigations  
**AFRC**—Air Force Reserve Command  
**AFWUS**—Air Force-wide unit type code availability and tasking summary  
**AFSFC**—Air Force Security Forces Center  
**ANG**—Air National Guard  
**AT**—antiterrorism  
**BDOC**—base defense operations center  
**CI**—counterintelligence  
**COB**—collocated operating base  
**COMSEC**—Communications Security  
**CONUS**—continental United States  
**DFC**—defense force commander  
**DoD**—Department of Defense  
**EOD**—explosive ordnance disposal  
**EPW**—enemy prisoner of war  
**GCS**—ground combat skills  
**HN**—host nation  
**IN**—Intelligence  
**JCS**—Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**JFC**—joint force commander  
**JRA**—joint rear area  
**JRAC**—joint rear area coordinator  
**JTTP**—joint tactics, techniques, and procedures  
**MAJCOM**—major command  
**MOOTW**—military operations other than war  
**NBC**—nuclear, biological, and chemical  
**NGB**—National Guard Bureau  
**OCONUS**—outside continental United States  
**OPLAN**—operation plan  
**READY**—Resource Augmentation Duty Program

**RAOC**—rear area operations center

**RTOC**—rear tactical operations center

**SF**—security forces

**SOFA**—status of forces agreement

**SOP**—standard operating procedures

**TAOR**—tactical area of responsibility

**TCF**—tactical combat force

**TPFDD**—time-phased force and deployment data

**TPFDL**—time-phased force and deployment list

**UTC**—unit type code

**WMD**—weapons of mass destruction

**WMP**—War Mobilization Plan

### *Terms*

**Air Base Defense**—The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Antiterrorism**—Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. See also antiterrorism awareness; counterterrorism; proactive measures; terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Bare Base**—A base having minimum essential facilities to house, sustain, and support operations to include, if required, a stabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraft parking areas. A bare base must have a source of water that can be made potable. Other requirements to operate under bare base conditions form a necessary part of the force package deployed to the bare base. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Base Defense Forces**—Troops assigned or attached to a base for the primary purpose of base defense and security, and augmentees and selectively armed personnel available to the base commander for base defense from units performing primary missions other than base defense. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Base Defense Operations Center**—A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Combined Operation**—An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Counterintelligence**—Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Force Protection**—Security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family

members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Host Nation**—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, operate in, or transit through its territory. Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Individual Mobilization Augmentee**—An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an active component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace**—An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Joint Force**—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Joint Force Commander**—A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Joint Rear Area**—A specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. Also called JRA. See also joint force; joint force commander; rear area. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Joint Rear Area Coordinator**—The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called JRAC. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures**—The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Law of War**—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. See also rules of engagement. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Military Operations Other Than War**—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also

called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**—Operations directed by the Department of State, Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Observation Post**—A position from which military observations are made or fire directed and adjusted, and which possesses appropriate communications; may be airborne. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Rear Area Operations Center**—A command and control facility that serves as an area/subarea commander's planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for area security operations. Synonymous with rear tactical operations center. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Rear Tactical Operations Center**—A command and control facility that serves as an area/subarea commander's planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for area security operations. Synonymous with rear area operations center. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Rules of Engagement**—Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. See also law of war. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Status of Forces Agreement**—An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Tactical Area of Responsibility**—A defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support. Also called TAOR. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Tactical Combat Force**—A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Time-Phase Force and Deployment Data**—The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: (a) in-place units; (b) units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; (c) routing of forces to be deployed; (d) movement data associated with deploying forces; (e) estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and (f) estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Time-Phase Force and Deployment List**—A Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base located at Appendix 1 to Annex A of deliberate plans. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. This listing is to include both: in-place units and units to be deployed to support the deliberate plan. Also called TPFDL.

(Joint Pub 1-02).

**Weapons of Mass Destruction**—In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (Joint Pub 1-02).

## Attachment 2

## SF MINIMUM WEAPONS ARMING QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Table A2.1. SF Minimum Weapons Arming Qualification Requirements.

UTC	WEAPON	PERSONNEL QUALIFIED	REMARKS
QFEB8 2 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFDB9 (PACAF HQ) 4 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEAD (ANG) 12 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M203 GL	6 per UTC	AFQC
	M249 AR	6 per UTC	Regional Training Center or Home Station Qualification
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEB2 (ABD Squad) 13 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	4 per UTC	AFQC or SPC
	M203 GL	6 per UTC	AFQC
	M249 AR	6 per UTC	AFQC
	M60 MG	3 per UTC	AFCSQC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	*M240 MG	3 per UTC	AFCSQC
QFEB9 4 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEBA (LG HQ) 22 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEBB (SML HQ) 11 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEBD (2-81mm Mortars) 8 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	81 mm Mortar	All UTC members	Regional Training Center Qualification or Home Station Qualification or Heavy Weapons Training

UTC	WEAPON	PERSONNEL QUALIFIED	REMARKS
QFEBF (1-M2 50 caliber MGs) 2 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	50 cal M2	All UTC members	50 cal AFQC
QFEBH 13 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEBJ (MK19 GL) 4 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	MK19 MG	All UTC members	Regional Training Center or Home Station Qualification or Heavy Weapons Training
QFEBK (FDC) 5 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	81mm Mortar	All UTC members	Regional Training Center or Home Station Qualification or Heavy Weapons Training
QFEBL (Combat Arms) 2 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFEBN (AFSOC) 5 members	M4/A1/GUU SMG	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	M203 GL	1-UTC member	AFQC
	M870 Shotgun	1-UTC member	AFQC
	M249 AR	1 UTC member	AFQC
QFEBP (MWD HQ) 2 members	M4/GUU SMG	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
QFEBR (MWD) 3 members	M4/A1/GUU SMG	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
QFEBS ABD Sec Coord Ele 5 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	1 per UTC	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC

UTC	WEAPON	PERSONNEL QUALIFIED	REMARKS
QFEBT AFSPC Launch Sec Ele  59 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	12 per UTC	AFQC or SPC
	M203 GL	18 per UTC	AFQC
	M249 AR	18 per UTC	AFQC
	M60 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	*M240 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC
QFEBU Force Protection Squad  13 members)	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFFPF Force Protection Flt  48 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	12 per UTC	AFQC or SPC
	M203 GL	18 per UTC	AFQC
	M249 AR	9 per UTC	AFQC
	M60 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC
	LAW	1 per fire team	When identified by HQ AFSFC/SFO
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	*M240 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC
QFFPG (820 <sup>th</sup> HQ) SF Group  31 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFFPL SF Log Flt  13 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	All UTC members	AFQC or SPC
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
QFFPR SF HQ Flt  45 members	M16 Rifle	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	M9 Pistol	12 per UTC	AFQC or SPC
	M203 GL	18 per UTC	AFQC
	M249 AR	9 per UTC	AFQC
	M60 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC
	LAW	1 per fire team	When identified by HQ AFSFC/SFO
	*M4/M4A1 Carbine	All UTC members	AFQC or SRC
	*M240 MG	9 per UTC	AFCSQC

**NOTES:**

1. An \* indicates when item is adopted and replace existing weapon system.
2. Personnel Qualified column data reflects number of unit personnel, not specifically just personnel assigned to a UTC, who must be qualified to fill UTC requirement.

### Attachment 3

#### SECURITY FORCES EQUIPMENT/UTC REPORT (RCS HAF-SF(SA) 9378)

A3.1. The Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report (RCS HAF-SF(SA) 9378) provides information for time-critical program management decisions in support of near- and long-term equipment improvement and/or replacement. It also provides current status of equipment essential to support contingency deployments. Required information will be recorded using the spreadsheet shown in [Figure A3.1](#). This spreadsheet is distributed by HQ AFSFC/SFOR and available on the HQ AFSFC website.

A3.2. Forward the report to HQ AFSFC/SFOR to arrive not later than 15 January and 15 July each year.

A3.2.1. For mobility use the UTC's Logistics Detail (LOGDET) and Allowance Standards (AS) 538 and 660 to determine authorized quantities.

A3.2.2. For in-place requirements, use the unit's Custodian Authorization/Custody Receipt Listing (CA/CRL) and appropriate Allowance Standards to (AS 538 and 660) determine authorized quantities.

A3.2.3. Include appropriate remarks to report equipment status when assets are in non-operational or unserviceable condition.

A3.2.4. Instructions to complete Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report.

A3.2.4.1. Date Block. Date transmitted/forwarded. (i.e., date unit sent report to MAJCOM and date MAJCOM sent report to HQ AFSFC/SFOR).

A3.2.4.2. Command. Substitute MAJCOMs identified on top row with units assigned to the MAJCOM.

A3.2.4.3. Ensure all blocks (i.e., authorized and assigned) reflect accurate information prior to transmitting upchannel.

A3.2.4.4. Totals. In the "Totals" column, provide total number of quantities submitted by all assigned units.

A3.2.4.5. Unit Type Codes (Section VII). List only the wartime deployable UTC's (WMP tasked) that a unit is tasked to provide.

Figure A3.1. Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report.

SECURITY FORCES EQUIPMENT/UTC REPORT																														
DATE:														HAF-SF(SA) 9378																
COMMAND:		ACC	AETC		AFMC		AMC		ANG		AFRC		SPACE		PACAF		AFSOC		USAFE		11 WG		AFA		820		AIA		TOTALS	
		AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN											
<b>I. WEAPONS</b>																														
1. M-249 Squad Automatic Rifle																														
2. M-60 Machine Gun																														
3. M-240 Machine Gun																														
4. M-2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun																														
5. MK-19 Grenade/Machine Gun																														
6. M29 Mortar																														
7. M-252 Mortar																														
8. M-203 Grenade Launcher																														
9. M-9 Handgun																														
10. 5.56 Weapons																														
a. M-16A1 Rifle																														
b. M-16A2 Rifle																														
c. M-16A3 Rifle																														
d. GAU/GUU SMG																														
e. M4/M4A1 Carbine																														
11. M-15 Revolver																														
12. 12 Gauge Shotgun																														
<b>II. WEAPONS (COMBAT ARMS)</b>																														
1. M-249 Squad Automatic Rifle																														
2. M-60 Machine Gun																														
3. M-240 Machine Gun																														
4. M-2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun																														
5. MK-19 Grenade/Machine Gun																														
6. M29 Mortar																														







# Education & Training Course Announcements



**Department of the Air Force**

[Visitor: 780254]

**USAF Formal Schools**

Prescribed by IC 99-1 to AFI 36-2201, Developing, Managing, and Conducting Training

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Design Last updated 3/31/2002