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Command Policy

**OPERATIONAL READINESS AND DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE PROGRAM**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction establishes responsibilities and guidance for the conduct of 354 FW Operational Readiness and Disaster Preparedness Exercises. It implements AFD 90-2, *Inspector General-The Inspection System*, and AFD 32-40, *Disaster Preparedness*; and expands upon the requirements of AFI 90-201, PACAFI 90-201, and AFI 32-4001/PACAF Sup 1. It applies to all agencies assigned or attached to the 354 FW in support of contingency operations or disaster preparedness response plans.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL GUIDANCE

1.1. OVERVIEW. The Chief of Wing Inspections, 354 FW/IGI, is the OPR for all 354 FW Initial Response Readiness Exercises (IRRE), Combat Employment Readiness Exercises (CERE) and Major Accident Response Exercises (MARE). Although training benefits are inherent with all wing-level exercises, the primary focus of IGI exercises is to provide the wing commander with an independent assessment of wing readiness. Specific Letters of Instruction (LOIs), Air Tasking Orders (ATO) and Special Instructions (SPINS) will provide additional guidance for each exercise. Wing generated exercises are implemented under the authority of the 354 FW Commander and are executed by the 354 FW Exercise Evaluation Team (EET).

1.2. EXERCISE SCHEDULE. 354 FW assigned/attached units are subject to exercise evaluation at any time. 354 FW/IGI will devise an annual exercise schedule, approved by the 354 FW/CC, as follows. Commanders are responsible for managing unit TDY and leave schedules to ensure maximum participation in pre-announced exercises.

1.2.1. **IRRE.** Two per year. May be short or no-notice, but are typically scheduled and announced in advance to maximize availability of all personnel.

1.2.2. **Attack Response Exercises (ARE).** Eielson AFB is designated a Low Chemical Biological (CB) Threat Area IAW AFI 32-4001. Minimum requirements are one CERE and one ARE implementing OPLAN 32-1 (ie., WMD/ Terrorist Attack IAW Appendix 10 to Annex A, or Enemy Attack IAW Annex C) per year. CEREs are scheduled and announced well in advance due to significant planning requirements and to maximize availability of all personnel.

1.2.3. **MARE.** One per quarter, typically no-notice but may be announced in advance to maximize availability of key personnel. MAREs may combine multiple scenarios to fulfill annual requirements (i.e., an off base, after-hours, conventional munitions accident). One MARE per year may be combined with an ARE IAW AFI 32-4001, PACAF Sup 1. Exercise the following MARE scenarios annually.

1.2.3.1. Conventional munitions.

1.2.3.2. HAZMAT emergency response.

1.2.3.3. Nuclear weapons. IAW PACAF Supp 1 to AFI 32-4001, may be conducted as a table top exercise that includes a review of planning documents.

1.2.3.4. Off-base deployment. Coordinate with the staff judge advocate, local civil authorities, and obtain MAJCOM headquarters approval before conducting an off-base exercise with local, state, and federal emergency response agencies.

1.2.3.5. Mass casualties.

1.2.3.6. Start times before or after normal duty hours.

1.2.3.7. Natural Disaster/Severe Weather. IAW PACAF Supp 1 to AFI 32-4001, may be conducted as a table top exercise.

1.3. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS. Tasked units/staff agencies will prepare internal instructions, procedures and checklists as required to meet objectives of this instruction.

1.3.1. **CERE Explan.** The 354 FW will maintain a current CERE EXPLAN to define exercise procedures for "Base X" at Eielson AFB. 354 OSS/OSX is the OPR for maintaining the CERE EXPLAN, and must provide 354 FW/IGI copies for incorporation into exercise planning and evaluation.

1.3.2. **Threat Scenario Planning.** IGI will use the latest version of the PACAF Command Intelligence Estimate for ABO Planning (CIEAP), the Peninsula Intelligence Estimate (if appropriate), current National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) threat documents, and current intelligence information to develop scenarios for attack response exercises.

1.4. EXECUTION TIMING. The 354 FW/CV directs the start of exercise evaluation or Start Exercise (STARTEX) as published in an exercise Warning Order (for IRREs) or LOIs (for CEREs), or by simply commencing the exercise scenario (for MAREs).

1.5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. The 354 FW/CC maintains operational control of all player forces. During wing exercises, the 354 FW Inspector General (IG) has tasking authority as exercise higher headquarters (HHQ). During wing exercises, EET members work directly for the 354 FW/IG until released by 354 FW/IGI or their EET Team Chief IAW [Chapter 6](#).

1.6. SAFETY. Wing-level exercises drive a significant increase in the level of unit ops tempo. Fatigue, abnormal duty hours and heat/cold stress all increase the potential for mishaps. Any person may stop specific exercise activity if an unsafe condition or actual emergency occurs. Notify the Inspection Team Chief and 354 FW/SE of such occurrences ASAP, through the IG Work Center (IGWC). The Inspection Team Chief will suspend exercise play as required until the situation is resolved.

1.6.1. **Guidelines.** Unit adherence to safety guidelines and procedures will be evaluated on all exercises IAW AFI 90-201 Common Core Criteria (CCC). The following specific areas will be evaluated.

1.6.1.1. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) Standards.

1.6.1.2. AFMAN 91-201, Explosive Safety Standards. Munitions/weapons storage, maintenance, flight line work areas and explosive safety site plans will be reviewed to ensure they are properly sited.

1.6.1.3. AFI 91-202, The USAF Mishap Prevention Program.

1.6.2. **Airfield.** 354 FW/IGI will brief the Airfield Operations Flight Commander (354 OSS/OSA) in advance of any exercise that involves air traffic control or any portion of the airport movement area.

1.6.3. **Fire Department.** 354 FW/IGI will brief the Fire Chief in advance of any exercise that involves emergency response.

1.6.4. **Emergency Response.** Emergency vehicles responding to exercise events must obey all traffic rules and speed limits, and may not use warning lights until on-scene. Emergency vehicles/personnel responding to real world emergencies are exempt from exercise play for the duration of the emergency.

1.7. SECURITY. Readiness exercises provide a unique opportunity for potential adversaries to gain insight into true combat capability. Personnel must be particularly vigilant in adhering to OPSEC and

proper security practices during exercises. Any person may intervene in specific exercise activity to protect classified materials or prevent inadvertent disclosure. Notify the Inspection Team Chief and 354 SFS/SFAI of such occurrences ASAP, through the IGWC. The Inspection Team Chief will suspend exercise play as required until the situation is resolved.

1.7.1. **Guidelines.** Unit adherence to security guidelines and procedures will be evaluated on all exercises IAW AFI 90-201 Common Core Criteria. The following specific areas will be evaluated.

1.7.1.1. Adequate security measures employed throughout the exercise.

1.7.1.2. OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans, followed throughout the exercise.

1.7.1.3. Proper COMSEC materials available to ensure mission accomplishment.

1.7.1.4. Employment of COMSEC and COMPUSEC measures to deny information to the enemy.

1.8. MESSAGE PROCEDURES. The Base Communications Center (BCC) will maintain a master copy and a log of all incoming and outgoing exercise AUTODIN messages. The IG will pick up copies of the log and messages at periodic intervals. The EET Superintendent at the IGWC will be the BCC NCOIC to establish message pickup procedures. Any outgoing messages requiring an immediate response must be identified to the on-scene EET.

1.8.1. **Address.** Address all exercise messages to "354 FW EIELSON AFB AK//IGI/" unless otherwise specified by LOI. The first and last line of text should identify the message as exercise traffic IAW LOIs. The second line of text should identify notional addressees to whom the message is intended.

1.8.2. **Intelligence Messages.** Intelligence message traffic may be sent directly to the intelligence element via intelligence classified systems. Intelligence personnel will develop and maintain a tracking system of all incoming and outgoing message traffic. All intelligence scenario inputs and message traffic will be annotated with time and date. Intel EET will function as HHQ for questions relating to scenario traffic or intelligence reporting.

1.8.3. **Military Deception (MD) Messages.** Incoming exercise SPECAT message traffic for military deception activities will be sent through the BCC. Outgoing SPECAT messages will be hand-carried directly to the IGWC. Prior to the exercise, IGI will coordinate with the Military Deception Officer (MDO) to clearly establish a formal MD chain of command to be used throughout the evaluation.

1.9. CONTRACTING LOCAL PURCHASES. There may be occasions when contracting actions are appropriate to satisfy requirements generated by exercises. To demonstrate contracting support, requesting agencies and contracting offices must complete all actions requesting supplies and/or services. Requested supplies and services will not be assumed available until approved by the EET.

1.9.1. **Guidelines.** Make no actual contractual obligations with contractors/vendors to satisfy exercise requirements. DO NOT contact actual vendors. Details and negotiations will be conducted with EET.

1.9.1.1. Requesting units will complete purchase request noting "EXERCISE". Follow normal approval/processing procedures and verify that funds exist to satisfy the purchase request. Provide a copy of purchase request to the IGWC.

1.9.1.2. Contracting officers will process requests through appropriate automated systems and execute all necessary contractual documents. Complete signature blocks with "EXERCISE". Provide a copy of contractual documents to the IGWC within 1 hour of execution.

1.10. PLAY AREA. The play area for IRRE/MAREs includes all of Eielson AFB unless specifically designated as a no-play area/facility. The play area for CEREs and the regeneration phase of IRREs is defined as Base X, IAW the 354 FW CERE EXPLAN; and the airspace and ground beneath the Pacific Air Range Complex (PARC). Additionally, 354 FW/IGI may coordinate specific off base exercise areas as required. Players inside no-play facilities or outside of designated play areas are not required to respond to exercise events.

1.10.1. **Base X No-Play Areas/Facilities.** As defined in the 354 FW CERE EXPLAN.

1.10.2. **Standing Eielson AFB No-Play Areas/Facilities.**

1.10.2.1. All base living areas, to include family housing areas, dormitories, billeting, and FAM-CAMP.

1.10.2.2. All school/university areas to include the Fairbanks/North Star School District, Child Development Center, Base Education Center Classes, and Youth/Teen/Community Centers.

1.10.2.3. Alaska Air National Guard, unless specifically agreed upon prior to STARTEX.

1.10.2.4. Det 1, 210 Rescue Squadron; Det 1, 66 Training Squadron; Det 1, 460 AFTAC, Det 14, OLA, 372 nd TRS (FTD); and AAFES/Defense Commissary Facilities/Credit Union Facilities (except for anti-robbery exercises), GTE, GCI Cable, base library, and Civil Air Patrol.

1.10.2.5. Contractor construction sites and maintenance facilities.

1.11. PLAYERS. During IRRE/MAREs, all military personnel, mission essential civilian employees, and civilian contractors whose contract allows exercise participation are considered exercise players. During CEREs and the regeneration phase of IRREs, players are limited to only those personnel "deployed" in tasked wing mobility positions and CERE augmentees IAW paragraph 1.12. All players will respond appropriately to exercise scenario events while in the play area. Players on medical profiles will react in-scenario IAW the limitations of their profile.

1.11.1. **Exemption from CERE Play.** 354 FW personnel not considered players or augmentees who require access to Base X for official duties must be approved non-players and wear a white armband while in the play area. They will not participate in, nor interfere with exercise events.

1.11.1.1. **White Armband Letter.** Unit commanders request that specific personnel be authorized access to the play area in a non-player status via a White Armband Letter. 354 FW/CV is the final approval authority for exemption from exercise participation while in the play area. A copy of all approved White Armband Letters must be forwarded to the IGWC. Non-players must carry a copy of the signed White Armband Letter while in the exercise play area.

1.11.2. **Players with Incomplete IPE/CWDE.** CERE players/augmentees without full CWDE/IPE must carry a unit commander-signed letter that lists what specific items the individual was not issued.

1.12. CERE AUGMENTATION. The mobility commitment of the 354 FW provides only a part of the total force required to stand-up and employ from Base X. Exercise augmentation assets are wing personnel and equipment that are not primary 354 FW deployed assets, but are available at Base X as either

WRM or deployed by other units. They are required to make Base X a functional airbase for exercise purposes and must be defined prior to STARTEX. In order to accurately evaluate combat capability at the deployed location, players/equipment that are not a 354 FW deployed or augmentation asset WILL NOT be used during exercise play. EET will make random checks of personnel and assets in the play areas.

1.12.1. **Personnel/Red Armband Letters.** GP/CCs designate personnel required as augmentation forces via the Red Armband Letter. Red Armband Letters must identify NAME, RANK, AFSC and notional base of origin. A copy of all Red Armband Letters must be delivered to the IGWC prior to STARTEX. Augmentees will carry a copy of their Red Armband Letter and will wear a red armband to identify them as such while in the exercise play area. Augmentees will fully participate in exercise events as players.

1.12.2. **Equipment.** Augmentation equipment (AGE, vehicles) will be strictly controlled to include only WRM assets available at the deployed location. Units will maintain a copy of authorization letters.

1.12.2.1. TRANS/CC will coordinate with units to provide a Vehicle Authorization List (VAL) to the IGWC prior to STARTEX. The list will include all player GOVs and identify them as deployed or WRM. EET will use this as a source document for determining GOVs authorized in the play area. Players will not use vehicles not on this list during the exercise. No-play GOVs will have a sign in the window designating them as such.

1.12.2.2. GP/CCs will designate all WRM (augmentation) AGE by type and S/N, in writing, to the IGWC prior to STARTEX.

1.13. ENTRY AUTHORIZATION LIST (EAL). An EAL identifying all EET members/observers and their security clearance is provided to the wing for authentication prior to each exercise. EET members will be cleared into restricted/controlled areas and/or exercise events as expeditiously as possible. EET members will not attempt to surreptitiously enter a restricted/controlled area. 354 FW/IGI will deliver an EAL to the 354 FW Command Post and remain on-scene for validation IAW AFI 31-101.

1.14. REPORTS/RATINGS. Reports will be published and posted on the 354 FW/IG Web Page within 10 working days after ENDEX. See [Attachment 1](#) (IRRE), [Attachment 2](#) (CERE) and [Attachment 3](#) (MARE) for report format/rated areas. Ratings are an assessment of the wing's capability to accomplish the mission; to include transition to, and conduct of contingency operations in support of assigned tasking. Exercises with an overall rating of Marginal or Unsatisfactory must be re-accomplished within 90 calendar days.

1.14.1. **Ratings.** Ratings are based on the five tier rating system.

1.14.1.1. **OUTSTANDING.** Operation or performance far exceeds mission requirements. Activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Few, if any, deficiencies exist.

1.14.1.2. **EXCELLENT.** Operation or performance exceeds mission requirements. Activities are carried out in a superior manner. Relatively free of deficiencies.

1.14.1.3. **SATISFACTORY.** Operation or performance meets mission requirements. Activities are carried out in a competent manner. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

1.14.1.4. **MARGINAL.** Operation or performance does not meet some mission requirements. Activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

1.14.1.5. **UNSATISFACTORY.** Operation or performance does not meet mission requirements. Activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Significant deficiencies exist which preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishments.

1.14.2. **Un-Rated Exercises.** The 354 FW/IG may direct an exercise not be rated or assess actual deployment or MARE activity. Example, annual MARE requirements may be met by evaluating and documenting actual response to real accidents or natural disasters. In this case, the exercise report may consist of a summary of the incident/exercise, units or personnel participating, installation actions, and lessons learned or recommendations for improvement.

1.15. FINDING/BENCHMARK REPLY INSTRUCTIONS. All findings and benchmark considerations require a reply. OPRs will provide written replies to 354 FW/IGI within 30 calendar days of the report date. All replies will be routed through the GP/CC or WSA Chief for endorsement.

1.15.1. **Findings.** A deficiency finding describes a core problem and will be assigned an OPR for resolution. It may also be followed by specific examples. Replies to deficiency findings should answer the basic problem. Address specific examples only when necessary to clarify the answer.

1.15.1.1. Each finding reply should contain enough detail to allow the IG to determine the status of the finding. Include a recommended status (open or closed) for each finding. If your corrective action is not complete by the suspense, describe what you are doing now and include an Estimated Completion Date (ECD). If the finding is beyond the unit's ability to resolve, describe the action taken to get help.

1.15.1.2. Format for replies to both local exercises and HHQ inspections are as follows.

1.15.1.2.1. Type the alphanumeric designator in parentheses and text of each finding on a separate Microsoft Word document page.

1.15.1.2.2. Type the text of each reply immediately under the finding. Include in the last line the OPR and ECD, if applicable.

1.15.1.3. Subsequent updates to open findings will be continued on the previously submitted reply.

1.15.1.4. Each finding reply will be submitted via diskette or electronic mail.

1.15.1.5. 354 FW/IGI will review all replies from OPRs and make recommendations to the FW/IG on the status of findings (open or closed). Open findings require a progress report and will be suspended by 354 FW/IGI until closed.

1.15.2. **Benchmark Consideration.** A benchmark consideration is something worthy of wing-wide attention. Send appropriate material (pictures, diagrams, procedures, etc.) to 354 FW/IG for evaluation and dissemination.

1.16. ATTRITION. The EET may remove players from the exercise for wanton failure to comply with exercise ground rules, whose action/inaction could have caused them to needlessly become a casualty in a combat environment, or who display a gross "lack of sense of urgency." EET will deliver attrition per-

sonnel to the IGWC Superintendent who will advise the EET Team Chief. The EET Team Chief will contact the individual's commander to determine further course of action.

1.16.1. **Pilot/Aircraft Attrition.** Pilots who do not properly avoid a simulated threat or employ inappropriate tactics/self-protection actions may be removed from exercise play, along with their aircraft, and the associated sortie (s) graded ineffective. The EET Team Chief will contact the individual's commander to determine further course of action.

1.17. OUTSTANDING PERFORMERS. EET may nominate no more than 1.5% of a unit's personnel to be designated as Outstanding Team or Individual Performers in the final report. EET must have observed the individual(s) during the course of the evaluation and be prepared to provide supporting rationale to 354 FW/IGI. EET Team Chiefs will validate all nominees with the individual's commander and ensure the 1.5% standard is not exceeded. Unit commanders may recommend that EET observe specific individuals as potential Outstanding Performers during the course of the evaluation.

1.18. EXERCISE OBSERVERS. Commanders or outside agencies who desire specific individuals to enter the play area in an observer capacity should make the request to 354 FW/IGI NLT seven days prior to a scheduled exercise. Observers will be included on the EET EAL, and may be privy to trusted agent information as coordinated with 354 FW/IGI. Observers will not interfere or participate in any exercise activity. Observers will not evaluate exercise events and will wear an Observer Badge, provided by 354 FW/IGI, to readily identify them to players.

1.19. ENDEX. After consultation with 354 FW/IG to ensure exercise objectives are met, the 354 FW/CC will declare ENDEX.

Chapter 2

INITIAL RESPONSE READINESS EXERCISE (IRRE)

2.1. GENERAL. The IRRE requires the 354 FW to quickly transition from routine daily procedures to a wartime mobilization posture. The IRRE evaluates unit capability to prepare personnel, weapons systems and equipment for contingency operations. The IRRE will be executed in accordance with AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning*, PACAF Sup 1 to AFI 10-403, Installation Deployment Plan (IDP). Evaluation criteria are IAW AFI 90-201/Common Core Criteria (CCC), PACAFI 90-201, and this instruction.

2.1.1. **Duration.** IRREs are typically planned as a five-day exercise.

2.1.2. **Startex.** For evaluation purposes, STARTEX begins upon delivery of a Warning Order to the WG/CC. The Execute Order DTG is the Reference Start Time (RST) for evaluating time-compliance actions. Recall Initiation Time (RIT) is the time that the 354 FW/CC directs a General Recall. RST and RIT are "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) unless otherwise specified.

2.1.3. **Core Assessment.** Validate accuracy of unit Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting to meet DOC tasking. Unit Manning Documents (UMD) and Deployment Requirements Manning Documents (DRMD) are also reviewed for accuracy.

2.2. EXERCISE AREA GUIDELINES. Prior to deployment, all Eielson AFB resources may be used. After deployment, only deployed assets and Base X rules as defined in the CERE EXPLAN will be used.

2.3. COMMAND AND CONTROL. Evaluate the wing's ability to effectively direct, respond, resolve, coordinate and execute all actions required to accomplish the assigned tasking in a wartime scenario. Functional area EET reps submit inputs to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion into the final report. 354 FW/IGI is responsible for writing this section of the after action report. The rating for command and control is subjective and includes the following areas:

2.3.1. **Battle Staff.** The Battle Staff will be evaluated on Operational Risk Management (ORM) decisions to balance mission accomplishment with sustainment and wing reception/beddown responsibilities. The rating will include assessment of situational awareness, problem analysis/resolution and timeliness/effectiveness of action. Battle Staff leadership must be familiar with supported OPLANs, wing limiting factors and HHQ objectives/priorities.

2.3.1.1. **CADRE.** CADRE leadership and staff will be evaluated on establishing Base X, managing reception duties and regeneration efforts to ensure arriving forces are capable of performing expected unified commander tasking or unit DOC, ASAP. Assess knowledge of the employment site, to include site survey, and understanding of integration with host base personnel.

2.3.1.1.1. EET will evaluate the adequacy and security of Base X C4I connectivity with both higher headquarters and subordinate units.

2.3.1.2. **Command Post.** Evaluate physical security, entry control and EAL procedures. Command post controllers will be evaluated on ability to properly process and disseminate emergency action messages, use of quick reaction/emergency action checklists, and operational report (OPREP) and situation report (SITREP) submission procedures. The command post EET rep will submit inputs/recommendations to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion in the final report.

2.3.1.3. Unit Control Centers (UCC) are rated as an integral part of the battle staff. Evaluate UCC capability to collect, display, report, and disseminate information which in turn initiates appropriate plans, procedures and implementing instructions to accomplish tasking. The SPTG EET Team Chief will submit inputs to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion into the final report.

2.3.2. **Mission Director/Staff.** The ability to coordinate and manage air tasking order (ATO) deployment missions and airlift chalks is a core competency. The wing will be evaluated on ability to manage aircraft generation and launch operations, cargo/PAX processing and reception of incoming forces. The mission director must be thoroughly familiar with ATO tasking/SPINS, airlift schedule and wing limiting factors.

2.3.3. **Command Staff Support.** Evaluate adequacy of command staff support to include Chaplain, Comptroller, Public Affairs and Staff Judge Advocate. Functional area EET reps will submit inputs and recommendations to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion in the final report.

2.3.3.1. Evaluate functional area support available to deploying personnel.

2.3.4. **Alert Recall Procedures.** Evaluate wing capability to conduct a no-notice general recall IAW 354 FWI 10-201, *Personnel Recall Procedures*. Recall Initiation Time (RIT) is declared by the FW/CC. The MSS EET Team Chief rates this area.

2.3.4.1. Simulate recalling personnel on leave or TDY. Track all simulated recalls via 0phone/message log IAW 354 FWI 10-201.

2.3.4.2. PRU will consolidate all phone logs and date/time stamped recall messages, and send to the IGWC NLT RIT+12 hours. PRU will maintain a copy of each unit's recall strength percentage and reporting time on the PRU Reporting Worksheet Log, and send a copy to the IGWC NLT RIT+24 hours.

2.3.4.3. Rating Criteria. Units are rated individually using the average difference between actual and required strength reporting for the first three hours after RIT. Ratings are a subjective assessment of unit ability to meet or exceed the wing standard IAW 354 FWI 10-201 (1st hour 35%, 2nd hour 75%, 3rd hour 95%).

2.4. EMPLOYMENT READINESS. Evaluate all actions taken to generate, deploy and regenerate fighter aircraft to conduct contingency operations as tasked. 354 FW/IGI determines overall rating for Employment Readiness with a subjective assessment of the five rated sub-areas.

2.4.1. **Generation.** Evaluation includes a subjective assessment of unit maintenance procedures, and an objective assessment of sortie generation and system reliability IAW **Table 2.1**. Generated aircraft must have operational systems capable of meeting mission requirements to include ground checks required for transoceanic flight IAW AFI 11-207, Flight Delivery of Fighter Aircraft. Aircraft must be fully serviced and configured IAW the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The OGQ Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.1.1. The standard for 354 FW exercises is to generate tasked aircraft IAW DOC response time.

2.4.1.1.1. Units may pre-generate up to 50% of tasked aircraft upon receipt of strategic warning message. This restriction ensures EET has the opportunity to observe the generation process.

2.4.1.1.2. Aircraft generation time is pilot acceptance time, when the pilot enters in the AFTO Form 781A, "Aircraft accepted at: (time/date), by: (name/rank)". This will be the last entry in the AFTO Form 781A prior to turning the aircraft over to the EET. At pilot acceptance, no further aircraft maintenance actions will be performed on the aircraft nor AFTO 781 forms entries be made until released by EET.

2.4.1.1.3. The Mission Director will notify the IGWC of acceptance times by tail number.

2.4.1.2. Baseline is the number of aircraft tasked, normally PAA. The baseline may be adjusted using the following formula: Tasked aircraft minus HHQ tasked on/all off station aircraft (includes contract team, deployed aircraft or other non-possessed codes) minus TNMCS (total number of aircraft for which parts will not be available to meet generation timing) equals adjusted baseline.

2.4.1.2.1. TNMCS aircraft must be validated with OGQ EET. NMCS/B aircraft will be included in the baseline if supply can provide the parts to repair NMCS/B aircraft within the generation time frame.

2.4.1.2.2. All not mission capable maintenance (NMCM) aircraft will be included in the baseline.

2.4.1.2.3. Brief tasked aircraft tail numbers to OGQ EET NLT RST + 1.5 hours.

2.4.1.3. Generated aircraft will be loaded with the tasked SCL using live munitions to the maximum extent possible. If sufficient live munitions do not exist to fulfill complete tasking, inert/captive or training munitions may be loaded; however, a mix of live and inert munitions of the same type will not be loaded on the same aircraft. The full SCL will remain loaded during generation and regeneration until the EET Inspector releases the aircraft. After EET inspection, load crews will download live weapons.

2.4.1.3.1. IAW the command missile policy, air-to-air missile portions of the configurations will be loaded with live missiles (AIM-9/AIM-120) not to exceed authorized quantities. Under no circumstances will aircraft be loaded with mixed loads of live and inert missiles, nor will they fly with live missiles.

2.4.1.3.2. Both A/OA-10 and F-16 guns will be fully loaded with TP/TPT or HE/HEI ammunition.

2.4.1.3.2.1. During the generation, aircraft will be loaded to the delayed flight or alert condition IAW the applicable T.O. series 33-1-2. Gun clearing cam sector holdback tools will be removed, rounds limiter set to no-limit, rounds counter set.

2.4.1.3.3. Tasked aircraft will be loaded with ALQ-184 pods, reprogrammed with the appropriate combat tape load for the deployed theater.

2.4.1.3.4. Munitions items installed, but restricted from flight, will be entered on a "Red X" in the AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*. Exceptional release need not be accomplished for those aircraft with munitions on a "Red X". The pilot will accept the aircraft and enter the appropriate write-up as if the aircraft were ready for flight.

2.4.1.3.5. All weapons activities will be recorded in the Aircraft Forms Binder. Supervisors will accomplish AF Form 2434, *Munitions Configuration and Expenditure Document*, which will include simulated as well as actual configuration.

2.4.1.4. Generated aircraft will be inspected by the EET for mission capability and proper configuration IAW the deployment ATO. EET inspection will include walk-around, forms review, servicing, compliance with mission essential subsystem list (MESL), core automated maintenance system (CAMS) historical data, and overall aircraft condition. EET inspection may include engine start and preflight checks. Aircraft rejected for safety of flight or improper configuration discrepancies will not be considered as generated and cannot be used in any further stage of the generation. However, if the aircraft can be brought up to MC status prior to the deployment phase, it may be used for that phase and all subsequent phases of the exercise. Minor discrepancies will be noted and included in the subjective evaluation.

2.4.1.4.1. Objective Criteria. Timing and the total number of aircraft generated for deployment are assessed IAW **Table 2.1**. The "Number of Aircraft Generated" is determined by subtracting EET rejects from the total number of aircraft offered for inspection. Each fighter squadron is assessed individually.

Table 2.1. Generation.

RATING	Number of Aircraft Generated
	Pilot Acceptance Time
OUTSTANDING	Baseline
	IAW DOC Response Time
EXCELLENT	Baseline minus 1
	IAW DOC Response Time
SATISFACTORY	Baseline minus 2
	IAW DOC Response Time
MARGINAL	Baseline minus 3
	IAW DOC Response Time
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet above criteria

2.4.2. **Deployment.** The Deployment rating will be a combination aircraft maintenance, operations and the number of aircraft arriving at Base X IAW **Table 2.2**. The OG Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.2.1. Aircraft Maintenance. This area encompasses all maintenance actions during deployment. The aircraft maintenance function will be evaluated on its ability to manage and control assigned resources, the content and use of deployment plans, technical data and safety compliance. Aircraft require Radar Warning Receiver and IFF Mode IV checks prior to launch.

2.4.2.2. Operations. The simulated and actual deployment briefings will be evaluated for planning, organization, and content. An EET inspector will fly with the deployment and evaluate the mission with emphasis on flight discipline and mission conduct. Operations assessment includes pilot understanding of unified commander's Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) procedures.

2.4.2.3. Deployment sorties are normally a local round-robin flight and include air refueling. The inspected unit will accomplish all flight planning. IGI may direct a taxi exercise during periods of

extremely bad weather. An "Elephant Walk" (taxi exercise), includes all unit deployment actions through aircraft brake release for takeoff roll, without an actual launch being required.

2.4.2.3.1. Deploying aircraft must be those accepted during generation phase. However, units may repair EET rejected aircraft and use them for deployment. Generated ground spares exceeding tasking are authorized.

2.4.2.3.2. Deployment Timing Requirements. On-time takeoffs are based on brake release of the cell lead's aircraft IAW the deployment ATO. Deviations, to include local air traffic control delays, may constitute a subjective adjustment to the deployment rating. A cell is considered late if more than 15 minutes after scheduled takeoff. Takeoff time slips due to tanker delays are not chargeable to the unit. Use of spare aircraft is authorized, however only those aircraft that can meet the timing criteria for the last scheduled cell are considered deployed for rating purposes.

2.4.2.3.3. Deployment sorties must demonstrate air-refueling capability. Aircraft scheduled for air refueling during the local round robin flight must take fuel to be counted as effective. If the local flight does not include air refueling or a taxi exercise is opted, fighter squadrons must demonstrate ground check of all deploying aircraft.

2.4.2.3.4. After landing, aircraft will be recovered with the minimum action required to "bed" the aircraft for parking. No action beyond that required to park, safe the aircraft, and perform time-critical servicing will be taken until regeneration start times.

2.4.2.3.4.1. Objective Criteria. Each fighter squadron is assessed individually IAW [Table 2.2](#).

Table 2.2. Deployment.

RATING	Number of Aircraft Arriving at Base X
OUTSTANDING	Baseline
EXCELLENT	Baseline minus 1
SATISFACTORY	Baseline minus 2
MARGINAL	Baseline minus 3
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet above criteria

2.4.3. **Regeneration.** Evaluation is a subjective assessment of unit maintenance procedures, and an objective assessment of sortie regeneration IAW [Table 2.3](#). This phase of an exercise tests the deployed unit's ability to attain a combat ready posture and provide the theater commander with an employment ready squadron as soon as possible after arriving at a deployment base. The regeneration effort will be accomplished in isolation, using only resources and equipment that were deployed or are in place at the actual deployed location. The OGQ Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.3.1. Regeneration start time is the actual post-mission chock time of the first deployed mission aircraft of each cell. Chock time is calculated by adding the enroute time to the scheduled takeoff times IAW the deployment ATO. Completion time will be when the aircraft is accepted and documented in the aircraft AFTO Form 781A.

2.4.3.1.1. Regeneration start times will not be adjusted for early/late takeoffs of the local sorties. IGI may adjust regeneration start times in the event of significant slips due to weather or tanker availability.

2.4.3.1.2. At regeneration start time, deployed MOC will load aircraft regeneration sequence and track aircraft regeneration actions in TBMCS. Deployed 18 FS and 355 FS PS&D personnel will supply production superintendent with AF 2408s and AF 2409s to manage aircraft regeneration actions.

2.4.3.2. Personnel, equipment, and MRSP pallets will be available for regeneration purposes after the simulated landing time (departure time plus flying time to the simulated deployed location) for each airlift load/chalk. Assets arriving at other than Base X will consider ground transportation time required.

2.4.3.3. Augmentation Forces, personnel assigned to replicate the additional manpower that is assumed to be available at the deployed location must comply with procedures in [Chapter 1](#), paragraph [1.12](#).

2.4.3.4. Augmentation Equipment, vehicles and aerospace ground equipment assigned to replicate the additional equipment that is assumed to be available at the deployed location, must comply with procedures outlined in [Chapter 1](#), paragraph [1.12](#).

2.4.3.5. Deployed and augmentation personnel will wear field gear and have CWDE readily available when they arrive at the deployed location and begin regeneration activities.

2.4.3.6. Aircraft will be reconfigured IAW the Pre-ATO and/or as coordinated with exercise HHQ.

2.4.3.6.1. Aircraft must be fully reconfigured with the proper suspension equipment and loaded with the all munitions items necessary to complete the tasked SCL.

2.4.3.6.2. Munitions will not be expended on deployment sortie unless specifically directed by 354 FW/IGI. Munitions that were not expended on the deployment do not need to be reloaded as long as they meet the employment SCL specifications.

2.4.3.7. Regenerated aircraft must meet Mission Essential Systems Listing (MESL) requirements, be serviced, and be properly configured to meet mission requirements.

2.4.3.7.1. Aircraft Acceptance Time. Defined as when the accepting pilot enters in the AFTO Form 781A, "Aircraft accepted at (time/date), by: (name/rank)". This will be the last entry in the AFTO Form 781A prior to turning the aircraft over to the EET inspector. For other than alert aircraft, if pilots are not available due to crew rest considerations, regeneration completion time will be the time the aircraft is declared ready by maintenance. Annotate date/time in AFTO Form 781A as above. After unit acceptance no further maintenance will be performed on the aircraft until released by the EET.

2.4.3.8. Objective Criteria. Timing and the number of aircraft regenerated define the regeneration criteria IAW [Table 2.3](#). The "Number of Aircraft Regenerated " is determined by subtracting the number of aircraft rejected by EET from the total number of aircraft offered for inspection. Each fighter squadron is assessed individually.

Table 2.3. Regeneration.

RATING	Number of Aircraft Regenerated
	Acceptance Time
OUTSTANDING	12 Aircraft
	<7 Hours
EXCELLENT	12 Aircraft
	7-11 Hours
SATISFACTORY	12 Aircraft
	≤12 Hours
MARGINAL	10-11 Aircraft
	≤12 Hours
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet above criteria

2.4.4. **Operations Support.** Evaluate operations related support to sortie production. The overall rating is assigned by 354 FW/OGV, and is a subjective assessment of all four areas and their contribution to accomplishment of wing mission tasking.

2.4.4.1. Mission Planning Cell. Rated subjectively by on ability to break out the ATO and coordinate, plan and prioritize wing assets in preparation for tomorrow's missions. Evaluated areas include target area attack planning/weaponeering, strike package coordination and mission commander orders, mission execution materials/products, daily flying schedule production, munitions tracking and prioritization, support to the Mission Director and tasking coordination with HHQ. The OGV team chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.4.2. Intelligence. Rated subjectively on the following USAF prioritized tasks for intelligence support. The Intel EET Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.4.2.1. Combat Intelligence Center (CIC) and unit intelligence function provide situational awareness, threat, and target status.

2.4.4.2.2. Consolidate, validate, and process unit requests for information (RFI)

2.4.4.2.3. Manage adequate inventory of targeting, mapping, charting and geodesy products.

2.4.4.2.4. Ensure that national, theater, force and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution and mission effectiveness assessments.

2.4.4.2.5. Evaluate threat assessment analysis for both ground and air forces.

2.4.4.3. Life Support. Rated subjectively in the following areas. The Life Support EET Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.4.3.1. Evaluate ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival and rescue equipment.

2.4.4.3.2. Evaluate ability to provide deployment packages supporting 60 days of surge flying operations.

2.4.4.3.3. Evaluate ability to support aircrew chemical defense operations.

2.4.4.3.4. Evaluate effectiveness of both aircrew and technician training programs.

2.4.4.4. Weather. Rated subjectively on ability to provide timely, accurate and meaningful weather support to Battle Staff, Mission Director, SOF, MPC and flying squadrons. The Weather EET Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

2.4.4.4.1. Evaluate integration of strategic, operational and tactical weather information into unit weather products tailored to mission requirements.

2.4.4.4.2. Assess weather function ability to prepare weather products with limited amounts of data.

2.4.4.4.3. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit tactical-level weather information in a timely manner.

2.4.4.4.4. Assess the timely receipt and transmission of weather information obtained from aircrew debriefs (TARWI).

2.4.4.5. Airfield Operations. (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management)

2.4.4.5.1. Evaluate the ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly and expeditious flow of aircraft during wartime/contingency tasking while adhering to USAF, FAA, DoD and ICAO procedures.

2.4.4.5.2. Evaluate the ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities (pavement, signs, markings, etc) during wartime/contingency tasking.

2.4.4.5.3. Evaluate Airfield Operations emergency actions procedures and checklists.

2.4.5. **Military Deception (MD).** Evaluate ability of the commander, Military Deception Officer (MDO) and the Military Deception working Group (MDWG) to develop and implement a military deception plan IAW USAF directives. Prior to the exercise, IGI will coordinate with the MDO to clearly establish a formal MD chain of command to be used throughout the evaluation.

2.4.5.1. Assess MD program management. Verify key leadership briefed into program and MDWG identified and trained. Validate current SPECAT Message Management Letter on file. Ensure MDO/Alternate have completed MAJCOM MD formal training.

2.4.5.2. Assess MDWG proficiency and ability to rapidly development a plan in a close hold environment that supports exercise HHQ tasking. Emphasis should be on creating and coordinating an execution checklist developed to support the HHQ tasking received at RST and the effective use of OPSEC at all levels. HHQ tasking will include one of the five basic MD skills. Actual MD plans will not be used for exercise evaluation purposes.

2.4.5.3. Execution may be evaluated, and will focus on the effectiveness of the MDWG in implementing the execution checklist to support MD plan objectives. Flexibility of the MDO/MDWG to overcome both real world and EET-injected exercise problems without compromising the MD objective are critical to overall rating. Assess effective use of OPSEC at all levels throughout the execution phase.

2.4.5.4. The rating for Military Deception is subjective.

2.5. MISSION SUPPORT READINESS. Evaluate all mobility and reception/beddown functions taken to prepare the wing for contingency operations. 354 FW/IGI will determine overall rating for Mission Support Readiness with a subjective assessment of both rated sub-areas.

2.5.1. **Mobility.** Evaluate all cargo and personnel processing functions. Evaluate Deployment Control Center (DCC) capability to develop a Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE) that maximizes utilization of provided airlift capacity and ensures unit prioritization and "in-place" timing requirements are met. Assess airlift utilization by reviewing all final load plans for maximum weight, indicated by percentage of Allowable Cabin Load (ACL), and/or cubic volume, indicated by the graphic presentation. Assess prioritization effectiveness by verifying critical increments required for C2 and regeneration are "in place" prior to fighter aircraft arrival at Base X, and all UTCs satisfy TPFDD RDD. Chalk departure timing is critical, however the quality of cargo/personnel increments and mobility support may raise or lower the rating. The Logistics EET Team Chief determines the overall rating, and will use objective assessment IAW [Table 2.4.](#) and a subjective assessment of both cargo and personnel processing.

Table 2.4. Chalk Departure Timing.

RATING	Percent of Chalks Departing On-Time*
OUTSTANDING	96-100%
EXCELLENT	90-95%
SATISFACTORY	80-89%
MARGINAL	70-79%
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet above criteria

NOTE: * Plan to use a working maximum on ground (MOG) of two C-17 equivalents departing every three hours (IAW EAFB Base Support Plan, Part II Chapter 21, para 21.4.4.)

2.5.1.1. General. Evaluation requires assessment of all status, tracking and deployment management files or worksheets. The wing is responsible for delivering the following documentation to the IGWC.

2.5.1.1.1. At STARTEX, a copy of the Installation Deployment Plan.

2.5.1.1.2. Deliver a photo copy (8X10 color) or computer printout of the DCC and RCC status boards at 12 hour intervals and before erasure for the duration of the exercise.

2.5.1.1.2.1. Provide a copy of all deployment schedules of events (DSOE), including changes, to the EET inspector in the DCC and to the IGWC within 30 minutes of publication.

2.5.1.1.3. Upon termination of the exercise, the DCC will consolidate and provide the following documentation to the IGWC.

2.5.1.1.3.1. Part IV of the Deployment Data File.

2.5.1.1.3.2. All messages received and dispatched during the exercise.

2.5.1.1.3.3. AFJMAN 24-204, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments; Shippers Declaration for Dangerous Goods sample book, DD Forms 1387-2 Special Handling Data/Certification Form, and letters authorizing unit personnel to sign.

2.5.1.1.3.4. A list of all discrepancies and frustrations fixed by the Quick-Fix Team, by unit.

2.5.1.1.3.5. One copy of each TDY order prepared by the DPU with amendments.

2.5.1.1.3.6. All Transportation Files (troop commander package, cargo courier documentation, aircraft commander package, station file copies of manifests and load lists).

2.5.1.1.3.7. A copy of PDF station discrepancy sheets by chalk. Discrepancy sheets must provide the complete mobility position number, name, and squadron of the individual cited for a deficiency. Immunization discrepancy sheet should differentiate shots "overdue" from shots that would expire during the deployment.

2.5.1.1.3.8. All Deployment Management System reports submitted by deploying units to the PDF. Include AFSC and skill level substitutions, non-availability waivers, and shortfall documentation, AF Form 4006 Unit Deployment Shortfalls.

2.5.1.1.4. Safety violations must be corrected on the spot, and may result in a late load if not resolved by load completion time.

2.5.1.1.4.1. Major violation. A major safety violation is an unsafe act or condition that results in or could result in damage to aircraft that could render it unsafe for flight, damage to equipment that renders it unusable, or disabling injury/death to personnel. Examples are incompatible cargo on the same pallet or aircraft, leaking fuel or corrosive material, improperly packaged hazardous cargo, or improperly tied-down rolling stock. A major safety violation will impact the overall mobility rating.

2.5.1.1.4.2. Minor violation. A minor safety violation is an unsafe act or condition that results in, or could result in minor damage to aircraft or equipment and/or minor injury to personnel. Examples are improper protective clothing, improper labeling of hazardous cargo (as long as the hazard is identified on the manifest), and unidentified hazardous cargo that does not change the compatibility requirements of the increment or load. Minor safety violations may impact the overall mobility rating.

2.5.1.1.5. The EET will randomly inspect Mobility Vehicle Operations (MVO) for vehicle support, timeliness, and safety.

2.5.1.2. Cargo Processing. Evaluate wing cargo processing from unit build-up through Joint Inspection (JI). The cargo loading process is not normally evaluated due to lack of on-station cargo aircraft. Include a detailed assessment of proper handling of classified and sensitive cargo, to include weapons and ammunition. Assessment includes random EET inspection of cargo after DSOE "JI complete" and before "load start" times. Cargo and documentation will be inspected for completeness, quality, serviceability, and safety. Individual squadrons may receive ratings separate from the wing rating to identify the quality of squadron inputs to the mobilization process. The Logistics EET Team Chief writes this section of the final report.

2.5.1.2.1. EET will randomly tag pallets or rolling stock for verification of the load/packing listing. EET tagged increments will not be disassembled until an EET inspector has released

the increment. EET will release tagged increments no later than the simulated chalk landing time of the aircraft carrying the load. EET will not tag mobility/personal bag pallets, which may be broken down and baggage returned to deploying personnel immediately after the aircrew passenger briefing. Personal mobility bag inspection will be conducted at the unit or DPU.

2.5.1.2.2. EET will inspect/verify bulk weapons pallets at Bldg 3426, only before or after marshaling.

2.5.1.2.3. Evaluate Material Selection and Preparation.

2.5.1.2.3.1. Verify weight and placards are within 5 percent of the actual increment weight.

2.5.1.2.3.2. Verify correct identification, marking, and documentation.

2.5.1.2.3.3. Verify adequate packing, and maximizing pallet use whenever possible.

2.5.1.2.3.4. Evaluate cargo movement to the marshaling area IAW the DSOE.

2.5.1.2.3.5. Unit representatives will accompany cargo to marshaling area and remain until cargo is through Joint Inspection or they are released by the Quick Fix Team, providing keys and combinations for all locked containers as required. Verify individuals are properly designated and briefed to perform duties as classified, weapons, and cargo couriers. Classified or sensitive cargo should be attended at all times.

2.5.1.2.4. Cargo increments are released from the CDF at the cargo load completion time. Released increments not tagged for EET inspection IAW paragraph 2.5.2.2.1. will not be used to support Base X events until the scheduled chalk land time at Base X. Released increments may be returned to the unit for storage or pre-positioned to the Base X area in preparation for regeneration activity.

2.5.1.2.5. Unit Frustrated Cargo. Frustrated cargo is defined as a discrepancy in paperwork or packing on an increment that must be corrected to ensure safety of flight. The amount of cargo frustrated at CDF in-check is rated objectively IAW [Table 2.5.](#), and is a measure of the quality of unit packed cargo increments. For units that process fewer than 5 cargo increments, the rating will be subjective.

Table 2.5. Unit Frustrated Cargo.

Units Processing 5-10 Total Increments		Units Processing Over 10 Total Increments	
RATING:		RATING:	
Number of Increments Frustrated		Percentage of Increments Frustrated	
OUTSTANDING	0	OUTSTANDING	0%
EXCELLENT	1	EXCELLENT	1 - 10%
SATISFACTORY	2-3	SATISFACTORY	11 - 30%
MARGINAL	4	MARGINAL	31 - 40%
UNSATISFACTORY	>4	UNSATISFACTORY	> 40%

2.5.1.2.6. Late Frustrated Cargo. Late frustrated cargo is further defined a cargo increment with safety of flight discrepancies not identified by JI completion or not corrected by cargo load completion time for the scheduled chalk. It is a measure of capability to identify and correct unit frustrated cargo in a timely manner. Late frustrated cargo is rated objectively IAW [Table 2.6](#).

Table 2.6. Late Frustrated Cargo.

1-10 Total Increments		Over 10 Total Increments	
RATING:		RATING:	
Number of Increments Late		Percentage of Increments Late	
OUTSTANDING	0	OUTSTANDING	0%
EXCELLENT	1	EXCELLENT	1 - 10%
SATISFACTORY	2-3	SATISFACTORY	11 - 30%
MARGINAL	4	MARGINAL	31 - 40%
UNSATISFACTORY	>4	UNSATISFACTORY	> 40%

2.5.1.3. Personnel Processing. Evaluate all Personnel Deployment Functions (PDF) to include inspection of the Deployment Processing Unit (DPU) for timeliness, briefing quality, completeness of orders, and personnel eligibility. DPU must maintain accountability of personnel, and maintain/operate the MANPER B system to meet all reporting requirements. Individual squadrons may receive ratings separate from the wing rating to identify the quality of squadron inputs to the mobilization process. The MSS EET Team Chief writes this section of the final report.

2.5.1.3.1. Personal Mobility Bags. Each officer and airman assigned to a primary or alternate mobility position must maintain the personal clothing required to support the most stringent contingency tasking.

2.5.1.3.1.1. The C-1 bag will be hand-carried, regardless of whether issued by Unit/Base Supply beforehand or during the processing line. The A and C bags may be palletized for shipment by the APT Transportation Representatives. Personnel moving by surface convoy will ensure personal baggage and professional kits are hand carried to the assembly area. After processing, individuals will ensure their gear is transported in the same vehicle they ride in.

2.5.1.3.1.2. The General Purpose Bag (Type A) will be used as the basic bag and is stored by the Supply Mobility Element. CE, Security Forces, Pacific Initial Communications Package (PICP), and Prime Rib are the only exceptions. Those units will maintain their own A-Bags. A-Bag requirements are found in PACAFI 23-204, Attachment 1.

2.5.1.3.1.3. The 354 FW does not issue or maintain Extreme Cold Weather Bags (B-Bag). IAW PACAFI 23-204, Para 10, wing commanders at Alaskan bases have the option of issuing B-Bag items to personnel. Items will not be duplicated in deployment bags. For example, since parkas, socks, mukluks, etc., are issued to 354 FW personnel for everyday use, they will not be maintained in built-up "B" bags. Therefore, each individual is respon-

sible to maintain, store, and bring to the assembly point or unit designated area for transport their issued extreme cold weather gear as required.

2.5.1.3.1.4. EET will randomly inspect baggage for completeness and serviceability.

2.5.1.3.2. Evaluate Personnel Selection and Preparation as follows. Verify delivery of the LOGMOD products to the processing line, verify all personnel report to the processing line, ensure personnel resources from the deploying unit are used to fill vacancies before seeking manning assistance (shortfalls), verify deployment eligibility of personnel, and ensure personnel deploy with required items.

2.5.1.3.2.1. Personnel on leave who are assigned against primary mobility positions may be “simulated” as processed if they could have been contacted and could have returned in time to make their chalk. (12 hours within Alaska, 24 hours in the CONUS, and 48 hours elsewhere) To process these personnel, the unit will send their mobility folders through the processing line. Each folder must include a copy of the phone/message log to verify availability.

2.5.1.3.3. Rate Personnel Processing objectively IAW **Table 2.7**. Personnel discrepancies noted by the DPU will determine unit ratings for personnel processing. For units processing fewer than 10 passengers, the total number of discrepancies determines the rating. For units processing over 10 passengers, the percentage of discrepancies (total number of discrepancies for each unit divided by the total number of unit personnel processed) determines the rating according to **Table 2.7**.

Table 2.7. Personnel Discrepancies.

Units Processing 1-10 Total Passengers		Units Processing Over 10 Total Passengers	
RATING: Number of Discrepancies		RATING: Percentage of Discrepancies	
OUTSTANDING	0	OUTSTANDING	0
EXCELLENT	1	EXCELLENT	1-10%
SATISFACTORY	2-3	SATISFACTORY	11-30%
MARGINAL	4	MARGINAL	31-40%
UNSATISFACTORY	>4	UNSATISFACTORY	> 40%

2.5.2. **Reception and Beddown.** Evaluate Reception Control Center (RCC) and unit capability to receive, support, and integrate incoming personnel and equipment IAW the Eielson Base Support Plan. Non-Player personnel/equipment will be tasked by 354 FW/IGI to act as inbound personnel/equipment for reception and beddown processing. The Logistics EET Team Chief consolidates and writes this section of the report.

2.5.2.1. Information about incoming forces and cargo will be provided in the following format:

Mission No.

A/C Type Unit

Arrival Time

PAX

Short Tons

Fuel and/or Maintenance Requirements

ULNs and UTCs on board

2.5.2.2. The wing will process incoming forces by taking all required actions that do not result in an unreasonable expenditure of funds. Personnel and cargo will be repositioned to designated locations; billeting arrangements will be made but not executed, receiving units will provide unit representatives to meet and brief incoming personnel. The unit will demonstrate the ability to deliver necessary billeting materials to appropriate locations. Dormitories or other facilities selected for billeting may be evaluated for adequacy, but will not be disturbed.

2.5.2.3. Wide Body Aircraft Parking, Servicing, and Security may be evaluated. Base operations will spot/mark on their airfield map the location(s) of inbound/outbound aircraft. Security Forces will place a traffic cone at the location representing securing of the aircraft if required. One POL specialist and a hydrant refueling hose will be dispatched and remain at the parking location during refueling operations. The POL control center will document simulated refueling times on the fuels servicing log (based on projected fuel loads and pumping rates) and simulate replenishing hydrant systems based on projected consumption rates. Airfield EET members will evaluate aircraft servicing operations.

2.5.2.4. Inbound cargo will be placed in the reception Marshaling Yard (Bldg 1140) thirty minutes after actual inbound airlift arrival.

2.5.2.5. The RCC must provide a copy of all reception schedules of events, including changes, to the inspector in the RCC and to the IGWC within 30 minutes of publication.

2.5.2.6. Rating. The rating for Reception and Beddown will be subjective.

2.6. ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND OPERATE (ATSO). This section provides evaluation guidance for Eielson AFB operations during contingency operations to include the ability to protect, sustain and restore mission capability when confronted with adversity. The base will be subjected to simulated terrorist attack, infiltrators, protestors, information warfare and mishaps. Exercise scenarios will be conducted through EET input cards, actor role-playing, smoke grenades/generators and ground burst simulators. All exercise radio, computer, and phone communications (except for "requests for password") will be preceded and followed by: "EXERCISE, EXERCISE." 354 FW/IGI will determine overall rating for ATSO based on subjective assessment of the three major sub-areas.

2.6.1. **Force Protection.** Evaluate unit capability to defend against terrorist attack, implement force protection measures, and security response and protection measures. The SFS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report and includes input from Intel and OSI EET Team Chiefs.

2.6.1.1. Evaluate Threat Working Group scenario analysis and recommendations to the Battle Staff

2.6.1.2. Assess unit understanding of the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) system and implementation of FPCON measures directed by the Battle Staff.

2.6.1.3. Actor/role players will not use actual weapons.

2.6.1.4. Vehicles must not exceed posted speed limits, but can use vehicle emergency equipment (i.e., emergency lights and siren) if the situation warrants same.

2.6.1.5. Handling of firearms and use of force must be consistent with local requirements and USAF policy contained in AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*.

2.6.1.6. Ensure that all SFS personnel are briefed on the following response force safety procedures.

2.6.1.6.1. Response Force Safety. Effective mission execution, commensurate with sound safety practices, is of paramount concern. Scenario deviations or noted procedural violations will be cause for immediate termination of the exercise. The exercise will be terminated immediately when a potentially dangerous situation develops. The safety of all participants, observers, evaluators, bystanders, etc., will be of utmost importance over all other factors.

2.6.1.6.2. When a perpetrator is involved, all posts and patrols must be advised, and responding patrols must acknowledge their understanding that a perpetrator is an expected element of the exercise.

2.6.1.6.3. The on-scene command/exercise inspectors are responsible for the control of the exercise.

2.6.1.7. Rating. The rating for Force Protection is subjective.

2.6.2. Defensive Counter Information (DCI). Evaluate the wing multi-discipline DCI effort to protect and defend Air Force information and information systems IAW AFPD 10-20. DCI elements include information assurance, operations security (OPSEC), counter intelligence, counter deception, counter psychological operations and electronic protection. Evaluate unit identification of critical and sensitive information and information system dependencies (centers of gravity). Assess commander/planner's use of risk management to apply operational, procedural, physical and/or technical countermeasures to reduce existing vulnerabilities. Evaluate effectiveness of unit DCI measures deployed to protect from potential enemy or malicious attack, assess response to attack and capability to use work-around procedures. Only the CS EET will execute scenarios involving INFOCON changes, unauthorized access or requests for passwords. 354 FW/IGI compiles this section of the report from inputs and recommendations of the various EET Team Chief and assigns overall rating.

2.6.2.1. Information Operations Conditions (INFOCON). Assess unit understanding of the INFOCON system and implementation of INFOCON measures directed by the Battle Staff or HHQ. The CS EET Team Chief evaluates this area.

2.6.2.2. Response to Information System Attack. Evaluate unit response actions to hacker activity, malicious software and denial of service attacks to include OSI investigation of the unauthorized intrusion. This area includes validating currency of anti-virus software/signature files installed on unit information systems. The CS and OSI EET Team Chiefs evaluate this area.

2.6.2.3. OPSEC/COMSEC. Evaluate unit OPSEC and COMSEC effort to identify and protect critical information from potential compromise, delay or loss. The flow of information up/down the chain and the use of secure systems will be assessed as the wing reacts to exercise events. Information flow also includes compliance with required HHQ voice and hard-copy reports. The CS EET Team Chief will coordinate and execute all exercise phone-monitoring activity.

2.6.2.4. Information Security. Evaluate effectiveness of the unit personnel security program to minimize the serious threat posed by disgruntled employees or hostile internal agents. Facility access control, password protection and workstation security discipline that limits unauthorized access to information/information systems are specific areas of evaluation. All personnel should be conscious of their working environment and report suspicious or unusual activities by others. The SFS and CS EET Team Chiefs evaluate this area.

2.6.2.5. Counter Psyop. Evaluate commander's use of Public Affairs and other military information dissemination methods to convey truthful, accurate information to mitigate the intended effects of adversary PSYOP or the unintended effect of rumors or inaccurate press reporting. The PA EET Team Chief evaluates this area.

2.6.2.6. Rating. The rating for DCI is subjective.

2.6.3. **Airbase Response.** Evaluate unit ability to provide civil engineering and communications sustainment and restoration support for the wing deployment. The SPTG EET Team Chief writes this section of the report.

2.6.3.1. Civil Engineer Support. Evaluate unit's ability to provide services as well as facility and installation sustainment and restoration activities. The CE EET Team Chief writes this section of the report

2.6.3.1.1. Crash/Fire/Rescue Response. Evaluate ability to prioritize and provide emergency response and on scene command. Possible evaluated events include response to aircraft emergency and/or aircrew extraction, structure and aircraft fires, and aircraft barrier engagement.

2.6.3.2. Communications Support. Verify that communications and computer capability and support equipment meet mission requirements. Verify that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks (LAN) are established and available. The CS Team Chief writes this section of the report.

2.6.3.2.1. Evaluate back-up communications and computer equipment or procedures to ensure uninterrupted mission support. Assess capability to ensure data integrity during power interruptions.

2.6.3.2.2. Evaluate emergency action procedures and capability to quickly restore or provide temporary workarounds for degraded systems. CS EET Team Chief will degrade actual system capability to simulate communications equipment damage.

2.6.3.2.3. Rating. The rating for communications and information will be subjective.

2.6.3.3. The rating for Airbase Response is subjective.

2.6.4. **Medical Response.** Assess unit ability to provide medical services and emergency care.

2.6.4.1. Evaluate MDG support of 354 FW deployment activities.

2.6.4.1.1. Evaluate ability to provide aerospace medical support to deploying flying personnel.

2.6.4.1.2. Assess capability to provide the commander's battle staff with effective medical staff support. Assess the employment and implementation of preventative medicine initiatives to maintain force readiness of all unit personnel. Evaluate medical recommendations for

resource protection and rapid response to hazardous materials exposure or mass casualty events.

2.6.4.2. Self Aid Buddy Care (SABC). Evaluate individual ability and proficiency at providing emergency care to injured personnel. All USAF personnel must be capable of providing first aid to injured personnel. Units will treat and care for personnel until delivered to the second level of medical care. Transportation will be responsibility of each unit.

2.6.4.3. Evaluate emergency response and medical care during MARE events scheduled during IRREs.

2.6.4.4. The Medical Group EET Team Chief writes this section of the report; the rating for Medical Response is subjective.

Chapter 3

COMBAT EMPLOYMENT READINESS EXERCISE (CERE)

3.1. GENERAL. The CERE tests the wing's ability to accomplish the mission in a wartime environment from a deployed location, Base X. CEREs include high combat sortie rates, joint force employment and 24-hour operations under the constant threat of enemy attack. Typical hostile actions against the airbase include conventional, chemical, biological or information warfare attacks from a variety of methods to include surface-to-surface missiles, aircraft, special operations forces or terrorists. Units must be pro-active in protecting assets from potential attack and be prepared to demonstrate the ability to survive and operate after attack or mishaps. Mishaps typically include situations such as in flight or ground aircraft emergencies, explosive mishaps, structural fires, and release of hazardous materials.

3.1.1. **Duration.** Typically planned as a three-day exercise with the fourth as weather back up.

3.1.2. **Startex.** Specified in LOIs. As the wing is liable for worst-case exercise scenarios and airfield attacks at STARTEX, all set-up and preparations should be complete prior to STARTEX.

3.2. EXERCISE AREA GUIDELINES. The exercise play area, also known as Base X, is defined in the 354 FW CERE EXPLAN. 354 CES/CEX will maintain and distribute a current Play Area Map.

3.2.1. **Personnel.** The wing will control access to the play area and limit access for non-players to official business only. Entry into the play area will be controlled through the Entry Control Point (ECP).

3.2.1.1. **Players.** Only personnel who deploy in primary mobility positions or augmentation forces (see paragraph 1.12.) will participate in the exercise as players. PERSCO will account for all players.

3.2.1.2. **Non-players.** Wing personnel who require access to, transit through, or perform non-exercise related duties will comply with paragraph 1.11.

3.2.1.2.1. ECP guards are not considered players or in the play area. ECP guards will remind non-players that they should use extreme caution as they enter the unrestricted exercise play area, and that pyrotechnic devices may be in use without warning.

3.2.1.2.2. Alaska Air National Guard personnel, civilian employees and contractors may enter the play area to perform official duty. Contractors should be fully briefed by their wing OPR. Personnel scheduled for training events, such as Arctic Survival or US Army, who must traverse the play area to access their training area will maintain convoy integrity until clear of the play area at Mullins Pit Road.

3.2.1.2.3. **Observers.** Personnel wishing to observe CERE activities will comply with paragraph 1.18.

3.2.1.2.4. **White Forces.** White forces are trusted agents employed by 354 FW/IGI to facilitate exercise management (example, MADDOG, ASOC, 11 AF Staff). White forces that must work inside the play area will wear white armbands and have a letter signed by the 354 FW/IG designating them as such.

3.2.2. **Vehicles, Equipment and Supplies.** Only deployed or augmentation assets (see paragraph 1.12.) available at Base X may be used during the exercise. Players may not use privately owned vehicles in the exercise play area.

3.2.3. **Communications.** All means of communication available at, or deployed to Base-X may be used during exercises to include telephone, radios, local area network and Giant Voice. Preface and end all exercise scenario information with the phrase, "Exercise, Exercise."

3.3. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2). Evaluate the wing's ability to effectively direct, respond, resolve, coordinate and execute all actions required to accomplish the assigned tasking in a wartime scenario. The Inspections Team Chief (354 FW/IGI) is responsible for writing this section of the after action report. The rating for command and control is subjective and includes the following areas:

3.3.1. **Battle Staff.** The Battle Staff will be evaluated on Operational Risk Management (ORM) decisions to balance mission accomplishment with sustainment and preservation of the wing's combat capability. The rating will include assessment of situational awareness, problem analysis/resolution and timeliness/effectiveness of action. Battle Staff leadership must be familiar with supported OPLANs, wing limiting factors and HHQ objectives/priorities. Evaluate Continuity of Command, delegation and restoration of wing C2 after attack, and capability to re-locate to alternate C2 facilities.

3.3.1.1. **Command Post.** Command post controllers will be evaluated on ability to properly process and disseminate emergency action messages, use of quick reaction/emergency action checklists, and operational report (OPREP) and situation report (SITREP) submission procedures. The command post EET rep will submit inputs/recommendations to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion in the final report.

3.3.2. **Mission Director/Staff.** The ability to coordinate and execute air tasking order (ATO) missions is a core competency. The wing will be evaluated on ability to manage sortie generation, mission tasking, launch and recovery operations, and post-mission reporting. The mission director must be thoroughly familiar with ATO tasking/SPINS, air campaign objectives/priorities and wing limiting factors.

3.3.3. **Survival and Recovery Center (SRC) Director/Staff.** The ability to quickly warn of attack, accurately assess attack damage and efficiently restore airbase activities that support air operation is a core competency. The rating will include ability to effectively sound the alarm when confronted with signs of impending attack. The SRC must continually assess and fuse field reports to build and maintain an accurate "big picture" of airbase status. The SRC director will coordinate and prioritize the post attack/mishap recovery with the battle staff. The SRC will direct and manage the recovery effort to minimize further loss of combat assets, and direct the contamination management/decontamination effort in a NBC environment.

3.3.3.1. **Unit Control Centers (UCC)** are rated as an integral part of the SRC. Evaluate UCC capability to collect, display, report, and disseminate information which in turn initiates appropriate plans, procedures and implementing instructions to accomplish tasking. The SPTG EET team chief will submit inputs and recommendations to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion in the final report.

3.3.4. **Command Staff Support.** Evaluate command staff support to include Chaplain, Comptroller, Public Affairs and Staff Judge Advocate. Functional area EET reps will submit inputs to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion into the final report.

3.3.4.1. All messages and transactions will be forwarded to the IGWC for review.

3.3.4.2. Chaplain. Chaplains will advise leadership of religious needs/holidays during the exercise timeframe. Chapel Control Center will be established, either fixed or mobile to serve as the focal point for all chapel requirements.

3.3.4.2.1. Unit visitation will be accomplished.

3.3.4.2.2. Chaplains will work closely with the medical and morgue teams to provide patient visitation and last rites as required.

3.3.4.2.3. Chaplains will perform Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) as required.

3.3.4.3. Comptroller. Evaluate all finance functions required for the exercise participants including Limited AFO Posture and Emergency Procedures. They should utilize the same workspace and work closely with contingency contracting.

3.3.4.4. Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Evaluate wing ability to conduct operations in compliance with LOAC and ROE. This includes, but is not limited to personnel capability to recognize and report potential violations, legal obligations with respect to targeting, employment of weapons, prisoners of war, noncombatant personnel or facilities, and neutral territory. The chain of command, to include a report to HHQ, must be notified of a potential LOAC/ROE violation

3.3.4.4.1. JA EET will verify LOAC training currency for deployed personnel and evaluate a sample of aircrews, security forces and medical personnel for LOAC/ROE awareness/proficiency.

3.3.4.4.2. The commander must consult a Judge Advocate (JA) concerning appropriate actions. Evaluate JA advice is timely and accurate. The JA must initiate required inquiries, remedial actions, and reports.

3.3.4.4.3. JA EET will submit inputs to 354 FW/IGI for inclusion into the final report for this area.

3.3.4.5. Rating. The rating for Command Staff Support functions will be subjective.

3.4. OPERATIONS. Evaluate unit capability to generate and employ to accomplish assigned tasking. Assess integration of deployed location procedures and requirements into planning documents and procedures.

3.4.1. **Sortie Generation.** Evaluation includes a subjective assessment of unit maintenance procedures, and an objective assessment of sortie generation and system reliability IAW **Table 3.5.** and **Table 3.6.** The OGQ Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

3.4.1.1. Aircraft maintenance will be evaluated on ability to provide combat ready aircraft during wartime scenarios. Evaluated areas include overall planning to support the printed daily flying schedule, supervisory involvement, information flow, technical data compliance, safety, Integrated Combat Turns (ICT) and hot pit refueling procedures.

3.4.1.1.1. Regeneration of "jettisoned" F-16 external fuel tanks. EET may designate up to 10 percent of the daily sorties as having expended external fuel tanks. To simulate reloading external tanks, use the following "Half Up/Half Down" procedure. Download one 370 gallon tank, move it at least 10 feet from the aircraft, then reload the tank. Comply with normal tank downloading/loading procedures including forms documentation and fuel transfer checks.

3.4.1.1.2. Regeneration of “jettisoned” stores. EET will provide exercise inputs for simulated weapons alternate mission equipment (AME) jettison to the pilots on specific sorties, who will report this to squadron as part of the in-flight report. If AME is required for subsequent sorties, the aircraft may not be used until all actions necessary to simulate replacement of jettisoned AME has occurred. To ensure the safety and reliability of aircraft, all applicable ground functional/jettison checks will be performed on aircraft reconfigured with replacement AME prior to the next sortie.

3.4.1.1.3. Regeneration of Halon. Use PACAF Standard Simulation 1.9 and the following procedures to demonstrate the capability to regenerate Halon Fuel Inerting Systems during combat turnarounds.

3.4.1.1.3.1. Prior to STARTEX, APG section chiefs coordinate cannibalization of reservoirs from “cann” jets and contact COSO to C-DECK available supply assets.

3.4.1.1.3.2. CAUTION: Resetting the Halon circuit breaker with only nitrogen in the reservoir may cause damage to internal heater. Do not clear entry on informational note page. Simulate resetting HALON HTR and FUEL INERT circuit breakers by placing additional informational note entry in AFTO Form 781A stating, “Halon tank not serviced with Halon, HALON HTR and FUEL INERT circuit breakers simulated reset.”

3.4.1.1.3.3. Between flights remove Halon bottles. Reservoirs must be collected and transported to the servicing area (Bldg 1348). An actual “swap” with spare reservoirs will NOT take place. Return and install the same reservoirs, provided all the spares were “serviced” when you arrived. Keep spare reservoirs at the servicing area, re-service IAW PACAF Standard Simulation 1.9.

3.4.1.2. Sortie Generation. Evaluate ability to provide mission capable sorties to meet ATO tasking.

3.4.1.2.1. Aircraft must be fully serviced, meet MESL requirements, and be configured IAW the printed flying schedule.

3.4.1.2.2. The sortie must be generated in time to meet its mission TOT requirements.

3.4.1.2.3. Aircraft systems must be functional to meet mission requirements (i.e., weapons control systems, sensors, ECM systems, etc.).

3.4.1.2.4. Weapons Loading Operations. Combat turn teams may be formed to meet mission requirements as directed by the Battle Staff. The OGQ Team Chief may also direct that ICTs be demonstrated as a task evaluation. Aircraft not generated with munitions as described below will not be counted as generated.

3.4.1.2.4.1. All air-to-ground munitions are considered expended on each sortie, except for 2.75 inch rockets which will require only a 50 percent replenishment each sortie. ASC sorties may carry a double load of rockets, allowing pit-and-go operations between first and second, or third and fourth sorties.

3.4.1.2.4.2. Air-to-air missile expenditures will be based upon simulated shots taken by the pilot and identified in the aircraft forms, or as tasked by EET inject. Pilots will document all missile expenditures in the aircraft AFTO Form 781A.

3.4.1.2.4.3. Completely reload chaff/flare systems and the F-16 gun on a minimum of 20 percent of the sorties flown. Completely reload the A-10A gun on a minimum of 50 percent of the sorties flown.

3.4.1.2.4.4. Generate aircraft with the standard conventional load (SCL) printed on the daily schedule.

3.4.1.2.4.5. Stations will be configured to support a full SCL, unless BDU-33s are fragged. If BDU-33s are fragged, one station will be TER configured with three BDU-33s. Other stations will be configured to support a "Half Up/Half-Down" procedure.

3.4.1.2.4.6. All required suspension equipment, orifices, impulse cartridges, etc., must be available at the site to accommodate loading the entire aircraft. All required functional tests must be performed.

3.4.1.2.4.7. Half-Up/Half-Down weapons loading procedures will be used. Aircraft must be loaded with live munitions to the maximum extent possible.

3.4.1.2.4.8. Load crews will enter the loading/unloading operation and time loaded in the aircraft forms.

3.4.1.2.4.9. Supervisors will accomplish AF Forms 2434 (or an approved configuration and expenditure document) to indicate simulated, as well as actual, expenditures. 30mm, 20mm, and CBU will be tracked by the last three digits of the manufacturer's lot number.

3.4.1.2.4.10. Aircraft Dash 6 technical order end-of-firing day inspections will be performed on all weapons stations used/simulated used after the aircraft's last sortie of the day.

3.4.1.2.5. Criteria. The following criteria will be used in determining sortie generation ratings. Units are accountable for MNDs (aircraft NMC or late crew ready), GABs, pilot availability and sympathetic aborts. Total tasked sorties may be adjusted for factors beyond the unit's control, such as HHQ cancels or poor weather. NOTE: Sorties lost due to delays during airbase attacks are not HHQ cancels.

Table 3.1. Sortie Generation.

RATING	Percent Generated (Sorties Generated/Sorties Tasked)
OUTSTANDING	97 - 100%
EXCELLENT	92 - 96%
SATISFACTORY	87 - 91%
MARGINAL	78 - 86%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 78%

3.4.1.3. Aircraft Systems Reliability. System reliability may be inspected using ground and/or airborne checks of avionics and armament systems. Ground systems reliability checks may be accomplished during Phantom Go's or after unit flying at ENDEX to prevent affecting flying ops.

3.4.1.3.1. Units will complete IFF and RWR checks on all aircraft prior to each flight. A daily recap of each day's failures and corrective actions will be provided to the IGWC by 0800 the next day.

3.4.1.3.2. A minimum of two aircraft from each fighter squadron will be evaluated by the EET for reliability checks.

3.4.1.3.3. Airborne weapons release reliability evaluations are based on first attempted firing of the gun or release of full-scale or practice (BDU) munitions loaded for each designated reliability check sortie flown. When a ripple release is attempted, each selected weapon will count as one release attempt. Chaff/Flare dispensing systems and IFF Mode IV may also be evaluated during airborne checks

3.4.1.3.4. Ground reliability checks will be performed by unit personnel and observed by the EET. The unit will supply personnel, technical data, and equipment to accomplish all checks with inspectors operating in an "over the shoulder" capacity. These checks may also be performed "off the aircraft" if directed by the OGQ EET Team Chief. For off aircraft test, the component will be removed from the aircraft and delivered to the appropriate maintenance facility. Ground weapons reliability rates will be computed by dividing the number of weapons stations that pass functional checks by the total number of stations tested.

3.4.1.3.4.1. Missile system reliability checks include the associated radar, weapons and optical sight, heads-up display, and armament control systems. All functions necessary for valid missile launch must be operative to receive credit for the associated station.

3.4.1.3.4.2. Avionics Systems Reliability. Sensor system (LANTIRN navigation/targeting pods, Pave Penny pods, etc.) reliability will be evaluated using the associated built-in tests (BIT). Internal EW systems will be evaluated using ground test sets or system diagnostic tools to verify correct software tape loaded. An operational check of the IFF System Mode IV will be conducted using a squirt box.

3.4.1.3.5. Criteria. The following criteria will be used in determining system reliability ratings. The rating for aircraft systems reliability will be a combination of avionics and armament ratings. Quality of maintenance may be used to alter the overall rating as determined by the IG.

Table 3.2. Systems Reliability.

RATING	Percent Functional (Functional Systems/Systems Checked)
OUTSTANDING	96 - 100%
EXCELLENT	92 - 95%
SATISFACTORY	88 - 91%
MARGINAL	84 - 87%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 84%

3.4.2. **Employment.** Evaluate the wing's ability to effectively employ combat forces and weapons systems to perform tasked missions during contingency operations. Fighter squadrons will be evaluated on their ability to perform ATO-assigned missions IAW current Desired Operational Capability

(DOC) statement. Exercise-specific SPINs define operational procedures and ROE. Operations assessment includes combat management of the pilot force, mass briefings, pilot understanding of unified commander's Rules of Engagement (ROE), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) procedures, and pilot compliance with all ground and airborne operational requirements. The Operations Group EET Team Chief (OGV) is responsible for writing this section of the after action report. The rating for employment is objective IAW **Table 3.1.-Table 3.4.**, however the rating may be adjusted for subjective criteria such as degree of difficulty of adversary IADS, threat reactions or tactics.

3.4.2.1. Mission Assessment. The maximum number of sorties possible will be evaluated through a combination of EET chase pilots and film review.

3.4.2.1.1. EET Chase Pilots. EET pilots typically replace pilots in the number 2 or 4 position, prior to brief. EET pilots will not be hard scheduled unless previously coordinated with 354 FW/IGI. Pilots replaced by EET will not be available for other duties (flight planning, SOF, etc.) for the period of time they are replaced. Replaced pilots are typically tasked to perform survivor duties or to process through the CCA. Sorties flown by EET as an integral member of the flight will not be included in mission effectiveness and weapons employment results.

3.4.2.1.2. Film Review/Mission Summary Sheet. Fighter squadrons will provide a VTR tape and completed mission summary sheet for each sortie. VTR tapes will be titled IAW the CERE EXPLAN. The mission summary sheet should include a copy of the lineup card (unclassified), attack card(s), and map (N/A for CAS/ASC/ CSAR missions). All documentation will be delivered to the IGWC after the second and fourth go's unless otherwise coordinated with 354 FW/IGI prior to STARTEX. Mission summary sheets should be as complete as possible, including alibis, to provide the inspectors maximum information. Sorties with incomplete documentation may be assessed as non-effective. EET Film evaluators will use the Mission Assessment Forms in **Attachment 7**.

3.4.2.2. Mission Effectiveness. The following functions will be evaluated and considered in the determination of each mission type's overall rating. The rating for each mission type will be no higher than the weapons employment rating for that mission. Each function may receive an individual rating. CSAR or ASC missions may be assessed as effective despite no opportunity for ordnance delivery.

3.4.2.2.1. Mission Preparation. Evaluated areas include use of available weather, environmental, and intelligence data; planning accuracy; route selection; weaponeering; target area tactics; large force/package integration, launch/recovery procedures; and briefings.

3.4.2.2.2. Mission Execution. Evaluated areas include all aspects of employment. Timing, communications, anti-communications jamming procedures, threat consideration, counter-measure usage, attack option selection, survival success, effective systems use, use of support assets, and maneuvering will be evaluated. Time-on-Target (TOT) slips must be coordinated with HHQ. Formations and tactics flown should be IAW current tactical doctrine and anticipated threat. Sorties may be declared ineffective IAW paragraph **1.16.1**. for inappropriate tactics/counter threat maneuvering, airspace violations or violations of training rules/ROE/SPINs.

3.4.2.2.2.1. Alert Missions. Alert response will be specified in the SPINs/ITO. Aircraft and crews committed to alert will assume status at the vulnerability time. CAS/CSAR alert scramble timing criteria is 8 minutes.

3.4.2.2.2.1.1. Scramble response timing starts with receipt of a scramble order at the WOC and terminates at initiation of continuous taxi for the active runway. The WOC will record timing for each aircraft scrambled. Deliver the timing record to the IGWC at the end of each flying day.

3.4.2.2.2.2. OCA/INT missions must hit the fragged DMPI to be effective. If the tactical situation or target weather drives a re-attack or attack on the dump target, explain details on mission summary sheet.

3.4.2.2.2.3. CAS/XINT/(X)ATK sortie effectiveness is based on success against valid targets. For each sortie, a minimum of 50% of weapons delivery attempts must be successful for an effective sortie. Maverick slew or search is not considered a weapons delivery attempt until pickle.

3.4.2.2.2.4. Air Strike Control Missions (ASC). Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Battalion Air Liaison Officers (BALO) will be evaluated on ability to identify valid target(s) to fighter aircraft in consonance with the threat environment, and to maintain positive control of the fighters in the target area. Although FAC weapons delivery is desired, ASC missions may be considered effective if at least one fighter mission is controlled and does a weapons delivery attempt on the designated target. Additional ASC mission evaluation areas include the following:

3.4.2.2.2.4.1. Coordinate with ground commander for targeting and attack restrictions.

3.4.2.2.2.4.2. Provide airspace deconfliction plan for fighters entering, working and exiting the area of operations. Provide fighters with an attack briefing.

3.4.2.2.2.4.3. Effective use of allocated strike aircraft/ordnance.

3.4.2.2.2.4.4. Maintain an observation position to provide final control for each fighter (permissive environment). Provide clear and accurate adjustment instruction to each successive fighter.

3.4.2.2.2.4.5. Provide each fighter and the ASOC with target Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA).

3.4.2.2.2.5. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and ESCORT missions are rated subjectively by EET chase or film assessment based on mission results and the tactical situation.

3.4.2.2.2.6. ASC, CSAR or ESCORT missions without an opportunity for weapons delivery due to the tactical situation must film the entire tactical portion of the mission to be assessable as effective.

3.4.2.2.2.7. Missions killed prior to the target or required to jettison ordnance due to threat reaction are considered ineffective, but should administratively proceed to the target for weapons delivery assessment.

3.4.2.2.2.8. Missions must conduct all weapons delivery attempts/re-attacks within the assigned TOT/vulnerability window. Missions assigned a Time on Station (TOS) must cover the entire vulnerability window to be considered effective.

3.4.2.2.3. Criteria. The following criteria will be used in determining mission effectiveness ratings.

Table 3.3. Mission Effectiveness.

RATING	Percent Effective (Effective Sorties/Total Sorties Flown)
OUTSTANDING	95 - 100%
EXCELLENT	85 - 94%
SATISFACTORY	75 - 84%
MARGINAL	65 - 74%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 65%

3.4.2.3. Air-to-Ground Procedures. All air-to-ground operations will be conducted IAW AFI 11-214, AFI 13-212, *Weapons Range Management*, exercise SPINS and applicable local range procedures. The wing is responsible for ensuring fraged ordnance is compatible with the intended target, ensures target destruction, and is IAW range directives. Changes must be requested from HHQ.

3.4.2.3.1. Only tactical deliveries will be evaluated for weapons employment effectiveness. Film will be reviewed to validate target aim point and ensure weapons delivery parameters/procedures are valid for fusing/function, are IAW training rules/SPINS altitude restrictions, and safe escape maneuvers are adequate.

3.4.2.3.1.1. Missions flown without expendable ordnance must film the weapons delivery pass and use full switchology to record a release cue in the HUD. Failure to film weapons delivery attempts results in an ineffective sortie.

3.4.2.3.1.2. Missions flown with expendable ordnance will be evaluated IAW AFTTP 3-1 and 11-2MDSV1, Aircrew Training. Ripple releases will score the nearest impact to the desired DMPI. Whenever possible, deliveries will be on a TOSS-scored targets to give weapons scores. No-spots will be non-chargeable for mission effectiveness. Deliveries on non-scored targets and no-spots will be evaluated by film assessment and/or air-scored by EET chase.

3.4.2.3.1.3. Tactical Rocket Deliveries. AFAC rockets will be scored a hit if they are usable for marking the designated target.

3.4.2.3.2. Criteria. The following criteria will be used in determining weapons employment ratings.

Table 3.4. Weapons Employment: Conventional Deliveries.

RATING	Tactical Hit Percent (Valid Deliveries/Total Attempts)
OUTSTANDING	95 - 100%
EXCELLENT	85 - 94%
SATISFACTORY	75 - 84%
MARGINAL	65 - 74%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 65%

Table 3.5. Weapons Employment: Precision Weapons.

RATING	LGB Hit Percent (Valid Deliveries/Total Attempts)	AGM-65 Maverick Hit Percent* (Valid Deliveries/Total Attempts)
OUTSTANDING	95 - 100%	90 - 100%
EXCELLENT	89 - 94%	80 - 89%
SATISFACTORY	82 - 88%	60 - 79%
MARGINAL	75 - 81%	50 - 59%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 75%	< 50%

NOTE: * Maverick hit percentages are only derived from attempted shots (hammer down, Rifle) and do not include Maverick slew and/or search.

3.4.2.4. Air-to-Air Procedures. Adversary air may be used to evaluate air-to-air tactics and/or air combat capability. All participating pilots will be fully briefed on provisions of AFI 11-214, *Aircrew, Weapons Director, and Terminal Attack Controller Procedures for Air Operations*, and the exercise specific SPINS. Pilots not D/ACBT current or qualified are subject to attack, but will react with wing-rock only.

3.4.2.4.1. Dissimilar adversary aircraft will be used to the maximum extent possible. Threat simulation will be specified in the SPINS and comply with procedures outlined in AFTTP 3-1V2, Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics. 354 FW/IGI will brief red aircrews on procedures and desired presentations. 354 FW/IGI will debrief red air. There will be no face-to-face brief/debrief between red and blue flyers.

3.4.2.4.2. Only captive training missiles will be used.

3.4.2.4.3. MADDOG is a safety observer whose instructions are directive, unless safety of flight overrides. When directed by MADDOG, pilots will terminate current engagement and comply with MADDOG instructions prior to resuming exercise play. Document such occurrences on the mission alibi sheet if a tactical disadvantage results.

3.4.2.4.4. Air-to-air missile employment effectiveness will be evaluated IAW AFTTP 3-1 volume set kill criteria. Missiles defeated by target maneuvering, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and/or infrared countermeasures (IRCM) after a valid launch will not be scored against the pilot. For example, AIM-120s should normally be supported to the medium pulse

repetition frequency (MPRF) active range, however failing to do so may be prudent because a defensive maneuver is subsequently required and therefore not chargeable. However pilots are responsible for recognizing that shots are invalid or defeated and must document appropriately on their mission alibi sheet. Valid at pickle includes a valid "hostile" declaration or VID IAW exercise SPINS/ROE.

3.4.2.4.5. Air-to-air gun employment effectiveness will be evaluated IAW AFTTP 3-1 volume set valid track criteria. Snapshot attempts will be reported, but will not be considered in the rating.

3.4.2.4.6. Criteria. The following criteria will be used in determining air-to-air employment ratings.

Table 3.6. Air-Air Weapons Employment

RATING	AIM-9/AIM-120 Hit Percent (Valid/Total Shots Taken)	Gun Hit Percent (Valid/Total Shots Taken)
OUTSTANDING	95 - 100%	80-100%
EXCELLENT	90 - 94%	65-79%
SATISFACTORY	80 - 89%	50-64%
MARGINAL	65 - 79%	40-49%
UNSATISFACTORY	< 65%	<40%

3.4.3. **Operations Support.** Evaluate operations related support to sortie production. The overall rating is assigned by 354 FW/IGI, and is a subjective assessment of all four areas and their contribution to accomplishment of wing mission tasking.

3.4.3.1. Mission Planning Cell. Rated subjectively by on ability to break out the ATO and coordinate, plan and prioritize wing assets in preparation for tomorrow's missions. Evaluated areas include target area attack planning/weaponeering, strike package coordination and mission commander orders, mission execution materials/products, daily flying schedule production, munitions tracking and prioritization, support to the Mission Director and tasking coordination with HHQ. Evaluate response to HHQ Electronic Warfare reprogramming directives to include ability to modify, create or verify mission tapes, and analyze the effects of changes in pilot procedures and system settings. The OGV team chief will write this section of the final report.

3.4.3.2. Intelligence. Rated subjectively on the criteria outlined in AFI 14-105 and USAF prioritized tasks for intelligence support listed below. The Intel EET Team Chief writes this section of the final report.

3.4.3.2.1. Control of Intelligence Operations, to include Combat Intelligence Center (CIC) and unit intelligence capability to provide order of battle management, threat analysis, and targeting support with available personnel and system connectivity. Intelligence personnel must also be capable of implementing emergency destruction of classified materials and/or relocation of intelligence operations.

3.4.3.2.2. Consolidate, validate, and process unit requests for information (RFI)

3.4.3.2.3. Timely transmission of intelligence information from mission debriefs. (MISREPs)

3.4.3.2.4. Consolidate and report mission battle damage assessments (BDA).

3.4.3.2.5. Manage adequate inventory of targeting, mapping, charting and geodesy products.

3.4.3.2.6. Ensure that national, theater, force and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution and mission effectiveness assessments.

3.4.3.2.7. Evaluate threat assessment analysis for both ground and air forces.

3.4.3.3. Life Support. Rated subjectively in the following areas. The Life Support EET Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

3.4.3.3.1. Evaluate ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival and rescue equipment.

3.4.3.3.2. Evaluate ability to provide deployment packages supporting 60 days of surge flying operations.

3.4.3.3.3. Evaluate ability to support aircrew chemical defense operations. The IG may task a limited number of pilots to suit up with full chemical wear to demonstrate either decontamination procedures at an aircrew CCA and/or tactical flying operations. Pilots tasked to fly chemical warfare sorties will comply with the procedures outlined in AFI 11-2MDS specific volumes and/or 32 series instructions.

3.4.3.3.4. Evaluate effectiveness of both aircrew and technician training programs. The IG may task a limited number of pilots to demonstrate Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) proficiency in the field and/or water survival procedures at the base pool.

3.4.3.4. Weather. Rated subjectively on ability to provide timely, accurate and meaningful weather support to Battle Staff, Mission Director, SOF, MPC and flying squadrons. The Weather EET Team Chief will write this section of the final report.

3.4.3.4.1. Evaluate integration of strategic, operational and tactical weather information into unit weather products tailored to mission requirements.

3.4.3.4.2. Assess weather function ability to prepare weather products with limited amounts of data.

3.4.3.4.3. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit tactical-level weather information in a timely manner.

3.4.3.4.4. Assess the timely receipt and transmission of weather information obtained from aircrew debriefs (TARWI).

3.5. MISSION SUPPORT. Evaluate the three essential support functions that affect the wing's ability to conduct assigned tasking during contingency operations. 354 FW/IGI will assign an overall evaluation of mission support based on inputs from the contributing EET team chiefs.

3.5.1. **Logistics.** Evaluate logistics related support to sortie production. The overall rating is a subjective assessment of all six areas and their contribution to accomplishment of wing mission tasking. Include evaluation of Logistics Readiness Center support to the Battle Staff. The Logistics EET Team Chief writes this section of the final report.

3.5.1.1. Supply. Evaluate the adequacy of the supply system to meet user requirements. This includes, but is not limited to ensuring assets on-hand replicate the level of support and re-supply

available at the actual deployment location. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability and efficient management of supplies and equipment. The rating for the supply function will be subjective.

3.5.1.1.1. Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) assets deployed to support exercises will be the primary source of supply for exercise aircraft.

3.5.1.1.2. A Combat Supply Activity (CSA) will be established to provide supply in the play area. MRSP will be relocated to the exercise area and dispersed. Deployed supply computer systems will be utilized, backed up by assets that cannot be physically collocated with the MFSS and delivered by the CSA when requisitioned. Supply computer remotes located in the MFSS will be turned off.

3.5.1.1.3. During CEREs, accountability for deployed assets will not be transferred to a lateral Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) but will remain at home station unless directed by LOI.

3.5.1.1.4. Only assets physically located in the deployed MRSP will be available for immediate issue. Assets not available in the deployed MRSP, but identified as available in collocated deployed unit MRSP, will be available for immediate issue.

3.5.1.1.4.1. Parts requests from areas outside the exercise play area will be subject to conditions of PACAF-approved Local Simulation 20. Assets will be pulled from main base supply stock and delivered to Bldg 1306. A receipt log will be maintained to show time of requisition/receipt from main base supply as well as the time the asset can be issued to MFSS. Upon completion of the simulated transit time, deployed MFSS personnel will be notified to report to the designated deployed MRSP location and pick up the asset.

3.5.1.1.5. All Due-In From Maintenance (DIFM) assets will be routed through the appropriate repair shop for normal DIFM processing. Repaired and unserviceable assets will then be returned to MRSP to clear any outstanding details and fill MRSP shortages.

3.5.1.1.6. ISIR (Items of Special Interest Reporting) (ISIR-Base Supply):

3.5.1.1.6.1. The IG will act as the initiating headquarters. Supply will begin reporting on day one of STARTEX. LOIs will designate the actual time for report submissions. The first report will be a list of all reportable items. Subsequent reports will contain only items that changed. 18th/355th FS UCCs will contact the Supply UCC to report usage/destruction of ISIR assets.

3.5.1.1.6.2. AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*, and the PWSP for Base X will be used to formulate the report. Reported quantities will include allocated ISIR and IG-initiated transactions. Use X68 for the Base Designator, DODIC codes for Component Designators and mark all reports "Exercise Use Only".

3.5.1.2. Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL). POL personnel will demonstrate servicing capabilities, management, and fuels operations control in a wartime environment. A Resource Control Center (RCC) will be established. The rating for fuels personnel and the POL function will be subjective.

3.5.1.2.1. Evaluate compliance with all safety procedures and technical data during all refueling operations and cryogenics servicing

3.5.1.2.2. Safe and timely refueling response and cryogenics support to meet sortie production.

- 3.5.1.2.3. Evaluate ability to properly detect, sample and analyze suspected fuel/cryogenics contamination.
- 3.5.1.2.4. Refueling vehicles stored in hardened shelters or dispersed throughout the exercise area if shelters are not available. In temperatures below -10 degrees F for Oshkosh refuelers and 32 degrees F for Kovatch refuelers, vehicles may be stored in Bldg 3240 to prevent hydraulic system failure and air operating system failure.
- 3.5.1.3. Transportation. Evaluate transportation support to meet user requirements.
 - 3.5.1.3.1. Assess capability to repair broken or battle damaged vehicles.
 - 3.5.1.3.2. Assess unit capability to prioritize and redistribute vehicles when the vehicle fleet is attrited.
 - 3.5.1.3.2.1. Prior to STARTEX, 354 TRANS will provide a listing of all Base X vehicles to the IGWC IAW paragraph 1.12. Vehicles not on this list will not be used by players during the exercise. No-play GOVs will have a sign in the window designating them as such.
 - 3.5.1.3.2.2. Replacements for attrited vehicles must be contracted or properly requested via HHQ. The LG EET Team Chief is the approval authority for replacement vehicles.
 - 3.5.1.3.3. Verify personnel operating vehicles in the play area are trained and certified to operate vehicles while wearing the full chemical ground crew ensemble including chemical mask. This is a unit training requirement and should be added and annotated in the individual's training record.
 - 3.5.1.3.4. The rating for transportation and vehicle procedures will be subjective.
- 3.5.1.4. Maintenance. The rating for maintenance squadron functions will be subjective.
 - 3.5.1.4.1. Hydrazine Response. 354 MXS may be tasked to respond to a simulated EPU activation and/or H-70 spill. Hydrazine response team will demonstrate capability in responding to EPU activation up to the disconnection/removal of the H-70 canister, and containment/clean-up procedures for an H-70 spill.
 - 3.5.1.4.2. Aircraft Removal. The 354 FW may be tasked to demonstrate aircraft removal. If the use of a sling is required, the exercise will proceed up to the point of attaching the crash-crane lifting sling to the aircraft and applying tension to the cables. Follow MAJCOM and local operating guidance.
- 3.5.1.5. Munitions. The proper flow of munitions and components from storage to the flight line in the proper delivery configuration must be established and maintained. The rating for the munitions function will be subjective.
 - 3.5.1.5.1. Munitions, to include missiles, used to generate aircraft will be returned to the storage/operating area before reuse. One half of the returned munitions must be removed from and reinstalled on handling trailers before the munitions may be considered available for use. This operation must be continuous to portray an actual wartime operation. One half of returned missiles (all if the trailer is loaded with only half SCLs) will be off loaded into all-up-round containers (AURC) or, if AURCs are not available, onto missile storage stands and then reloaded onto trailers.

3.5.1.5.2. The breakout and delivery of munitions from storage locations to munitions buildup areas will demonstrate re-supply capability. One half of these munitions will be off-loaded and uploaded from/to the transport vehicle at the buildup area, and then returned to the storage location where one half the SCL will be unloaded/uploaded to simulate further re-supply, if required. Empty pallets/containers may be used, but the use of required personnel and handling equipment will not be simulated.

3.5.1.5.3. The capability to remove empty shipping containers and residue from the buildup/breakout location(s) to disposal/ storage points must also be demonstrated. Required personnel and equipment will not be simulated.

3.5.1.5.4. The Combat Ammunition System Deployable (CAS-D) is the primary contingency munitions management system for PACAF. 354FW Munitions Flight will begin reporting at STARTEX using CAS-D procedures outlined in AFI 21-203. The first report will be submitted via e-mail (address to be provided by the munitions inspector) to 354/IGI NLT 0900L or IAW LOI. Follow-on reports will be daily NLT 0900L. Data will be compiled up to 2400L daily.

3.5.1.5.4.1. Items Of Special Interest Reporting (ISIR). The Theater Ammunition Control Point (TACP) and/or initiating headquarters will initiate and terminate ISIR reporting procedures in the event CAS-D procedures are interrupted. AFMAN 10-206, *Deployable Ammunition Operations Procedures*, and HQ PACAF/LGW ISIR Report ACTION package dated 12 Mar 98, will be used to formulate the report.

3.5.1.5.5. The following Base X ordnance inventory is notionally established for 354 FW Combat Employment Readiness Exercises/Inspections. This STARTEX list includes any ordnance flown in on the deployment sortie.

Ordnance	Quantity		Ordnance	Quantity
30mm CBMX	108,000		AIM 9M	72
20mm HEI	49,000		AIM-120	36
MK-82	200		CBU-87	250
MK-82HD	430		CBU-89	58
MK-84	200		M-206 IR Flare	11,000
MK-84HD	12		MJU-7 IR Flare	13,000
AGM-65D*	240		RR-170 Chaff	25,000
AGM-65G*	25		RR-180 Chaff	17,000
GBU 12B	76		LUU-2	30
GBU-24	26		2.75 M-156 WP/WH	13,000
GBU-24/I2K	19		2.75 M-151 HE/WH	2,000
GBU-10	32		ROCKET MOTORS	6,866
GBU-10/I2K	8		ALE-50	72

NOTE: * Due to limited availability of IR TGMs at Eielson AFB, EO TGMs can be substituted on any A/OA-10 tasked line for AGM-65 employment evaluation.

3.5.1.5.5.1. Units should plan to employ for five days using the above list with no re-supply. Units are responsible for managing ordnance expenditures, adapting shot ROE, requesting changes to the ATO, and requesting re-supply. The Munitions EET Team Chief will act as the TACP and initiating headquarters during exercises.

3.5.1.6. Contingency Contracting. The rating for contingency contracting will be subjective.

3.5.1.6.1. Contracting actions will be performed IAW guidance in **Chapter 1**, Paragraph **1.9**.

3.5.1.6.2. The wing will establish a Requirements Validation Management Board of senior officers and NCOs to validate local purchase requirements. This board's purpose is to identify who the contingency contracting officers are and to establish rules of engagement for purchasing supplies, services, and construction for the wing. The rules should include instructions on purchase descriptions, funding procedures, pick-up and delivery procedures, contract monitor duties, etc. Convening this board early will help avoid ratifications or retroactive contracting.

3.5.1.6.2.1. Typically, the board should consist of the wing or vice wing commander as chairperson, with the commanders of the logistics group, operations group, support group, transportation squadron, services squadron, civil engineering squadron, and comptroller flight as members along with the contingency contracting officer(s).

3.5.2. **Airbase Support.** Evaluate airbase-related support to sortie production. The overall rating is a subjective assessment of five areas and their contribution to accomplishment of wing mission tasking. EET Team Chiefs write/rate their individual sections of the final report. 354 FW/IGI consolidates rating of all areas to determine overall Airbase Support rating.

3.5.2.1. Communications and Information. Evaluate that deployed communications and computer capability and support equipment meet mission requirements. Verify that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks (LAN) are established and available. When possible, the wing will limit existing communications capability and support to simulate communications capability available at the deployed location. The CS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report.

3.5.2.1.1. Evaluate compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands and services, as well as national and theater compatibility. The PICP will be integrated with fixed communications services to be used during wing readiness exercises/inspections. PICP provides secure and non-secure voice and data communications utilizing mobile equipment to include: Tactical Secure Data Communications Systems (TASDAC), Deployable Local Area Network (DLAN); INMARSAT (commercial satellite access); Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) communications; Satellite Communications (SATCOM) van; digital and analog telephone switches; deployed Record Communications; secure and non-secure High Frequency (HF), Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) communications capabilities.

3.5.2.1.1.1. Setup time standard for PICP SATCOM during initial setup or relocation is 8 hours. The CS EET Team Chief will determine "start time" and initial conditions for evaluation.

3.5.2.1.2. Evaluate deployed network management and personal computer support. CS should provide equipment and manpower resources necessary to establish a deployed TBMCS configuration, to include five network nodes capable of supporting up to 40 laptop terminals.

3.5.2.1.3. Evaluate all back-up communications and computer equipment or procedures to ensure uninterrupted mission support. Assess capability to ensure data integrity during power interruptions.

3.5.2.1.4. Evaluate emergency action procedures and capability to quickly restore or provide temporary workarounds for degraded systems. CS EET Team Chief will degrade actual system capability to simulate communications equipment damage.

3.5.2.1.5. Rating. The rating for communications and information will be subjective.

3.5.2.2. Services. Evaluate all deployed services functions and their contribution to mission accomplishment. The services EET Team Chief write this section of the report.

3.5.2.2.1. Messing. Services personnel will set up and feed troops from the field kitchen/messing assets.

3.5.2.2.2. Mortuary Operations. Mortuary affairs will set up and operate a morgue at Base X, working closely with PERSCO and medical teams.

3.5.2.2.2.1. Return to Duty. All players "killed" during the exercise (Morts) will be processed first through the medical function at the Air Transportable Clinic (ATC), then the morgue. After services processing is complete and information for PERSCO processing/reporting is obtained, Morts will depart the exercise area. Morts are automatically regenerated and will return to duty the following shift.

3.5.2.2.3. Lodging. The lodging representative will be stationed with the PERSCO processing line. Personnel will be assigned billeting as if they were processing at Base X.

3.5.2.2.4. Rating. The rating for services will be subjective.

3.5.2.3. Civil Engineering (CE). The civil engineers will typically stage out of Spruce Lake and conduct operations IAW the CES Operating Instruction and may be tasked on a wide variety of areas. The CE EET Team Chief writes this section of the report.

3.5.2.3.1. Rating. The rating for CE will be subjective.

3.5.2.4. Combat Support Services. Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) is rated on ability to maintain accountability of all deployed and augmentation personnel. The MSS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report and assesses the following areas:

3.5.2.4.1. Evaluate ability to connect MANPER-B equipment and operate as a stand-alone computer.

3.5.2.4.2. MANPER-B system reports must be accurate and produced in a timely manner. In order to maintain accountability, units must provide the PERSCO SRC representative with any Duty Status Change Reports, Palace Exercise Messages, Discrepancy Reports, Status of Resources reports, and SITREP reports as required.

3.5.2.4.3. PERSCO must process all personnel, casualty and force management reports.

3.5.2.4.3.1. Routine backfill request for all deaths reported through medical/services agencies will be processed within 24 hours of notification.

3.5.2.4.3.2. Requests for replacement of critical backfills such as personnel possessing unique skills, or filling key positions, will be processed through the unit commander to the

SRC functional representative. The SRC functional representative will complete the Critical Backfill Request worksheet and deliver it to the PERSCO representative in the SRC.

3.5.2.4.3.3. PERSCO may also be tasked to demonstrate emergency leave actions, and produce standard and locally defined reports.

3.5.2.4.3.4. Copies of all personnel actions will be delivered to the IGWC within 30 minutes of production.

3.5.2.4.4. Rating. The rating for PERSCO will be subjective.

3.5.3. **Reception and Beddown.** The wing may be tasked to demonstrate reception capability. The Logistics EET Team Chief consolidates and writes this section of the report.

3.5.3.1. Reception Planning. The Base Support Plan outlines the role of the Reception Control Center (RCC) and will detail how personnel and equipment will be received and integrated into the units. Non-Player personnel may be tasked by 354 FW/IGI to act as inbound personnel for reception/beddown.

3.5.3.2. Information on incoming forces and cargo will be provided by 354 FW/IGI as follows.

Mission Number

A/C Type Unit

Arrival Time

PAX

Short Tons

Maintenance Requirements

UTC's

3.5.3.3. The deployed wing will take all required actions to process the incoming forces that do not result in an unreasonable expenditure of funds.

3.5.3.3.1. Establish an in-processing reception area to account for all arriving Base X personnel. PERSCO must maintain accountability of all deployed and augmentation forces. Billeting arrangements will be made, but not executed. Incoming personnel will be repositioned to designated locations. Deployed units will provide unit representatives to meet and brief incoming personnel during reception processing.

3.5.3.3.2. Airlift Aircraft Parking Plan. Base Operations will develop an aircraft parking plan, to include parking location, type of aircraft and length of anticipated ground time as a minimum. Deliver a copy of the plan and any changes to the IGWC within 30 minutes of publication. Airfield Management should demonstrate both tactical and airlift parking, show the degree of dispersal available.

3.5.3.4. The RCC must provide a copy of all reception schedules of events, including changes, to the IGWC within 30 minutes of publication.

3.5.3.5. Supply Support. Demonstrate procedures for receipt and accountability of additive MRSPs, and procedures for obtaining supplies to include consumables for flightline operations.

3.5.3.6. Transportation Support. Demonstrate procedures for transportation of passengers and assignment of vehicles, traffic management, and vehicle maintenance actions.

3.5.3.7. Services. Demonstrate how billeting and messing facilities will be expanded to beddown incoming forces. Demonstrate distribution of housekeeping assets to support additive forces.

3.5.3.8. Rating. The rating for Reception and Beddown will be subjective.

3.6. ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND OPERATE (ATSO). This section provides evaluation guidance for airbase operations during contingency operations to include the ability to protect, sustain and restore mission capability. The base will be subjected to various simulated attacks by enemy aircraft, missiles, special forces, mortars, snipers, infiltrators, and information warfare. Attacks may include chemical, conventional, biological or nuclear weapons. Exercise scenarios will be conducted through EET input cards, actor role-playing, red air adversaries, smoke grenades/generators and ground burst simulators. All exercise radio, computer, and phone communications (except for "requests for password") will be preceded and followed by: "EXERCISE, EXERCISE." The primary reference guides to ATSO procedures will be AFH 32-4014, *USAF Ability to Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environment* (Vol. 4), and the Eielson ATSO Guide. 354 FW/IGI will determine overall rating for ATSO based on inputs from the contributing EET Team Chiefs from the four major sub-areas.

3.6.1. **Base Defense.** Evaluate unit capability to plan and conduct force protection operations to include both active and passive measures, and assess personal response and protection measures of deployed/augmentee personnel. The SFS EET Team Chief compiles Team Chief inputs from the four sub-areas and determines the overall rating for Base Defense.

3.6.1.1. Active Defense. Evaluate the unit's capability to plan and conduct operations within DOC constraints, to include the capability to detect and neutralize enemy direct or indirect ground attacks without causing fratricide. Evaluate tasked SFS teams, SELARM program effectiveness, and user security awareness and response. The SFS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report.

3.6.1.1.1. Evaluate deployable SFS individual and team proficiency to tactically employ assigned weapons, vehicles, communications and equipment. Assess SFS teams capability to prevent enemy forces from penetrating the base close defense area and to providing convoy escort/security.

3.6.1.1.1.1. The SFS EET Team Chief must designate and coordinate a suitable area to support force on force exercise scenarios. This area should be segregated from the general Base X populace who are not issued blank ammunition for their weapons. Typically Blueberry Hill (the communications site above the Eielson ski hill) is used for 354 FW only exercises, and Camp Mad Bull (Elmendorf AFB) is used for joint 354 FW/3 WG exercises. Unless specifically authorized by the SFS Team Chief, Security Forces players will not exit the play area until termination of the exercise to demonstrate 24-hour capability.

3.6.1.1.1.2. To provide realistic weapons fire discipline and control, and to enhance the use of cover and concealment, SFS personnel armed with blank ammo will utilize multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES) equipment if available.

3.6.1.1.1.3. SFS teams will provide the EET with a copy of their warning and patrol orders.

3.6.1.1.1.4. Deployed SFS team leaders will coordinate defensive actions with higher and adjacent headquarters in the rear area through the SFS EET. Personnel deployed to the exercise play area will only use deployed tactical radios as primary means of communication.

3.6.1.1.1.4.1. The Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) at Base X is a shared responsibility of deployed US security forces and Host Nation personnel. The 354 FW has no BDOC UTC, therefore the EET must provide all scenario BDOC play through the SRC SFS or OSI rep, to include interaction with supporting ground/air defense forces or simulated Host Nation forces. SFS and OSI EET Team Chiefs will coordinate and provide intelligence on enemy ground activities as part of the scenario.

3.6.1.1.2. Non-player Security Forces. 354 FW security forces providing real world base security will remain within their assigned patrol areas of responsibility and will be armed with live ammunition. If a “real-world” incident occurs, exercise play will stop and these security forces will respond. The real-world security force personnel will be pre-briefed on significant exercise scenario events and will not participate in Base X scenarios. They will wear white armbands to identify them as such.

3.6.1.1.3. Weapons Safety. All players must be familiar with current use of force and weapons safety policy. Only SFS members supporting ground defense scenarios, in a sequestered area, will be issued blank ammo. All other players will be issued simulated ammunition via hand receipt. Do not mix blank and live ammo and do not include armed weapons/ammo guards in potential use of force exercises. Live ammunition will not be deployed to the exercise play area. Exception: Unit armorers, pilots preparing for flight activity, real world security forces. These personnel will not draw their weapons in response to exercise play.

3.6.1.1.4. Rating. The rating for Active Defense is subjective and based on current evaluation criteria from PACAF Commando Warrior ground combat center.

3.6.1.2. Force Protection. Evaluate the wing pro-active effort to protect personnel from potential enemy attack from terrorists or unconventional forces. The SFS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report and includes input from Intel and OSI EET Team Chiefs.

3.6.1.2.1. Evaluate Threat Working Group scenario analysis and recommendations to the Battle Staff.

3.6.1.2.2. Assess unit understanding of the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) system and implementation of FPCON measures directed by the Battle Staff.

3.6.1.2.3. Rating. The rating for Force Protection is subjective.

3.6.1.3. Asset Dispersal and Protection. Evaluate the wing pro-active effort to protect assets from potential enemy attack or subversion. The SFS EET Team Chief writes this section of the report and includes input from OSI and CE EET Team Chiefs.

3.6.1.3.1. Equipment, vehicles and supplies should be protected in bunkers to the max extent possible when not in use. Assets in use during attack should be sheltered ASAP to minimize attack damage.

3.6.1.3.2. Equipment, vehicles and supplies not under overhead cover and not in immediate use should be covered with two sheets of plastic to prevent contamination during a chemical

attack. **NOTE:** There is a PACAF standard simulation that requires each unit to demonstrate this on two vehicles/assets. All others may be simulated covered. Assets in use during attack should be sheltered under cover ASAP.

3.6.1.3.3. Equipment, vehicles and supplies should be dispersed to the maximum extent possible without adversely impacting operations. The goal should be to prevent losing all or a majority of one asset in a single attack.

3.6.1.3.4. Unattended vehicles (unless on the flightline), buildings and doors should be locked. Ensure that personnel secure vehicles against NBC contamination by rolling up windows, closing vents, and keeping doors tightly shut and locked when not in use. Ensure that unoccupied aircraft canopies are closed.

3.6.1.3.5. Evaluate M-8 deployment and management in the play area. M-8 paper is used on vehicles, equipment and building stanchions to detect presence of chemical agent after attack. M-8 turns green, red, yellow or blue to indicate type of agent. CEX issues simulated M-8 paper to all UCCs. M-8 should be checked, and annotated checked, after each attack and routinely throughout each day. Once contaminated or rain-soaked, it should be replaced. Proper placement of M-8 is IAW the above references.

3.6.1.3.6. Validate building and vehicle blackout procedures.

3.6.1.3.7. Validate that personal weapons are not left unattended.

3.6.1.3.8. Rating. The rating for Asset Dispersal and Protection is subjective.

3.6.1.4. Personal Response and Protection. This section provides evaluation guidance for pre-, trans-, and post-attack actions for personnel. Personal response and protection is outlined in AFMAN 32-4005 and the Eielson ATSO Guide. The CE EET Team Chief writes this section of the report.

3.6.1.4.1. All participants in the exercise will be equipped with chemical warfare defense (CWD) equipment and individual protective Equipment (IPE). If any such equipment is not available, players will have in their possession a letter signed by their commander stating status of equipment not issued.

3.6.1.4.1.1. CWD training equipment will be in good repair and consist of the battle dress over-garment (BDO), mask, hood, boots, gloves, and inserts. An operational mask with training filter will be issued to all players. Primary MPNs should have a current mask fit test certificate. All players will be trained in CWD procedures.

3.6.1.4.1.2. IPE will include flak vest, helmet, liner, headband, web belt, canteen, cup and, if appropriate, rain gear. Field gear will be worn when not within a hardened facility in the exercise play area. The helmet may be removed when actively working in confined areas of the aircraft. Additionally, all personnel should have dog tags, ID card and a current Airman's Manual, USAF ATSO guide and Eielson AFB ATSO Guide.

3.6.1.4.2. In a chemical environment (standard for all 354 FW CEREs), all players should be issued three simulated nerve agent antidote kits. 354 CES Readiness Flight (CEX) will issue simulated M291 (pre-printed papers)/M295 (brown paper bags) decontamination kits to all players. All items should be stored in the interior pocket of the gas mask carrier unless specifically directed otherwise by BSD. M-9 tape is simulated by using ordinary three-inch wide

masking tape. M-9 tape is used on personnel, and turns red when contaminated with liquid chemical agent. Proper use of M-9 is described in the above references.

3.6.1.4.3. Pre-Attack, Attack Not Likely (Alarm Green/MOPP 0 or 2). Accomplish all normal wartime duties including administrative duties, messing, smokers, etc. If MOPP 2 declared, personnel outside should be wearing MOPP2 CWD. Personnel inside buildings or working on aircraft may have CWD "readily accessible."

3.6.1.4.4. Pre-Attack, Attack Probable (Alarm Yellow/MOPP2). Mission essential duties only, all others should take cover. Expect activity to protect unsheltered assets, expedite aircraft launches or recoveries.

3.6.1.4.5. Trans-Attack, Attack Imminent or In Progress (Alarm Blue/MOPP 4): All personnel will immediately take cover and don all protective gear. Aircraft should be recovered and sheltered if on the ground. If taxiing out for takeoff, aircraft should launch for survival. If driving a vehicle and a shelter cannot be reached immediately, stop the vehicle, turn off engine, roll up windows and stay in vehicle. If in a vehicle and a shelter can be reached, pull the vehicle in the bunker.

3.6.1.4.6. Post-Attack, Damage Assessment (Alarm Black/MOPP 4 or MOPP 2). Players should perform buddy care on casualties. They should mark UXOs and set a cordon. Players should report all damage, UXOs and contamination to their UCC/SRC. The wing uses a two phased release system to minimize exposure to chemical contamination. Only mission essential personnel should be outside during Alarm Black to minimize unnecessary exposure to contamination.

3.6.1.4.6.1. Black/MOPP 4, Initial Release. Only key personnel should move. ADAT teams are released to sweep the runway for chemical contamination, UXOs and/or damage. DPST Recon teams are released to check chemical detectors deployed throughout Base X. Expect squadron maintenance personnel to perform post attack reconnaissance in the loop area.

3.6.1.4.6.2. Black/MOPP 4, General Release. Used after an attack with suspected NBC contamination. DART teams are released to check for facility and infrastructure damage. Expect UCC guards to perform post attack reconnaissance in unit areas of responsibility. Aircraft launch/recovery and shuttle bus system resume.

3.6.1.4.6.3. Black MOPP 2, General Release. Used after attack with no threat of NBC contamination. DART teams are released to check for facility and infrastructure damage. Expect UCC guards to sweep unit areas of responsibility for UXOs and damage. Aircraft launch/recovery and shuttle bus system resume.

3.6.1.4.7. Bugle Call. Used to warn the base of mortar attack or ground attack by enemy personnel. SELARM personnel should take up defensive fighting positions and actively defend the airbase. Unarmed personnel should take cover. In general, personnel should not assume MOPP 4.

3.6.1.4.8. Use random written tests to sample individual ATSO knowledge.

3.6.1.4.9. Rating. The rating for Personnel Response and Protection will be subjective.

3.6.2. Recovery Operations. Evaluate unit capability to assess damage and execute recovery activities after attack. The CE EET Team Chief writes this section of the report and determines the overall rating for Recovery Operations using a subjective assessment of six key areas.

3.6.2.1. **Damage Assessment.** Evaluate unit capability to provide the SRC a timely, accurate assessment of damage sustained, contamination, and UXOs remaining after attack. The wing uses two ADAT teams to assess airfield damage, Recon teams to check pre-positioned chemical detection checkpoints, two DART teams to assess facility and infrastructure damage, and UCC sweep teams to check unit areas.

3.6.2.1.1. Assess Minimum Operating Surface (MOS) plotters capability to accurately plot reported runway damage, select a MOS, and brief the battle staff in an expeditious manner.

3.6.2.1.2. Assess NBC Cell ability to accurately plot, monitor and report NBC agents/concentration level(s), projected persistency, and known areas of contamination.

3.6.2.1.3. Rating. The rating for Damage Assessment will be subjective.

3.6.2.2. **Rapid Runway Repair (RRR).** Evaluate unit ability to prioritize and quickly repair runways/ taxiways and critical airfield functions required to support air operations. Eielson AFB Taxiway Golf will be used for ADAT post attack sweeps. Airfield repair task evaluations will be performed at the RRR training site at Spruce Lake. CE EET Team Chief will validate initial stockpile of repair materials available prior to STARTEX.

3.6.2.2.1. Evaluate proficiency of all specialized airfield team functions to include Mobile Aircraft Arresting System (MAAS) Teams, Airfield Marking Teams, Contingency Airfield Lighting System (CALS) Teams, Folded Fiberglass Mat (FFM) Team, and Crater Repair Teams.

3.6.2.2.2. Unit should account for and requisition additional repair materials as needed.

3.6.2.2.3. Rating. The rating for RRR will be subjective.

3.6.2.3. **Expedient Construction.** Evaluate unit ability to prioritize and quickly repair airbase infrastructure; such as utilities, roads and buildings. Task evaluations may be performed at the Spruce Lake training site. CE EET Team Chief will validate initial stockpile of repair materials available prior to STARTEX.

3.6.2.3.1. Evaluate proficiency of Rapid Utility Repair Kit (RURK) team.

3.6.2.3.2. Unit should account for and requisition additional repair materials as needed.

3.6.2.3.3. Rating. The rating for Expedient Construction will be subjective.

3.6.2.4. **Crash/Fire/Rescue Response.** Evaluate unit ability to prioritize and provide emergency response in a contingency environment. As a minimum, assess response to aircraft emergency/aircrew extraction, structure and aircraft fires, and aircraft barrier engagement. The rating for Expedient Construction will be subjective.

3.6.2.5. **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.** Evaluate unit ability to survive and operate in an NBC environment. CE EET Team Chief will use the PACAF Chemical CONOPs as a guideline for evaluation of unit contamination management procedures. The unit should use the PACAF Chemical CONOPs to determine agent rate of fall, rate of absorption, lethality and persistency based on actual ambient temperature and EET-provided "exercise winds." The 354 FW/EET

will use "active measures" to contaminate personnel or assets. Units should not assume personnel/assets are contaminated unless the M-8/M-9 is "marked" by the EET. EET members will not mark assets as contaminated unless specifically tasked by 354 FW/IGI, and will provide hard copy record of personnel/assets marked to the CE EET Team Chief. The CE EET Team Chief will verify that contaminated personnel are processed through a Contamination Containment Areas (CCA) as described in paragraph 3.6.2.5.4. and that contaminated assets are identified, tracked and treated as such for the duration of the exercise.

3.6.2.5.1. Contamination Management. Evaluate the unit effort to isolate directly contaminated areas and minimize cross contamination. Only those personnel required for mission essential tasks should be exposed to known contamination. For those people exposed that are mission essential, work/rest cycles hydration standards should be established and enforced. For those people accidentally exposed that are not mission essential, decontaminate as soon as practical.

3.6.2.5.2. Personal Decontamination/Contamination Avoidance. Personnel "marked" contaminated by EET should quickly respond by using their personal decontamination kit, then seek CCA processing as soon as practical. Once contamination is present, personnel should routinely use shuffle boxes on entering clean facilities and should decontaminate gloves whenever contaminated assets are used.

3.6.2.5.3. Asset Contamination. Assets contaminated by persistent chemicals should be identified and tracked. High use areas, such as door handles or access panels, should be spot decontaminated. Personnel using contaminated assets must wear appropriate protective gear.

3.6.2.5.4. CCA. Evaluate unit capability to set-up and manage a CCA. Evaluate personnel proficiency in processing through a CCA. Although overpressurized facilities may set up mini-CCAs to service their facilities prior to STARTEX, wing open air CCAs may not be physically set up prior to the exercise start. These CCA(s) will be established at strategic locations around Base X. 354 FW/IGI may direct additional personnel, not contaminated in the scenario, to process through the CCA as a task evaluation. All scenario-contaminated personnel must process through a CCA.

3.6.2.5.5. Contaminated Waste Management. Personnel should display general awareness that contaminated waste should be isolated and disposed of separately. The wing should have a plan to remove and dispose of all contaminated waste.

3.6.2.5.6. Rating. The rating for NBC Defense will be subjective.

3.6.2.6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). This section evaluates EOD's ability to recognize, safe and dispose of potentially hazardous unexploded ordnance. The rating for EOD will be subjective.

3.6.2.7. The rating for Recovery Operations will be subjective.

3.6.3. **Defensive Counter Information (DCI).** Evaluate the wing multi-discipline DCI effort to protect and defend Air Force information and information systems IAW AFD 10-20. DCI elements include information assurance, operations security (OPSEC), counter intelligence, counter deception, counter psychological operations and electronic protection. Evaluate unit identification of critical and sensitive information and information system dependencies (centers of gravity). Assess commander/planner's use of risk management to apply operational, procedural, physical and/or technical counter-

measures to reduce existing vulnerabilities. Evaluate effectiveness of unit DCI measures deployed to protect from potential enemy or malicious attack, assess response to attack and capability to use work-around procedures. Only the CS EET will execute scenarios involving INFOCON changes, unauthorized access or requests for passwords. 354 FW/IGI compiles this section of the report from inputs and recommendations of the various EET Team Chief and assigns overall rating.

3.6.3.1. Information Operations Conditions (INFOCON). Assess unit understanding of the INFOCON system and implementation of INFOCON measures directed by the Battle Staff or HHQ. The CS EET Team Chief evaluates this area.

3.6.3.2. Response to Information System Attack. Evaluate unit response actions to hacker activity, malicious software and denial of service attacks to include OSI investigation of the unauthorized intrusion. This area includes validating currency of anti-virus software/signature files installed on unit information systems. The CS and OSI EET Team Chiefs evaluate this area.

3.6.3.3. OPSEC/COMSEC. Evaluate unit OPSEC and COMSEC effort to identify and protect critical information from potential compromise, delay or loss. The flow of information up/down the chain and the use of secure systems will be assessed as the wing reacts to exercise events. Information flow also includes compliance with required HHQ voice and hard-copy reports. The CS EET Team Chief will coordinate and execute all exercise phone-monitoring activity.

3.6.3.4. Information Security. Evaluate effectiveness of the unit personnel security program to minimize the serious threat posed by disgruntled employees or hostile internal agents. Facility access control, password protection and workstation security discipline that limits unauthorized access to information/information systems are specific areas of evaluation. All personnel should be conscious of their working environment and report suspicious or unusual activities by others. The SFS and CS EET Team Chiefs evaluate this area.

3.6.3.5. Counter Psyop. Evaluate commander's use of Public Affairs and other military information dissemination methods to convey truthful, accurate information to mitigate the intended effects of adversary PSYOP or the unintended effect of rumors or inaccurate press reporting. The PA EET Team Chief evaluates this area.

3.6.3.6. Rating. The rating for DCI is subjective.

3.6.4. **Casualty Care.** Evaluate the unit's ability to provide emergency care to wounded personnel. Medical assets are organized into echelons of medical services as defined by AFI 41-106, *Medical Readiness Planning and Training*. 354 FW assets can supply only 2nd (Medical Personnel/Air Transportable Clinic (ATC)) and 1st (Unit Self Aid/Buddy Care(SABC))echelons of care. 3rd and 4th echelons of care are simulated in 354 FW CEREs. The Medical Group EET Team Chief writes this section of the report, consolidating the rating from both areas to determine overall Casualty Care rating.

3.6.4.1. Medical Care. Assess support capability of deployed/augmentee medical personnel.

3.6.4.1.1. Evaluate 2nd echelon medical care by Air Transportable Clinic personnel to include basic life support or trauma care, ABC management, and limited medication capability to stabilize the patient before being transporting to a 3rd echelon of care. Verify focus to return the greatest number of airmen to duty. It is anticipated that 40-50 percent of casualties treated at the 2E site can be returned to duty within 2-5 hours after treatment.

- 3.6.4.1.2. Evaluate ability to provide aerospace medical support to deployed flying personnel. The Air Transportable Clinic should be positioned near squadron operations facilities.
- 3.6.4.1.3. Assess capability to provide the commander's battle staff with effective medical staff support. Assess the employment and implementation of preventative medicine initiatives to maintain force readiness of all unit personnel. Evaluate medical recommendations for resource protection and rapid response to hazardous materials exposure or mass casualty events.
- 3.6.4.1.4. The rating for Medical Care is subjective
- 3.6.4.2. SABC. Evaluate individual ability to provide emergency care to wounded personnel.
 - 3.6.4.2.1. All deployed forces must be capable of providing first aid to injured personnel. Units will treat and care for personnel until delivered to the second level of medical care. Transportation will be responsibility of each unit.
 - 3.6.4.2.2. The rating for SABC is subjective.
- 3.6.4.3. Evaluate emergency response and medical care during MARE events scheduled during CEREs.

Chapter 4

MAJOR ACCIDENT RESPONSE EXERCISE (MARE)

4.1. GENERAL. The MARE evaluates the wing response to a major accident or man-made/natural disaster (to include severe weather). IAW Eielson OPLAN 32-1, the wing Disaster Response Force (DRF) must act promptly to save lives, alleviate human suffering, minimize damage, and maintain capability of the base to execute its primary mission. The MARE will be planned and executed in accordance with AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations*, PACAF Supp 1 to AFI 32-4001, and Eielson AFB OPLAN 32-1. Evaluation criteria are IAW AFI 90-201/Common Core Criteria (CCC), PACAFI 90-201, and this instruction.

4.1.1. **Duration.** MAREs are typically planned as a one-day exercise. However, off-base scenarios may require a two-day/overnight timeline.

4.1.2. **STARTEX.** STARTEX for evaluation purposes will be specifically tailored for the various scenarios, to include wing response/preparations to warning events or messages.

4.2. REPORT FORMAT/RATED AREAS. IAW [Attachment 3](#). Command and Control (C2) and Initial Response Element (IRE) are the core rated areas. The report must also include date, duration, type of incident, a brief description of the scenario, and objectives. Adequacy of Plans and Checklists will be assessed on every MARE and reported on as necessary. Base Populace Response will be noted for actual accident or natural disaster incidents.

4.3. COMMAND AND CONTROL. Evaluate Disaster Control Group (DCG) and On-Scene Commander (OSC) initial response and command and control of military resources and functional expertise. IGI compiles this section of the report and determines overall rating.

4.3.1. **DCG Recall Procedures.** Evaluate wing capability to quickly recall and assemble the DCG at the designated assembly area. Recall includes accountability to ensure that DCG primary or alternate members respond, and that DCG members report clothed and equipped IAW OPLAN 32-1.

4.3.2. **Disaster Control Group.** Evaluate DCG ability to coordinate and direct operations and support requirements with the command post, unit control centers (UCC), specialized teams, and civil and governmental authorities. Responding functional representatives should perform duties inherent to their specific mission. If support requests exceed the capability of the installation, requests should be sent to higher headquarters. Functional area EET Reps provide IGI with input and rating recommendations for their functional area.

4.3.2.1. **Bio-Environmental Engineering** (Health physicist or medical representative in the bio-environmental engineer's absence). Evaluate assessment and advice concerning the occupational, radiological, and environmental health hazards at or near the accident or disaster scene. Assess the following areas as applicable to the scenario.

4.3.2.1.1. Determines protective measures, equipment for personnel entering accident or disaster scene.

4.3.2.1.2. Advises OSC to evacuate people, including civilian areas if required.

4.3.2.1.3. With CE, determines need for monitoring personnel, CCS procedures, and contamination control requirements. In coordination with the OSC, the bio-environmental engineer

will direct processing of personnel out of the cordon through the CCS until it is determined there is no contamination.

4.3.2.1.4. Coordinates with the medical representative regarding monitoring and decontaminating medical casualties.

4.3.2.1.5. Coordinates with mortuary affairs, determine procedures for decontaminating remains.

4.3.2.2. Chaplain. Chapel Control Center will be established, either fixed or mobile to serve as the focal point for all chapel requirements.

4.3.2.2.1. Chaplains will work closely with the medical and morgue teams to provide patient visitation and last rites as required.

4.3.2.2.2. Perform Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) as required

4.3.2.3. Civil Engineer_(CE). Evaluate CE assessment of damage to government and private real property, and coordination to restore, repair, and provide other CE emergency support. Assess the following areas as applicable to the scenario.

4.3.2.3.1. Provide environmental protection advice for compliance with local, state, and national requirements.

4.3.2.3.2. Advises the OSC concerning major accident and natural disaster response and recovery policies and procedures. Maintains communication link between the command post and accident site. Provides periodic situation updates at the scene.

4.3.2.3.3. Maintains log of events for all on-scene actions and communications. Develops after action reports and lessons-learned, and forwards these reports to higher headquarters counterparts.

4.3.2.3.4. Performs hazard prediction using available software based on hazardous material type, source strength, amount involved, type spill, etc. Advises on evacuation and cordon size. Performs radiological surveys (radial or grid) under the direction of the Service Response Force.

4.3.2.3.5. Provide input for OPREP-3 reports through the installation command post.

4.3.2.3.6. Operates the mobile command post vehicle.

4.3.2.3.7. With the bio-environmental engineer, directs monitoring and contamination control actions. Establishes an initial contamination control station (CCS).

4.3.2.3.8. Monitors personnel posted around the cordon to ensure they are not in a contaminated area.

4.3.2.4. Communications. Advises the OSC on the capability and availability of resources such as cellular phones, land mobile radios, satellite communications, and secure radios/telephone/facsimile.

4.3.2.5. Maintenance Squadron. Supervises aircraft, missile, and support equipment evacuation.

4.3.2.6. Munitions. Provides technical guidance on weapon components and their recovery. In coordination with Explosive Ordnance Disposal, renders safe and recovers weapons and system explosive components.

4.3.2.7. Public Affairs. Ensures that public information concerning accidents and DOD personnel, equipment, property, or other resources is released as applicable. Safety. Monitors response activities for safety hazards. Coordinates safety mishap investigation board activities.

4.3.2.8. Services. Coordinates food service and billeting requirements for deployed disaster response elements. Conducts search and recovery for human remains, identification, disposition, and other mortuary services. Coordinates with bio-environmental engineer to determine the type of contaminant and procedures to decontaminate human remains.

4.3.2.9. Staff Judge Advocate. Provides legal advice on matters, to include claims, provisions for setting up an NDA, jurisdiction, and setting limits on using Air Force personnel off-site. Coordinates aircraft and missile accident investigation board activities.

4.3.2.10. Transportation. Advises OSC on the availability or limiting factors of transportation resources. Ensures the availability of transportation for all DCG members (when required) from the assembly point to the designated entry control point.

4.3.2.11. Weather. Advises the OSC on meteorological conditions that might affect operations. Performs toxic corridor calculations, as required.

4.3.3. **On-Scene Commander.** Evaluate OSC action to effectively direct actions to mitigate damage, save lives, restore primary mission assets, and assist civil authorities. Key elements of OSC duties include unambiguous establishment of on-scene control and establishing initial monitoring points. Other areas to evaluate include the following:

4.3.3.1. Controls all deployed military assets until recovery operations are complete or until relieved by a higher authority or responsible agency.

4.3.3.2. Coordinates military activities with civil authorities, as required.

4.3.3.3. Establishes communication with the nearest military installation.

4.3.3.4. Controls access to the accident site. Identifies authorized people to security forces.

4.3.3.5. With the advice of staff judge advocate, directs establishment of National Defense Areas (NDA). Relay this information to the command post and responding control group members.

4.3.3.6. Through public affairs, releases information about the emergency response operation.

4.3.3.7. Coordinates required support for higher headquarters response elements deployed to the scene.

4.3.3.8. Assess threat of terrorists or potential protesters to response resources at the accident scene.

4.3.3.9. Works with mishap and accident investigation boards.

4.3.4. **Command Post.** Evaluate role as focal point for base wide notification, reporting, and operations. The command post EET rep rates and writes this section of the report. Other responsibilities should include:

4.3.4.1. Maintaining notification rosters and notifying DRF members and elements not on the secondary crash net.

4.3.4.2. Activating the installation warning system.

4.3.4.3. Briefing the installation commander and staff on the status of operations as required.

4.3.4.4. Disseminating information to, and collecting information from UCCs and the mobile command post. Coordination with HHQ elements as directed by OSC.

4.3.4.5. Submit HHQ required reports to include OPREP, TEMPEST RAPID and SITREPs as required.

4.3.5. **Unit Control Centers.** Unit control centers may be activated at the direction of the DCG depending on the nature of the scenario. Typically, they are only required for the functional areas represented on the DCG. UCCs provide a focal point within their organization to monitor unit resources and mission capability, and to coordinate their activities during disaster operations. EET reps will evaluate their respective UCCs as required.

4.3.6. **OPSEC.** Evaluate unit OPSEC effort to identify and protect critical or sensitive information from unintended disclosure or potential compromise. The flow of information up/down the chain and the use of secure systems will be assessed as the wing reacts to exercise events. The CS EET Team Chief will coordinate and execute all exercise phone-monitoring activity.

4.4. INITIAL RESPONSE ELEMENT (IRE). The IRE responds directly to the scene to take containment and life saving actions. If explosive ordnance is involved, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) should report to the site entry control point (ECP). IGI compiles this section of the report and assigns overall rating.

4.4.1. **Fire Department.** The senior fire department representative takes command of on-scene operations and performs the duties listed in paragraph 4.3.3. until the OSC arrives. CEF EET rep evaluates fire department response to include the following.

4.4.1.1. Designation of entry control point (ECP) location and the initial disaster cordon size.

4.4.1.2. Briefing the OSC upon arrival at the accident scene.

4.4.1.3. Provides the supporting weather unit and/or hazard prediction capability operator with information concerning hazardous material type, source strength, amount, etc., to calculate a toxic corridor.

4.4.1.4. Orders emergency withdrawal, if necessary.

4.4.2. **Medical.** Assess advice to OSC on the status of medical treatment activities. MDG EET rep evaluates medical response to include the following.

4.4.2.1. Coordinate with local medical facilities and directs the treatment and/or decontamination of medical casualties at those facilities.

4.4.2.2. Provide medical support for responders and accident investigation teams. Advise OSC on blood-borne pathogen protection for emergency responders.

4.4.2.3. Act as liaison with base medical facility for on and off base medical needs.

4.4.3. **Security Forces.** Assess advice to the OSC on security measures and efforts to ensure that classified material is protected. SF EET rep evaluates security forces response to include the following.

4.4.3.1. Establish and maintain the disaster cordon, NDA, ECP, and on-scene control point (OSCP).

4.4.3.2. Establish entry control procedures, such as a badging system, to control access to the accident site, disaster scene, or No Lone Zone.

4.4.3.3. Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies.

4.4.3.4. Advise OSC on procedures for establishing a NDA.

4.4.4. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).** Assess advice to OSC on weapons recovery and supervision of initial "render-safe" procedures. EOD EET rep evaluates EOD response to include the following.

4.4.4.1. Provide support and technical guidance on explosive components and weapon and weapon component recovery, and coordinates with munitions for additional support.

4.4.4.2. On initial entry into the scene of a nuclear weapons accident, monitors for radiological hazards.

4.4.5. **Specialized Teams.** Specialized teams may be tasked as required by the scenario. The EET functional expert in the Specialized Team area of focus will rate and write this section of the final report.

Chapter 5

SIMULATIONS

5.1. DEFINITION. A simulation is a substitute action(s) of a process required during an inspection or exercise that cannot be performed due to safety, cost, needless inconvenience, or would be a violation of law. The demonstration of a simulation should be designed to replicate the real process as closely as possible and account for all resources necessary to perform the actual process.

5.2. CATEGORIES. There are three types of simulations applicable to exercises and inspections.

5.2.1. PACAF Standard Simulations. PACAF Standard Simulations are developed by HQ PACAF staff and are applicable to all PACAF units. They can be found on the HQ PACAF IG Web Page. They are in effect until specifically rescinded by HQ PACAF/IG.

5.2.2. 354 FW Standard Simulations. 354 FW Standard Simulations are approved by HQ PACAF/IG and applicable to only 354 FW units. These are also listed on the 354 FW/IG Web Page. They expire one year after approval and must be renewed annually as required.

5.2.3. Temporary Simulations. Temporary Simulations are approved in writing by the 354 FW/CC and are used for one-time unique conditions or short-notice situations during a specific wing exercise. They do not apply to HQ PACAF inspections. Temporary simulations automatically expire at ENDEX.

5.3. SIMULATION POLICY. Units should make every attempt to react during the inspection/exercise as it would during a real world situation. Simulations will be reserved for those actions which are too costly (resource expenditure, potential risk, etc.) to perform in an exercise situation. Only simulations approved IAW paragraph **5.2.** may be used. See **Attachment 4** for written simulation request format.

5.3.1. Simulation Requests. 354 FW Standard Simulation requests may be submitted at any time, however requests should be submitted 60 days prior to an inspection to allow coordination with the appropriate HQ PACAF staff and ensure approval in time for the inspection. HQ PACAF-approved simulations are assigned an expiration date and may include modifying instructions. 354 FW Standard Simulations should be re-submitted at least 60 days prior to expiration for renewal.

5.3.1.1. A separate request package must be submitted for each simulation. The package should include a Staff Summary Sheet and be coordinated through the Group Commander/WSA Chief and 354 FW/IG as a minimum, prior to the Wing Commander for approval. All simulations affecting mobility will be coordinated with 354 LSS/LGLX.

5.3.1.2. Once the 354 FW/CC approves a 354 FW Standard Simulation request package, 354 FW/IGI will forward it to HQ PACAF/IGI for final approval.

5.3.2. Disapproved Simulation Requests. If a unit desires to submit additional justification and re-submit a disapproved simulation request, it will follow the same procedures listed above.

5.3.3. Expiration. Approved Standard Simulations expire after one year. Units must review simulations annually to verify/validate that they are still needed, and re-submit for approval.

5.3.4. Mobility Simulations. For all MPNs approved for processing simulation, units must walk the individual mobility folders through the processing line. For any approved cargo simulation, a con-

tainer representing the simulated cargo will be processed with all required shipping documentation, markings, required pallets, nets and tie-down straps. Necessary security procedures will also be followed.

Chapter 6

EXERCISE EVALUATION TEAM (EET) PROCEDURES

6.1. PHILOSOPHY. The two goals of the 354 FW exercise program are evaluation and training. The primary focus of the EET is to provide the wing commander with an independent assessment of wing readiness. The wing EET must embrace the role of "honest broker" as they craft the exercise schedule of events (SOE) and evaluate unit ability to accomplish contingency tasking. Compliance with the standards outlined in the many directives governing functional areas and the objective standards contained in the previous chapters constitutes core guidelines for EET evaluation. The secondary focus of the EET is training. The exercise SOE should be crafted to provide training opportunity in core events for all players. EET members must carefully balance the need to allow players to "work through" a problem in-scenario, with the responsibility to correct errors on the spot. If "EET coaching" is required to accomplish an exercise event or task evaluation, the grade and the final report should reflect this fact. However, EET should not hesitate to offer their expert advice or techniques to improve performance as they debrief players after an exercise event.

6.2. UNIT COMMANDER ROLE. The 354 FW IG is solely responsible for final SOE content and the content of exercise reports and ratings. Commanders and Wing Staff Agency (WSA) Chiefs must support their appointed EET members in their role as "honest broker" and be aware of EET's competing loyalties as key members of their unit. Commander/WSA chief involvement is essential in the SOE building and after action validation processes. However, commanders/WSA chiefs must be careful to refrain from undue command influence on their EET that could mask deficiencies in unit training, processes or equipment.

6.3. TRUSTED AGENT. To provide "honest broker" assessment of unit capability, it is necessary for the 354 FW/IG to designate exercise planning and execution materials as Trusted Agent information. Only EET members appointed IAW paragraph 6.4., and actively supporting that particular exercise are privy to Trusted Agent information. Trusted agents will not divulge information to unauthorized personnel, to include commanders and WSA chiefs. IAW AFI 90-201, paragraph 2.11.1, commanders at all levels must ensure the integrity of the trusted agent system. Trusted agent information will not be sent via e-mail or re-produced without the express consent of 354 FW/IGI. Only 354 FW/IG/IGI are authorized to release trusted agent information outside EET channels.

6.4. EET APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES. 354 FW EET composition is IAW [Table 6.1.](#), and is considered the minimum necessary to provide a meaningful evaluation for readiness exercises. All EET members are not necessarily required for all exercises. Example, MAREs require only a core EET as designated by IGI. Group Commanders and WSA Chiefs will appoint their team chiefs. Commanders must ensure sufficient EET manning to cover a 24-hour exercise schedule. EET members will not be dual-tasked as players or held responsible for other, non-EET duties by their units during exercises.

6.4.1. EET Appointment Letter. Commanders/WSA chiefs will appoint, in writing, highly qualified personnel in grades E-5/O-3 and above to the EET. Individuals must be of high caliber and considered a subject matter expert, and should be chosen based on ability to evaluate with sound judgment while representing the wing commander. Select individuals with a minimum of one-year retainability. Commanders/WSA chiefs will ensure their EET members attend training IAW paragraph 6.5.

6.4.1.1. Appoint EET members by letter to 354 FW/IGI, IAW the sample in [Attachment 5](#).

Table 6.1. Suggested EET Composition. (*Denotes EETC)

354 FW	354 MDG	354 LG	354 SPTG	354 OG
*FM (2)	*MDOS (7)	*LGQ (10)	*CES (9)	*OGV (3)
*HC (2)	MDSS (1)	CONS (2)	CS (5)	OGQ (16)
*JA (2)		LGS (4)	MSS (4)	OGW (4)
*OC (2)		LGT (4)	SFS (5)	18 FS (2)
*OSI (2)			SVS (3)	355 FS (2)
*PA (2)				OSS (7) OSA (2)/OSS/ IN (2) OSKL (2)/ OSW (1)
*SE (2)				

6.5. EET TRAINING/CURRENCY. 354 FW/IGI will schedule training and maintain training documentation for all EET members.

6.5.1. **Initial Training.** All newly appointed EET are required to attend EET formal training prior to acting in the capacity as an evaluator. When practical, EET team chiefs should pair newly appointed EET with experienced members during exercises.

6.5.2. **Ground Burst Simulator (GBS) Training.** 354 FW IGI will ensure a sufficient number of EET members are current and qualified in GBS training to support exercise requirements. As a goal, 25% of all assigned EET members should be GBS current and qualified.

6.5.3. **EET Currency.** If the wing has not had a readiness exercise in the previous six months, 354 FW/IGI will conduct EET refresher training prior to STARTEX.

6.5.4. **On Scene Commander's Course.** 354 FW IGI will ensure a minimum of one IGI staff has attended the formal USAF On-Scene Commander's Course.

6.6. EET UNIFORM/IDENTIFICATION. In general, EET members will not wear IPE or MOPP gear during the course of an exercise. All EET members will wear a distinctive EET Badge prominently displayed to easily identify them to all players. Upon verifying EET members are on the EAL, players should allow EET members unrestricted access to their areas. EET will not surreptitiously enter facilities or restricted areas to evaluate security awareness. All security awareness or OPFOR response evaluations will use actors as perpetrators and be closely supervised by on-scene EET.

6.6.1. **EET Badge.** Only EET members serving in the capacity as evaluator in the exercise may wear an EET Badge. Observers will comply with guidelines IAW paragraph [1.18](#).

6.7. EXERCISE PLANNING. 354 FW/IGI is the OPR for 354 FW exercise planning.

6.7.1. **Tanker Support.** 354 FW/IGI will coordinate projected tanker support quarterly with OSCR.

6.7.2. **Airspace/Ranges.** 354 FW/IGI will coordinate airspace requirements with the Joint Scheduling Office (JSO), Range Support with 353 CTS, ATC coordination with FAA Anchorage Center, and other required outside agency support NLT 30 days prior to STARTEX.

6.7.3. **Objectives.** 354 FW IG will coordinate primary exercise objectives and specific WG/CC guidance NLT 3 weeks prior to STARTEX.

6.7.4. **SOE/ATO.** 354 FW/IGI draft an SOE and ATO that consolidates WG/CC guidance, primary exercise objectives, team chief inputs, open findings and MAJCOM SII's in a logical, coherent scenario to players, and ensures that EET members can be on-scene to evaluate all events. Schedule an SOE/ATO review meeting with the EET team chiefs NLT 3 working days prior to STARTEX. 354 FW/CV will approve the final SOE prior to STARTEX.

6.7.4.1. EET members will meet with their unit commanders prior to each exercise to review open findings and outline what type scenarios and events the unit requires. EET members will forward desired SOE inputs to their team chiefs.

6.7.4.2. EET team chiefs will solicit inputs from all members and provide a consolidated list of SOE inputs to 354 FW/IGI NLT 2 weeks prior to STARTEX.

6.7.5. **Special Instructions (SPINS).** 354 FW/IGI will maintain, update and publish current exercise SPINS for air operations prior to each exercise.

6.7.6. **GBS/Smoke Planning.** 354 FW/IGI will plan required GBS/Smoke Grenade required to support attack scenarios and coordinate storage area in the IGWC prior to STARTEX, IAW IG OI 90-201.

6.7.7. **EET Augmentees.** 354 FW/IGI determines the number of additional personnel required acting in the capacity of casualties or actors. Give the wing a "head's up" and include the requirement in the LOI's prior to STARTEX.

6.7.8. **Exercise Support.** Team Chiefs will prepare all required exercise inject cards and coordinate props, actors and moulage as required prior to STARTEX.

6.7.8.1. EET inject cards are required for task evaluations, aircraft missile expenditures/jettison (OGQ), facility (CES) or vehicle (LGT) damaged or destroyed, casualties (MSS), communications outages (CS), SABC scenarios (MDG) that will not use props, actors or moulage. Use 354 FW/IGI provided standard Inject Cards.

6.7.8.2. The MDG team chief will provide support for all moulage events.

6.8. EXERCISE DUTY LOCATION. During an exercise and until the report is drafted, EET members are chopped to the 354 FW/IG. After ENDEX, team chiefs may release their team members when no longer needed to validate/draft the final report. EET duty location during an exercise is the IG Work Center (IGWC) located in Building 3111 behind Amber Hall.

6.8.1. **EET Mobility Processing Exemption.** EET members filling Mobility Position Numbers (MPN) are exempt from mobility processing during local exercises. Units may simulate processing EET members who fill an MPN or are required to backfill a shortfall MPN by sending their mobility folders through the processing line. Each folder must include a copy of the individual's EET appointment letter. Commanders should consider using non-MPN personnel for EET duties, if at all possible.

6.9. SUBJECTIVE GRADING GUIDELINES. Many of the graded areas in an exercise are subjective, or do not have a specific "approved" procedure. The rating must be based on mission accomplishment and EET's "expert judgment." Many situations are straight forward, such as a problem that causes a missed sortie. There will also be Gray Area situations, like a mechanical problem that might not cause a sortie to be aborted but may effect future availability of the aircraft or combat survivability if not fixed. When in the Gray Area, apply the "So What?" test. The "So What?" test is to ask "Does a situation add to/detract from the unit's ability to do its job, now or in the future?" Hopefully this will prompt the thought process that will yield the correct answer, but never hesitate to consult with the Inspections Team Chief for further guidance.

6.10. EET TEAM CHIEF RESPONSIBILITIES.

6.10.1. **Planning.** Conduct exercise planning IAW paragraph 6.7.

6.10.2. **Management.** During exercises, the EET will be manned as two shifts for 24-hour operations. EET team chiefs exercise general supervisor responsibility for their team members and will schedule their people to ensure adequate functional area expertise is available to cover all SOE events. Team chiefs will designate a deputy chief who will supervise the off shift.

6.10.3. **Validation.** Ensure EET inputs are continuously validated and promptly provided to the IGWC IM support staff for entry into the master database. Team chiefs will review all report inputs for their functional area to include all observations, AFIs, findings or Outstanding Performers. Team chiefs may request a database dump for their functional area as required throughout the exercise and to assist in report drafting after ENDEX. Do not save inputs until ENDEX, as it prevents trend analysis during the exercise and overburdens the IM staff at ENDEX. Use the standard Input Form provided by 354 FW/IGI.

6.10.4. **SOE Changes.** Request approval from the Inspection Team Chief for all "in-house" events, and for additional SOE events required for a "re-look." Keep "in-house" events to a minimum.

6.10.5. **EET Meetings.** Team chief and deputy must attend all EET meetings.

6.10.6. **Report Writing.** EET team chiefs are responsible for their section of the final report IAW [Chapter 2](#) and [Chapter 3](#). Draft report sections and submit to the IG Superintendent on the disk provided. EET team chiefs will not be released from exercise duties by 354 FW/IGI until the hotwash is complete and their report is received.

6.11. EXERCISE PROPS/ACTORS. EET will closely monitor and control all events using props and actors. Inert UXOs will be clearly marked as such and "For Training Only." Suspicious packages will be clearly marked with "For Exercise Only - 354 FW IG." All props will be promptly removed from the play area by the EET when the event is terminated.

6.12. EET REQUIREMENTS DURING WING RECALL. EET members must first report to their unit to ensure proper accountability, then proceed to the IGWC for exercise tasking.

6.13. EXERCISE HOTWASH. In general, IGI will not provide a formal out-brief of wing exercise performance. A commander's hotwash will be conducted in the IGWC within two working days of ENDEX to highlight significant events and problem areas. EET team chiefs are required to attend.

OFFICIAL

BOB D. DULANEY, Brig Gen, USAF
Commander

Attachment 1

IRRE REPORT FORMAT/RATED AREAS

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL (IGI)

A1.1. Battle Staff (IGI)

A1.1.1. CADRE

A1.1.2. Command Post (OC)

A1.2. Mission Director/Staff (IGI)

A1.3. Command Staff Support (IGI)

A1.3.1. Chaplain (HC)

A1.3.2. Comptroller (FM)

A1.3.3. Public Affairs (PA)

A1.3.4. Staff Judge Advocate (JA)

A1.4. Alert Recall Procedures (MSS)

B. EMPLOYMENT READINESS (OGV)

B.1. Generation (OGQ)

B.2. Deployment (OGV)

B.3. Regeneration (OGQ)

B.4. Operations Support (OGV)

B.4.1. Mission Planning Cell (OGV)

B.4.2. Intelligence (IN)

B.4.3. Life Support (OSKL)

B.4.4. Weather (OSW)

B.4.5. Airfield Operations (OSA)

B.5. Military Deception (IGI)

C. MISSION SUPPORT READINESS (IGI)

C.1. Mobility (LG)

C.1.1. Cargo Processing (LG)

C.1.2. Personnel Processing (MSS)

C.2. Reception/Beddown (LG)

D. ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND OPERATE (IGI)

D.1. Force Protection (SFS)**D.2. Defensive Counter Information Operations (IGI)**

D.2.1. Information Operations Conditions (CS)

D.2.2. Response to Information System Attack (CS/OSI)

D.2.3. OPSEC/COMSEC (CS)

D.2.4. Information Security (SFS/CS)

D.2.5. Counter Psyop (PA)

D.3. Airbase Response (SPTG)

D.3.1. Civil Engineering Support (CES)

D.3.2. Communications Support (CS)

D.4. Medical Response (MDG)

Attachment 2

CERE REPORT FORMAT/RATED AREAS

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL (IGI)

A2.1. Battle Staff (IGI)

A2.1.1. Command Post (OC)

A2.2. Mission Director/Staff (IGI)

A2.3. Survival and Recovery Center (CE)

A2.3.1. Unit Control Centers (CE)

A2.4. Command Staff Support (IGI)

A2.4.1. Chaplain (HC)

A2.4.2. Comptroller (FM)

A2.4.3. Public Affairs (PA)

A2.4.4. Staff Judge Advocate (JA)

B. OPERATIONS (OGV)

B.1. Sortie Generation (OGQ)

Table A2.1. Sortie Production

	Day 1			Day 2			Day 3		
	Total	F-16	A-10	Total	F-16	A-10	Total	F-16	A-10
Fragged	80	40	40	80	40	40	80	40	40
WX (non-counter)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MX CNX	7	5	2	4	3	1	4	2	2
OPS CNX/SYM	-	-	-	2	1	1	8	6	2
HHQ CNX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Phantom Go	-	-	-	10	8	2	-	-	-
Phantom reject	-	-	-	2	0	2	-	-	-
Flown	73	35	38	72	36	36	68	32	36
% Flown vs Frag	91%	88%	95%	90%	90%	90%	85%	80%	90%

B.1.1. System Reliability (OGQ)

B.2. Employment (OGV)

Table A2.2. Sortie Effectiveness

	Day 1			Day 2			Day 3		
	Total	F-16	A-10	Total	F-16	A-10	Total	F-16	A-10
Sorties Fraggged	80	40	40	80	40	40	80	40	40
Flown	71	33	38	72	36	36	68	32	36
WX Abort (non counter)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No/Bad Tape	6	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	2
Poor WD	2	0	2	4	4	0	8	8	0
Tgt ID/Miss	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
Other	4	2*	2**	3	3**	0	3	2**	1**
Effective	59	28	31	61	27	34	52	19	33
% Effective vs. Flown	83%	85%	81%	85%	75%	94%	76%	59%	91%
% Effective vs. Frag	74%	70%	77%	76%	68%	90%	65%	48%	90%

B.2.1. Interdiction/Alert Interdiction/Offensive Counter Air/Counter Fire (INT/XINT/OCA/XATK)

B.2.2. Close Air Support (CAS)

B.2.3. Air Strike Control (ASC)

B.2.4. Battalion Air Liaison Officer/Tactical Air Control Party (BALO/TACP)

B.2.5. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

B.3. Operations Support (OGV)

B.3.1. Mission Planning Cell (OGV)

B.3.2. Intelligence (IN)

B.3.3. Life Support (OSKL)

B.3.4. Weather (OSW)

C. MISSION SUPPORT (IGI)

C.1. Logistics (LG)

C.1.1. Supply

C.1.2. Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

C.1.3. Transportation

C.1.4. Maintenance

C.1.5. Munitions

C.1.6. Contracting

C.2. Airbase Support (IGI)

C.2.1. Communications and Information (CS)

C.2.2. Services (SVS)

C.2.3. Civil Engineers (CE)

C.2.4. Combat Support Services (MSS)

C.3. Reception and Beddown (LG)

D. ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND OPERATE (ATSO)

D.1. Base Defense (SFS)

D.1.1. Active Defense (SFS)

D.1.2. Force Protection (SFS)

D.1.3. Asset Dispersal and Protection (CE)

D.1.4. Personnel Response and Protection (CE)

D.2. Recovery Operations (CE)

D.2.1. Damage Assessment

D.2.2. Rapid Runway Repair

D.2.3. Expedient Construction

D.2.4. Crash, Fire, Rescue Response

D.2.5. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense

D.2.6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations

D.3. Defensive Counter Information Operations (IGI)

D.3.1. Information Operations Conditions (CS)

D.3.2. Response to Information System Attack (CS/OSI)

D.3.3. OPSEC/COMSEC (CS)

D.3.4. Information Security (SFS/CS)

D.3.5. Counter Psyop (PA)

D.4. Casualty Care (MDG)

D.4.1. Medical Care

D.4.2. Self-Aid/Buddy Care

Attachment 3

MARE REPORT FORMAT/RATED AREAS

Scenario Overview: Date, duration, type of incident, brief description of the scenario, and objectives.

A3.1. COMMAND AND CONTROL (IGI). Assess overall adequacy of plans and checklists. Note base populace response only for actual accident or natural disaster incidents.

A3.1.1. DCG Recall Procedures (IGI)

A3.2. Disaster Control Group (IGI)

A3.2.1. Airfield/Base Ops (OSA)

A3.2.2. Bioenvironmental Engineering (MDG)

A3.2.3. Chaplain (HC)

A3.2.4. Civil Engineer (CE)

A3.2.5. Communications (CS)

A3.2.6. Maintenance Squadron (MXS)

A3.2.7. Munitions (MXS)

A3.2.8. Personnel (MSS)

A3.2.9. Public Affairs (PA)

A3.2.10. Safety (SE)

A3.2.11. Services (SVS)

A3.2.12. Staff Judge Advocate (JAG)

A3.2.13. Transportation (TRANS)

A3.2.14. Weather (OSW)

A3.3. On-Scene Commander (IGI)

A3.4. Command Post (OC)

A3.5. Unit Control Centers (IGI)

A3.6. OPSEC (CS)

B. INITIAL RESPONSE ELEMENT (IGI)

B.1. Fire Department (CEF)

B.2. Medical (MDG)

B.3. Security Forces (SFS)

B.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

B.5. Specialized Teams (As Required)

Attachment 4

SIMULATION REQUEST FORMAT

(DATE)

MEMORANDUM FOR 354 FW/IG

354 FW/CC

HQ PACAF IGI

IN TURN

FROM: (Group Commander Office Symbol)

(Full Address)

SUBJECT: Exercise Simulation Request – (Short Title of Simulation Issue)

1. OPR: 354 FW/IG, DSN 377-1321/2

2. REQUESTOR: (Office symbol/name/phone of originator)

3. REASON: (Brief explanation of why the simulation is required)

4. SPECIFIC COST/IMPACT IF NOT APPROVED: (Brief, but specific; describe impact on squadron resources and/or safety if disapproved. Avoid using "wasted man-hours" as a reason)

5. DEMONSTRATE: (Describe how simulation will be accomplished)

(Group Commander Signature Block)

1st Ind, 354 FW/IG

MEMORANDUM FOR 354 FW/CC

Concur/Non-Concur

(354 FW/IG Signature Block)

2nd Ind, 354 FW/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ PACAF/IG

Approve/Disapprove

(354 FW/CC Signature Block)

Attachment 5**EET APPOINTMENT LETTER FORMAT**

(DATE)

MEMORANDUM FOR 354 FW/IGI

FROM: (Unit CC/WSA Chief Office Symbol)

SUBJECT: Appointment of Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) Chief/Members

1. The following personnel are appointed to the EET for this unit:

NAME	Rank	DEROS	Office	Phone	SSAN (Last 6)	Clearance	Line Badge	Team Chief
Miffwick, Ida	LtCol	Feb 02	354 FW/ IGI	7-1322	12-3456	TS	1234567	Prim
Ragman, Joe S.	MSgt	Mar 02	354 FW/ IGIR	7-1322	78-8123	S	7891230	No
Minion, Justin	SSgt	Apr 02	354 FW/ IGIC	7-1322	45-6789	S	4567891	Alt

2. This letter supersedes previous letter, dated _____, same subject.

(Signature Block)

Attachment 6

EET INPUT FORMAT FOR EXERCISE REPORTS

ARCTIC GOLD _____ IRRE/CERE
REPORT AREA <i>(See Reverse)</i> _____
EVALUATOR NAME/DATE _____ / _____
TYPE: Strength <input type="checkbox"/> Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Area For Improvement <input type="checkbox"/> Outstanding Performer <input type="checkbox"/>
DESCRIPTIVE
TEAM CHIEF VALIDATION <i>(Initials)</i> _____

Attachment 7

EET MISSION ASSESSMENT FORMAT

A. Squadron _____

B. Sortie Effectiveness Summary.

	INT/ATK (X)	CAS/ASC	CSAR	TOTAL
Fragged				
Flown				
%Flown/Fragged				
Effective				
%Eff/Flown				

C. Weapons Employment Effectiveness Summary.

Weapon	Event	Attempts	Hits	Hit%	Remarks
Total					

